




THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

FREDERIC THOMAS BLANCHARD
ENDOWMENT FUND



BISHOP WARBURTON'S
W O R K S.

VOLUME THE FOURTH:

CONTAINING

A L L I A N C E.

J U L I A N.

D O C T R I N E O F G R A C E.

THE
WORKS
OF THE
RIGHT REVEREND
WILLIAM WARBURTON,
LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.
IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE FOURTH.

L O N D O N,
PRINTED BY JOHN NICHOLS:
AND SOLD BY T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.
MDCCLXXXVIII.

C O N T E N T S
O F
T H E F O U R T H V O L U M E :

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE :
O R,
THE NECESSITY AND EQUITY OF AN ESTABLISHED
RELIGION, AND A TEST-LAW, DEMONSTRATED.

IN THREE BOOKS, p. 1—331.

PREFACE to the First Edition in 1736, p. 3—6.

DEDICATION to the Earl of CHESTERFIELD, in 1748, p. 7—10.

ADVERTISEMENT to the Edition of 1766, p. 11, 12.

LETTER from M. De Silhouette, to the Cardinal Fleury,
p. 13—18.

B O O K I.

O F the Nature and End of Civil and Religious Society, p. 19—71.

Chap. I. The Occasion and Nature of this Discourse, p. 19.

Chap. II. Of the State of Nature ; and the Establishment of Society, p. 22.

Chap. III. Of the natural Defects of Civil Society ; and the Necessity of applying Religion to remedy these Defects, p. 25.

Chap. IV. Of the Nature and End of Civil Society ; and the Causes of the common Mistakes concerning it, discovered and explained, p. 36.

Chap. V. Of the Nature and End of Religion, p. 48.

NOTES on the FIRST BOOK, p. 65—71.

B O O K II.

OF an Established Church, p. 73—199.

Chap. I. *Of the Nature of that Union between Church and State, which produces a Religion established by Law, p. 73.*

Chap. II. *Of the Motives the State had to seek, and the Church to accept an Alliance, p. 76.*

Chap. III. *Of the reciprocal Terms and Conditions of this Alliance, p. 90.*

Chap. IV. *That the Christian Religion is, of all others, best fitted for such an Alliance with the State as may be most productive of their mutual advantages; and that one is the most perfect of all Christian Establishments, p. 140.*

Chap. V. *In which an Objection to the fundamental Principles of this Alliance is removed, p. 176.*

NOTES on the SECOND BOOK, p. 188—199.

B. O. O K III.

OF a Test-Law, p. 201—247.

Chap. I. *Of the Origin and test of a Test-Law, p. 201.*

Chap. II. *Of the Necessity and Equity of a Test-Law, p. 206.*

Chap. III. *In which the Objections to the Equity and Expediency of a Test-Law are considered, p. 210.*

Chap. IV. *Of the mistaken Principles on which Writers on this Subject have hitherto proceeded; the Mischiefs and Absurdities that followed them; and the Remedies which the Principles here laid down are able to supply, p. 235.*

Chap. V. *The Conclusion, in which the remaining Objection of both Parties are considered, p. 241.*

NOTES on the THIRD BOOK, p. 246—247.

APPENDIX to the FIRST EDITION, in 1736, p. 249—263.

POSTSCRIPT to the FOURTH EDITION, in 1746, p. 265—323.

INDEX to the ALLIANCE, p. 325—331.

JULIAN;

CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

J U L I A N;

O R,

**A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE EARTHQUAKE
AND FIREY ERUPTION, WHICH DEFEATED THAT
EMPEROR'S ATTEMPT TO REBUILD
THE TEMPLE AT JERUSALEM,**

**IN WHICH THE REALITY OF A DIVINE INTERPOSITION
IS SHEWN; THE OBJECTIONS TO IT ARE CENSURED; AND
THE NATURE OF THAT EVIDENCE WHICH DEMANDS THE
ASSENT OF EVERY REASONABLE MAN TO A MIRA-
CULOUS FACT IS CONSIDERED AND EXPLAINED.**

P. 333—531-

INTRODUCTION, p. 335—360-

BOOK I. p. 361—413.

BOOK II. p. 414—531-

THE

THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE;

OR,

THE OFFICE AND OPERATIONS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT,
VINDICATED FROM THE INSULTS OF INFIDELITY,
AND THE ABUSES OF FANATICISM.

WITH SOME THOUGHTS (HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE ESTABLISHED CLERGY)
REGARDING THE RIGHT METHOD OF DEFENDING RELIGION
AGAINST THE ATTACKS OF EITHER PARTY, p. 535—723.

ADVERTISEMENTS to the First Edition, p. 535.

PREFACE, p. 537—543.

BOOK I. p. 545—591.

BOOK II. p. 592—681.

BOOK III. p. 682—723.

T H E
A L L I A N C E
B E T W E E N
C H U R C H A N D S T A T E:
O R,
T H E N E C E S S I T Y A N D E Q U I T Y
O F
A N E S T A B L I S H E D R E L I G I O N
A N D
A T E S T L A W
D E M O N S T R A T E D.
I N T H R E E B O O K S.

True *Faith*, true *Policy* UNITED ran;
That was but love of God, and this, of Man. POPE.

P R E F A C E

T O T H E

F I R S T E D I T I O N

IN MDCCXXXVI.

IF the *Form* or *Matter* of the ensuing Discourse may be thought to stand in need of further Apology than that general one of the Author's weaknesses and imperfections, which is always decent, and almost always necessary, to make to the Reader, I desire this following Advertisement may pass with him for such. As to the Form, the subject being of the greatest weight and gravity in itself, and here treated abstractedly, I have aimed at nothing, in the style, but exactness in the expression, and clearness in the construction: Content to have it without further ornament than what Truth bestows upon it; and it being capable of affording Science; I have not only preserved strictness of method, but have not been over studious to decline even the Formality of it. Now these are Circumstances which, though they assist the gentle *Reader* in the Intelligence of the Discourse, yet render his employment less agreeable and amusing. But this is not the worst. For, relying on the strength of my demonstration, I have laboured to contract the Discourse within such a compass as that the whole may be commodiously read at once. But in treating of a great variety of particulars, I was necessitated to be very brief in many points of im-

portance : which had been inexcusable had not my subject confined me to qualified Readers, and my choice led me to such as a great Ancient requested for judges of his Writings, *Tales meorum scriptorum velim iudices qui responſionem non ſemper deſiderent, quum, his quæ leguntur, audierint aliquid contradici.*

As to the *Matter* ; Writing in an age that, of all others, ſeems moſt to be attentive to diſengage itſelf from prejudices, enlarge its views, and follow truth and nature whitherſoever they lead ; to ſo juſt, ſo generous, and prevalent a ſpirit, I ſhall have the leſs occaſion to apologize for the latitude of my theory. But this is the peculiar happineſs of our own times. It was not always ſo. When Dr. Taylor, about a century ago, compoſed his liberty of prophesying in defence of Religious Toleration (the firſt book on that ſubject wrote on reaſonable principles), though he had ſo ſtrongly vindicated the Right, and that in favour of the *Eſtabliſhed Church* under oppreſſion and perſecution ; which had been overthrown for the want of a *Teſt-Law* to ſecure her ; yet ſuch was the ſtrange perverſity of *ſome men*, at that time, that the great Author was accuſed and calumniated for having vindicated their right of ſerving God according to their Conſciences ; becauſe he did it on Principles which made that Right extenſive to all the reſt of mankind. They would accept of Toleration on no other terms but becauſe they were the *true Church*. I find my engagement to be much the ſame with this excellent Writer's. When attempts had been, and are ſtill making, to violate the immunities of the *Eſtabliſhed Religion*, which have proved ſo far ſucceſſful as to induce a very prevailing opinion that *it*, with its attendant, a *Teſt-Law*, was a violation of the law of nature and nations, I preſumed, very unworthy as I am, to ſtand up in its defence. And to do this to more advantage, I have all along reaſoned, on the principles of our adverſaries themſelves, to prove that an *Eſtabliſhed Church* and a *Teſt* are agreeable to thoſe Laws, whether ſuch Church be the true one or no. So far, I ſay, we are alike. But as greatly as that Author has the
advantage

advantage of me in the noble elegance, learning, and force of his composition, which, I truly think, is as great as can well be; so greatly have I the advantage of him in the felicity of the times I write in. That narrow, sour, ignorant spirit of bigotry, blessed be God, is now no more. A learned one, of liberty, and Christian charity, universally prevails. So that that freedom of thought, which then gave so much offence, now creates a prepossession altogether favourable to the Writer. But if, after all, I should chance to be mistaken in the humour of the times, as it would be no great wonder if I should, the words of this illustrious Writer, with a little alteration, will be my best apology.—“When a persecution (says he, in
 “his general Epistle to his Polemical discourses) did arise against the
 “Church of *England*, and that I intended to make a defensative
 “for my Brethren and myself, by pleading for a liberty to our
 “consciences to persevere in that profession which was warranted
 “by all the laws of God and our Superiors, some men were angry
 “and would not be safe that way, because I had made the roof of
 “the sanctuary so wide that more might be sheltered under it than
 “they had a mind should be saved harmless: men would be safe
 “alone or not at all, supposing that their truth and good cause was
 “warranty enough to preserve itself. And they thought true, it
 “was indeed warranty enough against persecution, if men have be-
 “lieved it to be the truth. But because we were fallen under the
 “power of our worst enemies, they looked upon us as men in mis-
 “persuasion and error; and therefore I was to defend our persons
 “that whether our cause was right or wrong (for it would be
 “supposed wrong) yet we might be permitted in liberty and im-
 “punity. But then the consequent would be this, that if we,
 “when we were supposed to be in error, were yet to be in-
 “demnified, then others also, whom we thought as ill of, were
 “to rejoice in the same Freedom, because this equality is the
 “great instrument of justice. Of this, some men were im-
 “patient; and they would have all the world spare them, and
 “yet

6 PREFACE TO THE EDITION OF 1736.

“yet they would spare nobody. But because this is too unreasonable I need no excuse for my writing to other purposes.—I CANNOT REPENT ME OF SPEAKING TRUTH, OR DOING CHARITY.”

DEDICATION TO THE EDITION OF 1748.

TO THE
 RIGHT HONOURABLE
 P H I L I P
 EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

MY LORD,

THE only subjects worth a wise Man's serious notice, are RELIGION and GOVERNMENT ; such Religion and Government, I mean, as exclude not (which too often they do) MORALITY and POLITICKS ; and these are subjects that, at the same time, most need his attention. For though they be ordained to one end, to perfect HUMANITY ; yet, as they pursue it by different means, they must act in conjunction, lest the diversity of the means should retard or defeat the attainment of the concurrent end.

BUT then, the object of Religion being Truth, which requires liberty ; and the object of Government, Peace, which demands submission ; they seem naturally formed to counteract one another's operations.

HOWEVER, though their Natures, and consequently their Agency, be thus different, yet their Views being the same, there seems to be

be no more reason against their **POLITIC ALLIANCE** than we see there was against the *physical union* of the Soul and Body, for whose distinct benefit each of those Institutions was severally ordained. For though these two constituent parts of Man run counter, and frequently defeat each other's purpose; yet Reason can easily reconcile their jars, and teach them how to draw together; so as best to put in use and improve each other's Faculties: the Body supplying the Mind with organs of sensation; and the Mind, the Body with the active principle of spontaneous motion.

The chief design of the following Discourse is to shew, that the like important uses may be derived from an **UNION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE**: and to explain upon what Principles these services are best procured. In doing this, I have still kept our own happy Constitution in my eye: and so, have escaped the danger which speculative Writers, intent only on their philosophic ideas, have incurred in framing their Utopian Societies.

And now, my Lord, being willing to leave behind me a Monument of my love to my Country, I have taken the privilege, arising from the principles here laid down, to appeal, from the Ecclesiastical, to a Lay-Tribunal, under the protection of a Character which is going down to posterity in the full lustre of those amiable qualities of humanity which Nature delights to throw round the Names of her distinguished Favourites.

It is an uncommon happiness when an honest man can congratulate a Patriot on his becoming Minister*: and what one would not, in conscience, overlook. When Ministers turn Patriots into Courtiers, it is a loss, to the Public, of a *good name*, at least: But when Patriots teach Courts public spirit, the loss of a *word* is well repaid by the good that word was supposed to imply. And now if such a one should be asked where is his Patriotism? he

* Secretary of State in the year 1748.

might well answer in the Spanish proverb,—*The KING has enough for us all.* What Subjects have thrown off is not lost, but lodged in safer hands, the Crown ; the old, the natural, the legal Guardian of British Liberty.

But Your Lordship has now a nicer part to manage. The PEOPLE are much more reasonable in their demands on their PATRIOTS than on their MINISTERS. Of their Patriots they readily accept the Will for the Deed ; but of their Ministers, they unjustly interpret the Deed for the Will. Our great English Poet, who honoured Your virtues, as much as he loved Your person, was more candid. He understood the delicate situation of a Minister ; and in this fine apology, as I have it under his hand, does justice to their good intentions :

Our Ministers like Gladiators live ;
 'Tis half their business blows to ward or give :
 The good their VIRTUE would effect, or SENSE,
 Dies between Exigents and Self-defence.

Besides, my Lord, the dead weight of long desuetude upon good intentions seems not to have been enough considered. Of all the strange connexions which the revolutions of Time bring about, the rarest and most accidental is that between MERIT and REWARD. So that when things have taken their plying, a Minister may be well allowed to answer with him, in the comic Poet, to one who complained he had *been cruelly scratched by Fortune, That it was now too late to think of paring her nails.*

Nor are the mistakes of Expectants far short of the difficulties of *Men in power.*

Scholars (to speak the Court sense of them) who know but little of practicable Life, are apt to fancy that superior distinction in Letters, or superior services in their Profession, may entitle them to the honours of it. But things are not so carried. High Stations, even of the more spiritual kind, require a *knowledge of Affairs.* The

purſuit of Letters keeps men from the ſight of *Buſineſs*: And learned impreſſions make them unapt and aukward in the diſcharge of it. The Mind muſt be unburthened before it will be able to move there, either with eaſe or grace. Nothing is more unqueſtioned, nor, conſequently, *truer* than theſe Court-Maxims. And the moſt that can be ſaid for ſo helpleſs a Tribe is, *That Letters never made a Blockhead*. But I go no farther. For indeed it muſt be owned, That as they find him, ſo they always leave him.

But perhaps, my Lord, I am all this while giving an example of that very ignorance I would endeavour to excuſe. For, if what we daily hear be true, I am pleading for the Decorations of Society, at a time, that the Foundations of it are thought to be inſecure. Which certainly would be as bad oeconomy as his, who buſied himſelf in white-waſhing his manſion-houſe, when the walls wanted both ſupport and repair.

It is true, I had a view to *Uſe* as well as Ornament; for I hinted at *Religion* as well as Letters. But it is not of that wood (I mean the wood of the Croſs) of which the public ſupports are now made. So that a great Miniſter will find many things to do, before he comes to embellish and adorn. And if the temper of the times will but ſuffer Your Lordſhip to be inſtrumental in ſaving Your Country by a reformation of the general manners, men of ſenſe would be unjuſt to complain, though they might lament, that the work of poliſhing our genius was denied to you, and reſerved for ſome happier Succeſſor.

I am, my LORD,

Your LORDSHIP'S moſt obliged and faithful ſervant,

W. WARBURTON.

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

EDITION OF 1766.

A VERY able and judicious *French* Writer * not long since translated the following Treatise (amongst the other Works of this Author) into his native Language. His purpose in it was to open a way for appeasing the commotions of *Jansenism*, at that time in a high ferment. He addressed it, in a private Letter †, to the late Cardinal FLEURY, to whom he was well known. And to give the conclusions, I have deduced, the more credit with his countrymen, he supported them all along with quotations (which are here inserted) from the two famous Works of DE MARCA and BOSSUET ; the one the wisest, and the other the most sensible Divine that Nation ever produced : And although their Religion kept them strangers to the principles here laid down, as appears from their supposing, all along, that both Church and State continue sovereign and independent, even after *aid* and *protection* have been mutually given and repaid : yet the love of their Country led them to the conclusions arising from them ; which they readily embraced from observing their use to Mankind, without understanding the grounds on which they stood.

* M. de Silhouette.

† A copy of which follows this Advertisement.

The Translator's success was such as might be expected from every attempt to ease or soften **POPERY**, though directed to its firmer Establishment. For, the politic directors of that Superstition having long since filled up their measure of unrighteousness, Providence will not suffer them to be *wise even in their own Generation*. The Minister was jealous of principles, and plans of policy, which came from the schools of Liberty and Reason: Neither could he relish or understand them, though dressed up and recommended by some of the ablest Doctors of his own Church. It is a trite observation, that Divines make bad Politicians; I believe it is more generally true, that Politicians are but 'bad Divines; and especially, secularized Politicians, such as our Cardinal. Yet had this great Man been in the Direction, under a Government like ours, are we to think he would then have slighted a Work which only professes to shew on what solid grounds the fundamental Constitutions of it are erected? By no means. Though his maxims of Policy might not suffer him to countenance Innovations, how just and beneficial soever; yet the dictates of Common sense would have led him, to encourage all attempts of supporting the established System of things, on reasonable principles.

Copie d'une Lettre écrite à M^{sr}. le Cardinal de FLEURY, en lui envoyant les *Differtations sur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, & de la Politique* ; tirées d'un Ouvrage de Mr. Warburton.

PERMETTEZ moi, M^{sr}. de presenter à votre Eminence des Differtations sur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, & de la Politique, tirées de l'Ouvrage d'un savant Anglois. Je presume d'en parler avec d'autant plus de liberté que je n'a gueres fait que traduire & qu'extraire. Ce n'est pas sans de puissans motifs que j'ai entrepris cet ouvrage, & que je prens la liberté de vous le presenter. Frapé des progrès de l'irreligion, & de la decadence des mœurs, qui en est toujours une suite infaillible, instruit par l'histoire de toutes les nations, & EN PARTICULIER PAR MON SEJOUR EN ANGLETERRE, DES MAUX FUNESTES QUE PRODUIT, DANS TOUTES LES BRANCHES DU GOUVERNEMENT, LE RELACHEMENT DES PARTICULIERS DANS LA PRATIQUE DE LA VERTU & DES DEVOIRS RELIGIEUX ; trop persuadé que l'*Angleterre* n'est pas le seul pays où l'irreligion ait repandu son poison contagieux, j'ai cru que l'ouvrage le plus utile au quel un bon citoyen put s'appliquer, étoit de tacher d'arrêter le cours d'un libertinage si pernicieux, d'exposer les chimeres ainsi que l'ignorance des esprits forts, & de demontrer alternativement l'utilité de la Religion par sa verité, & sa verité par son utilité. Pour mettre cette grande verité dans tout son jour, j'ai aprofondi autant qu'il m'étoit possible la conduite de tous les Legislateurs & les sentimens de tous les Philosophes ; discussions qui ouvrent d'elles-mêmes un beau champ à la literature.

MAIS,

MAIS, M^{rs}. j'ose dire que ce n'est point assez que de s'oposer aux excès de l'irreligion, si l'on ne s'opose en même tems aux abus de la Religion même. L'histoire de presque toutes les nations modernes de l'Europe offre des tableaux bien touchans des maux qu'a produit l'abus de la Religion : Et pour ne se point faire d'illusion, que ne doit-on point craindre du feu que couvent les dissensions qui divisent encore aujourd'hui les esprits, & dont l'eclat n'est retenu que par la sagesse & la moderation de votre Eminence ? J'ai toujours été extrêmement frappé d'un passage de St. Chrysostome, que je vous demande la permission de rapporter ici. *HÆC EST CHRISTIANISMI REGULA, HÆC ILLIUS EXACTA DEFINITIO, HIC VERTEX SUPRA OMNIA EMINENS, PUBLICÆ UTILITATI CONSULTARE.* C'est le caractère essentiel de la Religion que de s'allier avec l'utilité de l'Etat. Et cependant de combien de calamitez la religion n'a-t-elle pas été la source, elle que n'est destinée qu'à produire des fruits salutaires ? On abuse des meilleures choses, & c'est l'abus, que l'on fait de la RELIGION, contre lequel je me suis proposé d'élever une barriere qui marque tout l'usage que l'on en peut, & que l'on en doit faire, & qui fixe le point où l'on doit s'arrêter. Je n'ai travaillé sur les principes d'aucun parti : je n'ai absolument songé qu'à trouver le point critique de reunion où se concentrent LA VERITE & L'UTILITE ; Quoique je me suis aidé du secours de quelques uns de nos Theologiens les plus respectables, j'ai moins songé à puiser dans leurs ouvrages, que dans les sources primitives d'un raisonnement fondé sur la nature & l'essence même des choses. Un long séjour dans des pays où la diversité des religions ne produit aucun désordre a contribué à me mettre sur la voye du vrai, & m'y a ensuite affermi : j'ai marché avec d'autant plus de sûreté que je me suis trouvé guidé par l'expérience des autres nations : j'ai même trouvé ces matieres savamment & profondément discutées par des Theologiens de l'Eglise *Anglicane* : un nombre infini d'ecrits ont paru sur ce sujet : la liberté de tout dire a fait, qu'aucune

qu'aucune difficulté n'a été supprimée, & aucune n'a été proposée qu'elle n'ait été clairement & solidement expliquée.

Je laisserois à la lecture de CES DISSERTATIONS à dévoiler le seul remede qu'il convienne, & que l'on puisse appliquer efficacement & salutairement aux desordres de religion, si les occupations importantes & multipliées de votre Eminence pouvoient lui permettre une lecture aussi longue. Ce remede, c'est l'établissement d'un Acte par lequel l'Etat s'assure que tous ceux qui remplissent des postes publics, soit civils ou religieux, se conforment à la Religion dominante : c'est, en d'autres mots, la requisition ou d'un Serment, ou de la signature d'un Formulaire. J'espère en avoir démontré la justice & la nécessité, sans insister sur d'autres principes que sur ceux de l'Equité naturelle & de la prudence universelle de tous les Etats polices : genre de demonstration que je ne sache pas que personne eut encore entrepris, & qui cependant est essentiel.

Je fais que je dois m'attendre à essuyer un orage violent de la part d'un Parti * qui ne s'est rendu que trop populaire, & dont tout le credit est fondé sur l'illusion & le cagotisme. Mais j'ai tout lieu d'espérer que cet orage se dissipera de lui-même, lorsque l'on verra que la requisition de la signature d'un formulaire, bornée, comme je le propose, aux personnes qui veulent occuper des emplois publics, n'attaque en rien la liberté des consciences, & qu'elle se trouve entierement exemte de tous les reproches de persecution. C'est là je crois le seul moyen de rendre inutiles toutes les ruses d'un parti extrêmement habile à s'emprevaloir ; car pour peu que l'on examine avec attention, il n'est pas difficile de decouvrir ce qui lui attire un si grand nombre de proselytes. La plupart des particuliers ne sont pas capables de juger des matieres theologiques qui separent les deux partis. Le François a naturellement l'ame noble & genereuse, en sorte que le parti qui peut faire accroire qu'il est persecuté, ce parti, soit bon ou mauvais, ne peut manquer d'avoir un grand

* Les jansenistes.

nombre de partisans. Rien ne le prouve mieux qu'un trait fort remarquable rapporté par Brant, dans son Histoire de la Reformation des Pays Bas, Livre qui fait l'admiration de tous les Hollandois compatriotes de l'Auteur ; estimé par tous les Etrangers qui le connoissent, & qui, quoique l'ouvrage d'un Protestant, renferme bien des connoissances utiles & instructives pour un Lecteur Catholique. Cet Historien rapporte qu'avant la revocation de l'Edit de Nantes, quelques Religioneux du Poitou passerent en Angleterre, où interrogez sur leur foi, & en particulier sur le nombre des sacramens, ces bonnes gens, souverainement ignorans, repondirent qu'il y en avoit trois, le Pere, le Fils, & le St. Esprit. Comment se peut-il que des gens eussent tant de zele que d'abandonner leur patrie, et tout ce qui leur étoit cher, pour une Religion qu'ils ne connoissoient certainement pas ? Rien de plus naturel : ils croyoient que l'on vouloit contraindre leurs Opinions ; & ils ne s'imaginoient pas que la Force & la Verité pussent aller de concert. Avec combien d'art les Jansenistes ne cherchent-ils pas à persuader qu'ils sont persecutez ? Ils savent bien que cette opinion, bien loin de decourager leur secte, est tout ce qu'il y a de plus capable de l'augmenter. Je suis persuadé que l'on trouvera que c'est là le cas de la plupart de leurs partisans.

C'est dans cette vue qu'en m'attachant à prouver la justice & la necessité d'un formulaire dont la profession seroit requise de toutes les personnes qui voudroient des emplois publics, je n'ai pas insisté avec moins de force sur la Tolerance de Opinions, à l'égard de ceux qui ne sont dans aucun emploi. C'est même en vain qu'on voudroit les contraindre : les Opinions sont libres, & le pouvoir des hommes n'a aucune prise sur elles. Il n'a d'autre moyen d'introduire l'uniformité que l'expulsion, expedient qu'il faudroit renouveler sans cesse, parce qu'il renaît sans cesse des Opinions nouvelles ; expedient par consequent trop dangereux ; & qui ne s'accorde pas avec la maxime de St. Chrysostome sur l'utilité de la Religion pour l'Etat. J'ose d'autant plus volontiers avancer, que
la

la Violence & la Religion sont incompatibles ; que rien n'est plus opposé que la violence au caractère & aux sentimens que toute l'Europe reconnoit dans votre Eminence.

Toute secte privée des dignitez de l'Etat fut-elle appuyée sur la verité, ne peut faire de grands progrès dans ce siècle corrompu. On en a un exemple sensible dans les Catholiques de Hollande & d'Angleterre, & surtout dans ceux de cet dernier pays, où leur nombre diminue tous les jours, uniquement parce qu'il y a un plus grand nombre de dignitez à distribuer, & qu'elles y sont plus faciles à obtenir, qu'en Hollande, où elles sont presque entièrement confinées aux familles des Magistrats des Villes. Les progrès seroient encore bien moindres à l'égard des sectes qui auroient le malheur d'être dans l'erreur. Les Catholiques de Hollande n'y causent aucun trouble, non plus que les Presbyteriens en Angleterre. Exclue de tous les emplois, ils n'ont point assez de pouvoir pour introduire aucune division dans le Gouvernement ; & jouissant en même tems de la liberté de professer tranquillement leur religion, rien ne les excite à se soulever contre un Gouvernement juste & équitable. Les Catholiques d'Angleterre sont, à la verité, moins bons sujets ; mais d'où provient cette difference d'avec ceux de Hollande, si non que les Loix penales, qui en Angleterre ont lieu contre eux, leur donnent toujours lieu d'apprehender la violence, & les reduisent, en quelque maniere, dans un état de persécution.

Me permettez-vous, M^r., de dire avec ingenuité, que je suis convaincu tant par l'étude que je puis avoir faite de la nature humaine, que par le témoignage unanime qu'en rend l'Histoire de toutes les nations florissantes, que l'Union de la PROFESSION D'UN FORMULAIRE d'une part, avec la TOLERANCE de l'autre, est le seul moyen de prevenir les maux que l'on a lieu d'apprehender d'une SECTE qui s'accroît plus qu'elle ne diminue ; & qui jette de jour en jour des racines plus profondes ; qui ne peut être détruite par tout autre moyen, qu'en même tems l'on n'affoiblisse infiniment l'Etat, & qui, en ce cas même, seroit sûrement succédée par quelque

secte nouvelle. Une rigidité exacte à exiger la profession d'un Formulaire commun, de tous ceux qui entrent dans quelque poste ou dans quelque société publique que ce puisse être, & une indulgence entière à l'égard des opinions des simples particuliers, assureroient la tranquillité de l'Etat contre les efforts non seulement des sectes actuelles, mais encore de toutes celles qui pourroient se former par la suite.

Je soumets toutes ces reflexions, M^{sr}., aux lumieres de votre Eminence, & j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

THE
NECESSITY AND EQUITY
OF AN
ESTABLISHED RELIGION
AND
A TEST LAW
DEMONSTRATED.

B O O K I.

Of the Nature and End of CIVIL and of RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.

C H A P. I.

The Occasion and Nature of this Discourse.

AN ESTABLISHED RELIGION and a TEST LAW, the two great solecisms, as we are told, in modern politics, are the subject of the following Discourse. A subject that hath not only, in common with most others of importance, been much perplexed by the bringing in, on both sides, mens' civil and religious prejudices into the question; but likewise, which is almost peculiar to this controversy, by their concurring in one and the same erroneous principle: for where the two parties go on different grounds, they

naturally begin with examining one another's principles, which leads to the discovery of the true, and consequently to the timely determination of the controversy. But where a *false* principle has the luck to be unquestioned, the disputants may wrangle for ever, and be, after all, no nearer to the truth. This hath been the fate of the subject in question; while both parties placed their arguments on the same mistaken foundation, the one defended a Test on such reasonings as destroyed a *Toleration*; and the other opposed it on such as conclude equally against the very essence and being of a *National Religion*.

Inveterate mistakes, therefore, upon a subject of such importance, would be a sufficient apology for the Expediency of this Discourse at any time, although some late occurrences had not made it particularly seasonable at the present. Our unhappy divisions in the state have, it seems, amongst the various intrigues of parties, afforded opportunity and encouragement to the Protestant Dissenters to enter upon measures for the Repeal of the *Test-Law*; that is, as we shall prove, for throwing the state into convulsions, by a dissolution of the original union between the two Societies. In the mean time it hath unhappily befallen, that some, to whom this kingdom is greatly indebted for their reasonings in defence of public liberty, have thought hardly of a *Test-Law* and of an *Established Religion* so secured. From what their mistake hath arisen will be shewn in its place. However, the authority of these great names hath induced many unprejudiced persons to shew too much countenance to this destructive project; and hath emboldened the promoters of it to appeal to the abstract principle of Right. I shall therefore attempt to shew THE NECESSITY AND EQUITY OF AN ESTABLISHED RELIGION AND A TEST-LAW FROM THE ESSENCE AND END OF CIVIL SOCIETY, UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS.

This being our subject, I do not propose to defend an *Established Religion* and a *Test*, by the laws of this or that state, or on the principles of this or that scheme of religion, but on the great and
unerring

unerring maxims of the law of nature and nations: and when, on occasion, I may happen to apply the reasoning here inforced, to this or that church or state, it will be only so far forth as they are conformable to that law.

And this is all now wanting to determine this long controversy. For the adversaries of establishments having been beaten off from their attacks of the *Test-Law*, on the frame and principles of our own constitution, by many excellent vindications of *the Corporation and Test-Acts*, have left this partial question, and appealed to the law of nature and nations. To that tribunal we now propose to follow them.

The *Principles* of Society, Civil and Religious, here delivered, will serve to lay open the absurd reasonings of those, who, thinking an *Establishment* of divine right, defend it on the doctrine of intolerance, which makes a church, an inquisition; and the necessary *consequences* deduced from those principles will as plainly expose the mischievous reasonings of those, who, holding a *Test* to be against all human rights, oppose it on a doctrine of licentiousness, which makes the church a rope of sand. Having done this, from those clear principles, and these necessary consequences, we shall demonstrate the perfect concord and agreement between *Religious Liberty* and a *Test Law*; and, in the last place, detect the delusive Principle, above-mentioned, upon which both parties have gone, and shew how it hath led both, as extraordinary as it may seem, to quite contrary conclusions. From all this it will appear, which is one of the principal purposes of this Discourse, that our present happy Constitution, both of Church and State, is erected on solid and lasting Foundations.

C H A P. II.

Of the State of Nature; and the Establishment of Society.

TO lay my foundation therefore with sufficient strength, it will be necessary, though in as few words as may be, to consider the nature of man in general, and of that civil community which he invented with so much benefit to himself and fellows: that, seeing his wants, and the remedies he applied to them, we may better judge of their fitness to, and operations on, each other.

The appetite of self-preservation being indispensably necessary to every animal, nature has made it the strongest of all. And though, in rational animals, reason alone might be supposed sufficient to answer the end for which this appetite is bestowed on others, yet, the better to secure that end, nature has given man likewise a very considerable share of the same instinct with which she has endowed brutes so admirably to provide for their preservation. Now, whether it were some *plastic nature* that was here in fault, which, Lord Verulam says, *knows not how to keep a mean**, or that it was all owing to the perverse use of human liberty, certain it is, that, borne away with the lust of gratifying this appetite, man, in a state of nature, soon ran into very violent excesses; and never thought he had sufficiently provided for his own being, till he had deprived his fellows of the free enjoyment of theirs. Hence all those evils of mutual violence, rapine, and slaughter, that, in a state of nature, must needs abound amongst equals. Because, though man, in this state, was not without a law which exacted punishment on evil doers, yet the administration of that law, not being in common hands, but either in the person offended, who being a party would be apt to enforce the punishment to excess; or else in the hands of every one, as the offence was against mankind in general

* *Modum tenere nescia est.*

and

and affected the good of particulars not immediately or directly, would be executed remissly. And very often, where both these executors of the law of nature were disposed to be impartial and exact in the administration of justice, they would yet want power to enforce it. Which, altogether, would so much inflame the evils abovementioned, that they would soon become as general and as intolerable as the *Hobbeists* represent them in that state to be, was it not for the restraining principle of RELIGION that kept men from running into the confusion which the appetite of inordinate self-love necessarily produces. But yet religion could not operate with sufficient efficacy for want, as we observed before, of a common arbiter, who had impartiality enough fairly to apply the rule of right; and power to enforce its operations: So that these two PRINCIPLES were in endless jar; in which justice generally came by the worst. It was therefore found necessary to call in the CIVIL MAGISTRATE, as the ally of Religion, to turn the balance.

*Jura inventa metu injusti fœdare necesse est,
Tempora si fastos velis evolvere mundi.*

Thus was *Society* invented for a Remedy against Injustice: and a *Magistrate* by mutual consent appointed, to give a sanction to “that common measure to which, reason teaches us that, creatures of the same rank and species, promiscuously born to the same advantages of nature, and to the use of the same faculties, have all an equal right*.” Where it is to be observed, that though society provides for all those conveniencies and accommodations of more elegant life, which man must have been content to have done without, in a state of nature, yet it is more than probable that these were never thought of when society was first established †: but that they were the mutual violences and injustices,

at

* Locke.

† Though the judicious Hooker thinks those advantages were principally intended when man first entered into society: *This was the cause* (says he) *of men's uniting themselves*

at

at length become intolerable, which set men upon contriving this generous remedy. Because evil felt has a much stronger influence on the mind than good imagined: and the means of removing the one is much easier discovered than the way to procure the other: and this by the wise disposition of nature; the avoiding evil being necessary to our existence; not so, the procuring pleasure. Besides, the idea of those unexperienced conveniencies would be, at best, very obscure: And how unable men would be, before trial, to judge that society could bestow them, we may guess by observing how little, even now, the generality of men, who enjoy those blessings, know or reflect that they are owing to society, or how it procures them; because it doth it neither immediately nor directly. But they would have a lively sense of evils felt; and would know that society was the remedy, because the very definition of the word would teach them how it becomes so. Yet because *civil society* so greatly improves human life, this *improvement* may be called, and not unaptly, the *secondary end* of that convention. Thus, as *Aristotle* accurately observes in the words quoted below, that which was at first constituted for the *sake of living*, is carried on for the *sake of happy living*.

This is further supported by fact. For we see that those savage nations which happen to live in peace out of civil society, never think of entering into it, though they feel all the advantages of that improved condition in the neighbouring colonies round about them.

as first into politiqua societates. Eccl. Pol. L. i. § 10. His master Aristotle, though extremely concise, seems to hint, that this was but the *secondary end* of civil society; and that *that*, which we here make to be so, was the first. His words are: *ἡ πολιτεία μὲν οὐ τὸ τῆς ζῆναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς εὖ ζῆναι.* Pol. L. i. c. 2.

C H A P. III.

Of the natural Defects of Civil Society; and the Necessity of applying Religion to remedy those Defects.

CIVIL Society thus established; from this time, as the Poet sings,

—*abstulere bello,*
Oppida cæperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis Fur esset, neu Latro, neu quis Adulter.

But as before, bare RELIGION was no preservative against civil disorders; so now SOCIETY alone would be equally insufficient.

I. 1. For, first, its laws can have no further efficacy than to restrain men from open transgression; while what is done amiss in private, though equally tending to the public prejudice, escapes their censure. And man, since his entering into society, would greatly have improved his practice in this secret way of malice. For now an effectual security being provided against *open violence*, and the inordinate principle of self-love being still the same, *secret craft* was the art to be improved; and the guards of society inviting private men to a careless security, what advantages it would afford to those hidden mischiefs, which civil laws could not take notice of, is easy to conceive.

2. But, secondly, the influence of civil laws cannot, in all cases, be extended even thus far, namely, to the restraining of open transgression. It cannot *then*, when the severe prohibition of one irregularity threatens the bringing on a greater: and this will always be the case, when the irregularity is owing to the violence of the sensual passions. Hence it hath come to pass, that no great and flourishing community could ever punish *fornication*, or vague lust, in such a sort as its ill influence on society was confessed to

deserve : Because it was always found that a severe restraint of this forced open the way to more flagitious lusts.

3. Thirdly, The very attention of civil laws to their principal object occasions a further inefficacy in their operations. To understand this, we must consider, that the care of the state is for the WHOLE, under which *individuals* are considered but in the second place, as accessaries only to that whole ; the consequence of which is, that, for the sake of the body's welfare, some individuals are often left neglected. Now the care of *Religion* is for PARTICULARS, and a *Whole* has but the second place in its concern *. This is only touched upon to shew, in passing, the natural remedy for the defects, I am here endeavouring to account for.

4. But this was not all : There was a further inefficacy in human laws. The Legislator, in enquiring into the mutual duties of citizens arising from their equality of condition, found those duties to be of two kinds. The first, he intitled the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION, because civil laws could readily and commodiously, and were of necessity required, to enforce their observance. The other he called the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION ; not that morality doth not as strongly exact them, but because civil laws could not conveniently provide for the observance of them ; and because they were supposed not so immediately and essentially to affect the welfare of society. Of this latter kind are *gratitude, hospitality, charity, &c.* Concerning such, civil laws, for these reasons,

* Regium Imperium a Sacerdotali in eo maxime distat, quod illi non solæ singulorum civium rationes commissæ sint, sed totius reipublicæ salus ; unde fit ut in cives etiam invitos ad fovendum totius reipublicæ corpus, jus illi competat—Quod aliter se habet in episcopali ministerio, cui ecclesiæ sollicitudo ita est commissæ, ut singulorum salutis præcipue invigilare debeat, nec curare possit universum corpus aliquorum membrorum perniciæ. PETRUS DE MARCA, *De concordia sacerdotii et imperii. Epistola ad Cardinalem de Richelieu* : Nous aurons occasion de citer souvent ce fameux ouvrage, écrit à la requiſition du Cardinal de Richelieu. Nous l'indiquerons par le nom de l'Auteur, prelat aussi zélé pour sa religion que pour son prince. Il mourut peu de tems après sa nomination à l'Archevêché de Paris, où il étoit parvenu par son mérite et par le discernement de son Roi. *French translator.*

are generally silent. And yet, though it may be true, that these duties, which human laws thus overlook, may not so directly affect society, it is very certain, that their violation brings as sure, though not so swift destruction upon it, as that of the duties of *perfect obligation*. A very competent judge, and who, too, speaks the sentiments of antiquity, in this matter, hath not scrupled to say—" Ut scias per se expetendam esse GRATI ANIMI ADFECTIONEM, per se fugienda res est INGRATUM esse: quoniam nihil æque concordiam humani generis diffociat ac distrahit quam hoc vitium *."

5. Still further, besides these duties both of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation, for the encouraging and enforcing of which, civil regimen was invented; SOCIETY itself begot and produced a *new set of duties*; which are, to speak in the mode of the legislature, of *imperfect obligation*: the first and principal of which is, that antiquated forgotten virtue called the LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY.

6. But, lastly, SOCIETY not only introduced a new set of duties, but likewise increased and inflamed, to an infinite degree, those inordinate appetites for whose correction it was invented and introduced; like some kinds of powerful medicines, which, at the very time they are working a cure, heighten, for a time, the malignity of the disease. For the appetites take their birth from our real or imaginary wants. Our *real* wants are unalterably the same; and, arising only from the imbecillity of our nature and situation, are exceeding few, and are easily relieved. Our *fantastic* wants are infinitely numerous, to be brought under no certain measure nor standard; and are always increasing in exact proportion to our improvements in the arts of life. But the arts of life owe their original to society: and the more perfect the policy is, the higher do those improvements rise; and, with them, are our wants, as we say, proportionably increased; and our appetites inflamed: for those appetites which seek the gratification of our imaginary wants

* Seneca de Benef. Lib. iv. c. 18.

are much more violent than what are raised by our real wants : not only because the imaginary are more numerous ; which gives constant exercise to the appetites : and more unreasonable ; which makes the gratification proportionably difficult ; and altogether unnatural ; to which there is no measure : but principally because vicious custom hath affixed a *kind of reputation* to the gratification of the fantastick wants, which it hath not done to the relief of the real ones. So that, on the whole, our wants increase in proportion as the arts of life advance and perfect.—In proportion to our wants, is our uneasiness—to our uneasiness, our endeavours to remove it—to our endeavours, the weakness of *human restraint*. Hence it appears, that, in a state of nature, where little is consulted but the support of our existence, our wants must be few, and our appetites in proportion weak ; and that, in civil society, where the arts of life are cultivated, our wants must be many, and our appetites in proportion strong.

II. Thus far concerning the imperfection of civil society, with regard to the administration of that power which it hath, namely, of *punishing* the refractory. We are next to consider its much greater imperfection with regard to that power which it wanteth ; namely of *rewarding* the obedient.

The two great sanctions of law and civil regimen are REWARD and PUNISHMENT. These are generally called the two hinges, on which government turns. And so far is certain, and apparent to the common sense of mankind, that whatever laws are not enforced by both these sanctions, will never be observed in any degree sufficient to carry on the ends of society.

Yet, I shall now shew, from the original constitution and nature of civil society, that it neither had, nor could enforce, the SANCTION OF REWARD.

But, to avoid mistakes, I desire it may be observed, that, by *Reward*, must needs here be meant, *such as is conferred on every one for observing the laws of his country* ; not such as is bestowed on particulars, for any eminent service : as by *Punishment* we understand

understand *that which is inflicted on every one for transgressing the Laws*; not *that which is imposed on particulars, for neglecting to do all the service in their power.*

I make no doubt but this will be put into the Number of my paradoxes; nothing being more common in the mouths of politicians *, than *that the sanctions of reward and punishment are the two pillars of civil government*; all the modern *Utopias*, and ancient systems of speculative politics, deriving the vigour of their laws from these two sources. Let the proof therefore of the two following propositions be considered.

I. That, by the *original constitution* of civil government, the sanction of rewards *was not* enforced.

II. That, from the *nature* of civil government, they *could not* be enforced.

I. In entering into society, it was stipulated, between the magistrate and people, that *protection* and *obedience* should be reciprocal conditions. When, therefore, a citizen obeys the laws, that debt on society is discharged by the protection it affordeth him. But, in respect to disobedience, the proceeding is not analogous (though protection, as the condition of obedience, implies the withdrawing it on disobedience) and for these Reasons: The effect of withdrawing protection must be either expulsion from the society, or exposing the offender to all kinds of insult from others, in it. Society could not practise the first, without bringing the body politic into a consumption; nor the latter, without throwing it into convulsions. Besides, the first is no punishment at all, except by accident; it being only leaving one Society to go into another: And the second is an inadequate punishment; for though all obedience be the same; and so, *uniform protection* a proper return for

* Neque solùm ut SOLONIS dictum usurpèim, qui & sapientissimus fuit ex septem, & legum scriptor solus ex septem. Is rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, PÆNITENTIA ET PØENA. Cíc. ad Brutum, Ep. 15.

it; yet disobedience being various both in kind and degree, the withdrawing protection would be too great a punishment for some crimes, and too small for others.

This being the case, it was stipulated that the transgressor should be subject to pecuniary mulcts, corporal castigations, mutilation of members, and capital inflictions. These were the sanction, and *only* sanction of civil laws. For, that protection is no reward in the sense that these are punishments, is plain from hence, that protection is of the essence of society itself; penal inflictions an occasional adjunct. But this will farther appear by considering the opposite to protection, which is *expulsion*, or banishment; for this is the *natural* consequence of withdrawing protection. Now this, as we said, is no punishment but by accident: and so the State understood it; as we may collect, even from their manner of employing it *as a punishment* on offenders: for banishment is of universal practice, with other punishments, in all societies. Now, where withdrawing protection is inflicted as a punishment, the practice of all states hath been, to retain their right to obedience from the banished member; though, according to the nature of the thing, considered alone, that right be really discharged; obedience and protection, as we observed, being reciprocal. But it was necessary all States should act in this manner when they inflicted exile as a punishment; it being no punishment but by accident, when the claim to subjection was remitted with it. They had a *Right* to act thus; because it was inflicted on an *Offender*; who had wilfully forfeited all claim of advantage from that *reciprocal condition* *.

11. But secondly, from the nature of civil government, *the sanction of rewards could not be enforced by it*: because society could neither distinguish the objects of its favour; nor reward them, though they were distinguished.

* See note [A], at the end of this Book.

1. First, *Society could not distinguish the objects of its Favours.* To inflict punishment, there is no need of knowing the Motives of the offender; but judicially to confer reward, on the obedient, there is.

All that civil judicatures do in punishing is to find whether the act was *wilfully* committed. They enquire not into the intention or motives, any further, or otherwise, than as they are the marks of a voluntary act; and having found it so, they concern themselves no further with the motives or principles of acting, but punish, without scruple, in confidence of the offender's demerit. And this with very good reason; because no one of a sound mind can be supposed ignorant of the principal offences against right, or of the malignity of those offences, but by some sottish negligence that hath hindered his information; or some brutal passion that hath prejudiced his judgment; both which are highly faulty, and deserve civil punishment.

It is otherwise in rewarding the abstaining from transgression. Here the *motive* must be considered: because as *merely doing ill*, i. e. without any *particular* wrong motive, deserves punishment, a crime in the case of wrong judgment being ever necessarily inferred; so *merely abstaining from ill* cannot, for that very reason, have any merit.

In *judicially rewarding*, therefore, the *Motives* must be known: but human Judicatures can know them but by accident: It is only that tribunal, which searches the heart, that penetrates thus far. We conclude, therefore, *that reward cannot, properly, be the sanction of human Laws.*

If it should be said, that though rewards cannot be equitably administered like punishments; yet nothing hinders but that, for the good of society, all who observe the laws may be rewarded, as all who transgress the laws may be punished: the answer will lead us to the proof of the second part of this proposition.

2. That

2. That *society could not reward, though it should discover the objects of its favour*; the reason is, because no society can ever find a fund sufficient for that purpose, without raising it on the people as a tax, to pay it back to them as a reward.

But the universal practice of society confirms this reasoning, and is explained by it; the sanction of *punishments* only, having, in all ages and places, been employed to secure the observance of civil laws. This was so remarkable a *fact*, that it could not escape the notice of a certain excellent wit, and studious observer of men and manners; who speaks of it as an universal defect: *although we usually, says he, call reward and punishment the two hinges, upon which all government turns, yet I could never observe this maxim to be put in practice by any nation except that of Lilliput* *. Thus he introduceth an account of the laws and customs of an *Utopian* constitution of his own framing; and, for that matter, as good, perhaps, as any of the rest: And, had he intended it as a satire against such chimerical common-wealths, nothing could have been more just: for all these political romancers, from *Plato* to this author, make civil rewards and punishments *the two hinges of government*.

I have often wondered what it was, that could lead the reformers of laws from fact, and universal practice, in so fundamental a point: But, without doubt, it was this: the design of such sort of writings is to give a perfect pattern of civil government; and to supply the fancied defects in real societies. The end of government coming first under consideration; and the general practice of society seeming to declare this end to be only, what, in truth, it is, *security to our temporal liberty and property*; the simplicity of the plan displeased, and appeared defective. They imagined, that, by enlarging the bottom, they should ennoble the structure: and, therefore, formed a romantic project of making civil society serve for all the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of produc-

* Gulliver's Travels, vol. I. p. 97.

ing. And thus, instead of giving us a true picture of government, they jumbled together all sorts of societies into one ; and confounded the *religious*, the *literary*, the *mercantile*, the *convivial*, with the *CIVIL*. Whoever reads them carefully, if indeed they be worth reading carefully, will find that the errors, in which they abound, are all of this nature, and arise from this source, from the losing, or never having had, a true idea of the simple plan of civil government : a circumstance, which, as we shall shew occasionally, in the course of this work, hath been productive of many wrong judgments concerning it. No wonder then, that this mistake, concerning the *end* of civil society, drew after it others, concerning the *means* ; and this, amongst the rest, that *reward was one of the sanctions of human laws*.

On the whole, then, it appears, that civil society hath not, in itself, the *sanction of rewards*, to secure the observance of its own laws. So true, in *this* sense, is the observation of St. Paul, that **THE LAW WAS NOT MADE FOR THE RIGHTEOUS, BUT FOR THE UNRULY AND DISOBEDIENT.**

But it being evident, that the joint sanctions of rewards and punishments are but just sufficient to secure the tolerable observance of right (the common false opinion that these are the two hinges of government arising from that evidence), it follows, that, as **RELIGION, ONLY, CAN SUPPLY THE SANCTION OF REWARDS, WHICH SOCIETY WANTS, AND HATH NOT, RELIGION IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.**

Thus, on the whole, we see,

I. That society, by its own proper force, cannot provide for the observance of above one third part of moral duties ; and of that third, but imperfectly. We see likewise, how, by the peculiar influence of its nature, it enlargeth the duty of the citizen, at the same time that it lessens his natural ability to perform it.

II. We see further, which is a thing of far greater consequence, that society totally wants one of those two powers which are owned by all to be the necessary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be supported.

To supply these wants and imperfections, some other coercive power must be added, that hath its influence on the mind of man, to keep society from running back into confusion. But there is no other than the power of RELIGION; which teaching a governing Providence, who hath given laws for the perfecting of Man's nature, and so becomes the rewarder of good men, and the punisher of ill, this religion can oblige to the Duties of *imperfect obligation*, which human laws overlook: and teaching, also, that this Providence is omniscient, that it sees the most secret actions and intentions of men, will oblige to those duties of *perfect obligation*, which human laws cannot reach, or sufficiently enforce.

Thus we have explained, in general, the mutual aid which *religion* and *civil policy* lend to one another: not unlike what two parties in the same cause, and engaged in the same encounter, may reciprocally receive and give against a common enemy: While one party is closely pressed, the other comes up to its relief; disengages the first; gives it time to rally, and repair its force: By this time the assisting party is pushed in its turn, and needs the aid of that which is relieved; which is now at hand to repay the obligation. From henceforward, the two parties ever act in ALLIANCE; and, by that means, keep the common enemy at a stand.

THIS USE OF RELIGION TO THE STATE was seen by the learned, and felt by all men of every age and nation. The ancient world particularly was so firmly convinced of this truth, that their greatest secret of the sublime art of legislation consisted in this, how religion might be best applied to the service of society. The particular methods they employed, and the several artful detours they contrived to arrive at this end, are in the second book of *The Divine Legation of Moses* explained at large.

Religion

Religion being thus proved necessary to society, that it should be so used and applied, in the best way, and to most advantage, needs no proof. For it is as instinctive in our nature to improve a good, as to discover or investigate it. And with regard to the improvement of this particular good, there is a special reason why it should be studied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coactivity of *civil laws* and *religion* is but just enough to keep men from running into disorder and mutual violence. But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural good, every thing constitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's industry to enable him to reap that benefit. We receive it all at the provident hand of heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our use, than immediately fit for our service. We receive it, indeed, in full measure, but rude and unprepared. The efficient cause of this, in natural goods, is the intractability and innate stubbornness of matter; and in moral goods, the malice and perversity of man. The final cause seems to be, that man, of all God's creatures the most incapable of a state of inactivity and idleness, may be set to work; and by this means made to cultivate, what would else lye fallow, the faculties both of his mind and body.

Now concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is, in artificial bodies, as in natural: *Two* may be so essentially constituted as to be greatly able to adorn and strengthen each other. But then, as in the one case a mere juxtaposition of the parts is not sufficient, so neither is it in the other; some union, some coalition, some artful insertion into each other will be necessary.

But now again, as in natural bodies, the artist is unable to set about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a reasonable knowledge of the nature of those bodies which are the subject of his skill; so neither can we know in what manner religion may be best applied to the service of the state, till we have learned the real and essential natures both of a *state* and a *religion*. The

obvious qualities of both sufficiently shew that they must needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied *; as our artist, by his knowledge of the obvious qualities of two natural bodies, we suppose discerns as much; though he hath not yet gotten sufficient acquaintance with their nature, to make a proper application.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Nature and End of Civil Society: And the causes of the common mistakes concerning it, discovered and explained.

IT behoves us, therefore, in the next place, to examine the nature of CIVIL SOCIETY and RELIGION more at large. Of whose *natures* to be truly informed, the way is to find out their *ends*. And this will be the more necessary on account of the wonderful extravagances that the several sects amongst us have run into, concerning one and the other society; while some strike at the *administration*, some at the *nature*, and some at the very *Being* of both. The PAPIST makes the state a creature of the church; the ERASTIAN makes the church a creature of the state: the PRESBYTERIAN would regulate the state on church ideas; the HOBBEIST, the church, on reasons of state: And, to compleat the farce, the QUAKER abolishes the very being of a church; and the MENNONITE suppresses the office of the civil magistrate.

But to begin with *Civil Society*. It was instituted either with the purpose of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of some certain good, which the institutors, unconcerned with, and unattentive to, any other, had in view. To suppose its end the vague purpose of ac-

— * Non natura, sed hominum vitio factum, ut ambæ illæ potestates, quæ amico fœdere conjungi debuerant, in dedecus Christiani nominis aliquando divellantur ab invicem. *Marca, Epistola ad Cardinalem de Richelieu.* F. T.

quiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shewn by the writers * on this question. And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what we have said above, of the Origin of Society. Civil Government then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been invented for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But, again, amongst all those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in fact obtruded, upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is but one difference in their properties, as ends; which is this, *That one of these is attainable by civil society only; and all the rest are easily attained without it.* The thing then, with that singular property, must needs be the genuine end of civil society. And that is no other than **SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN.** For this end, as we have shewn, civil society was invented; and *this*, civil society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, **THE SALVATION OF SOULS**, or the *security* of man's future happiness, belongs, therefore, to the other division. For *this*, not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society; and therefore, on the principles here delivered, cannot be one of the causes of the institution of civil government; nor consequently one of the ends thereof †.

But if so, the promotion of it comes not within the peculiar province of the magistrate ‡. For he who has nothing to do with the

* See Locke's Defence of his Letters of Toleration. This appears too to have been Aristotle's opinion from these words—*φύσει μὲν ὅν δύνανται τὸ θῆλον, καὶ τὸ βέλων ἄλλο γὰρ ἢ φύσει ποιεῖ τούτων, εἰς χαλεμώτερον τὸν [Δαλφυν] μάχαιραν, ποιητῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἔσθαι.* Polit. l. i. c. 1.

† See note [B], at the end of this Book.

‡ Summa divini numinis benignitate duobus maximis præfidiis instructa est humani generis societas ad felicitatem consequendam, Sacerdotio et Imperio; quorum alterum divinis

the *end*, can have no concern with the *means*. These means are DOCTRINE AND MORALS, which compose what is called RELIGION, in the largest sense of the word—That *opinions* are not in his reffort, I again refer the reader to Mr. *Locke's* discourses on *Tolerance*; where it may be seen, how, from the principles here laid down, the whole doctrine of religious liberty is demonstrated: and that even *morals* are not, when considered only in a religious sense, how strange soever this assertion may appear, is evident both from the reason of things, and from the fundamental practice of all governments.

We have shewn they were the *bodies*, not the *souls* of men, of which the magistrate undertook the care. Whatever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his jurisdiction; whatever to the *soul*, is not. But, and if there be *that* which refers equally to both (as *morals* plainly do) such thing must needs be partly within and partly without his province; that is, it is to be *partially* considered by him; his care thereto extending so far only as it affects society. The other consideration of it, namely as it makes part of religion, being in the hands of those who preside in another kind of society; of which more hereafter.

Again, with regard to civil practice; if we cast our eye on any *digest* of laws, we shall find that evil actions have their annexed punishment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right: nor as they

divinis mysteriis se impendit, alterum componit reipublicæ statum, et humanæ vitæ tranquillitatem procurat; ita ut ex utriusque concordia Christiana respublica cumulatissimis incrementis augeatur. Utraque potestatum suis limitibus est circumscripta, et in diffinis omnino negotiis exercetur; cum illa spiritualibus addicatur, hæc publicis occupata sit—certæ quidem regulæ in genere assignari possunt, quibus invicem disternuntur.—Et en parlant des difficultez qui peuvent survenir entre ces deux puissances, l'Auteur ajoûte—Quæ locum habent non in controversiis fidei, quæ longo intervallo remotæ sunt e cognitione principum, nec in rerumpublicarum administrationibus, quæ alienæ sunt a cura pascendi gregis. Marca in præfatione prima. F. T.

are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation from the revealed will of God; which two things indeed coincide: But as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to their malignant influence on civil society.

But the view in which the *state* regards the practice of morality is evidently seen in its recognition of that famous maxim by which, in all communities, penal laws are fashioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PROPORTION TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME. A maxim evidently *unjust*, were actions regarded by the state as they are in themselves; because the *law of nature* enjoins only in proportion to the ability of the subject; and human abilities abate in proportion to the contrary propensities:—evidently *impious*, were actions regarded by the state as they refer to the *will of God*, because this state-measure directly contradicts his method and rule of punishing. But suppose the magistrate's office to be what is here assigned; his aim must be the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*, or of those actions which malignantly affect society; and then nothing can be more reasonable than this proceeding. For then, his end must be the good of the *whole*, not of *particulars*; but as they come within that view. But the good of the whole being to be procured only by the *prevention of crimes*; and those, to which there is the greatest propensity, being of the most difficult prevention, the full severity of his law must, of necessity, be armed against these *.

* “A law there is mentioned amongst the Grecians whereof *Pittacus* is reported to have been author: and by that law it was agreed, that he, which being overcome with drink did then strike any man, should suffer punishment double as much as if he had done the same being sober. No man could ever have thought this reasonable that had intended thereby only to punish the injury committed according to the gravity of the fact. For who knoweth not that harm advisedly done is naturally less pardonable, and therefore worthy of the sharper punishment. But for as much as none did so usually this way offend as men in that case, it was for the public good to frame a positive law for remedy thereof accordingly.” *Hooker*, Eccl. Pol. L. i. § 10.

But

But now it is to be observed, in order to clear this question from the confusion to which the want of these considerations has subjected it, that though *Religion*, or the *Care of the Soul*, be not within the province of the magistrate, and consequently matters of *doctrine* and *opinion* are without his jurisdiction; yet this must always be understood with an exception to the three fundamental principles of Natural Religion; namely—THE BEING OF A GOD—HIS PROVIDENCE OVER HUMAN AFFAIRS—and THE NATURAL ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE OF MORAL GOOD and EVIL. These doctrines it is directly of his office to cherish, protect, and propagate; and all opposers of them it is as much his right and duty to restrain as any the most flagrant offender against civil peace. Nor doth this at all contradict our general position, that the sole end of civil society is the conservation of body and goods. For the magistrate concerns himself with the maintenance of these THREE FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES, not as they promote our *future* happiness, but our present: as they are the very foundation and bond of civil policy. To understand this, we must remember what hath been said above of its original.

The progress and increase of mutual violence in the state of nature, till it became general and intolerable, was owing to the *natural equality* of power amongst men. The remedy of which was seen to be civil society. But that equality of power, which occasioned the evil, prevented the remedy, any otherwise than by the will and free consent of every one. The entrance therefore into society was by free convention and stipulation. But then again, that same equality which made every man's consent necessary, prevented his giving any other security for the performance of his compact than his mere word: and how feeble a security that is, all men know. Some means therefore were to be contrived to strengthen the obligation of his word. Now nothing, in the case here imagined of perfect equality (and such was the real case on mens' entering into society) could give this strength, but RELIGION. An OATH then, rising on the *three great principles* above-mentioned,

mentioned, was that sanction to his word which was universally employed in all conventions. For an oath is an invocation to heaven, whose providence is believed to regard mens' actions; justice being the object of his delight, and injustice of his displeasure; and that he will punish and reward accordingly: all which necessarily imply an essential difference between good and evil, prior to human decrees. Thus an old *Grecian* sage quoted by *Clemens*, speaking of the office of the ancient Lawgiver, says: "He first of all trained the race of mankind to justice by the invention of an oath *."

Again, when society was established, it was necessary that human laws should be enforced on a principle of RIGHT as well as *power*; that is, on a principle which would make them *obeyed for conscience sake*. But the preserving these *three* great articles of natural religion could alone subsist that principle. Therefore was the magistrate to provide for their support. But these being all that were necessary to this end, Religion, as such, was no farther under his direction. The consequence is, that no particular scheme or mode of religion was under his care as a magistrate, till he had covenanted and compacted to that purpose; as we shall see hereafter. But for a fuller proof of the necessity of these *three great principles* to a state, I refer the Reader to the first book of *The Divine Legislation of Moses*; where he will find the cavils of Mr. *Bayle* against that necessity confuted at large.

Thus it is seen, that though the conservation of these principles belong to the magistrate, it is not because they make a part of the civil institute (for this would be violating the unity of its end), but as they are the very rock and foundation on which the edifice of a common-wealth is built. Nor is it, for that, the less within the province of the magistrate. It was equally the concern of the ancient *Ædiles* at *Rome* to see to the support of the foundations as well as

* Πρώτος ὅτι αἱ ἀναγκαστικαὶ Συναὶ ἔχουσιν, διότις ἔχουσιν. Strom. lib. i.—See also note [C], at the end of this Book.

to the repair of the public buildings erected on them. Nor is this distinction made without reason. For if the care of these principles were within the magistrate's jurisdiction, as making part of the civil institute, his office would extend to the *care of souls*; and then I can see no reason but that more, with equal pretence, might enter in, till the whole of religion devolved upon him. And how mischievous this would be to the state, and how much more mischievous to religion, the following discourse will amply demonstrate. But if these principles are within his care only as they are the Rock on which society is erected, there is then abundant reason why it should not be enlarged. And yet many policies, both ancient and modern, by a preposterous kind of architecture, that enlarges the foundation at the same time that it narrows the superstructure, have so surrounded the commonwealth on all sides with this rock, that it puts one in mind of the old punishment of immuring malefactors within four walls. For a mistaken regard to virtue and religion hath, in all ages, disposed the magistrate to deviate from his proper office; till at length the care of the soul got the upper hand of that of the body, in his administration; to the infinite damage of mankind in all his interests.

Though one may easily conceive the magistrate industriously propagating this flattering delusion, in order to add power to his office, and veneration to his person; yet, I am persuaded, mistake first introduced this mischief: though fraud might, perhaps, contribute to support it. Because I find the error to have spread itself even into those communities where public liberty, and consequently where public good, have been most aimed at, and effected. Which hath so riveted the mistake, in the minds of some, concerning the magistrate's real office, that they have even ventured to accuse the wisest administrations of injustice: for, borne away with the common notion that his office extended to the care of souls, and finding the best institutes of civil laws framed with a manifest disregard to that care, they have rashly censured them for carnality and irreligion.

To

To vindicate such constitutions, and to remove this only objection to the principles here laid down, it may be proper to trace up, from their original, the several causes that have concurred to the mistake of the magistrate's real office ; by which it will be seen, that what makes most for it, its *antiquity*, only proves the *inveteracy* of the mistake.

I. The first ground of this error was the confused mixture of civil and religious interests, to which the magistrate, in the execution of his office, had his regard attached. This several causes had in several ages contributed to effect.

As FIRST, In the infancy of civil society, fathers of families (who were wont to execute the office of the priesthood) when they advanced, or were called up, to the administration of public affairs, carried that sacred character with them into the magistracy : and continued to execute both functions in person. So that the *care of religion*, which was thus by *accident* attached to the *person* of the magistrate, would naturally in time be thought inherent in his *office*.

Secondly, Most of the antient law-givers, and institutors of civil policy, having found it necessary, for the carrying on their respective establishments, to pretend to inspiration, and the extraordinary assistance of some God *, unavoidably mingled and confounded civil and religious interests with one another ; so as to animadvert on actions not only as *crimes* against the *state*, but as *sins* against that *God* who patronized the foundation ; and consequently, sometimes, to make their adjustments and proportions between the action and the punishment rather according to this latter estimate.

Thirdly, PAGAN RELIGION had for its *subject* not only each individual, the *natural man* ; but likewise the *artificial man*, Society ; for whom, and by whom, all the *public* rites and ceremonies of it were instituted and performed †. So that here the care of religion

* See The Divine Legation of Moses, book II. § 1.

† Ibid.

became the care of the republic : The consequence of this was, that religion held the government in partnership ; and nothing was consulted or executed without the advice of the oracle. Prodigies and portents were as common as civil edicts ; and bore as constant a share in the public administration.

Fourthly, In after-ages, when the Roman emperors became Christian, agreeably to the zeal of new converts, they made the *civil* institutes *religious*, by introducing laws against *sin* ; in which, as they were told by their teachers they were not only authorized, but directed, by the examples and precepts of that SCRIPTURE which they professed to believe. This greatly contributed to confound the distinction between a church and state. However, this false judgement did not owe its birth to the *Christian* Religion, where this distinction is so marked out and enforced, as not easily to be mistaken ; but to the *Jewish*, in which those societies were consolidated, and, as it were, incorporated. For there they saw, in a civil policy instituted by God himself, and therefore to be esteemed most perfect, and, of course, worthy the imitation of all magistrates who professed themselves the servants of that God, they saw, I say, *sins* and *crimes* equally within the magistrate's jurisdiction. They did not reflect that *that* jurisdiction was the necessary consequence of a THEOCRACY *, a form of government different in kind from all human policies whatsoever.

Fifthly, in these later times, when the great separation was made from the church of Rome, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ; the people, in most places, except in England, procured for themselves their national reformation, supported by their ministers, whose heads were full of the Jewish dispensation ill understood. And, in some places, it being the fortune of the state, as well as church, to be new modeled, it was no wonder that, under such artificers, a ridiculous imitation of the Jewish state should be affected ; and, consequently, that the magistrate should shew a

* Divine Legation, book V.

greater attention to restrain *sins* than *crimes*. And here I cannot but, with much grief, observe, that this wrong judgement was not only pernicious to civil society, but highly injurious to the interests of the *Protestant Religion*. It did indeed contribute more than any thing besides to re-establish *Popery*, which was then shaken even to what itself calls, its very CENTRE OF UNITY. It put a sudden stop to the glorious progress which the *reformed Religion* was then making throughout Europe, from East to West. For the well-disposed princes on the continent finding, in the *reformed* ministers, a pragmatic spirit, which was for modeling the state as well as church, on their own theologic standard, adhered, or fell back, to the Papal power: as preferring an ecclesiastic tyranny they had been used to, before a new one, whose principles threatened an entire subversion of the established policies. The excellent *Grotius* shall be my warrant that I have given no injurious account of the conduct of the *reformed* ministers: who, in the history of his own country, has exhibited to us a very lively representation of this whole scene. Speaking of the *Establishment* of the *reformed Religion* by the *States of Holland* he says:—"Recepta PUBLICÆ disciplina, quæ Genevæ et in Palatinatu Germaniæ passimque alibi docebatur: hoc tamen interest, quod ejusdem religionis ALII *diversas minus tolerant*: QUIPPE NON IN HOC TANTUM ORDINATAS A DEO CIVITATES AC MAGISTRATUS DICTANTES UT A CORPORIBUS ET POSSESSIONIBUS INJURIE ABESSENT, SED UT, QUO MORE IPSE JUSSISSET, EO IN COMMUNE COLERETUR; CUJUS OFFICII NEGLIGENTES MULTOS POENAM, ALIORUM IMPIETATI DEBITAM, IN SE ACCERSISSE. Contra, istæ nationes non modo, &c *."

Nor was *England* altogether free from the effects of this disorder. For those amongst us who were called *puritans*, having, during the distressed state of religion at home, been obliged to reside abroad amongst these new modelers of church and state, imbibed their ruinous notions of reformation: and returning home, on the ap-

* *Annales de Rebus Belgicis*, lib. ii. Anno 1572.

proach of better times, began early to inforce their whimsies to the disturbance of their own country, 'till *Hooker*, in his immortal book of *Ecclesiastical Policy* *, put a stop to this religious frenzy. So that the spirit of *purity* seemed now to be subdued : When, towards the conclusion of our last unhappy civil wars, the famous *Mr. Baxter* took advantage, on the ruins of the constitution, to write his book of *the Christian Commonwealth*.

II. A second cause of this error arose from what is called the *establishment of religion* in the state. There never was a civil society, ancient or modern, but what had a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED. Which arising from a league or union between the civil and religious interests, it receives a delegated coercive power from the state ; which, instead of applying to the promotion of their joint interests, as was the intention of the trust, it is too apt to divert to the support and increase of it's own. But of this, more hereafter. Now, one error arising from such *establishment* was, that these powers of the civil kind, which the religious society in such circumstances exercised, were inherent in it : and those who fell not into this, but saw it was an intrusted power, borrowed from the state, yet ran into an opposite ; namely, that the restraining of *sin*, which was aimed at in the right application of this *borrowed* power, was one of the natural, essential tendencies to which the civil magistrate, as such, should *himself* direct that power. Whereas, indeed, such application was only the result of that union between the civil and religious interests.

III. A third cause of this error was, that, though in many cases, the malignity of an action varies, according as it is applied to civil or to religious interests ; and that the direction of civil laws is generally regulated on the degree of evil the action occasions to the state ; yet, very often, too, the degrees are the same, and the malignity of the *sin* and *crime* is equal. In this case, therefore, it

* See note [D], at the end of this Book.

could not be seen, which was in the legislator's intention to punish; the *crime*, or the *sin*. And to the people concluded that both were in his view. Add to this, that these two complex modes, having, in their composition, many simple ideas, common to both, were not easily seen to be, what, in reality, they are, two distinct modes, but thought, only two terms of one and the same: Which would very much help forward the error whose original we are here deducing.

IV. But the last general cause we shall assign of this error, was the magistrate's punishing, and by a just exertion of his power, some immoral actions, *as sins*: and even restraining *speculative opinions*. We have observed, that the only bond of society amongst equals is the sanction of an *oath*, as it is an appeal to heaven, the avenger of falsehood and injustice. And *common swearing* directly tending to destroy the reverence due unto it, all states have concurred to punish that impiety. But an oath derives it's force and virtue from those three great principles of natural religion, *The being of a God,—his providence,—and the essential difference of good and evil*: which therefore come within the office of the civil magistrate to support. Now the people seeing moral actions, as they regard the Deity, and speculative opinions, as they regard truth, (the two parts which make up religion, in the largest sense of the word) under the magistrate's jurisdiction, and not conceiving the reason, as here explained, concluded that the whole of religion was under his care and direction *.

* See note [E], at the end of this Book.

C H A P. V.

Of the Nature and End of Religion.

HAVING thus explained the nature and end of CIVIL SOCIETY, together with the origins of those errors which men and even states, in every age, have been apt to entertain concerning it; I come in the next place, as I propos'd, to treat concerning RELIGION;

Whose end is first, *to procure the favour of God*; and secondly, *to advance and improve our own intellectual nature.*

As to the *first* end, the *favour of God*, this, common sense informs us, one man cannot procure for another; nor hinder him from procuring for himself; for as integrity of heart is what alone recommends us to his favour, every one hath this in his own power. It is evident, then, that man, in his *religious* capacity, had no occasion to constitute a society for procuring for himself the *favour of God*; as he had occasion in his *social*, to secure to himself the enjoyment of his liberty*. If, therefore, as a religionist, he entered into society, it was for a reason different from that for which, as a civilist, he constituted a commonwealth; that is, it was not to guard himself against the malice of man.

And this leads us to consider the *second* end of religion, namely *the advancement and improvement of our INTELLECTUAL NATURE.* Now this, we can as easily conceive how a number of *religious* beings consociated may advance, as we can how a number of *secular*

* Regium imperium quietem publicam, episcoporum sollicitudo felicitatem æternam hominibus procurat, testante apostolo. Reges sæcularibus, pontifices spiritualibus ordinandis se impendunt. Quamdiu neutra potestatum in alienos limites insiliet, mutua concordia res Christiana amplificabitur.—Soli principi potestas in hæc terrena & temporalia imperandi asseritur, ut ecclesiæ sacra & spiritualia procurandi. Marca, lib. 2. c. 1. F. T.

beings confociated may advance and improve our ANIMAL NATURE, the *secondary* end of civil society.

To see the necessity of forming this society, we are to consider how the *intellectual nature* is improved by religion.

Religion, as an act or exercise regarding its object, is a commerce and intercourse with the supreme cause of all things. Which consisting, on our parts, in suitable sentiments, raised in us by *contemplation on his nature, and on the relations we stand in towards HIM*, the proper and adequate object of all dependent beings, must needs advance and improve our *intellectual nature* to its utmost height.

But now it may be asked, whether this intercourse, as it begins, so likewise, it should not end in mental exercise; and, consequently, whether religion be not, what *many* seem now disposed to think it, *but a kind of divine philosophy in the mind*; which composes only a *spiritual and mystic body* of its followers? For if this be indeed the case, there is an end of all *religious society*; this species of a religion neither standing in need, nor being capable of such a community.

To resolve this question, we are to consider, that, as RELIGION is an intercourse with the Creator and Governor of all things, it is the object of all rational dependent beings. Now we can easily conceive how a mere *mental religion* may fit the nature of pure immaterial spirits, of which doubtless there are innumerable degrees within the vast limits of the universe. But man being compounded of two contrary, though, by the divine skill, united natures, *soul* and *body*, it seems necessary, at first sight, that religion *here* should partake of the character of its subject, and be composed equally of *internal meditations*, and *outward acts and offices*. This will appear on considering his *nature* as resulting from this composition; and the *situation* in which Providence hath been pleased to place him. To fit us for the station here assigned us, it was seen proper, as we find by experience, that the passions of the mind should be greatly influenced by the temper of the body; in which covering likewise, the intellectual faculties should be so enveloped as to render vain

all attempts of emancipating ourselves from the body, while our business was in this gross material world. Now how unfit such beings are for a mere *mental religion* appears evident from the very state of the case. Experience likewise hath constantly confirmed these observations. For whenever men, by a mistaken aim at perfection, have endeavoured, in their religious exercises, to defecate the grossness of sense, and soar up into the region of pure ideas, it has been found that just as the temper and constitution was, so has been the consequence and issue: If *cold* and *phlegmatic*, their religion has sunk into quietism; if *bilious* or *sanguine*, it has flamed out into all the frenzy of enthusiasm.

But further, our station and circumstances here contribute to render our natural incapacity, for such a mental religion, still more invincible. The supply of the necessities and conveniences of life, through all our intercourses for the satisfaction of those necessities and conveniencies, subjects us to perpetual converse with the most sensible and material objects. But often repeated converse produces HABITS. And of what force habits are in keeping the mind bent their way; and how obstinately they adhere, when we endeavour to get free of them, is as well known, as it is with difficulty remedied. Now these habits are so opposite, so averse to, so incompatible with mental contemplation, that, to do even so much this way, as the very essence of religion requires, we must bribe sense and matter, and draw them against themselves, to assist us in the rational offices of religion. If we add to this, that the common people, who compose the gross body of mankind, and for every individual of which, religion is intended, are, by their station and employments, most immersed in matter, we shall need no further proof, that a mere mental intercourse with God, which makes religion only a *divine philosophy in the mind*, is altogether unfit for such a creature as man in his present station upon earth.

But supposing all these impediments of ideal devotion to be away; yet if men be not so far spiritualized as to give and receive

an

an intuitive knowledge of one another's mental acts of religion, still such a religion would not properly fit them. Because, to the due exercise of religion it is required that open profession of it be made by each individual, so as to be seen by others. For, that reason which tells us it is our duty to acknowledge all the relations in which we stand towards God: the same tells us, it is equally our duty to make those acknowledgements public. Again, of the blessings, Providence bestows upon us, some are particular to the individual, and others common to the species. Now, as return of thanks is due from each man for the blessings he has received in particular; so reason tells us, that for those bestowed on mankind in common, a joint return should be made, by as many of the kind together as can conveniently assemble for this purpose.

From what has been said then, it appears, that such a religion as is suitable to the nature of man, HERE, must have *our meditations on the divine nature* drawn out into ARTICLES OF FAITH; and *our meditations on the several relations in which we stand towards him* digested into suitable and correspondent ACTS OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP; and both of them to be professed and performed in COMMON. Which things, as we shall now shew, require the aid of a SOCIETY to regulate and establish.

1. Opinions concerning the nature of the Deity so entirely influence all religious *practice* that *this* invariably takes its character from *those*; and becomes more or less perfect as *those* are nearer to, or further from the truth*. On which account the greatest care is to be taken to preserve opinions pure and untainted. But this cannot be done but by a SOCIETY; as we may understand from the very mention of those two ways which all such societies have ever put in practice. 1. By reducing men's belief into one common formulary. And 2. By making the profession of that formulary the term of communion. For by this means there is a *summary of belief* in aid of the ignorant; and a *common repository* that men

* See Plato's Euthyph.

may always have recourse to for information. Where it is to be observed, that the wider the bottom is made, and the more general the terms of communion (consistent with the being of a Society), the wiser and juster is that religious institution.

2. The several *acts of religious worship* are correspondent to the sentiments arising in us from our meditation on the several relations we stand in towards God; and instituted with design to aid and improve those sentiments. Now, as meditations, not tempered with these outward acts, are apt, as we have shewn, to fly out into *enthusiasm*; so outward acts not regulated by, nor adapted to those meditations, are as subject to degenerate into a childish unmeaning *superstition*. And, how much enthusiasm depraves all the faculties of the mind, how much superstition dishonours the service of our Maker, is disputed by no one acquainted with the nature and effects of these direful evils. The greatest care therefore is to be taken, that the *solemn acts of religion* be preserved *simple, decent, and significative*. But then this can be done only by providing persons set apart for this office; whose peculiar employment it shall be to preside in, direct, and superintend the *ritual of worship*, lest any thing childish, profane, or superstitious should (as it certainly would, if left to every one's fancy) obtrude itself into *religious service*. Now public officers and ministers must act by some *common policy*, which may regulate and settle their several employments, powers, and subordinations. But that *policy* is no other than the laws of a society properly so called.

What hath been here said is sufficient to manifest the Divine Wisdom of the *Author and Finisher of our Faith*, who, revealing the will of his heavenly Father to mankind, actually formed our holy religion into a society, on a common policy, with public rites, proper officers, and a subordination of the ministry. So that though we had not proved that religion forms a society by *nature*, from whence arises the equity of an *established religion* at large: yet we now find it doth so by *institution*, which justifies an *establishment* wherever the religion professed is the Christian. But, how
certain

certain soever it be that *religion composes a society by nature*; nevertheless we may at the same time see, from a remarkable circumstance, in the rise and progress of the people called *Quakers*, how little the plainest truths are secure from contradiction. These men, in spite of the records of sacred history which assure us, that *Jesus* instituted a rule and government, and formed his Followers into a *church* or society, yet regard *Christianity* as only a kind of divine philosophy in the mind, it being the fundamental principle of this sect, *That there is no other reason or measure of compliance or conformity, in matters relating to God, than the conviction of the light and spirit of Christ in every conscience.* But here lay the mischief; the very principle on which this wise sect was formed, had a necessary tendency to its immediate destruction, reducing all aggregate bodies to a mere heap of sand. And in fact it was running into all the confusion which is necessarily produced by such a principle, when PENN and BARCLEY arose to lick this abortion into shape. Penn soon perceived that no sect could subsist on such a principle; and therefore set upon convincing his *friends* of the necessity of some common policy: but perceiving that if he should insist on that necessity for the sake of *religion*, he should too openly contradict their darling principle; he argues for this common policy from the benefits resulting from it to *civil life*: and thus, instead of a *church*, he hath helped to make *Quakerism*, considered in its discipline, a *civil community* or *corporation*: and such indeed it is at present in much perfection. A memorable instance, that truth rarely fails of requiting its opposers: while these very men, the most averse to every Thing that looks like a church, or church-policy, have by their use of it, under another name, borne, before they were aware, the strongest *testimony* for its necessity.

I. RELIGION thus composing a society, we are now to consider what kind of society it is. First then it must needs be SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT ON THE CIVIL *. Natural dependency of one society

* Regnum & sacerdotium distinctas potestates in suo quamque ordine supremas esse—
omnia.

society on another, must arise either from the *law of nature* or of *nations*.

Dependency by the *law of nature* is from *essence*, or *generation*. Dependency from *essence* there can be none. For a dependency arising from thence is a mode of natural union and coalition; and coalition only there exists where an agreement is found *in eodem tertio*; but there being no such agreement to be found between two societies essentially different as these are, there can possibly be no dependency: now this essential difference is evident from their having *different ends and means*; the ultimate end of religion being the care of souls; and the ultimate end of civil society the care of bodies; and the means of that being by *external* application; and of this by *internal*. Dependency which arises from *generation*, is where one society springs up from another, as corporations, colleges, companies, and chambers in a city. These, as well by the conformity of their ends and means, as by their charters of incorporation, betray their original and dependency. But *religious society*, by ends and means entirely different, gives *internal* proof of its not arising from the state; and we have shewn *, by *external* evidence, that it existed before the state had any being.

Again, no dependency can arise from the *law of nations* or the civil law. Dependency by this law is, where one and the same people composing two different societies, the *imperium* of the one clashes with the *imperium* of the other; for, in such case, the lesser society, by that law, becomes dependent on the greater; because the not being dependent, would make that great absurdity in politics called *imperium in imperio*. But now civil and religious society having ends and means entirely different; and the means of *civil* society being *coercive power*; which power, therefore, the *religious*

omnia monumenta clamant, &c. Defensio declarationis celeberrimæ quam de potestate ecclesiastica sanxit clerus Gallicanus 19 Martii, 1682, ab Illust. ac Reverend. JACOBO BENIGNO BOSSUET, Meldensi Episcopo, ex speciali jussu Ludovici Magni Christianissimi Regis scripta & elaborata, l. 5. c. 3. F. T.

* See The Divine Legation of MOSES, Book iii. § 6.

hath

hath not*; it follows that the administration of each society is exercised in so remote spheres that they can never meet to clash; and those societies which never clash, necessity of state can never bring into dependency on one another.

Indeed, were the common opinion true, which we have been at some pains to confute, *That the magistrate's office extended to the care of souls*, it would then follow, from what hath been said of dependency from *essence* and *generation*, that the religious society was subservient to, and a creature of, the state: for then it could not be reasonably thought constituted but by the magistrate: and constituted by him to serve and help him out in the discharge of his office; who might have endowed his creature, the church, in its first constitution, with what powers he thought proper. *Hobbes* and his followers pushed this matter home. They supposed that, if indeed there were any soul to be taken care of, the care naturally devolved upon the civil magistrate; who, by delegation, might transfer it on proper officers, commissioned by him to model, and bear rule in, a church. And because somebody or other at that time chanced to think, that the people were the keepers of the king's conscience †: he, who, above all things, loved contradiction, would needs have it that the king was the keeper of the people's.

On the other hand, *did the care of the religious society naturally extend to the body* and its concerns, then would the *state* run the risque of becoming dependent, and a creature of the church. For *religious society* having the noblest province, the care of souls; and the most extensive, when the care of bodies is joined to it; and pretending for the most part, and sometimes really having, a *divin*;

* Verum dominatum esse penes Reges, non autem penes Sacerdotes—in Legibus Ecclesiasticis locum non habere summum imperium, in quo erdo imperandi & parandi id exigat, ut subditi dominorum mandatis cedant, quemadmodum Apostoli disertissime docuerint—Dominus Ecclesiasticam potestatem & regiam componendo, Apostolos allocutus hæc verba protulit, “Reges gentium dominantur eorum, vos autem non sic.” *Marca*, in præfatione secunda. F. T.

† See the Story of the Earl of Strafford.

while the state has only a *human original*; as greatly as the *spiritual* excels the *corporal*; and the *whole* is more than a *part*; and *divine* authority is above *human*, so high would men deem the *religious* society to be above the *civil*: and that superiority which the church would thus assume as of *right*, she would find within herself a *power* to maintain. For the care of bodies necessarily implies an inherent *coercive* power in whatever society that care is found.

And, in effect, these conclusions have been long ago reduced to practice under the *Christian* religion. For the church of *Rome* having entertained this extensive idea of a religious society, she has, consentaneously thereto, exalted *the chair apostolic* far above the thrones of mere earthly potentates*; of whom she has required and received homage; and once bid fair for making that homage universal. For she would persuade us, as it should seem, that when *Jesus* said, *His kingdom was not of this world*, that he had before transferred it, with the keys of the other, to *St. Peter*.

But this, however, is worthy our observation, that, as different ways as the *Hobbeist* and *Papist* look, in speculation, they tend to the same point in practice. For though the *one* would have the magistrate discharge his office only as executioner of the church; and the *other* authorizes him to use his power as the maker and creator of it; yet they equally concur in teaching it to be his right and office to domineer over conscience. What they differ in, is only a point of ceremony.

II. We come now, in the second place, to shew *that this independent religious society, HATH NOT, IN AND OF ITSELF, ANY COERCIVE POWER OF THE CIVIL KIND*†; its inherent jurisdiction being in its nature and use entirely different from that of the state. For if, as hath been proved, *civil society* was instituted for the

* See note [F], at the end of this Book.

† Hoc præcipuum est discrimen inter canonum decreta & Leges publicas, quod illa unicuique Christiano felicitatem æternam parent, & ad eum finem instrumenta accomodata subministrant; hæc vero reipublicæ pacem & singulorum civium, quatenus sunt partes reipublicæ, promoveant, &c. Marca, l. ii. c. 10. F. T.

attainment of one species of good, all other good, requisite to human happiness, being to be attained without it; and that civil society attains the good for which it was ordained by the sole means of coercive power, then it follows, that the good which any other kind of society seeks may be attained without that power: consequently, coercive power is unnecessary to a *religious society*. But that means, which is *unnecessary* for the attainment of any end, is, likewise, *unfit*; in all cases, but in that where such means are rendered unnecessary by the use of other means of the same kind or species. But religious society attains its end by means of a *different kind*; therefore coercive power is not only unnecessary, but unfit. Again, *ends* in their nature different can never be attained by one and the same *means*. Thus in the case before us, coercive power can only influence us to outward practice; by outward practice only is the *good*, which civil society aims at, immediately effected; therefore is coercive power peculiarly fitted to civil society. But the *good* which religious society aims at cannot be effected by outward practice; therefore coercive power is altogether *unfit* for that society.

1. But it may be objected, "That though indeed *outward practice* doth not affect religion, as it is the object of each individual, yet it does affect a religious society; *salvation of souls* being the end of religion, but *purity of worship* the end of religious society: now *purity of worship* is affected by outward practice; and to outward practice is coercive power fitly applied."

To this I reply, that *purity of worship* is the immediate end of religious society, and *salvation of souls* the ultimate end thereof. Consider then religious society, with regard to its ultimate end, and all we have said above of the unfitness of coercive power still holds good. Consider it with regard to its immediate end, purity of worship; and then, indeed, there will appear no unfitness in the application of coercive power. Thus we gain by the objection, a concession, which we must otherwise have demanded, as the foundation of a claim, we always reserved to ourselves, to make in favour of religious society, which is, that it hath in itself the

power of expelling refractory members from its body ; or, in other words, *a right of excommunication*. Nor is this recalling any thing, we had before given up : for if excommunication may be properly called a coercive power, it is yet no coercive power *of the civil kind*, or what the state could exercise ; the sole power here confessed not to be inherent in a church. It only then remains to prove, *that this power is usefully and necessarily applied,—that it is all which religious society stands in need of,—and that more is unfit and unjust*.

As the immediate end of religious society is purity of worship ; and as a necessary means of preserving that purity is *uniformity of worship* ; which cannot be maintained but by expelling from the community all who refuse to comply with what is publicly established, therefore *this power of expulsion in every religious society is most fit and useful*. But we go further, and say, that every kind of society, whatever be its end or means, must necessarily, as it is a society, have this power of expulsion : it is a power inseparable from the very being of society, which can subsist only in the conformity of the will of each natural member to the will of that artificial body which society produces : this being violated, as it must be unless all contraveners be expelled, the society dissolves, and falls back again into nothing. Just as would be the case of the natural body, should not nature, whose conduct societies, in this case, imitate, evacuate noxious and malignant humours.

But then, secondly, this so useful and necessary power is *all which a religious society stands in needs of*. For by the exercise of this power, conformity in belief and worship is preserved ; which securing the essence and end of a church, is all that is necessary to the well-being of Society.

In the last place, *more* coercive power than this *is both unfit and unjust* to be exercised by a religious society. That it is *unfit* appears from hence : the immediate end of religious society being purity of worship, it requires outward conformity, to what is publicly established : and, at the same time, its ultimate end being the salvation of souls, it requires

requires likewise that this outward conformity be accompanied with a suitable disposition of mind; but any further power than *simple expulsion* tends naturally to make a divorce between these two things. For such further power *forces*, more or less, to *outward* compliance with the community; but as the will cannot at the same time be forced, here is likely to be only outward compliance, without an inward disposition suitable thereunto: so that by this means the ultimate end of religious society becomes defeated: further power therefore than simple expulsion is unfit. That further power is *unjust*, appears from hence: by the law of nature every man hath a right of worshipping God according to his own conscience. Now when it so happens that a member of a religious society cannot conscientiously join in the public worship, and be on that account expelled by the society, in order to preserve its essence and end, such member is so far from being debarred, by that expulsion, of his right of worshipping God according to his own conscience, that he is thereby put into a way of exercising his right without molestation. But if any further power be allowed, either of keeping such member within the society against his will; or of annexing, to expulsion, any mulct on his person, goods, or reputation; in such case, the right of nature is scandalously violated*: a force being put upon his conscience, either by direct restraint, or by obliquely biasing the determination of his will. All coercive power therefore, other than *simple expulsion*, is unjust.

2. But it will be again urged perhaps, that, in thus removing one objection, we have made way for another; which is, “That by granting a coercive power to the church, for such (they will say) is the right of excommunication, we destroy the argument of her independency by the *law of nations*, founded on her having no coercive power; which power clashing with the state’s, brings in

* Cum ergo & Christus & Apostoli, quo loco explicant ecclesiasticæ potestatis censureque vim summam, nihil de adimendis temporalibus juribus aut rebus edicant satis profecto constat non id ad potestatem Ecclesiasticam pertinere. Bossuet, l. v. c. 23. F. T.

an *imperium in imperio*; to remove which, *that* law prescribes her dependency." This too admits an easy solution. We say that civil society having no right to reward any of its members by admission into a religious society; and no right to punish by excluding from it; the church's exercise of this power can never possibly clash with the state; and consequently the argument for its independency still holds good.

We are now come round; and have at length proved, what in the beginning of this chapter had been asserted, that RELIGIOUS SOCIETY HATH NO COERCIVE POWER OF THE CIVIL KIND: for we have shewn that this power of expulsion from a religious society, is not a power which the state can exercise.

Nor doth the denial of a coercive power make the church an enervated, defenceless body, exposed either to the injuries of those without, or to the insults of those within: it hath still all the power and authority, that, as a religious body, it can exercise; all that is necessary to preserve it a regular well-ordered society; in which are rites and ceremonies, ministers with degrees of subordination, and judiciary assemblies: for the power of constituting a discipline and a formulary of communion, both enforced by excommunication, will still remain unto it. What hath made some men apprehend sad consequences from the church's being thus left without the guard of coercive power, is their seeing it stand possessed of some advantages, by them supposed essential to a church, which coercive power only can secure. But these may be eased of their apprehensions by being told, that those advantages are only adventitious *, and bestowed upon it by the state, in consequence of an.

* Nempe utriusque potestatis sancta societas postulabat, ut altera alterius munia in speciem usurparet, ex jure quo amici amicorum rebus utuntur—Quo demonstratur non esse semper pro vero innatoque Ecclesiæ jure reputandum id quod ea egerit, habuerit, decreverit, tacentibus Regibus; sed diligentissime discernenda quæ a Christo concessa sunt, ab iis quæ Regum autoritate, consensu, permisso, conniventia, silentio denique jusserit aut habuerit.—Ac tamen si nullæ concessionem producantur, valere tamen ea omnia ex concessione tacita facile demonstrabunt. Quid ita? Quia scilicet ipsa rerum natura

an UNION; and as the state granted these, it granted coercive power likewise to defend them; and that, when the *union* is dissolved, they both fall together, without any essential damage to the church, as a Religious Society.

Thus have we endeavoured to establish these *two great essential Characters* of a Religious Society, its INDEPENDENCY, and its DISCLAIM OF COERCIVE POWER: where, it is worth observing, that the arguments employed to prove that each of these characters do indeed belong to it, are strongly enforced by the necessary connexion there is between them. For admit the Religious Society to be *independent*, and you invincibly destroy all pretence to *coercive power*; because coercive power introduces an *imperium in imperio*, which is removed only by destroying the independency. Admit again, that Religious Society has *no coercive power*, and you supersede all the state's claim of *dependency*: a claim solely founded on the evil of an *imperium in imperio*, which evil can arise no otherwise than by the church's exercise of an inherent coercive power: and yet these plain, and almost self-evident, principles have had so ill reception in the world, that They have been overlooked and neglected; while two very different systems of church-government have divided the general suffrage between them. Different, I say, not only from what is here delivered and explained, but from each other; yet agreeing in this, to make an unnatural divorce between the two essential characters, which are here shewn to have an inseparable connection in nature, *independency* and *no coercive power*: the one giving to the church this independency together with coercive power; and the other stripping and depriving it of both one and the other.

1. The first of these systems is that of THE HIGH-CHURCH CLERGY*, which contends for the absolute independency of the church, *natura docet ecclesiastica non nisi per Ecclesiam haberi posse. Sic ubi Ecclesia feudus admittit, concedit, aut aliud quid ex civili potestate decerpit; ea civilis potestatis consensione. Item tacita accepta referemus. Bossuet, Defensio Declarationis, &c. l. viii. c. 4. F. T.*

* See note [G], at the end of this Book.

with

with all the prerogatives and powers it is found to stand possessed of, under an establishment. If this error be not sufficiently detected already, the shewing, as I shall do in the next book, how the church became possessed of several of its prerogatives and powers, now legally enjoyed by it, will abundantly expose it. I will only observe, that this model, if indeed it be not the true POPISH system a little disguised, is infinitely more irrational than that: Because a church with inherent coercive power, which, with a false modesty, stops at mere independency, obtrudes a scheme attended with all the evil of an *imperium in imperio*; when going one step further, and taking the state into pupilage and protection, would effectually remove it. Backwards or forwards this system must needs go: for a church so circumstanced, in order to avoid that evil, must fall into the state; or the state into it. This the COURT OF ROME plainly saw; and therefore *chose the better part*. And a pretence was not wanting. For an inherent coercive power, in the church, necessarily implying a care of bodies, as one of the ends of that society (for to bodies only can coercive power be rationally applied) all states when employed in this care, might be fairly understood as only doing journey-work for the church. Thus that refined court chalked out no idle plan of power, when, together with the brute thunder of the *vatican*, it forged real fetters for the prostrate and servile WEST *.

II. The other system is that invented by, and (I wish I could say) peculiar to THE ENEMIES OF OUR HOLY FAITH; at the head of which stand the two famous authors of THE RIGHTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, and of THE INDEPENDENT WHIG. The *true* design of these books is evidently this, to persuade us that the Christian and all other churches, in their natural state, without coercive power, are creatures of the civil magistrate. For while the *pretended* drift be to shew from whence an Established Church receives its coercive powers, the arguments they employ conclude

* See note [H], at the end of this Book.

against a church's natural independency in any condition whatsoever. But it is curious to observe the different routs this noble pair of athletes have taken to arrive at the same place :

The author of *THE RIGHTS* comes first.

At, quum aspicias triflem, frugi censeas.

He hath taken up the argument of Hobbes ; and affects the tenderest concern for the good and happiness of the state. So that whenever a church comes in his way, he falls upon it with the old battery of *imperium in imperio*. But, in this, less honest than that unlucky philosopher. Hobbes * owned the tendency of his argument ; and enforced it for the sake of that very tendency. But this writer seems willing you should believe that it concludes only against a *High Church Clergy*.

The Writer of *THE INDEPENDENT WHIG*, who appears to have more vivacity than his formal brother, is for quicker dispatch. His ready road led him on to the destruction of all *Church Officers*, and the very being of a *Ministry* : which that he might the easier bring about, he has represented all public rites, and assemblies for worship, as impertinent ; by shewing the natural *inefficacy of prayer* for obtaining our petitions ; which again (for, to do him justice, he is very consequential), he establishes on *the doctrine of fate*. This he well saw would bring on a thorough dependency : a dependency that was like to last ; as being produced by the destruction of the society itself. And yet, after all this, he hath the honest confidence to talk of the church as of a *society*. But a society without officers, degrees of subordination, and powers adapted to its nature, being as inconsistent, unintelligible an idea as a house without walls, roof, or apartments ; we must conclude that he who so talks, intends to give us a society in words, but to deprive us of it in reality.

In earnest, I do not know a greater insult ever put on the understandings of men than by these two writers ; while it was pre-

* See note [I], at the end of this Book.

sumed that the gloom of equivocation, which spreads itself through the formal *chapters* of the one ; and the glare of puerile declamation, that tinsels over the trite *essays* of the other, could hide their true end from the observation of those whose destruction they were conspiring. For, as Tully says of the two assassin gladiators, *Par est improbitas, eadem impudentia, gemina audacia ; & ubi, Quirites, multa audacter, multa improbè, multa perfidiosè facta videtis, ibi scelus quoque latere inter illa tot flagitia putatote* *.

Let the reader then but attentively consider what hath been here said of the different natures of civil and religious society, and he will need nothing more than the plain principles, deduceable from thence, to unravel all the silly sophistry which makes up the bulk of these two famous performances ; though the first of them, the parent of the other, hath imposed upon a great writer † ; and, as it is pretended, was planned by the assistance of one still greater ‡.

On the whole, how different soever these *High-church* and *Free-thinking* system-makers would have their notions thought from *Popery* and *Infidelity*, they are unavoidably drawn, by the alacrity of their own heaviness, into the very centers of *Malmesbury* and *Rome* ; from whence indeed they derived their birth ; but are, I know not how, ungraciously ashamed of their progenitors.

* Orat. pro Sex. Ros. Amer.

† Le Clerc.

‡ Mr. Locke.

NOTES TO BOOK I.

P. 50. [A]. **T**HIS will aid us to resolve a doubtful question ; namely, *Whether a banished man be a subject of the state from which he hath been expelled?* Hobbes and Puffendorf hold the negative ; and Tully, with the excellent Lord Chancellor Hyde, the affirmative. The former, in support of their opinion, say, that, by the very act of expulsion, the state gives up and renounces all right of subjection : the latter only appeal to the practice of societies ; the reason of which practice, as here given, seems to determine the question in their favour.

P. 37. [B]. Whoever reads what is here said of the different views and ends which God and men had in instituting the two several communities, *Civil and Religious*, cannot but be surprised at the extreme ignorance or inattention of *J. J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva*, who, in his *Contrat Social*, speaking of the means employed by the ancient law-givers to procure submission to their laws, concludes his observations in these words—" Il ne faut pas, de tout ceci, conclurre avec **WARBURTON** que la politique et la religion aient, parmi nous, **UN OBJECT COMMUN** ; mais, dans l'origine des nations l'une sert d'instrument à l'autre." p. 59. " But from all this we are not to conclude with **WARBURTON**, that civil policy and religion have, amongst us, one **COMMON OBJECT** ; but in the origin of nations, one was made an instrument to the other."—Now this whole chapter of the *Alliance* is written for no other purpose than to prove that Civil Policy and Religion had not **ONE COMMON OBJECT**, but two, entirely different and distinct. The very thing which possibly misled him (viz. the title of my book, *The Alliance between Church and State*) had he duly attended to it, would have set him right : for the word *Alliance*, when used, as here,

in a civil sense, and applied to *Church and State*, shews that, in my opinion, *Policy and Religion* HAD NOT ONE COMMON OBJECT: because an *Alliance* between two communities implies the independency of each: but had the Church and State *one common object*, this would destroy the independency of one, in order to avoid, what of necessity must be avoided, an *imperium in imperio*. If Mr. Rousseau, by *the common object* held by Warburton, means, *the good of mankind*, he either trifles or prevaricates. In this sense, all the ordinances of God, all the legitimate institutions of man, have *one common object*. The consequence of all this is, that either Warburton or Rousseau was here upon a subject which he did not understand. Yet this is the man who says to Christophe de Beaumont Archeveque de Paris, “Monseigneur, J’ai cherché la vérité dans les livres; je n’y ai trouvé que le mensonge & l’erreur—C’est souvent un petit mal de ne pas entendre un auteur qu’on lit: mais c’en est un grand quand on le refuse, et un très grand quand on le diffame.”

But if this writer be consequent, the principle, that *Civil Policy and Religion* have *one common object*, is his own: for he holds, that though the Magistrate ought to tolerate Religions already introduced and spread abroad in the community, yet he is under no obligation to suffer new ones to be introduced; and that in policy he should not do it.—“Quant aux religions une fois établies ou tolérées dans un pays, Je crois qu’il est injuste et barbare de les y détruire par la violence, et que le souverain se fait tort à lui-même en maltraitant leurs sectateurs. Il est bien différent d’embrasser une religion nouvelle, ou de vivre dans cette où l’on est né; *le premier cas seul est punissable*. On ne doit ni laisser établir une diversité de cultes, ni proscrire ceux qui sont une fois établis.” Now if M. Rousseau says this upon principles, and does not merely copy Bolingbroke, as Bolingbroke is copied by Voltaire, he must needs espouse the opinion which he falsely charges upon the Author of the *ALLIANCE*, that *Civil Policy and Religion* have *one common object*, for this opinion making Religion a Creature of the State, she may always be so treated as best serves the ends of the civil magistrate.

P. 41. [C]. From hence we may collect how pernicious it would be to *Society*, and how destructive of its end, to multiply the use of oaths to inferior purposes: for if the sanction of an oath be the great fundamental cement of civil society, and the multiplying of them doth unavoidably tend to

to dissolve (as it is clear it does) all their force and efficacy, such mistaken politics must prove very fatal to the state. Hence too we may see, it would be as bad policy, in a contrary extreme, to dispense with the religion of an oath in matters of highest moment, out of indulgence to tender consciences. But that which shews such indulgence to be pernicious to society, shews the claim to it to be vain and ill founded; there being no exemption, on pretence of conscience, from the necessary demands of society. And for politicians to let one part of their fellow-citizens loose from the religion of an oath on the most indispensable occasions, and to tie up the rest so closely by it, and even for trifles, looks as if they had the same notion of the *moral* world, that certain philosophers have had of the *natural*: and that the quantum of oaths in society was like the quantum of motion in the universe, always to be kept the same: and a want in one place to be made up by an abundance in another.

P. 46. [D]. It is very true that the new modeling *ecclesiastical* Government was the principal point debated in that famous dispute: but then the *Puritans* contended for that Reformation on principles that equally concluded for a Reformation in the Civil likewise: and this Mr. Hooker well understood, when he took so much pains to overthrow their fundamental maxim, the *head theorem*, as he calls it, of their scheme:—*That the scripture of God is in such sort the rule of human actions that simply whatsoever we do and are not by it directed thereunto, the same is sin*. Now who sees not that this principle pursued, brings on, directly and necessarily, a Reformation of the civil government upon Jewish ideas? The very error of the reformed ministers of that time. This, as we say, was not hid from the penetration of this great man. *The reason* (says he, in his preface), *where-with you would persuade that Scripture is the only rule to frame all our actions by, are in every respect as effectual for proof, that the same is the only law whereby to determine all our Civil Controversies*: and therefore to root it out for ever was the main reason, I suppose, why, in a particular dispute, he goes so far back as to give a long account of the original of laws in general, their several kinds, and their distinct and contrary natures.—But the best comment on this *puritan* principle are their actions, when in power. They once had that power.—Their use of it is well known.

P. 47. [E]. After all this, one would not have expected to find the following paragraph, in the fourth volume of the late bishop of London's

Sermons, as the last result of his thoughts on this question, though they were the first in which he had been brought up.—“If the FATHER OF A FAMILY has his authority from God, and rules not only over his own children, but the servants and creatures of the Almighty, and ought therefore to have a concern for God and religion; is the case of the MAGISTRATE different? Are not his subjects also the servants and creatures of God? And is he not the minister and vicegerent of God, and therefore bound, IN THE FIRST PLACE, to have a regard to his honour, who is the common master of him and his servants.” p. 377, 378.

All this is so loosely expressed, that without returning to the bishop's original principles, one can hardly divine what he would be at. For did any magistrate, who believed a God and his government, ever hesitate *to have in the first place a regard to God's honour?* Our duty to God ever taking place of the two other branches of morality, those which regard our neighbour and ourselves. Or did any subject ever quarrel with the magistrate on account of that preference? We must conclude therefore, that the bishop, in this paragraph, would insinuate (for, at this time of day, no man, who had regard to his own character, would venture to do more) *that religion, as such, is properly within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, as such.* A long contested question; and which, this chapter is employed to confute.

Taking this to be the bishop's meaning, let us see how he supports his position. THE FATHER OF A FAMILY (says his lordship) *having his authority from God, to rule not only over his own children but the servants and creatures of the Almighty, ought to have a concern for God and religion.* THE MAGISTRATE'S COMMISSION IS THE SAME: *therefore the magistrate is in the first place to take care of their religion.* The argument, we see, supposes, that the office of *father* and *magistrate* is the same, and derived from the same root and original. If this be not true, the argument falls to the ground. But no man, unless he be a follower of *Folmar*, and a maintainer of the *divine hereditary right* of kings, will pretend to say that PATERNITY and MONARCHY are equally derived from the same source. Those who have exploded the doctrine of *passive obedience and non-resistance* tell another story. They say, that fathers and patriarchs must remain fathers and patriarchs; and can never either ripen or degenerate into kings, as coming from a very different stock: that these latter arose from compact, and were the creatures of the people: that the will of God, discoverable by
natural

natural reason, gave the immediate right to **FATHERS**; and that the will of man, discoverable by human actions, gave the immediate right to **KINGS**: that both, indeed, are the *ordinance of God*, as all things are which have a natural tendency to better and improve humanity. But, to infer from thence, that the rights annexed to one *ordinance of God* belong to another of his ordinances, (though of quite a different nature and original,) is illogical and inconclusive. Nay even supposing that *paternity* and *monarchy* were both the *ordinance of God* in the same and supreme sense of an ordinance, immediately and extraordinarily revealed from God, it would by no means follow, that the offices of *father* and of *king* were the same; nor consequently the administration of those offices. The English monarch, by the self-same *ordinance*, commissions a chief-justice and a captain-general. Has the chief justice therefore a right to preside in a court-martial, or the captain-general, in the king's bench? With just as much reason as the supreme magistrate directs and orders the religion of *God's creatures*, amongst his subjects, because a father of a family directs and orders the religion of *God's creatures*, amongst his children. As in God's house in heaven there are many mansions for those who deserve them; so in God's household here on earth there are many offices for those who are capable of discharging them; in which, each has his distinct, and not one common business, though the end of all be the same, the benefit of mankind. But to suppose this end may be best obtained by each society's aiming at all the good they are, by any means, capable of promoting, is so idle a fancy, that it would be the ready way to do no good at all. Since each society would clash with another, and all of them remain unfit for what they undertake.

P. 56. [F]. In the quarrel between Boniface the VIIIth and Philip the Fair of France, concerning the bounds of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Pope roundly affirms that to deny the *temporal* to be subject to the *spiritual* is falling into the Manichean heresy, or the admission of its *two principles*. But his holiness might trust to his logic at a time when the learning of the whole body of the French nobility was in so deplorable a state, that the College of Cardinals, writing to them on this occasion in Latin, advises them (with a true Irish kindness) to get some honest man to translate the letter, for them, into French.

P. 61. [G]. Archbishop Laud may be called the father of this sect : and though he made a notable use of the King's supremacy to carry on his schemes, yet that he held the supremacy to be no better than an usurpation, appears pretty plainly from these words of his DIARY, where speaking of his having procured the Lord High Treasurer's Staff for Juxton, Bishop of London, he goes on thus—*No churchman had it since Hen. VII. time. I pray God bless him, to carry it so that the church may have honour, and the king and the state service and contentment by it. And now IF THE CHURCH WILL NOT HOLD UP THEMSELVES UNDER GOD I can do no more.*—A remarkable passage in Sir Philip Warwick, who wrote altogether in favour of Laud and his party, will justify the interpretation I have put on these words of the diary.—“He [Laud] was a great assertor of church-authority, instituted by Christ and his Apostles and as primitively practised ; (which notwithstanding he really and freely acknowledged subject unto the secular authority :) therefore he carefully endeavoured to preserve the jurisdiction *which the church anciently exercised, before the secular authority owned her.* At least so much thereof as the law of this our realm had applied to our circumstances ; which our common lawyers dayly “struck at.” *Memoires*, p. 79.

P. 62. [H]. The SARACEN CALIFES, from sovereign princes, became, as their *empire decayed*, only sovereign pontiffs. The ROMAN POPES, from sovereign pontiffs, became, as their *religion degenerated*, sovereign princes. The reason of this contrary rout was this. Christianity, as it degenerated, partook more and more of the spirit of Mahometanism : but Mahometanism never admitted of the spirit of Christianity ; which separates the two characters of PRINCE and PRIEST ; assigns to each his distinct province ; and gives to each his lawful due.

P. 63. [I]. Hobbes is commonly supposed to be an enemy to all religion, especially the *Christian*. But it is observable, that in his attacks upon it (if at least he intended his chapter of the *Christian Common-wealth* in the LEVIATHAN, for an attack) he has taken direct contrary measures from those of Bayle, Collins, Tyndal, Bolingbroke, and all the other writers against *Revelation*. They endeavoured to shew the GOSPEL-SYSTEM as *unreasonable* as their extreme malice could make it ; he as *reasonable* as his admirable wit could represent it. The schemes of CHURCH DISCIPLINE likewise, which they and he severally recommended, were by an odd fatality

ality as different as their representations of the DOCTRINE ; but in the reverse as to their qualities. They, all of them contended for the most unbounded *toleration* : He, for the most rigorous *conformity*. He seems, indeed, to have formed his plan of *ecclesiastical government* before he turned his thoughts to the *Christian doctrine* : and therefore as his politics had enforced an absolute submission to the Civil Magistrate in spirituals, he contrived, in order to make it go down the better, to make the object of this submission as reasonable as possible. Whereas the others, beginning with the *Christian doctrine*, which they aimed to render as absurd as possible, very equitably contrived to make it fit easy on their followers, by a licentious kind of toleration destructive of all *Church Discipline*.

B O O K II.

OF AN
ESTABLISHED CHURCH.

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature of that Union between Church and State, which produces a Religion established by Law.

HAVING now dispatched the first part of this enquiry, and shewn,

I. The Origin of Civil Society; the natural deficiency of its plan; and how the influence of religion only can supply that defect:

II. How all natural and moral good, and consequently *this* of Religion to the State, may be improved by human art and contrivance; together with the necessity there is of *seeking* this improvement: And,

III. As the *finding* it depends on an exact knowledge of a civil and of a Religious Society, their *distinct* natures and ends have been shewn and explained:

We are at length enabled to discover how this improvement is to be brought about.

For having, by a diligent enquiry, found,

I. First, *That the care of Civil Society extends only to the Body and its concerns; and the care of Religious Society only to the Soul; it necessarily follows*, that the civil magistrate, if he will improve this natural influence of Religion by human art and contrivance, must seek some UNION or ALLIANCE with the Church. For his office not extending to the care of souls, he hath not, in himself, power to inforce the influence of religion: and the church's province not extending to the body, and consequently being without coercive power, she has not, in herself alone, a power of applying that influence to civil purposes. The conclusion is, that their joint powers must co-operate, to apply and inforce the influence of religion, in such a manner as may best serve the true interests both of church and state. But they can never act conjointly but in *union and alliance* *.

II. Secondly, Having found, that *each society is sovereign, and independent on the other*, it as necessarily follows, that such union can be produced *only* by FREE CONVENTION AND MUTUAL COMPACT: because whatever is *sovereign and independent* can be brought to no act without its own consent: but nothing can give birth to a *free convention*, but a sense of mutual wants which may be supplied, or a view of mutual benefits which may be gained, by it. *Such*, then, is the nature of that UNION which produceth a CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED; and which is indeed no other than a *politic*

* *Ambas potestates, ecclesiasticam et civilem, ita esse divino numine constitutas, ut in suo genere & ordine unaquæque sub uno Deo proxime collocata prima ac suprema sit: collatæ vero invicem, sociæ federatæque sunt—ergo ambæ potestates supremæ ac principes in suo ordine, conjunctæque & amicæ, non una alteri per sese subdita, subordinatæque est—satis enim claruit duas quidem potestates esse oportere, ecclesiasticam & civilem, quæ principales ac supremæ, & tamen sociæ, conjunctæ & amicæ, ne societas humana distrahatur. Mutuam sibi operam debent, præstantque, & sese mutuo non tantum adjuvant, verum etiam temperant. Bossuet, l. v. c. 31, 32, & 33. F. T.*

league and alliance for mutual support and defence. For the state not having *the care of souls*, cannot, of itself, inforce the influence of religion; and therefore seeks *aid of the church*: and the church having *no coercive power* (the consequence of its care not extending to bodies) as naturally flies *for protection to the state* *. This being of the nature of that alliance which Grotius calls, FOEDUS INÆQUALE. “Inæquale foedus (*says he*) hic intelligo quod ex ipsa vi passionis manentem prælationem quandam alteri donat: Hoc est “ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium ac majestatem conservare UT “POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, INFERIORI PLUS AUXILII DEFEN- “RATUR †.”

From whence it is seen, that, were those common notions true, which we have been at so much pains to confute, concerning the nature of a *church* and *state*, there could be neither *room* nor *motive* for this *alliance*. Were they not *independent on each other*, there could be no *room*; because *freedom of will*, the very essence of this alliance, would be wanting on one part; and had the *state the care of souls*, or the *church the care of bodies*, there could be no mutual *MOTIVE*; for, in the first case, the state, by its own authority, might apply religion to civil purposes: in the latter, the church, having, in consequence of the care of bodies, an inherent coercive power, might, by its authority, provide for its own security.

AN *ALLIANCE* then, by *free convention*, being in its nature *such* that each party must have its motives for contracting; our next enquiry will be, first,

I. What those motives were, which the state had for *seeking*, and the church for *accepting* the offers of an *Union*. And, secondly,

* Hæc extant præclara Arnulfi Lexovenſis Episcopi verba, “Dignitas ecclesiastica regiam provehit potius quam adimit dignitatem, et regalis dignitas ecclesiasticam conservare potius consuevit quam tollere libertatem. Equidem quasi quibusdam sibi invicem complexibus dignitas ecclesiastica & regalis concurrent; cum nec reges salu- tem sine ecclesia, nec ecclesia pacem sine protectione regia consequatur.” Marca, l. ii. c. 12. F. T.

† De Jure Belli & Pac. Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

II. What were the mutual benefits and advantages arising therefrom.

By the *first* part of which enquiry, we hope to make it appear, THAT THIS ALLIANCE WAS INDISPENSABLY NECESSARY FOR SECURING THE WELL BEING AND HAPPINESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY : And by the *second*, THAT NO COMMON RIGHT OF MAN, CIVIL OR RELIGIOUS, IS IMPEACHED BY IT. To demonstrate *which* is one of the principal ends of this discourse.

C H A P. II.

Of the Motives the State had to seek, and the Church to accept, an Alliance.

THE motives the magistrate had to *seek* this alliance were these :

- I. To preserve the essence and purity of Religion.
- II. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner.
- III. To prevent the mischief which, in its natural independent state, it might occasion to civil society.

I.

I. The Magistrate was induced to seek it,

1. *As the necessary means of preserving the very BEING of Religion.* For though, as hath been shewn, Religion constitutes a Society ; and that this society will indeed, for some time, support Religion, which, without it, would soon vanish from amongst men : yet, if we consider, that this society is made up of the same individuals which compose the civil ; and destitute likewise of all coercive power ; we must needs see, that a society, thus abandoned to its
OWN

own fortune, without support or protection, would, in no long time, be swallowed up and lost. Nor can we reasonably hope that this danger might be averted, by that inherent power, we have shewn, to be in the state of restraining the oppugners of the *three fundamental principles of natural religion*; because that power could only prevent these principles from being directly depraved or subverted; not from gradually decaying and falling into oblivion. Of this opinion was an able writer, whose knowledge of human nature will not be disputed: "Were it not, says he, for that sense of
" virtue which is principally preserved, so far as it is preserved, by
" NATIONAL FORMS AND HABITS of Religion, men would *soon*
" *lose it all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the
" worst of savages do *."

2. But of whatever use an alliance may be thought, for preserving the *being* of religion; the necessity of it, for preserving its PURITY, is very evident. For if TRUTH and PUBLIC UTILITY coincide, the nearer any religion approaches to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the service of the state. That they do coincide, that is, that truth is productive of utility, and utility indicative of truth, may be thus proved. That truth is *productive* of utility, appears from the nature of the thing. Observing truth, is acting as things really are: He who acts as things really are, must gain his end; all disappointment proceeding from acting as things are not; just as in reasoning from true or false principles, the conclusion which follows must be, as the principles, necessarily right or wrong. But gaining the end of acting is utility or happiness; disappointment of the end, hurt or misery. If then truth *produce* utility, the other part of the proposition, that utility *indicates* truth, follows of course. For not to follow, supposes two different kinds of general utility relative to the same creature, one proceeding from truth, the other from falsehood; which is impossible; because the natures of those utilities must then be different;

* Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 124.

that

that is, one of them must, and, at the same time, must not, be utility. Wherever then we find UNIVERSAL UTILITY, we may certainly know it for the PRODUCT OF TRUTH, which truth it indicates. Let us then consider the danger which religion runs, of deviating from truth, when left, in its natural state, to itself. In these circumstances, the men of highest credit are such as are famed for greatest sanctity. This sanctity hath been generally understood to be then most perfect when most estranged from the world, and all its habitudes and relations. But this being only to be acquired by secession and retirement from human affairs; and that secession rendering man ignorant of civil society, of its rights and interests; in place of which will succeed, according to his natural temper, the destructive follies either of superstition or fanaticism; we must needs conclude that Religion, under such directors and reformers (and God knows these are too commonly its lot) will deviate from truth; and consequently from a capacity, in proportion, of serving Civil Society. I wish I could say, we had not fact to support this speculation. The truth is, we have seen, and yet do see, Religious Societies, some grown up, and continuing unsupported by, and *united* with the state; others that, when supported and *united*, have by strange arts brought the state into subjection, and become its tyrants and usurpers; and thereby defeated all the good that can arise from this alliance; such societies, I say, we have seen, whose religious doctrines are so little serviceable to civil government, that they can prosper only on the ruin and destruction of it. Such are those which teach the sanctity of *celibacy* and *asceticism*; the *sinfulness of defensive war*, of *capital punishments*, and even of *civil magistracy* itself.

On the other hand, when religion is in ALLIANCE with the state, as it then comes under the magistrate's direction, those holy leaders having neither credit nor power to do mischief, its purity must needs be reasonably well supported and preserved*. For,

* Imminuta esset libertas ecclesie, si a principum secularium imperio libera, ab episcopis iniqua servitute premeretur. Marca, l. iii. c. 1. F. T.

truth and public utility coinciding, the civil magistrate, as such, will see it for his interest to seek after, and promote TRUTH in religion: and, by means of public UTILITY, which his office enables him so well to understand, he will never be at a loss to know where such truth is to be found. So that it is impossible, under this civil influence, for religion ever to deviate far from truth; always supposing (for on such supposition this whole theory proceeds) a LEGITIMATE government, or civil policy established on the principles of the natural rights and liberties of mankind. For an unequal and unjust government, which seeks its own, not public utility, will always have occasion for error; and so must corrupt religion both in principle and practice, to serve its own wrong interests *.

II. Secondly, the magistrate was induced to seek this alliance as *the necessary means of improving the usefulness; and of applying the influence of religion to its service.* And this an alliance doth by several ways.

1. *By bestowing additional reverence and veneration on the person of the civil MAGISTRATE, and on the LAWS of the state.* For in this alliance, where the religious society is taken under the protection of the state, the supreme magistrate, as will be shewn hereafter, is acknowledged HEAD of the religion. Now nothing can be imagined of greater efficacy for securing the obedience of the people. Those two consummate masters in politics, *Aristotle* and *Machiavel*†, thought it of so great, as to be sufficient to gain reverence and security to a tyrant. What then must we suppose its efficacy on a

* See note [A], at the end of this Book.

† "Ετι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὰς θείας φαινομένη ἀπὸ συνδύσεως διαφερόντως, ἥτις ἐν τῇ γὰρ φρονήσει τὸ παθὲν τὴν παρόνομον ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐν διανοίᾳ νομίζουσιν ὡς τὸν ἀρχοῦν καὶ φρονίζουσιν τῶν θεῶν. Καὶ ἡ ἐπιβουλὴ αὐτοῦ ἥτις, ὡς συμμάχου ἔχουσιν καὶ τὰς θείας. Polit. lib. v. c. 12.—Et non à cosa più necessaria à parere d'havere, che questa ultima qualita [religione] perche gli huomini in universale giudicano più à gli occhi che alle mani, perché tocca à vedere à ciascuno à sentire à pochi. Del Principe, cap. xviii.

legitimate magistrate*? The same veneration will extend itself over the *laws* likewise. For while some of them are employed by the state for the *support of the church*; and others *lent* to the church to be employed in the *service of the state*, and all of them enacted by a *legislature in which church-men have a considerable share*; all these things, as we shall see presently, being amongst the conditions of *alliance*; *laws*, under such direction, must needs be obeyed with the greatest reverence.

2. *By lending to the church a coactive power.* It may be remembered that, in speaking of the innate defects in the plan of civil society, we observed, that there were several sorts of duties which civil laws could not enforce: such as the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; which, a religious society, when endowed with *coactive power* to invigorate the influence of religion, is capable of exacting; and SUCH likewise of the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION, whose breach is owing to the intemperance of the sensual appetites. The severe prohibition of which threatens greater and more enormous evils. For while these unruly passions overflow, the stopping them in one place is causing them to break out with greater violence and disorder in another. As the rigorous punishment of fornication hath been generally seen to give birth to unnatural lusts. The effectual correction therefore of such evils must be begun by moderating and subduing the passions themselves. But *this*, civil laws are not understood to prescribe; as *punishing* those passions, only when they have risen into *act*: and not *rewarding* the attempts to subdue their first irregular motions. It must be a tribunal regarding bad intentions as criminal, which can moderate and regulate the passions. And this is no other than the tribunal of religion. When this is done, a coactive power of the civil kind may have a good effect; but not till then. And

* Cives in officio suo erga se & erga principem religionis cultu, veluti vinculo quodam, adstringuntur, ut de Romanis observavit Augustinus. Marca, l. ii. c. 10. f. T.

who so fit to apply this coactive power in such cases, as that society which fitted and prepared the subject for its due reception and application *? Again, we have observed, that the state punishes deviations from the rule of right, as *crimes* only; and not as they are *such* deviations; nor as they are *sins*: and on that first idea proportions its punishments: by which means some very enormous deviations from the rule of right, which do not *immediately* affect society, and so not considered as *criminal*, are overlooked by the civil tribunal. Yet these being, *mediately*, pernicious to the state, it is for its interests that they should be brought before some capable tribunal. But besides the civil there is no other than the ecclesiastical endowed with coactive power. Hence may be inferred *the true and only end and use of SPIRITUAL COURTS*. A church-tribunal then, with coactive power, being necessary in all these cases; and a religious society having, in itself, no such power, it must be borrowed from the state: but a state, as we shall see, cannot lend it, without danger, *but* on the terms of an alliance: a state therefore will be induced to seek this alliance, in order to improve the natural efficacy of religion.

3. *By conferring on the state the application of this efficacy of religion; and by putting it under the magistrate's direction.* There are peculiar junctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinary serviceable to the state; and these the civil magistrate best knows. Now while a church is in its natural state of independency, it is not in his power to improve those conjunctures to the advantage of the state, by a timely application of religion; but when the *alliance* is made, and consequently the church under his direction, he hath then authority to prescribe such public exercises of religion, in such manner, and at such seasons, as he finds the exigencies of state require †.

* See note [B], at the end of this Book.

† See the scandalous squabbles between the civil magistrate and the church, concerning the exercise of this power, in the histories of the *presbyterian* church of *Scotland*.

4. *By engaging the church to apply its utmost endeavours in the service of the state.* For an alliance laying an obligation on the state to protect and defend the church, and to provide a settled maintenance for its ministers, such benefits must needs produce the highest attachment to the benefactor ; which will be shewn from motives both of gratitude and interest, in the most zealous labours for the service of civil government *.

III. *Lastly, the magistrate was induced to seek this alliance as the only means of preventing the mischiefs that the church, in its natural independent condition, might occasion to civil society.* 1. For, in this situation, the church having, of itself, a power of assembling for religious worship, *factious men* may conveniently, under that cover, hatch and carry on designs against the peace of society ; and the influence which popular and leading men gain over the consciences of such assemblies, by the frequency of public harangues, may easily ripen these contrivances into act ; when strengthened with the specious pretext of religion. That unhappy prince, Charles I, when he was now become better instructed by misfortunes, and able enough to understand, that the interest of his country and his own were the same, delivers himself in these words : “ Touching
“ the government of the church by bishops, the common jealousy
“ hath been, that I am earnest and resolute to maintaine it, not so
“ much out of piety, as policy, and reason of state. Wherein
“ so far indeed reason of state doth induce me to approve that go-
“ vernment above any other, as I find it impossible for a prince to
“ preserve the state in quiet, unless he hath such an influence upon
“ churchmen ; and they such a dependence on him, as may best
“ restrain the seditious exorbitancies of ministers tongues ; who
“ with the keys of heaven, have so far the keys of the peoples

* Carolus Magnus, præter causas pietatis, motus etiam fuit ad distribuenda liberali manu bona ecclesiis ob utilitatem reipublicæ, existimans nimirum episcopos sanctius observaturos fidem promissam. Marca, l. viii. c. 19. F. T.

“ hearts,

“ hearts, as they prevail much by their oratory to let in, or shut out, both peace and loyalty *.” Now all these evils are speedily remedied by this *alliance*. For now the civil magistrate being become protector of the church, and, consequently, supreme head and director of it, the ministry is much in his power; that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, so pernicious to the state, being, by means of a settled revenue, broken and destroyed. He admits and excludes to the *exercise* of their function as he sees fit; and grants it to none but such as give a previous security for their allegiance to the state. By which means, all that power and influence, which the ministers and leaders in a church had over it before the alliance, *as the protectors of religion*, is now drawn off from them, and placed, more properly, in the civil magistrate †.

The view of these mischiefs, from a church in its natural state of independency, so terrified *Hobbes* and his followers, that they denied there ever was such a state; for that the magistrate had a *natural right* of dominion and supremacy over the church, as his servant and creature: which was arguing just as reasonably as that community would act, who, alarmed at the growing power of a neighbour, from which a likely mischief might be suspected, should endeavour, on a principle of right, to bring that people which gave them umbrage under vassalage. Whereas reason and justice both point out a different remedy, which is to obviate the mischief by *league* and *alliance*. The same should be done in the affair before us: and were not men unreasonably prejudiced against a *church*, they would see the cases to be exactly alike. Indeed when there is, during the independency of two different societies composed of one and the same people, a natural and direct tendency,

* ΕΙΚΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ, chap. xvii.

† Ex hoc tuitionis & patrocinii jure quod reges exercent, illud commodi in ecclesiam totamque rempublicam Christianam redundat, ut ecclesiastica & civilis potestas amico & perpetuo fœdere invicem conjunctæ mutuis auxiliis ad comprimendos improborum conatus & juvanda bonorum studia inter se conspirent. *Marca*, l. ii. c. 12. F. T.

in the **LEGITIMATE** exercise of *one* dominion, to the damage of the *other*, then the *law of nations* prescribes the less to be dependent on the greater. But as religious society hath been shewn to have nothing in the *legitimate* exercise of its sovereignty that can clash with civil power, though it be, indeed, so liable to be *abused** as to make it of infinite interest to the state to prevent the abuse, we conclude, that its dependency on the state, the only means of preventing the evil, can be brought about no otherwise than by an *alliance* between the two societies, on the footing of a *free convention*.

But secondly, as a *Hobbeian claim* would be unjust in itself, so would the *prosecution* of it be mischievous to civil liberty. To exchange that temperate, conditional subordination of the clergy, here laid down, for the slavish dependency which *Hobbes* and his followers prescribe, would prove a very ill bargain for the state. An entire independency of the clergy might in time, indeed, overturn a free government; but so, more certainly, would a slavish dependence. The noble author of *The Account of Denmark*, saw clearly the destructive consequences of *both these conditions*, where, in the conclusion of his book, he delivers himself in these words: “It hath been a great mistake amongst us that the *Popish* religion is the only one of all the *Christian* sects proper to introduce and establish slavery in a nation; insomuch that popery and slavery have been thought inseparable.—I shall make bold to say, that other religions have succeeded as effectually in this design as ever *Popery* did.—For in *Denmark*, as well as other protestant countries in the north, *through the entire dependence of the clergy upon the prince*, through their principles and doctrine, which are those of unlimited obedience, through the authority they have with the common people, &c. slavery seems to be more absolutely established than it is in *France*.” If then, in the opinion of this famed politician, an *absolute independence* and an *absolute dependence*

* See note [C], at the end of this Book.

are equally pernicious to society, what remains, but to confess that the clergy's condition in *alliance*, which takes off their independency, and makes them the *free subjects*, but not the *tools* of civil power, is that very circumstance in which only they can be useful to society, in the manner they were destined by God and nature. What obligations, therefore, lye on every lover of his country to protect from *innovations* our present happy constitution, which hath actually placed the clergy in this very condition ; from which the churches of the *north* and *south* have so fatally deviated, though into contrary extremes !

2. Another mischief there is in this *unallied* condition of the church, still more certain and fatal, whenever more than one religion is found in a state. For, in these latter ages, every sect, thinking itself alone the *true church*, or, at least, the most *perfect*, is naturally pushed on to advance its own scheme upon the ruins of the rest ; and where argument fails, *civil power* is made to come in ; as soon as ever a party can be formed in the *public administration* : and we find they have been but too successful in persuading the magistrate that his interests are much concerned in these religious differences. Now the most effectual remedy to those dangerous and strong convulsions, into which states are so frequently thrown by these struggles, is an *alliance* ; which *establishes one church*, and gives a full *toleration to the rest* * ; only keeping sectaries out of the *public administration* ; from a heedless admission into which, these disorders have arisen.

Having now shewn the principal motives which induced the state to *seek* an ALLIANCE with the church :

II.

We come next to consider the motives which the church had to *accept* it. For, this being, as we observed, a FREE CONVENTION ; unless the church, as well as state, had its views of advantage, no

* See note [D], at the end of this Book.

alliance could have been formed. To discover these motives, we must recollect what hath been said of the nature and end of a *religious society*; for the benefits adapted to that nature and end, must be her legitimate motive: but if so, this benefit can be no other than SECURITY FROM ALL EXTERIOR VIOLENCE. The state indeed could not justly offer it, had an alliance never been made. But this is no reason why the church should not think it for her interest to secure her natural right by *compact*, any more than that one state should not bind another, in the same manner, nor to do it violence, though *that other* were under prior obligations, by the law of nature and nations, to abstain.

But, by this alliance between the two societies, the state doth more; it not only promiseth not to injure the church confederated, but to serve it; that is, to protect it from the injuries of other religious societies, which then exist, or may afterwards arise in the state. How one religious society may be injuriously affected by another, we have shewn just before: how great these injuries may prove, will be shewn hereafter. It must needs then be the first care of a church, and a reasonable care, to preserve herself, by all lawful ways, from outward violence. A state then, as we have said, in order to induce the church's acceptance of this offer, must propose some benefit to her, by it; and because this is the only *legitimate* benefit the church can receive, it must propose *this*; which, therefore, being considerable, will be the church's *motive for alliance*.

There are only two other considerations which can be deemed *motives*: The one, *to engage the state to propagate the established religion by force*: and the other, *to bestow honours, riches, and powers upon it*. Now, on recurring to the nature and end of the two societies, the *first* motive will be found *unjust*; and the *second*, *impertinent*. It is *unjust* in the church to require the engagement; because the performing it would be violating the natural right every man hath of worshipping God according to his own conscience: It is *unjust* in the state to engage in it; because, as we have shewn, its

its jurisdiction extendeth not to opinions: it is *impertinent* in a church to aim at riches, honours, powers; because these are things which, as a Religious Society, she can neither use, nor profit by. To imagine these fit accommodations for such a society, is as sensual a fancy as theirs who were for building sumptuous tabernacles for the three great messengers of God, at the Transfiguration. It is very true, that these things which, for the sake of the state, followed an alliance, might be in the private views of ambitious churchmen, when that alliance was projected; and might not a little help forward the completion of it. But what motives the *clergy* of a church might have, is nothing to the purpose of our enquiry; we are only to consider what the *church* had, which, as a Religious Society, consists of the whole body of the community, both laity and clergy*: and her motive, we say, could not be riches, honours, and power, because they have no natural tendency to promote the *ultimate* end of this society, *salvation of souls*; or the *immediate* end, *purity of worship*. We conclude therefore, that the only legitimate motive she could have, *was security and protection from outward violence*. This the Reader would do well to keep in mind, because much will be found to depend upon it, in the sequel of this discourse.

On these *mutual* inducements then, was formed this *FREE ALLIANCE*; which gave birth to a *CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED*: and these being so prevalent, we are not to wonder that the civil communities of all ages had an *ESTABLISHED RELIGION*, which was under the more immediate protection of the civil magistrate; and so, distinguished from those that were only *TOLERATED*. How closely these two interests were united in the *Egyptian* policy, which afterwards became the model of civil wisdom to the rest of mankind, is notorious to all who are the least acquainted with an-

* —Longe a proposito aberrant, qui ecclesiam clero coercent. Latior est illius significatio quæ Laicos ipsumque regem comprehendit.—Ecclesiæ corpus quod ex fidelium omnium compage constituitur, in duas præcipuas personas, sacerdotalem scilicet & regiam, divisum est. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F. T.

tiquity. Nor were the polite republics of *Rome* and *Athens* less solicitous for the common interests of the two societies than that sage and powerful monarchy, the nurse of arts and virtue. But an *Established Worship*, as we say, is the universal voice of nature, and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager, and sensible observer of the various manners of men, *John Baptist Tavernier*, speaking of the kingdom of *Tunquin*, says, “ I come now to the political description of this kingdom, under which I comprehend the Religion, which is almost *every where* in concert with the civil government for the mutual support of each other *.” It is true, there are exceptions to this, as there are to all the general practices of mankind. *Ovington* tells us, p. 278. that, amongst the Bannians of India, this *alliance* is not between religion and the state, but BETWEEN RELIGION AND TRADE; every profession differing from another as much in its modes of worship, as in its ways of traffic. The enemies of our alliance may perhaps improve upon this hint; for as unwilling as they seem to be, that the church should profit by an *alliance* with the state, they would not, I suppose, be averse to *trade's* profiting by an *alliance* with the church.—Now, if the foregoing account may explain the true origin of this general practice, *the practice*, we presume, will corroborate what hath been said of the force of the *motives* here delivered; the wisest and most experienced law-givers, as we see, concurring to act upon them.

But when I say that *all* regular policied states had an *established religion*, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing civil society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produces, affirm, that all nations had a civil policy. For as this writer could not be supposed to mean, that every one instituted a free state, on the principles of public liberty; which

* Je viens à la description politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprends la religion, qui est presque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l'appuy reciproque de l'un & de l'autre. Relation Nouvelle de la Royaume de Tunquin, cap. x. à la fin.

yet was the only society he purposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good ; because it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles, or abused to different ends ; so neither would I be understood to mean, when I say all nations concurred in making this *alliance*, that they all exactly discriminated the natures, and fairly adjusted the rights of the two societies, on the principles here laid down ; though an *establishment* resulting from this discrimination and adjustment be the only one I would be supposed to recommend. On the contrary, I know this union has been generally made on mistaken principles ; or, if not so, hath degenerated by length of time ; whence it hath come to pass, that the national religion in the Pagan World hath been most commonly a slave to the state ; and in the Christian, the state sometimes a slave to the church. And, as it was sufficient for that writer's purpose, that those societies, good or bad, proved the sense all men had of the benefits resulting from civil policy in general, though they were oft mistaken in the means ; so it is for ours, that this universal concurrence in the two societies to *unite*, shews the sense mankind had of the usefulness of such an *union*. And lastly, as that writer's speculative principles are not the less true on account of the general deviation from them in the actual forming of civil societies ; so may not these plain principles of *alliance*, though so few states have suffered themselves to be directed by them in practice ; nor any one before, that I know of, delivered them in speculation : especially if, as in that case, so in *this*, we can derive such *mistake* and *degeneracy* from their causes. It would draw me too far out of my way to explain distinctly the causes of the *mistake* ; and the intelligent reader, who carefully attends to the whole of this discourse, will not be at a loss to discover the most considerable of them ; some of which I have already hinted at ; and others, I may possibly, in the sequel, take occasion to mention. As for the *degeneracy*, it hath been observed, that the *alliance* is of the nature of the FOEDERA INÆQUALIA : Now,

the common effect of such, Grotius informs us of, in these words : *Interim verum est accidere plerumque, ut qui superior est in fœdere, si is POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET : PRÆSERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT* *.

C H A P. III.

Of the reciprocal Terms and Conditions of this Alliance.

AS, from the natures of the two societies, we discovered what kind of union only they could enter into ; so from their natures, together with the *motives* they had in uniting, may be deduced, by necessary consequence, the reciprocal **TERMS** and **CONDITIONS** of this union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great *preliminary and fundamental article* of **ALLIANCE** is this, **THAT THE CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE ; AND THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.**

1. But, to enable the two parties to perform this agreement, there must needs be a **MUTUAL COMMUNICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POWERS.** For the province of each society being naturally distinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, only by mutual concession †.

* De Jure Belli & Pacis, lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

† Hæ ambæ potestates inter se ut duo apices comparantur. His sua in utraque substantia, terrena scilicet & cœlesti, assignantur officia. Eæ ut principes suoque in ordine supremæ sociali tantum fœdere conjunguntur, non altera alteri in suis quidem rebus subditur : & quo jure regi permittitur, ut super animarum salute, sed ex canonum auctoritate, decernat ; eodem jure permittitur pontifici, ut delinquentes etiam pœnis temporalibus, sed forensi lege, non innata sibi potestate, coerceat. Bossuet, l. vi. c. 29. F. T.

2. But again, these societies being likewise as naturally independent one on the other, a mutual concession cannot be safely made unless one of them give up its INDEPENDENCY to the other. From whence arises what Grotius, we see, calls *MANENS PRÆLATIO*; which, in his *Fœdus inæquale*, the more powerful society hath over the less, by the cession of its INDEPENDENCY.

Now from the two conclusions, which necessarily spring from *this fundamental article of union*, we deduce all the terms, conditions, mutual grants, and concessions *, which complete this *alliance*.

For, from this obligation on the church *to apply its influence to the service of the state*, proceed a SETTLED MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINISTERS OF RELIGION, and an ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION with coactive power; which things introduce again, on the other side, the DEPENDENCY OF THE CLERGY ON THE STATE. And from the state's obligation *to support and protect the church*, proceeds the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; which again introduceth, on the other hand, the right of CHURCHMEN TO A SHARE IN THE LEGISLATURE.

Thus are all these rights and privileges closely interwoven, and mutually connected by a necessary dependence on one another. We have here, in a succinct manner, reduced each of them in the order in which they reciprocally arise: but the importance of the subject requiring a more minute examination into the reason and foundation of each GRANT and PRIVILEGE, we shall go over them again in a different order; and put together all that belong to the CHURCH under one head; and all that belong to the STATE under

* *Christianæ politiz antiquitas a summo jure recedebant, ut concordiz litarent. Attamen cum remissio illa nisi certis limitibus concludatur, in abjectionis vitium desciscat, necessariæ sunt regulæ quædam, intra quas prudentia, quæ omnino in his negotiis adhiberi debet, se contineat. Porro regulæ illæ in eorum axiomatum cognitione constitutæ sunt, quæ communi utriusque reipublicæ suffragio sunt receptæ; ex æquo & bono unitatis & concordiz alendæ studio, ex utraque parte quamplurima remissa. Marca, in præfatione secunda. F. T.*

another: the first order being the properest for a *general* view; the second for a *particular*; but both necessary, to give a true idea of that mutual connexion with, and necessary dependence on, one another.

Let us then examine,

I. What the Church **RECEIVES** from the State.

II. What the Church **GIVES** to it.

Which will present us with a *new view of the two societies as they appear under an establishment*; and leave nothing wanting to enable us to judge perfectly of their natures.

I.

I. What the Church *receives* from the State by this alliance, is,

I. First, A **PUBLIC ENDOWMENT FOR ITS MINISTERS**: a separate and certain share of the national property being assigned for the maintenance and support of the clergy; portioned out into distinct benefices; and collated to by the state. The reasons of this endowment are: 1. To render the religious society, whose assistance the state so much wants, more firm and stable. 2. To invite and encourage the clergy's best service to the state, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. But, 3. and principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency, between the clergy and people, which arises from the minister's support by voluntary contribution; the only maintenance that could be claimed or given before the two societies were allied; which dependence, we have shewn to be productive of great mischiefs to the state. Add to all this, that as the clergy are then under the sovereign's direction, and consequently become a public order in the state, it is but fit and decent, that a public maintenance should be provided for them. Which most nations have done by way of **TYTHES**.

From this account of a public and fixed provision for the clergy, may be deduced these **COROLLARIES**.

1. *That*

1. *That though the payment of tythes to the Jewish priesthood should give the Christian Clergy no right to them, till bestowed by the sovereign, yet the example of this mode of provision, under the Mosaic Economy, may be fairly and properly urged by Christian ministers in favour of them as a proper civil donation.* Under the Mosaic æconomy, God himself made the union between church and state; as he had before planned the form of civil government. From his very choice of the Hebrew people we may collect, that his dispensation to them was as well relative to the rest of mankind as to themselves. Now as amongst the various ends which he had for erecting that society, we must conclude, *one* was to teach mankind, by his example in the HOREB CONTRACT, to form civil policies on the principles of natural right and public liberty; so we may be equally assured, that one of his ends *in uniting the two societies*, was to give them the same general lesson of *union* and *alliance*: If an union, in general, then consequently all those fundamental terms of union which arise (not from the peculiar nature of the Jewish church and state, but) from the common nature of a civil and a religious society united, must be intended likewise for our imitation. But a fixed maintenance in the Mosaic æconomy, for the priests, being one of those fundamental terms which depends not on the frame of that peculiar policy, but, of a church and state in general, we may fairly conclude, that the mode of it by *tythes*, as a mode in itself equitable, is not improper for our imitation. For though the establishment of this mode of provision in Judea confers no divine right, yet it strongly supports every *civil constitutional* appointment of them.

2. A Second Corollary is, *That it is ABSURD in any member of the established church to suspect, that a settled revenue may be injurious to the state, as making the clergy too powerful: and that it is UNJUST in any who are not of the established church to refuse payment of tythes, on pretence of their contributing to the maintenance of opinions different from their own.* The suspicion of church-men is *absurd*; because it appears, from what we have but now observed, that this policy
bath

hath a very contrary effect; a settled maintenance destroying that mutual dependency between clergy and people, from whence only can arise the power of churchmen to do mischief. In the church of Rome, besides the endowed clergy, there are several orders of religious which possess nothing, but depend on the charity of the people. And yet, for many ages, these *evens* and *botches* of a corrupted church got all the power and influence of churchmen to themselves, from the endowed clergy, notwithstanding the immensity of their possessions. And the state throve accordingly.—The refusal of dissenters is *unjust*; because this maintenance is not assigned by the public for the *support of opinions*, but for *the use and service of the state*, as such. With as good reason, therefore, might they refuse to pay other taxes which, in their several applications, are for the same civil purpose. The difference is only accidental: *Church-officers* happen to have religious opinions; and *civil officers*, sometimes, have none*.

3. A Third Corollary is: *That as a fixed and public maintenance began with an established church, so it must end with it.* For the members of a church unestablished have no right, let their association, for that purpose, be as extensive as it will, to support their ministers by an appropriated endowment. All they can do for them is by voluntary contribution; a fixed maintenance being solely in the power of the state to bestow, both as it is a common tax, and as it requires a public sanction for its exaction: and the state could neither *wisely* nor *justly* affix a settled maintenance on the clergy of a church with which it was not in alliance. Not *wisely*, because the advantage in breaking the dependency between clergy and people, which the state gains by a fixed maintenance, would be greatly over-balanced by the inconvenience of giving so considerable a share of its property to a society independent of it. Not *justly*, because no contribution to a public maintenance could be lawfully demanded of those who are not members of an unestablished church

* See note [E], at the end of this Book.

so pretending. For in this case it would indeed be for *maintenance of opinions*, which they think erroneous; and to which no man can be obliged to contribute; as all men justly may, to that which, by *covenant and compact*, is expressly directed to promote the good of that civil policy of which they are members.

II. The second privilege the church *receives* from this alliance is, *a place for her superior members in the court of legislature*; which, with us, is THE BISHOPS SEAT IN PARLIAMENT. For as it necessarily follows (as we shall see presently) from that *fundamental article of alliance of the State's supporting and protecting the Church*, that the church must, in return, *give up its independency to the state*, whereby the state becomes empowered to determine in all church-matters, so far as relates to it as a society; as this, I say, necessarily follows, the church must needs have its *superior members in the court of legislature*, to prevent that power, which the state receives in return for the protection it affords, from being perverted to the church's injury: for the church's giving up its independency to the state, without reserving some share in the legislature, would be making itself, instead of a *subject*, a *slave*, to the state. Besides, without these ecclesiastics, no laws could be reasonably made in the court of legislature concerning the church; because no free man, or body, can be bound by laws to which they have not given their consent. So that as the church, when she entered into alliance, cannot *justly*, we must presume she did not *willingly* give up her independency, without the reservation of such a privilege. This shews the necessity of their sitting and acting in the legislature, in all affairs *ecclesiastical*. That they should act too, when they are there, like the other members, *in civil matters*, is very useful to the community: as giving additional sanction to its laws, when the people see that church and state have concurred in their enacting.

From this account of the grounds and original of this privilege may be deduced the following COROLLARIES:

1. " That

1. "That churchmen who sit in the higher house of legislature "in consequence of this *alliance*, are to be considered first, not as "REPRESENTATIVES indeed, but yet as GUARDIANS OF THE "CHURCH: the qualification for the exercise of this office being "their *baronies*. They are in the second place to be considered as "BARONS like the other members of that house." For not to allow that bishops sit as guardians, would be to take away the most useful, and even the necessary end of their sitting, *which is, to watch over the interests of the church*. Besides, this office implies, that the church still continues a *distinct*, though an *allied* society; whereas to sit only as *barons* supposes the CHURCH not only *united* to, but incorporated with, and *dissolved* in, the STATE, while lay fees alone are seen to give one and the same privilege both to the secular and spiritual lords.

2. "That yet, notwithstanding, these churchmen (though they "sit as *guardians* as well as *barons*) do not, on the other hand, by "virtue of this alliance, constitute or compose any distinct or THIRD "ESTATE in parliament." For this would be attended with all the mischiefs of a contrary extreme, by putting the allied church again in possession of its *independency*, while it had a *negative* on the acts of the state. And this evil, which no management could prevent, so neither could time itself remedy: for the union, which is in its nature dissolvable, would by churchmen's sitting as a *third estate* become perpetual; every estate of legislature being essential to that government whereto it belongs. But whatever is essential can never be separated or taken away, without a change in the government itself.

These are the two extremes so hurtful both to religion and civil government, so destructive of that benefit which a rightly formed *alliance* is fitted to produce. Yet the common system hath joined these two discordant parts together; and made the bishops, at once, *guardian-barons* and a *distinct estate*.

3. A Third corollary is, "That as the bishops' right to sit in "parliament began with the *alliance*, so it must end likewise with
" it."

“ it.” It hath been shewn that the bishops sit there, *ne quid ecclesia detrimenti capiat* : For the church, by this alliance, having given up its *supremacy* to the state, which had now, whenever the grant should be abused, opportunities to do her injury, the principal churchmen are placed in a court of legislature, as watchmen to prevent the mischief, and to give the church’s sentiments concerning laws ecclesiastical. But when the *alliance* is broken, and the establishment dissolved, the church recovers back its supremacy, and from thenceforth the state losing the means of injuring, by having no longer a right of making laws for the exterior government of it, the church hath no longer a pretence of having *guardians* in the legislature : nor will the bishops’ *baronies* remain, to keep them there ; for these tenures will exist no longer than while the church continues *established* ; it being part of that public maintenance which the state assigns to the clergy of a church in *alliance* : and which, on the dissolution of that union, reverts back again to the state. So neither the office nor title of *guardian-barons* remaining, bishops of the universal church have no further business in any particular civil court of legislature.

Having thus, in a summary way, considered the nature of that station which churchmen hold in parliament, as it is *DE JURE*, deducible from the principles of this theory, I shall now, the subject being both important and curious, consider it *DE FACTO*, under the several forms it assumed, as the *CONSTITUTION* kept improving and refining, till it arrived to that perfection, in which we hope long to enjoy it.

What I have to observe on the subject will be best digested in a resolution of these three questions.

I. Whether the bishops in parliament now make one of the *ESTATES* there ?

II. Whether they be *BARONS* of parliament ?

III. Whether they be *PEERS* of parliament ?

I. As to the first question, it hath been held as a constitutional point, by many of great name, amongst which are Lord Chancellor Hyde, Bishop Stillingfleet, and Archbishop Wake, that the Bishops even now compose an *estate* in parliament. “Learned and unbiaſſed men (ſays the firſt of theſe eminent perſons), who know the frame and conſtitution of the kingdom, know that the biſhops are no leſs the repreſentative body of the clergy than the Houſe of Commons is of the people*.” And again, ſpeaking of the Biſhops’ expulſion from their houſe, he ſays, “They who loved the church, and were afraid of ſo great an alteration as the taking away *one of the three eſtates*, of which the parliament is compounded, were infinitely provoked†.”—He who looks no further than into the preſent face of the conſtitution, will wonder how ſuch a doctrine ever came to be received; ſince every circumſtance relating to, and, at preſent, attendant on, the biſhops’ ſeat in parliament, manifeſts the falſehood of it. They have no *negative* voice, which is eſſential to an ESTATE: they have no *ſeparate* houſe for conſultation, which hath been long the eſtabliſhed uſage of an ESTATE: they are not in numbers ſufficient, on the *feudal* ſyſtem, to conſtitute an ESTATE.

If we would know from whence this venerable error hath ariſen; for venerable it is both for the antiquity of it, and for the eminence of thoſe who hold it; we muſt go up to the very cunabula of the Engliſh conſtitution.

As in the infancy of letters there was no accurate ſeparation of ſcience; ſo in the infancy of the *Northern Policy* there was no diſtinct ſeparation of ESTATES.

Till the Norman Conqueſt, the BISHOP and the ALDERMAN ſat together on the bench, in one common judicatory. *William* made a fit and proper ſeparation of the magiſtracy, as the terms of an *alliance*, between the two ſocieties, require. Which, had it not been for an accident of the times, the accumulating ſuperſtition.

* Hiſt. of the Rebellion, B. iv.

† Life of Edward earl of Clarendon, p. 101, 102, 8vo edit.

and the rapacious spirit of usurpation in the church of Rome, would have been of great advantage to the community, by marking out and ascertaining the proper bounds and limits of each SOCIETY. For churchmen were very improper ministers of the crown, to judge in causes merely civil, both from the peculiar nature of their office, and the implied prohibition of their master ; who himself disclaims all temporal jurisdiction. Besides, the practice of the BISHOP's sitting with the ALDERMAN rendered the original of the former's *coercive power*, there exercised in a coequality, very doubtful and uncertain. As the *Alderman's* authority was seen to be from the *state*, men would be naturally misled to think that the *bishop's* was from the *church* ; at a time too, when churchmen allowed so little to the civil magistrate ; whereas all *coercive power* being derived from the state, and to be exercised only for its use, it is of the highest moment not to have it misunderstood. From henceforward the CHURCH became, in a more just and proper sense than before, ONE OF THE THREE ESTATES OF THE REALM. But it was not till long after that they became, as properly, AN ESTATE IN PARLIAMENT.

For, though the bishops and prelates sat in Parliament as BARONS, and as GUARDIANS of the church, in spiritual matters, even from the Conquest, yet it was not till the twenty-third year of Edward I. that churchmen constituted an ESTATE IN PARLIAMENT. They and the *Commonalty* receiving this quality or condition of estates together, from the mode of granting their aids in Parliament ; which was by taxing themselves distinctly ; and supporting themselves in this right (as appears from all the records) by the exertion of a *negative voice* ; a privilege which constitutes, and is essential to an *estate in Parliament* *. And the way of summoning the clergy thither,

* When the *Estates General* of France, a body most resembling our *Parliaments*, had received its most perfect form and stability under John II, his famous declaration concerning its nature and rights (which some have compared to the *Magna Charta* of his namesake, King of England) begins with an inviolable law, that nothing pro-

ther, as an *estate*, was by adding the *præmunientes* clause to the bishop's writ: in consequence of which, the whole body of the clergy appeared, partly in person, and partly by proxy; the bishops, prelates, and the *procuratores cleri*, composing this *estate*. But as their principal and almost only business was granting subsidies to the crown, it happened, as much on this account, as because the *three estates* sat all together in one place, that the exercise of their *negative*, otherwise than in ecclesiastical matters, is not so clearly delivered down to us. For, till the latter end of Edward III. the estates of Parliament sat together in one house. Till then, they debated in common and granted apart: as now, they sit apart and grant in common.

But against this account of the FIRST ESTATE, it may be objected, "That even while the clergy gave separate aids in Parliament, the lower clergy, at times, were not summoned." I answer, that this makes nothing against their quality of an *estate*; for in those irregular seasons of the constitution, the Commons themselves were sometimes neglected, as in the nineteenth year of Edward III.

It may be further objected, that, "according to this system, the SECOND ESTATE, consisting of the temporal peers, should have taxed themselves, separately from the THIRD, consisting of the Commons; in the manner of the FIRST." This is true. And in fact they sometimes did thus tax themselves: though sometimes they did not: and there was sufficient reason for both these practices. The PROPERTY of the kingdom might be considered in two lights, as separated either by their different TENURES; or by their supposed different ORIGINALS. When considered in the first light, the *tenures* of the Lords and Commons were so very unlike, that it was no wonder they should (as they sometimes did) grant

posed there should be held of validity that had not the concurrence of three orders, of the *Clergy*, *Nobles*, and *Commons*, and that the concurrence of any two only should not bind the third, which had refused its consent.

their

their subsidies separately and distinct from one another. But when **PROPERTY** was considered according to its supposed *original*, one part founded in *human* right, and the other in *divine*, it then divided itself into *lay property* and *clerical*; and the property of the Lay Lords and the Commons fell into one of the divisions. Hence they found it reasonable to tax themselves together. But, as was essential to *estates*, the Lords and Commons had a negative on one another, in the common proposal.

Thus was this change in the constitution (by the **ADDITION** of a *clerical estate in parliament*) silently and insensibly introduced. It returned as silently and insensibly to its former model, by a gradual and unperceived **EXCLUSION** of this *estate*. For the clergy, in that corrupt season of religion, ever aiming at an independency on the civil magistrate, began, in good time, to break in upon this *new establishment*; first by contriving, for the sake of pretended *regularity*, to have their grants in Parliament **CONFIRMED** in their **SYNODS**. This was easily indulged them, being considered only as a matter of form. When they had so soon gained their point, it was not long ere they grew scrupulous and uneasy about **GRANTING** at all in *Parliament*; and contended warmly for having this business carried, in the first instance, into their *Synods*. But this was a more serious matter. Our kings did not care to trust churchmen out of their sight; and the wisest of themselves began to foresee how it might effect their new quality of an *estate* in parliament. So this pretension, for a time, was coolly pushed. But the frequent and urgent necessities of the crown (of which they never failed to make their advantage) encouraged them, at such junctures, to urge this last demand with fresh vigour: and the monarch, in such straits, was more intent to get their subsidies, than to watch over their encroachments: so that this, likewise, was occasionally suffered; as in easier times, it was occasionally denied. However, the clergy having been so far successful in their aims, as *always to confirm*, and *sometimes to give*, their subsidies in synod, the crown found it necessary that these *church-assemblies* should

should be ever at hand to attend *parliament*, lest scruple or pretence should afford this *first estate* a handle to retard the public supplies : and therefore at the same time that the Parliament-writs were issued, a writ of summons was now directed to the clergy, to assemble in synod, under the new name of a CONVOCATION, as they now treated of *civil* matters ; to distinguish it from a *provincial synod*, which treated only of *spiritual*. And to manifest more clearly the change in the nature of these ecclesiastical assemblies, from the time of Edward II. provincial Parliamentary writs were issued to the two arch-bishops, or in a vacancy to the prior and chapter, requiring them to send their mandates to the clergy of the province, to summon them to Convocation, *to assist in the difficult and urgent necessities of the church and REALM*. On which account, doubtless, it was, that in after-times these *Convocations* were thought to be irregular if assembled out of Parliament-time : and the opinion appears to be founded. But the clergy were able fencers. They knew as well how to take advantage of an adversary (for such they almost always esteemed the CIVIL POWER) when he was on, as when he was off his guard. The *Convocation* now constantly sitting in Parliament-time, it gave them a pretence more obstinately than before to insist on ALWAYS granting their subsidies in *Convocation* ; since that assembly was always at hand to enable them to serve the crown with expedition.

How soon they succeeded in this likewise, may be guessed at, from what passed in parliament so early as the fourth year of Richard II. The *Commons* having offered a certain sum, on condition the *clergy* would give their proportion ; the churchmen bravely answered, *That their grants NEVER HAD BEEN nor ought to be made in parliament*. Without doubt, applauding themselves for their dexterity in securing the honour of their word, by giving the name of *grant*, to the *confirmation* of it. A covering, slight as it was, yet suiting, well enough, this summer-season of the church. But the prelates of those times never obtained a favour, which they did not employ for a step to procure a greater. Thus we have

have seen how they used the indulgence, of *sometimes confirming* their grants in Convocation, to extend their claim of *always confirming them*: And, from this latter allowance, how they were encouraged to ask the privilege of *sometimes making* their grants in Convocation: which when imprudently connived at, they proceeded, in a little time, to claim the right of *always making* them there. With what success they accomplished all this may be seen above, where they declare, as if they had ingrossed to themselves the gift of memory as well as languages, *that their grants never had been, nor ought to be made in parliament.*

But, so the clergy *granted*, the indigent monarch was little delicate about the manner how. He thought he had fully secured the main point, by always summoning a Convocation along with a parliament. But he was out in his reckoning: the clergy were not to be so served. They appear to have been ill at ease while labouring under this badge of civil dependency, the necessity of granting when the other *estates* did. They therefore at length assumed, not only, that they ought to grant no where *out of* Convocation, but that, *in it*, they should grant but when they themselves pleased, as their own content, they pretended, was necessary to bring this Convocation together. In the weak reign of *Richard II. Courtney*, archbishop of Canterbury, plainly tells the King himself—*Credimus quod Clerus convocari non valeant, nisi scripsimus pro eodem* *. By a dextrous pass of hand, trying to establish this *usurped* right on a former *contested* one; by confounding the new provincial *Convocation*, called for civil matters, with the old provincial *synods*, convened only for spiritual.

It is true, that by this conduct, they lost as much of their *legal* ground on one side, as they had gained of their *usurped*, on the other. For when they had possessed themselves of the power of granting only in Convocation; and claimed to assemble that Convocation when they themselves thought fit, they had no longer

* See note [F], at the end of this Book.

a pretence of being an *estate in parliament*. But their canonists had warned them of the danger of parting with any thing they had once got. So that trusting to what stood them in more stead than their own clerkship, the ignorance of the laity, when in the fourth year of Richard II. they had, as we have seen, affirmed *IN VERBO SACERDOTIS*, *that their grants never had been, nor ought to be, made in parliament*, and thereby fairly abolished their *estate* in parliament, they did not scruple, in the twenty-first of the same reign,—*to pray the King, that since divers judgments were undone HERETOFORE for that the clergy were not present, they might appoint some common proctor with sufficient authority for that purpose*. They confided in their logic, and were not deceived. They desire they may be still acknowledged an *estate in parliament*, because they had been one, *HERETOFORE*. And the demand was granted: for what court could resist the force of such an argument?

By what hath been said, the reader may now understand, that since the time of Edward I. there have passed three periods, in the course of which, the clergy exercised this right of *taxing themselves*. The first was when they did it in Parliament only. The second, when they did it sometimes in Parliament and sometimes in Convocation. The third, when they did it in Convocation only. Under the two first they were, without all question, a *civil estate in Parliament*: under the last, a *civil estate only in Convocation*, which they continued to be all the time they taxed themselves in that place. But when they had given up this right to the community, they ceased to be a *civil estate* even in *Convocation*: and from thenceforth were no other than representatives of the church in their *synods* for spiritual matters. And in quality of a *civil estate*, were reduced back to what they were before the time of Edward I. *AN ESTATE OF THE KINGDOM*. Very properly distinguished from an *estate in parliament* or in *convocation*, notwithstanding bishop Stillingfleet's reasoning to the contrary: Who says,—“That “then the *three estates are not represented in parliament*.” For this is a mistake. No *estate* can sit in parliament but for
their

their TEMPORALS : and the clergy, since they ceased to tax themselves, have been represented for their *temporals*, by the COMMONS ; whose members are chosen by the clergy and lay-people promiscuously, according to their respective properties. It is true, this answer would be defective, were the *temporalities* of the clergy of a distinct nature from those of the laity, as was the doctrine in the times of superstition, when a certain consecration of one part of them, and a divine designation of the other, sanctified their property, as it did their persons. But the clergy have long since become both wiser and honefter. They own their possessions to be a property derived to them from the same civil source with that of the laity ; that it is all of the same *species* ; and consequently may have the *same representation*. But the learned prelate's phrase is curious—*An estate REPRESENTED in parliament*, for, *an estate sitting in parliament* : but the impropriety was unavoidable. The churchmen in parliament were, at this time, too few to be called *an estate*, he therefore chuses to call them *the representatives of an estate*.

AGAIN : I cannot see (says bishop Stillingfleet) how it can be “ avoided but the bishops in parliament must be one of the *three estates*, unless a Convocation sit.” And then I suppose his meaning is, that not the bishops alone, but they, with the rest of the clergy, make the *first of the three estates in parliament*. His whole reasoning being founded on this mistaken principle, that it is now essential to the British constitution that its parliaments should be composed of THREE ESTATES. At least, he must suppose, that since there was once *three estates* in it, no change has been made in the constitution ; no such change having been proclaimed. But this change, we say (as important as it is) is a matter which may be done in silence, and by degrees, as well as suddenly, and with much noise.

To return : the time when the clergy ceased to be *a civil estate in Convocation* is well known ; for the *Æra* of their giving up the right to tax themselves is in every man's memory. But the precise

time of their ceasing to be an *estate in parliament* cannot be so well fixed. It was certainly at the time when they no longer gave in *parliament*, but in *convocation* only. Yet, when this was, is not easy to be found. For they gained their point, as we observed above, gradually, and step by step. First, they grew importunate to have their grants in parliament, *confirmed* in convocation. When they had got thus far, they tried for the privilege of *granting* in convocation. This was not so easily obtained : however, occasionally, it was indulged. So that, for a course of years, they sometimes *granted* in one place, and sometimes in another. At length they gained the point they were ever aiming at from the first ; to be allowed to give their subsidies *always in convocation*. From thenceforth the clergy, no longer granting in *parliament*, were no longer any *estate* there. This precise time, for the reasons just given, is not likely to be ascertained ; yet one would think that the small number of the clergy which afterwards came to parliament, would have pretty well marked it out. And so indeed it would, but for that perversity and wayward ambition in the clergy, who would needs continue an *estate* in parliament, though, by persisting to grant only in *Convocation*, they had transferred their *estate*ship (together with their submission) from *parliament* to that other place : and the *præmunientes* clause continuing (as it still does) to run the same, in the bishop's writs of summons to parliament, supported them in this absurd idea. However though, occasionally, they sat in numbers like an *estate*, some think, as late as Henry VI. yet from the time (as well as we can guess) that the clergy granted *only in convocation*, they gradually paid their attendance in *parliament*, in fewer and still fewer numbers ; till at length none came thither except the bishops and greater prelates. But, indeed, it was no wonder the clergy should indulge this notion of their being still an *estate* in parliament, even after they had refused that submission and service of granting in parliament, which was the only thing that made them so ; it is no wonder, I say, they should be fond of this notion, since the *two other estates* appear to have been long under the same delusion,

delusion, with regard to these prelatical deserters. For the clergy, as we said, coming from thenceforth (except when their usurped claims were in danger) in small numbers to parliament, the speaker of the House of Commons 21 of Richard II. required that the clergy should constitute a proxy to parliament; because, says he, “Divers judgments and ordinances have been repealed and annulled, for this reason, that the STATE of the clergy was not *present* in parliament at the making of them*.” The speaker’s political logic not reaching to this truth, that when the King and Parliament had consented that the clergy should grant their parliamentary subsidies in *convocation*, they were no longer a STATE in *parliament*, but a STATE in *convocation only*. On the same mistaken principle, it continued a custom long after, for the House of Lords to adjourn themselves on those days when the bishops and prelates were to be absent in Convocation, as wanting, at such times, this imaginary ESTATE. Nay, the whole LEGISLATURE, the King and parliament, even down to the time of Elizabeth, continued, in their public acts, to give the name of an *estate* to the clergy in parliament.

THAT the NAMES and FORMS of things should remain the same, long after the things themselves have ceased or been abolished, will appear nothing strange to us, when we reflect, how adherent and tenacious the people, in all times and places, have ever been of old modes and fashions. Especially when we observe further, that their governors have generally found it for their interests to comply, in this matter, with the people’s humours and tempers. So that when a *constitution* hath undergone a change, not by violence, but by slow and insensible degrees, OLD NAMES AND FORMS have still continued; and kept their ground so long that, at length, for this very reason, the *change* itself hath been called in question.

* Archbishop Wake observes, that to the 5th of this King the writs to the clergy ran to *do* as well as to *consent*; from the 5th only to *consent*, *reducing* (says he) *their power to a mere matter of consent*. But is not *consenting* and dissenting, *doing*; and does it not imply that their consent was thought necessary, as an *estate*?

Nay, when the *constitution of a state* hath been totally changed, and even by sudden violence, as was that of the republic of Rome to an imperial tyranny, so fond were that people of *old names*, and so apt are all people to take *names* for *things*, that the usurpers found a necessity, and found their account in that necessity, of having **NOMINAL Consuls, Prætors, Tribunes, &c.** according to the old republican forms.

We need not wonder then, that when the clergy, so lately as Elizabeth, were called, by the several statutes of her reign, an *estate in parliament*, there should have been ever since several particulars of great name, both amongst the clergy and laity, some with good faith, and some without, who have persevered in contending for this imaginary *estate*. Not all, for the sake of the clergy: The constitution has engaged the care of many, who finding the records speak so frequently of **THREE ESTATES** in parliament, and seeing from many of the circumstances, occasionally enforced above, that the *clergy* could no longer be one of them, they have, in order to make out *three estates in parliament* (essential, as they falsely supposed, to the constitution) made the King himself the **FIRST ESTATE**, in direct opposition to the very nature and genius of all **FEUDAL** governments.

Thus have I endeavoured, by a plain historical deduction of facts, to clear up a very embroiled affair: in itself of importance; but necessary to be explained, if we would discourse intelligibly on the two next questions, which I promised to discuss.

II. The first is, in what capacity the Bishops now sit in the House of Parliament, when they are no longer an **ESTATE** there? Whether as **PRELATES** of the church, or as **BARONS** of the realm, or both?

The House of Lords compose two sovereign assemblies; a supreme **COURT** of judicature with the king at the head; and an **ESTATE** of legislature. The bishops sit in this supreme court of judicature as **BARONS OF THE REALM**. In the Saxon times, indeed, they held their

their temporalities in *frank almoigne* : but the Conqueror, much against their will, changed that tenure into *baronage*, by subjecting them to all the services of lay-baronies. The constitutions of Clarendon go upon this principle, and declare that the bishops sit as *barons* in the supreme court of judicature. “ ARCHIEPISCOPI, EPISCOPI (say the Constitutions) et universæ personæ regni, qui de rege tenent in capite, habent possessiones suas de rege, sicut BARONIAM, et inde respondeant et sicut cæteri barones debent interesse judiciis curiæ regis.”—On these *Constitutions*, NAT. BACON observes, and rightly, *that they were made by the Lords in their judicial capacity*. The *Constitutions* are formed upon the principles of the FEUDAL LAW, which directs, that *barons* of the realm only shall compose this court. Indeed, according to the nature of civil government in general, as well as of the *Feudal* in particular, none but *barons* for their temporalities, whether lay or ecclesiastical, can sit in such a court of justice.—As ministers of Christ, or as successors to the apostles in the government of the church, no bishop has any *civil jurisdiction* belonging to his office. *Who made me a judge or divider amongst you?* says their divine master. So that whatever *civil jurisdiction* churchmen have, they derive it all from the *civil power* : and from this power of the *Feudal* kind, *ecclesiastical barons* are invested with right of judgement in that supreme court.

It is otherwise in the legislative part of this high assembly. There, the bishops sit as PRELATES OF THE CHURCH, in behalf of religion ; nothing being more consonant to right reason, in a Christian country, or more essential to an *alliance between church and state*, than, that certain of the superior clergy should be of the higher court of legislature : not as *representatives* of the *church*, any more than lay lords are *representatives* of the *state*, but as members simply of each society, yet, at the same time, as GUARDIANS of each, respectively. But with this difference, that as the temporal lords are ordained to watch over the civil interests primarily, and the religious interests in the second place ; so the spiritual lords are to intend the religious interests primarily, and the civil, only in the second place.

place. *Lay* and *spiritual* lords belonging to both societies; but belonging to them in the varying modes of relation above explained: the indispensable qualification both of the **MAGNATES** and the **PRELATI** to bear this share in legislation, being their **BARONIES**.

That this is the sense in which the English constitution considers the bishops' seat in this high court of legislature appears from the old custom, in the vacancy of a see, to send writs to the **GUARDIAN OF THE SPIRITUALITIES** to attend parliament: a plain declaration, that government considered the bishops in parliament as *ecclesiastical prelates* sitting in behalf of religion, rather than as *barons*: for, the barony, at this period, is, as it were, in *abeyance*. While churchmen made a third estate in parliament, the bishops sat as **BISHOPS**, properly so called, and **BARONS**: ever since, they have sat under the more general idea of **PRELATES**, or superior churchmen, and **BARONS**; as bishops now do in the Germanic diets, where they sit as prelates and princes of the empire.

This will assist us to appreciate the value of Lord Chief Justice **HALE**'s opinion concerning bishops in parliament, as we find it in a manuscript treatise *touching the right of the crown*, communicated to me by a friend. By which it appears, that his not properly distinguishing between the *court of judicature*, and the *estate of legislation*, in the **HOUSE OF LORDS**, hath spread over his discourse much inaccuracy and confusion. His words are these:—"The
 " bishops sit in the House of Peers by *usage* and *custom*, which I
 " therefore call *usage*, because they had it not by express charter,
 " for then we should find some. Neither had they it by tenure;
 " for, regularly, their tenure was in *free-alms*, and not *per baro-*
 " *niam*, and therefore it is clear they were not *barons* in respect of
 " their possessions, but their possessions were called baronies, because
 " they were the possessions of customary barons. Besides, it is
 " evident that the writ of summons usually went *electo & confirmato*,
 " before any restitution of the temporalities; so that their posses-
 " sions were not the cause of their summons [as it was in part, and
 " but in part, in the case of some abbots.] Neither are they
 " *barons*

“ *barons* by prescription ; for it is evident that as well the lately
 “ erected bishops, as *Gloucester, Oxon, &c.* had voice in parliament,
 “ and yet created within time of memory, and without any special
 “ words in the erection thereof to entitle them to it. So that it is
 “ a privilege by usage annexed to the episcopal dignity within the
 “ realm ; not to their order, which they acquire by consecration ;
 “ nor to their persons, for in respect to their persons they are not
 “ barons, nor to be tried as barons, but to **THEIR INCORPORATION**
 “ and dignity episcopal.”—*The bishops sit in the House of Peers by*
usage and custom. This is observed, to shew a difference between
 their right, and the right of the Lords-temporal. He gives two
 reasons for his assertion. 1. *Because it is not by express charter.*
 2. *Neither by tenure ; for that, REGULARLY, their tenure was in*
FREE ALMS, and not PER BARONIAM. His first reason is allowed ;
 but then it includes many Lords-temporal, who sit by *usage and*
custom. His second reason is more to his point, but not true ; for
 though during the Saxon times they held their possessions in *free*
alms : yet, as the learned Chief Justice well knew, this tenure was
 changed by the Conqueror (along with the constitution itself) into
 the tenure *per baroniam*. Now, because they once sat, and not for
 their tenures, does it follow, that they cannot sit at present for
 their tenures, which give a right by usage and custom ? The
 clergy were once the *first estate in parliament*. Would the great
 man have allowed it to follow, that they are so now ? It is with
 regret that I take notice of a piece of management and argumenta-
 tive *finèssè*, in the most candid of all writers.—**REGULARLY** (says
 he) *their tenure was in free alms*. If instead of, *regularly*, he had
 said, *anciently*, the phrase had been exact, and the proposition true.
 But then it would not have served his purpose. *Regularly* (says
 he) *their tenure was*—this, though a kind of jargon, is to insinuate
 however, that *regularly their tenure is*. Yet this being visibly false
 (because the Conqueror changed what *regularly was*—free alms ;
 into what *regularly is*—per baroniam), the good man chose rather
 to *insinuate*, by an obscure phrase, what he would not *affirm* in a
 plain one.

But

But further, to support his second argument, he observes, that *the bishops' writ of summons usually went electo & confirmato, before any restitution of the temporalities*. And for a good reason; but a reason which makes nothing for his point; though this he did not see, from his not chusing to distinguish between the lords' *juridical* and *legislative* capacity. In the *latter*, we have shewn, that the bishops sit as *prelates* and *guardians* of the church, and not as *barons*; though their *qualification* to sit in a court of legislature is their *baronies*: in the *former*, they sit as *barons*. But the principal branch of parliamentary business being the *legislative*, the *juridical* being only occasional, we easily understand how it came to pass, that the summons *usually* went *electo & confirmato*. This leads me to observe (as it tends more clearly to explain this matter) that the practice of the great officer of state, who issues these writs, has been, sometimes to send them *before the restitution of the temporalities*; sometimes *after*; just as each happened to conceive of the bishops' right in general; or to distinguish concerning the exercise of it, in the two distinct courts, in particular.

The learned Chief Justice gives his second argument this further support. *Neither are the bishops, barons by prescription, for the lately erected bishops, as Gloucester, Oxon, &c. had voice in parliament, and yet, created within time of memory*. But surely, if the temporalities of the ORDER be *baronies by prescription*, as his argument seems to allow, then, in all reason and common sense, those members of the ORDER, lately formed, are, by the very erection of their bishopricks, partakers of all the rights of *barons by prescription*, enjoyed by their elder brethren: and this, on the very principles of the learned Chief Justice himself: who, in conclusion, tells us, they derive all from *their INCORPORATION and episcopal dignity*. But we know that all the *members* of an *incorporated body* enjoy the same rights and privileges in common. This shews the true reason of a fact which the learned Judge seems to lay some stress upon, where he observes that in the creation of the new erected bishops, *there are no special words in their erection to intitle them to the rights of barons*

barons by prescription: for now, we see, even on the learned Lawyer's own principles, there was no need.

From all this defective reasoning he thus concludes.—*So that it is a privilege by usage annexed to the episcopal dignity within the realm, not to their order, which they acquire by consecration.* He means, they sit as *bishops of the church of England*, not as *bishops of the universal church*. This is true when meant of their seat in the court of legislature only.—He goes on—*the privilege is not annexed to their persons, for in respect to their persons, they are NOT BARONS.* It hath been here evidently shewn, that **THEY ARE**, unless personality be separable from office or title; and that the *privilege* of sitting in the high court of judicature is annexed to their *baronies*; which *baronies* are a **QUALIFICATION** for their sitting in the court of legislature; though in this court, the *privilege* of the bishops (to speak in the chief justice's own language) *be IMMEDIATELY annexed to episcopal dignity within the realm.*

III. The last question is concerning the **PARLIAMENTARY PEERAGE** of the bishops. For such is the perversity of opposing parties, and their equal propensity to fall into contrary extremes, that while some churchmen, on the one hand, will still have the bishops an **ESTATE** in parliament, although it hath been extinguished long since; so on the other, some laymen seem unwilling to allow, that the bishops are even **PEERS** in that place, though long possessed of this uninterrupted title; at all times, recognized by our *kings* and *parliaments* themselves. By these, they are declared to be—**PEERS of the land—PEERS of parliament—PEERS of the realm.** In the 15th of Edward II. when the parliament reversed the judgement of the *Spencers*, one cause by them assigned was, *Because the Lords Spiritual, who were PEERS, assented not to it.* In an act of 25 Edward III. intituled, *A Bishop's Temporalities shall not be seized for a convent,* this reason is given—"Sith they be **PEERS** of the land, the king, &c." in the 21st of Richard II. they are called *Peers of the Realm. Peers in Parliament, and Peers of the Realm in Parliament.*

And when the Commons prayed, that archbishop Arundel might be put in safe-custody, the king's answer was, *That he would be advised, because the impeachment touched a PEER of the kingdom* *.

But perhaps it will be said, "That some change in the constitution may have deprived the bishops in particular of their PEERAGE; as it did churchmen collectively, of their ESTATE in parliament: although the NAME of *peer* (like that of *estate*) might be long in use, even after the thing itself was lost and abolished." To this I answer, that the change in the constitution, whereby churchmen lost their *estate* in parliament, has been fully explained: It will be incumbent therefore on the enemies of the bishops' *peerage* to shew what change it was in the constitution which deprived them of this latter title †. As they are not likely to do this, I shall proceed; and first, it may be asked, what mighty reasoning it was which disposed them to conclude, *that bishops were not peers in parliament*. For as to the late offer of an argument, "that PEERAGE belongs only to HEREDITARY *baronies*," it was urged under an entire forgetfulness of the nature of *feudal tenures*. The greater lay fiefs, long before they became *hereditary*, were only PERSONAL, for term of years or life. But the authentic argument is this, "That in capital cases, the bishops are not tried by the *Peers*, but by a Jury of the *Commoners*: and that they themselves cannot sit

* See, for further proof of this point, Selden's Privileges of the Baronage. Wilkins's edit. p. 1538.

† For I do not suppose that a *declaration* of the Lords not long before the confusions of the civil wars in the time of Charles I. to be found at present (I do not know by what confusion of ideas) amongst the *standing orders* of the House, will be judged of force to make such a change. Mr. Selden, who, by order of the House of Lords, drew up a *collection touching the privileges of the peers of parliament*, seems to refer to, and to confute that *standing order*, in his second chapter, concerning privileges of the *second kind*, in the following words—"It hath been doubted whether the same law (by which temporal barons are to be tried by their peers in parliament) be in case of trial of spiritual barons or no. And in that doubt *one special argument*, amongst others, hath been made from the name of *peers*. Some concluding thus, *spiritual barons are no peers; therefore not to be tried by their peers*. But it is plain and true, the spiritual barons are *peers*; the testimonies justifying them to be so are very frequent."

“ in judgement upon the *Peers*, when it proceeds to the loss of life
“ or members.”

The reasoning, we see, stands on this false PRINCIPLE, *that the title of Peer in Parliament depends on their judging and on their being judged.* Now granting, for the present, that the *principle* is true, it will by no means follow, that these premisses infer the conclusion, that therefore the bishops are *not peers* in parliament. For though, in *capital cases and of blood*, they try not, neither are they tried, in the manner which these men imagine to be *essential to peerage*, yet in *misdeemeanours* they have the common right and privilege of trying and being tried like the lay lords. If therefore the argument hath any strength, which concludes that the bishops *are not peers*, because they neither try nor are tried in capital cases of blood; it is equally strong when it concludes, on the other hand, that they *are peers*, because they try and are tried in cases of *misdeemeanour*. From all this, my logic teaches me to infer, that the reasoning which concludes both ways can conclude neither.

But, a truth laid down under the second head, and enforced by *the laws and constitutions of Normandy*, might teach men to reform their logic on this occasion.

Barones (say these Constitutions) autem per PARES suos debent judicari*. I argue then in this manner—All BARONS (according to the feudal law) have a right to be tried by their PEERS. The bishops are acknowledged to be BARONS; therefore they have a right to be tried by their PEERS. This is common sense. But what name now shall we give to this distorted reasoning. *The bishops are not tried by barons, therefore they are not peers!* The rules of good reasoning require that our adversaries' premisses should have a very different conclusion.—*The bishops are not tried by barons therefore they are not barons.* But the misfortune was, their *baronies* were acknowledged; and therefore they had only that mis-shapen syllogism to trust to. In a word, it was not the *trial*, it was the

* Jur. et Const. Norm. c. ix.

barony which made the **PEER**. But why should we stand quarreling with the *form* of the *argument*, while the argument itself is destitute of all *substance*. The vanity of it may be shewn in very few words. It is only desiring the learned Reader to recollect, how it came to pass that the bishops' right of trying, and being tried by their peers, in capital cases, fell into disuse.

In the times of church tyranny and superstition, the clergy, now become all powerful, amongst their many usurpations, claimed this, an exemption from the civil tribunal: for, serving *two masters*, and both unfaithfully, they soon learned the trick of escaping the **KING's** justice by sheltering themselves under their spiritual head, the **POPE**. The clergy had provided largely for lay-rogues of all kinds; who, in old pagan asylums, new-christened, *sanctuaries*, and spread over the whole land, might safely defy the justice of the laws: and they thought it hard not to have one *place of refuge* for themselves. This, partly through the ignorance, partly through the superstition of the state, though it had long struggled against this new species of treason, was, by the time of Henry IV. become a legal doctrine. This king would have had Sir W. Gascoigne, a man of great probity, and knowledge in the laws, arraign archbishop Scroope; whom the sovereign had taken in arms, fighting against him. But the Chief Justice told his master, "that, by the constitution, neither his highness, nor any one by virtue of his commission, could be authorized to sit upon the life of a bishop." However, the king procured another judge who was less scrupulous; and by his assistance this metropolitical rebel was condemned and executed. Though he is said to be the first bishop who suffered death in England by the sentence of civil judges. And the **POPE** did all he could that the first bishop should be the last; for he excommunicated those who were concerned in the impiety of that sentence. Thus the matter stood till the dawnings of the Reformation. And when afterwards the bishops returned to their obedience, and a willing subjection to the civil power, the lay peers, once irritated, never since thought fit to forget this insult on their
 peerage;

peerage; but left them to apply for justice where they could. Though I am inclined to think, that when Henry VIII. had extinguished the papal authority in England, he would have restored the bishops to that high privilege of peerage, the being hanged by the LORDS, had not the first episcopal criminal been bishop FISHER, his most inveterate and personal enemy. And when once there was a precedent to try a spiritual peer by commoners, the old resentment still fresh in the HOUSE would do the rest.

The other episcopal claim of exemption, *the not sitting on their peers in capital cases*, has a more certain and determined original: although it arose from the same treasonable principle, which encouraged them to desert the civil laws, and adhere to the ecclesiastical. Archbishop *Lanfrank* had, in a synod at London, procured the following canon of the council of Toledo, to be received amongst the ecclesiastical laws of this realm: a canon founded in hypocrisy, and a feigned shew of superior *mercy* and *purity*.—"Ut nullus "episcopus vel abbas seu quilibet ex clero hominem occidendum vel "membris truncandum judicet, vel judicantibus suæ autoritatis "favore commendet." Henceforth the bishops, in such cases, to prevent the danger of incurring what, in the language of canonists, is called an IRREGULARITY, begged leave to withdraw. This at first was hardly granted, and with much reluctance, both by king and parliament, as it was a declining of the service of their tenures; a misdemeanour, on the feudal ideas, of a very high nature. Yet here again they got another triumph over the state; and the *Constitutions of Clarendon* established them in this usurped privilege likewise. "Archiepiscopi et episcopi, sicut cæteri barones, debent "interesse judiciis curiæ regis quousque perveniatur ad diminutionem membrorum vel ad mortem."—However, this constitution (we see) in its first and principal intention is *positive*; and *negative*, only in its second and inferior. They are *required* to sit in judgment, and only *indulged* to withdraw when the sentence proceeds to loss of life or member. But we may be sure, it was not in the intention of the bishops, while they were extending their *ecclesiastical*

tical privileges, to give way to the loss of any of their *civil*. They took care therefore, when such *judgement* was to be given, to offer (together with their *request* to withdraw) a PROTEST that their withdrawing was an INDULGENCE, not an EXCLUSION. And that this might be kept in perpetual memory, they required it to be registered. In this they call themselves *pares regni*; and their right to sit STILL, *jus paritatis*. So little did they foresee, after all this caution, that their PEERAGE could ever be called in question, from their asking leave to observe the canon of Toledo.

This is a fair and true account of matters of fact; from whence arose the custom of bishops to withdraw, on the trial of peers, when the sentence came to loss of life or member; and of their being sent themselves to an inferior tribunal, when charged with a capital delinquency. Which yet, is not given to insinuate the justice or equity of restoring them now, in these happier times of Gospel light and liberty, to those rights, which they themselves had abandoned. Perhaps true policy may require that that desertion of the service of the state, and that refusal of civil subjection, should, for example's sake, be branded with a lasting punishment, to deter bad churchmen, in all future times, from wantonly insulting the powers and prerogatives of society*. Yet still, this reasonable justice should not be abused, by extending the punishment to a deprivation of that dignity which the bishops never gave up, but always claimed, and, what is more, was, by sovereign authority, always acknowledged.

This account opens our way (which is all that is intended by it) to the discussion of the last question; Of the bishops' PEERAGE; by shewing, in the first place, that these JUDICIAL RIGHTS in part lost, and in part contested, were not of essential concern to their *peerage*, in the original Feudal Constitution, but accessory only to it; and occasionally arising from it. Spelman, who went upon these ideas, distinguishes very rightly, the *PERES* (as they were,

* See note [G], at the end of this Book.

at first) generically considered, from the *PARES CURIÆ*, as they were afterwards specifically understood. The former, he thus defines, "*PARES dicuntur qui acceptis ab eodem domino, puta rege, feudis PARI LEGE VIVUNT.*" The other, thus, "*PARES CURIÆ sunt qui in eadem curia PARI FUNGUNTUR POTESTATE.—EJUSDEM CURIÆ JUDICES*"—But, *pari lege vivere*, he makes of the very essence of the *PEERAGE* in all feudal constitutions. If ever, therefore, our prelates endangered their *peerage*, it was when, submitting to canons against laws, they acknowledged the *POPE* for their *Seigneur Souverain*; and so, were not, like the lay-peers, *sub pari lege*. But when they returned to their obedience, and that obedience was *ACCEPTED*, their right of *peerage* was again *restitum in curia*.

Nay should we admit, that the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the *English peerage* (both legislative and juridical) stood all upon one original and equal footing; yet the loss of one or two, out of many (if that indeed were, as it is not, the case) could never deprive these partial sufferers, of their *peerage*.

Indeed, in that other kind of *peerage*, amongst the *equal people of a vicinage*, where they derive their title from the common exercise of a single right only, viz. the trying, and being tried by, one another, whoever loses this right, loses his *rural peerage*. But where the title is derived, as in this *sovereign peerage*, from the exercise of many common rights and prerogatives, the loss of one (especially if the *TITLE*, as here, was not derived from that *one*) cannot, while he enjoys all the rest, deprive him of the name of *peer*, any more than the loss of an arm can deprive the loser, of the name of *man*; which was derived to him from the donation of many *essential* parts, which he still possesses; analogous to those *essential* parts in legislation, still enjoyed by the *lords spiritual*. For the rights exercised by the supreme court of legislature are the *essential prerogatives of the peerage*, not those rights exercised in a supreme court of judicature, annexed to parliament. On this plain distinction, arising from the first principles of common sense, it was, that our incomparable *SELDEN* apparently went, when he declared

declared it as his opinion, that the bishops' ceasing to claim or to exercise any part of their *juridical* power did not deprive them of their PEERAGE.

But the DENIAL of the bishops' *peerage*, for the reason here assigned, is a novel conclusion, how respectable soever become by the quality of those who lately deduced the conclusion, and of those who more lately supported it. The *peerage* of the bishops hath, by all the ANCIENT PARLIAMENTS, been invariably and incontestably acknowledged, even then, when their right, and the exercise of that right, in *trials by peers*, stood just as it doth at present. So little conception had those ancient barons (who best knew the nature and privileges of their own tenures) that the bishops' claim of exemption from the civil tribunal, and licence to follow a canon against law (though the barons disputed both) could at all effect their prerogative of *peerage*. To give one example out of many. In the *protestation* of the clergy, 2 Richard II. they call themselves *pares regni—cum cæteris dicti regis paribus*—meaning the lay-lords. This *protestation* was enrolled in full parliament by the king's command, with the assent of the lords temporal and commons; and so became a compleat STATUTE. It is further to be observed that, in this parliament, the lords temporal were all-powerful.

What hath been hitherto said hath gradually opened to us the true principles on which this question must be finally decided: To speak out, The argument employed (and no other has been yet advanced) for this DENIAL of the bishops' *peerage*, stands on a mere EQUIVOCATION. The term PEER is ambiguous: it signifies either, the *equal* inhabitants of a certain district, who enjoy, in common, a right of trying one another, by a select number, called a *jury*; which sort of PEERAGE arose out of the old GERMANIC constitution; or else it signifies, the *magnates*, the *patricii*, who sit in the supreme court of parliament, as the great council of the sovereign; and this PEERAGE arose out of the later FEUDAL constitutions. Now the denial of the bishops' *peerage*, which is of the
feudal

feudal kind, is only supported by an argument drawn from the nature of the *peerage* of the *Germanic* kind; in which no other privilege than the *right of trial* gave the title. Whereas in the *feudal peerage*, the matter of juridical trial did not so much as come into the original idea of it: as we shall now shew.

Feudal Peerage arose from the common enjoyment of the privileges belonging to a *BARONY*; the first and most essential of which was the right of sitting in the great council of the sovereign, convened for the discussion of public affairs, and assembled in the high court of parliament, with the monarch at their head. *Dicuntur PARES CURIE* [senatoriæ] (says *Spelman*) *quod in curia domini illius cujus sunt vassalli, parem habent potestatem*. But the King being the fountain of *JUSTICE*, as well as *HONOUR*, he constituted in this assembly his supreme court of *judicature* as well as of *legislation*. Yet that this did not come into the first ideas of these sovereigns, who created the *FEUDAL PEERAGE*, appears from the more early definitions of the title.

The word *peer* or *par*, in the feudal language, when applied to the *Magnates*, signifies, in its original, men who hold of the sovereign, by one common tenure, and under the same services, those higher fees, called baronies. In the parliament of Northampton, held by Henry II. the bishops challenge their *peerage* under this idea only; and under this idea it was allowed them. “Non sedemus hic episcopi, sed barones. Nos BARONES, vos BARONES (say they to the Lords temporal) PARES HIC SUMUS.” This was no new logic. For in the old English and French writers, *BARON* and *PEER* or *par*, are always used as synonymous* or convertible terms. And with what good reason, *Du Cange* tells us, where he says, *PARES EXINDE APPELLATI UNIUS DOMINI CONVASSALLI*. Hence, in

* What much contributed to their being anciently used as *synonymous terms* was that a *feudal peerage* and a *feudal tenure* were distinctly liable to the same service, namely, *homage*. Thus history tells us, that Philip Duke of Burgundy performed three homages to Charles VI. of France: the one for his *peerage*, the other for Burgundy, and the third for Flanders.

the feudal law, *par integer* is he who holds a whole fee: and *semi-par*, he who holds but half. That this was the essence of the *feudal peerage*, and the thing in which it originally consisted, appears likewise from the ancient oath of a *peer* of France, given us by *Ducange*, where nothing else was exacted but “fidelity to the King and crown of France; a promise to give him faithful counsel when asked, and to keep *his* secrets and *their own* *.” These were the *pares convassalli*. Afterwards, when their court of judicature received a more regular and settled form, the oath was enlarged; and then, as he tells us, these words were added to it—to render—*la justice au pauvre comme au riche*. And now the barons became PARES CURIÆ [juridicæ] as well as PARES CONVASSALLI; the *King’s equal judges*, as before his *equal vassals*.

A *supreme court of judicature*, in its first and essential idea, includes the duty (as the oath exacts) of *rendering justice* to others, *the poor as well as rich*. But the members of this court being themselves, like others, obnoxious to justice; and it being unsuitable to their dignity to come juridically before their inferiors; it was thought most agreeable to equity, that they should be tried by their *peers*, in their own court: just as, by the *Germanic* constitution, all the inhabitants of the vicinage of equal rank did try, and were tried by, their *fellows*; for whose use and credit, the *feudal* term of PEERS was borrowed; and is thus transferred to them, in this law of Henry I. *Unusquisque per PARES suos judicandus est, et EJUSDEM PROVINCIÆ*. But it was not that circumstance of *trial* amongst the Lords, (a *consequence* of their equality) but the *equality itself*, arising from their *baronies*, which gave the title of PEERS to lords of parliament. So that the definition of PEERAGE formed from the circumstance of trying one another, is a mere modern notion, sprung from men’s confounding the *feudal peerage* with the *Germanic*.

DUCANGE had so little conception that the PEER and BARON were different dignities, that he calls those men *peers*, indifferently,

* ART. PARES, in his Glossary.

who were either summoned to the *great council of the King*, or those who sat in judgment in the *supreme court of judicature*. “Vox
 “*utraque* (says he) *eadem notione passim usurpata legitur pro ma-*
 “*joris dignitatis vassallis*, qui VEL IN CONSILIUM adhibentur a
 “*domino* AUT rege, vel *cum eo*, PARIUM LITES DIJUDICANT*.”
 Conformably to this usage, the common name for a *baron*, as we have observed, was *peer*, both amongst the old French and English writers.

In conclusion, what is here said will instruct us, (which was the point aimed at) to judge of the accuracy of that distinction, which ALLOWS THE BISHOPS TO BE LORDS OF PARLIAMENT BUT NOT PEERS: since it hath been shewn, “that none but *barons* in parliament are *lords* there; and that *barons* and *peers* are the same.”

III. To return. The third and last privilege the church gains by this ALLIANCE, is the being intrusted with *jurisdiction assisted by co-active power*, FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS. It follows from one of the *preliminary* articles of this alliance, *that the church should apply its best influence in the service of the state*. But there is no way in which this influence can be so effectually applied as by a jurisdiction of this kind. In speaking (in the first book) of the natural defect in the original plan of civil power; and (in this book) of the motives the state had to seek an *alliance*; it hath been shewn, that there is a numerous set of duties of *imperfect obligation*, which human laws could not reach; and several of *perfect obligation*, which, by reason of the intemperance of the sensual appetites, (from whence the breach of those duties proceeds) those laws could not effectually enforce; as their violence yielded only to the influence of religion. Now the good of society requires that *these* should be reached and enforced: but the endeavours of *civil courts* (for of private *societies for the reformation of manners*, the mention is too absurd) have always proved ineffectual: it was necessary

* Gloss. p. 137.

therefore, that, in an establishment, *an ecclesiastical jurisdiction* intrusted with coercive power should be erected by the state, for a *succedaneum* to the civil judicatures. And indeed the sense of those wants and defects which these courts do supply, was the principal motive of the state's seeking this alliance. So that the abolition of SPIRITUAL COURTS (as they are called) would shake the very foundation on which the establishment is erected. On the other hand, the church having now given up her supremacy, she would, without the accession of this authority, be left naked and defenceless, and reduced to a condition unbecoming her dignity, and dangerous to her safety.

FROM hence we deduce these COROLLARIES,

1. THAT *no matters of opinion; nor any civil matters, which the temporal courts can conveniently inspect, come within this spiritual jurisdiction.*

NOT *matters of opinion.* Because the church cannot lawfully exercise (though it were given her) coercive power over conscience. And because, what is thus given, the state had no right to bestow. 1. We have shewn in the former book, that all coercive power is unfitly and unjustly applied by the church to its own service. But, punishing opinions is so applying it: And we have shewn, in this book, that the state lent this coercive power to be employed in the state's service: For the church therefore to employ it in punishing opinions, which is using it in her *own service*, is defeating the end for which it was communicated. 2. The state had no such power to bestow: *For no one can give that to another which he hath not himself.* And we have proved, that the state hath nothing to do with *opinions*. In both cases, indeed, we admit an exception: the church hath an adherent power of expulsion for not complying with its formulary of communion: and the state the same power of coercion for opposing any of the *three great principles of natural religion*, mentioned in the first book of this discourse. But then these exceptions affect not the reality of the position, *that an ecclesiastical court, endowed with coercive power, hath nothing to do with*

with opinions. For, so far as respects the church's inherent power of expulsion, when not attended with civil detriment, it is the same it was before the union. On other accounts there is a difference; for, since the union, no one can be expelled for not complying with its formulary of communion without the state's consent, as will be shewn in its place. And, with regard to those opinions which concern the *fundamental principles of natural Religion* which the state hath an inherent power to restrain, the exercise of that power is of so great moment and importance to the state, that it would not be safe to intrust it in any other hands: besides, it is very liable to abuse when exercised by *spiritual* courts; a danger not likely to be incurred while in the *civil*: For the *former* have many temptations to confound these principles with those of their peculiar modes of religion; the *latter* scarce any at all. Nor ought ecclesiastical courts to *expect* this power, because it is what temporal courts can commodiously exercise. Which comes in with the other part of the division of those matters that belong not to ecclesiastical jurisdiction: namely, *civil matters, which temporal courts may conveniently inspect.* These, we say, can never belong to an ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It hath been shewn, that this court was erected as a *succedaneum* to the civil, to take cognizance of such actions as the civil could not reach, or could not remedy. And we may be assured that nothing less could have induced the state to consent to its erection. For the parting with a share of its jurisdiction is not a matter of indifference; but, indeed, considering how liable it is to abuse in other hands, a real evil; which, before the state could be persuaded to incur, it must be satisfied a greater evil would be thereby avoided: and the suffering those transgressions, which itself could not conveniently and effectually restrain, to go unpunished, was that greater evil. A *less* therefore was providently chosen. From hence it is very evident, that the state could never intend to put those things under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which fell most conveniently under its own. Because here was an evil incurred: and no greater, yea none at all, avoided.

avoided. Apparently, it was on this principle that the famous BRACON went when he said, “Non est laicus conveniendus . . . coram iudice ecclesiastico, de aliquo quod in foro seculari determinari possit & debeat *.” Besides, for ecclesiastical courts to engross matters which belong to the civil jurisdiction †, as it can possibly have no good use, may very possibly be attended with this further evil of inviting and encouraging the church to aim at more power than is consistent either with her own good or the good of the state. But if *criminal causes*, as they are called, which civil courts can commodiously take notice of, belong not to the church’s jurisdiction; what pretence hath she to the inspection of *civil causes*, or the determination of private property? The great founder of her religion said, WHO MADE ME A JUDGE OR DIVIDER BETWEEN YOU? And what he would not assume to himself, he would hardly bestow upon his ministers. And that the state should ever intend to give the church what was the peculiar right of the temporal courts, is as difficult to suppose. We must conclude then, that such custom, wherever it is found, was derived, not from the reasonable laws of this alliance, but from the authority of old papal usurpations. And in this light it was regarded by that great and wise legislature under Edward VI. when it took MATRIMONIAL and TESTAMENTARY causes from ecclesiastical courts, and RESTORED them to the civil. How the usurpation of so extensive a jurisdiction first began is not difficult to apprehend, on reflecting upon what hath been before said concerning the methods the state made use of, by the aid of *allied* religion, to add a sanction to its civil

* 45. c. 2.

† Superest ultima appellatum species, quæ locum habet cum jura regis et regni aut jurisdictionem secularem in exercendis litibus de actione reali, etiam adversus clericos, & de omnibus omnino actionibus adversus laicos, præter mere spiritualia, aliqua judicium ecclesiasticorum interlocutione & judicio violari contingit. Plane æquum esse concilium Lateranense sub Innocentio III. existimavit, ne ambæ jurisdictiones præscriptos terminos egrederentur, neu, prætextu libertatis ecclesiasticæ, episcopi secularium jura invaderent. Marca, l. iv. c. 21. F. T.

institutes.

institutes. For thus *marriage*, a *civil compact*, being of the highest importance to society, was, in order to give it the greater sanctity, made a *religious one*, by being confined to the administration of the clergy. And so far all was well. But from thence, the clergy, by degrees, took occasion to draw into the church's jurisdiction every civil matter which arose between the two sexes from that compact, the rites of which they administered. And from this example may be seen, what bad work *spiritual courts* cut out, (not for themselves, indeed, but for their neighbours) when they usurp the determination of *civil causes*. For here, though the voice of nature and the oracles of God concurred to pronounce, in some cases, as in adultery, a DIVORCE; yet, on the idle fancy, or crafty pretence, that marriage was a SACRAMENT, they boldly ventured to contradict both, and to pronounce the contract, when not void *ab initio*, indissoluble.

Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, therefore, with coactive power, neither extending to *matters of opinion*, nor yet to *mere civil concerns*; we must conclude that it was given SOLELY FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS*. From hence it appears with how just policy our constitution hath subjected all sorts of dissenters from the established church, to this jurisdiction. For the state's care of *reformation of manners* extending to all its members of whatever denomination, no sect can pretend conscience for such an exemption.

2. Another corollary is, *that the erection of these courts does not exempt the clergy from civil jurisdiction*. For as to what is purely episcopal, that is, spiritual, in the prelate's office, his superintendency over the clergy of his diocese, there is no need of a court of judicature to assist him in the discharge of it. A very unfit instrument of pastoral care, in the opinion even of the canon-law itself, which says, "EPISCOPI se debent scire PRESBYTEROS, non dominos,

* N. Bacon, in his *Discourses*, p. 44, holds that ecclesiastical courts were in their original, only *pro reformatione morum*.

“ nec debent in clerum DOMINARI : episcopus se sedente non per-
 “ mittet presbyterum stare. Episcopi noverint se magis *consuetudine*
 “ quam *dispensatione* presbyteris majores *.” 1. It hath been shewn,
 that ecclesiastical courts were not erected for the sake of the church,
 but of the state. They cannot therefore take cognizance of the civil af-
 fairs of the clergy ; because *that* would be employing their jurisdic-
 tion to their own purposes. 2. It hath been shewn they were erected to
 take care of those things which civil courts were incapable of inspect-
 ing : but all causes that relate to the clergy, whether criminal or civil †,
 civil courts may inspect : and not to bring the first of these before the
 temporal courts, but to allow them a jurisdiction distinct from the
 rest of their fellow-subjects, would be the occasion of much mis-
 chief to the state : As not to bring the other before the same com-
 mon tribunal (the chief of which causes concern their ecclesiasti-
 cal revenues) would in time create mistakes about the original of
 these revenues ; which being derived from the state, there seems
 to be no other way to preserve the memory of that derivation, than
 by providing that all disputes concerning *them* be determined by
 the civil judicature ‡.

3. A third corollary is, *that ecclesiastical courts go invariably by
 the rules and maxims of the municipal laws of that state to which the
 church is united ; that the forms of process and judiciary proceeding be
 borrowed from the civil courts ; and that appeals to these, from the
 courts ecclesiastical, be allowed, in all cases.* The state must needs
 intend, when it prescribes and defines the power it communicates, that
 that power should be exercised according to the RULES and MAXIMS

* See note [H], at the end of this Book.

† Eninvero quia clerici, non tantum qua clerici, sed etiam qua cives sunt, spec-
 tantur in republica, legibus principum tenentur—potestatem regiam a clericis, qua sunt
 clerici, et a rebus omnino spiritualibus et mere ecclesiasticis arcemus, præterquam si
 ad tuendos canones exercentur. Marca, l. ii. c. 7. F. T.

‡ Quæ de bonorum ecclesiasticorum possessione, fructibus, & plerumque etiam de
 proprietate oriuntur lites, apud magistratus seculares disceptantur. Marca, in *præsa-
 tione secunda*. F. T.

itself

itself observes in the civil courts; and observed there, as most conducive to justice, equity, and the ease of the parties. For this care of its subjects in civil courts, it could never be supposed to throw off when it sent them to an ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

It must likewise be supposed to intend, that this power should be exercised by the same FORMS OF PROCESS and *judiciary proceeding* which itself employs in the civil courts: because this is the surest way of preserving the memory of the original and dependency of the ecclesiastical *. On which account too, there is a propriety in the judge of this court's being a LAYMAN by civil appointment †. On the contrary, for ecclesiastical courts to administer their power and regulate their proceedings on *foreign forms, rules, and maxims*, is acting as if independent on the NATIVE, or subject to a FOREIGN, JURISDICTION.

That there should be *appeals from these courts to the civil, in all cases*, is as evident. 1. Because it is of the nature and condition of all inferior courts to be appealed from, to a superior. 2. Because *ecclesiastical courts*, not so subjected, would effect an independency on the civil power. And, 3. Because they would soon erect themselves into tyrannies ‡. And it is observable, that, even in the most unfriendly

* By the parliament called in the first year of Edward VI. it was enacted, that all processes ecclesiastical should be made in the king's name, as in writs at the common law; and that all persons exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction should have the king's arms in their seals of office.

† See 26 Hen. VIII. c. 3.

‡ Ac primo quidem de appellationibus, quæ vulgo abusu dicuntur—quæ tractatio cæteras antecedere debet; quia tuitio regia otiosa esset & reliqui libertatum articuli facile labefactarentur, nisi connecterentur hoc uno vinculo—Non omittendum est reges nostros aliquando, etsi nullis precibus ecclesiæ Gallicanæ interpellati essent, novitates a Romana curia adversus aliquos mores introductas, legibus suis & magistratuum executione repulisse, ob detrimentum quod inde regni tranquillitati inferri poterat—Apud Hispanos obtiner, ut episcopi & clerici, qui mandatis regis non obtemperant, seu ad impertiendam tuitiorem contra vim judicum ecclesiasticorum in causa ecclesiastica latis, sive ad repellendam invasionem, quæ sit a clericis adversus jurisdictionem secularem, aut ob quamcunque aliam gravio rem contumaciam, jure civitatis, seu naturalitatis regni

friendly seasons of our constitution, these appeals had a free course, till obstructed by the statute of *circumspecte agatis* in the time of Edward the First.

These are the privileges, which, through the concession of the state, the church gained by this alliance.

II. Let us see next, what privileges, through the concession of the church, the state gained by it. These, in a word, may be comprised in its SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL *. *The church resigning up her independency, and making the magistrate her SUPREME HEAD, without whose approbation and allowance she can administer, transact, or decree nothing †.* For the state, by this alliance, having undertaken the protection of *the church*; and protection not being to be afforded to any community, without power over it, in the community protecting; it necessarily follows, that the *civil magistrate must be supreme*. Protection is a kind of guardianship: and guardianship, in its very nature, implies superiority and rule. The charge therefore of protection, without a right of SUPREMACY, is giving the state no better an office, than that of PUBLIC EXECUTIONER OF THE DECREES OF THE CHURCH: In which high station we find those states to be advanced that are most enslaved to the papal power. But further, when the state, by this convention, covenanted to afford the church protection, that contract was made with a particular church of one denomination, and of such determined doctrine and discipline. But now that protection, which

priventur, & statim a regno expellantur, suisque redditibus spoliuntur. Non quidem, inquiunt illi, per modum jurisdictionis ordinariæ quæ in clericos regibus non competit, sed potestate quadam politica & æconomica, ut docent Covarruvias & Bodavilla, & omnes Scriptores Hispani. Marca, in præf. prima, & l. iv. c. 9, & seq. F. T.

* Ex Theodosii Imperatoris litteris ad Synodum Ephesinam patet societatem & cognitionem quandam inter religionem et rempublicam; ad principis studium pertinere ecclesiastici status æque ac imperii pacem; regii muneris esse ut eum firmum & inviolatum præstet ex omnium consensu, pietatis religionisque sinceritatem tueatur, curetque ut eorum qui clero adscripti sunt emendata sit castigataque vita. Marca, l. ii. c. x. F. T.

† See note [1], at the end of this Book.

might

might be advantageous to a state in union with such a church, might be disadvantageous to it in union with one of a different doctrine and discipline: therefore, when protection is given to a church, it must be, at the same time, provided, that no alteration be made in it, without the approbation and allowance of the state *. Lastly, the state having *endowed* its clergy, and bestowed upon them a *jurisdiction* with coactive power, these privileges would create an *imperium in imperio*, had not the civil magistrate, in return, this *supremacy of the church* †.

The three principal branches of which are these; and because they have been often disputed, we shall now endeavour to explain and support them. The first is,

1. *That no ecclesiastic of the established church can exercise his function without the magistrate's approbation and allowance.* Because the doing otherwise is an act of sovereignty in the church, and of independency in the clergy. But here we must be careful how we think the magistrate, by virtue of this branch of the *supremacy*, can *make or conf-r the character of priest or minister*; or even himself exercise that office ‡. This was not, nor *could* be, given him by the convention: 1. Because it answers no reasonable end or purpose. All the possible advantages arising to the magistrate by his *supremacy*, being secured by his having the *EXERCISE* of the ministerial function absolutely under his direction. So that to interfere in *MAKING* the character, would be *impertinent*. 2. Because this power directly tends to the destruction of a church as a society:

* See note [K], at the end of this Book.

† Carolus Magnus, præter causas pietatis, motus etiam fuit ad distribuenda liberali manu bona ecclesiis, ob utilitatem reipublicæ, existimans nimirum episcopos sanctius observaturos fidem promissam—Ex quibus probatur quoddam jus nov. m. r.ibus quæritum fuisse ob naturam bonorum quibus ecclesia fruebatur. Marca, l. vii. c. 19. F. T.

‡ Imperatorem præsidere humano generi dignitate, sed in perceptione sacramentorum sacerdotibus subditi; legibus principis, quantum attinet ad ordinem publicæ disciplinæ, parere religionis antistites, sed in erogandis mysteriis & in cœlestibus sacramentis principem ordine religionis a sacerdotum judicio pendere, &c. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F. T.

the essence of which, as we have shewn, is, to have officers and ministers of its own creation. Therefore, the giving up this right to the magistrate would not be a convention of *alliance*, but an act of *incorporation*, absorbing and dissolving the church into the state. This consequence, the enemies of a church, as a society, are so well aware of, that, in order to bring on its dissolution, they principally labour to enforce this point, *that the magistrate may confer and exercise the sacred function and character*. So that to interfere in making the character would be *unjust*. 3. Because this power would in those religious societies, where the founders themselves have directed the manner of conferring the sacred character, be esteemed the violation of a divine right: so that to interfere in *making* the character would be *impious*.

On the whole then we must conclude, that the office and character of the clergy is made and conferred in the very way it was, before the alliance; whether the method was of divine appointment, or of human: *The exercise only* of that office, when thus made, being under the magistrate's direction.

The opinion of Chief Justice HALE, in the tract before quoted, will, I suppose, add weight to what is here delivered. " 1. The power (says he) of ecclesiastical order *is not derived from the crown*; neither is it so conceived to be; but so much as is not superstitious, is derived from *Christ*. Hence it is that the powers of order are not in themselves, nor, as to the efficacy of them, confined to any diocese or precinct. 2. The determination of the exercise of those powers of order to time, place, person, manner of performance, *is derived from the crown*; ex. gr. the prescribing who shall be a bishop; the extent of his diocese; the circumscription of him under pain of contempt to act his powers of order within those limits; these are powers originally inherent in the crown. 3. The power of the keys, *in foro conscientiae*, which is not properly a jurisdiction, because it is without any external coercion or change in the party. This is *not derived from*
 " the

“*the crown*, but from a higher commission. 4. All power of external jurisdiction is *originally in the king*, either formally to exercise, or at least virtually to derive; which is evident *.” Under this head is to be referred the king’s right of nominating to the greater benefices, which, before the alliance, were elective, and in the body of the church †.

II. The second branch of this *supremacy* is, *That no convocation ‡, synod, or church assembly, hath a right to sit without the express permission of the magistrate: nor, when they do sit by virtue of that permission, to proceed in a judiciary or legislative manner, without a special licence § for that purpose; nor to impose their acts, as authoritative, till they have received his confirmation ||*: Whether it be for decreeing matters of discipline; or for condemning, by expulsion, for matters of doctrine; or lastly, for correcting manners. That the church cannot assemble in synod, under the magistrate’s supremacy,

* MS. Treatise touching the Right of the Crown; communicated ut supra.

† See note [L], at the end of this Book.

‡ See the Stat. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19.

§ Alio etiam, eoque eximio jure, utebantur principes in præscribendo judiciorum ordine, quæ in synodis a se indictis peragenda erant. Hinc profectum est, ut præcipuos magistratus delegarent qui conciliis interessent, non solum ut vis publica & tumultus acercentur, sed etiam ut ab episcopis cognitionum ordo servaretur.—Tantâ autem severitate hac in parte a conciliis obedientiam principes exigebant, ut si præscriptum sibi judiciorum ordinem egressa fuissent, quicquid neglecta cognitionis lege decretum foret, in irritum mitterent, ut patet ex Theodosii rescriptis adversus synodum Ephesinam latis—Principes aliquando suspendebant prioris synodi judicatum nova synodo indicta, quod factum est a Theodosio in causa Nestorii.—Neque acta synodorum reciderunt nisi ad asserenda mandata quæ dederant, quorum contemptus lædebat auctoritatem publicam: neque executionem rerum judicatarum suspenderunt, nisi ob canonum violationem, e qua scandala & dissentiones oriebantur. Marca, l. iv. c. 3, 4. F. T.

|| Sufficiunt, opinor, ea quæ diximus, ut difficilibus & morosis ingeniis persuaderi possit, magnam regibus auctoritatem competere ad convocanda concilia—Confirmatio canonum decernenda est a principe, cum cognitione causæ; quandoquidem ei vim legis publicæ in regno tribuit acceptatio & consensus principis, tanquam capitis populorum, & confirmatio etiam, tanquam principis qui superiorem non agnoscit. Marca, l. vi. c. 17—22. F. T.

without

without his permission, is evident. Because, before the alliance, the power that follows the supremacy and independency of the church, was exercised in those assemblies. To suffer such therefore to meet, after the union, without licence, would be virtually giving up his supremacy, and acknowledging it to be now, as before, in the church. That when assembled it cannot proceed in a judiciary or legislative manner without express and particular licence to act, and without confirmation of its decrees, is plain from hence :

1. Because, in its *judiciary* capacity, the church hath already one jurisdiction, with coactive power, granted to it, called the *bishop's court*. To give it other fixed and standing judicatories would be both unnecessary and unfit. *Unnecessary*, because the bishop's courts are sufficient for the common uses of the state; and, for rare and uncommon cases, an OCCASIONAL JURISDICTION is sufficient. *Unfit*, because the giving two fixed and perpetual judicatories with coactive power, would be intrusting the church with more temporal authority than, even under the magistrate's SUPREMACY, would be consistent with the safety of civil government.
2. Because in its *legislative* capacity, the decreeing matters of discipline, and condemning, by expulsion, for matters of doctrine, cannot be done in alliance without the consent of the state *.

But it appears, on the other hand, a great error to imagine such assemblies, when legally convened, to be either useless or mischievous. For all churches, except the Jewish and Christian, being *human* politic societies, of the nature of which, even the Christian, *in part*, partakes †; and all societies, without exception, being administered by human means, it must needs happen that

* —Nimirum ad regem pertinere jus convocandi ecclesiam Gallicanam, proponendi materiam quam in conventu agitari voluerit, examinandi res in eo decretas, easque, si vitum fuerit expedite, approbandi, earumque executionem jubendi—Nunquam discedere oportet ab hac certissima regula, deliberationes Ecclesiæ Gallicanæ considerari non posse aliter quam velut consilium regi datum, easque executioni non posse mandari abique consensu & confirmatione ejus. Marca, l. vi. c. 34. F. T.

† See Hooker's Eccl. Pol.

religious societies, as well as civil, will have frequent occasion to be new regulated, and put in order. Now though by this *Alliance of Church and State*, no new regulations can be made for church government, but by the state's authority; yet still there is reason that the church should be previously consulted, which we must suppose well skilled (as in her proper business) to form and digest such new regulations, before they come before the consideration of the civil legislature*. Acting otherwise is changing this, which is a *federate alliance*, into an *incorporate union*; where, indeed, the practice is different; For in an incorporate union of two societies, one of them is lost and dissolved in the other; by which means, all the power in question devolves upon the survivor†. But, in a *federate alliance*, the two societies still subsist intire; though in a subordination of one to the other: in which case, it seems agreeable to natural equity, that no alterations in church government be made without the joint consent of both. If it should be said, that ecclesiastics are placed in the civil court of legislature for that purpose, I must beg leave to dissent. It hath been shewn, they

* *Quæri potest an ex eo quod suprema canonum protectio ad regem pertinet, sequatur eum jubere posse ut observentur, non expectata etiam sententia ecclesiæ Gallicanæ. Certum quidem est earum constitutionum observationem fore sanctiorem, si considerentur cum generali cleri consensu—Nihilominus æque certum est regem ex sententia concilii sui, quod auget & minuet prout ei lubet, posse latis edictis decernere ut canones observentur, ac circumstantias & modos necessarios addere ad faciliorem eorum executionem sive etiam ad veram eorum mentem explicandam, eosque accommodare ad utilitatem regni. Ad probationem autem hujus auctoritatis extant exempla omnium imperatorum christianorum—Utuntur adhuc eo jure reges christianissimi. Nam licet tomos deliberationum cleri Gallicani recipiant, eæ tamen tantum spectantur velut consilium & oratio ad principem, vulgo appellata *remonstrances*. Dein rex decernit id quod lubitum ipsi fuerit, sive respondendo in margine tomi, ut vulgo fieri consuevit; sive etiam per edictum. Præterea reges nostri condunt constitutiones pro condenda politia ecclesiastica ad executionem canonum; neque ullam cujuslibet cœtus sententiam rogant quam sui concilii, quod ex personis ecclesiasticis & secularibus constat. Marca, l. vi. c. 36. F. T.*

† See note [M], at the end of this Book.

make

make no distinct ESTATE there: and, consequently, are not *representatives*, but *guardians* only of the church; to watch over its welfare, and to be always at hand to carry on a mutual intercourse of good offices between two societies so closely allied. And therefore, there was no absurdity in that custom, which continued during the *Saxon* government, and some time after, which admitted the laity into ecclesiastical synods; there appearing to be much the same reason for laymen's sitting in convocation, as for churchmen sitting in parliament.

As for the mischiefs arising from synodical assemblies, by their heats, quarrels, and divisions, it is owned they are great. So as to have occasioned the civil magistrate to suspend them for a long time together. Nor is this a late exertion of the prerogative. We find Archbishop *Anselm* complaining that *William Rufus* would not allow any ecclesiastical synod to be called for thirteen years together: which, upon the matter, took in that king's whole reign. But then we must consider, that these quarrels have all arisen from not having had their original and end, under an establishment, precisely determined. As appears from the constant subject of their quarrels; which have always been about the power and extent of their privileges and jurisdictions. And we may venture to affirm, that synods convened, and meeting, on the principles here laid down, cannot possibly be pernicious to the state, or fruitless to the church. I say, we may venture to affirm this, when such a man as *Hooker* characterises religious councils and synods in the following manner; "A thing whereof God's own blessed spirit was the
 "author, a thing practised by the holy apostles themselves, a thing
 "always afterwards observed and kept throughout the world, a
 "thing never otherwise than most highly esteemed of, till pride,
 "ambition, and tyranny, began by factions and vile endeavours to
 "abuse that divine invention, unto the furtherance of wicked purposes. But as the just authority of civil courts and parliaments
 "is not therefore to be abolished because sometime there is cunning used to frame them according to the private intents of men
 "over-

“ over-potent in the commonwealth : so the grievous abuse which
 “ hath been of counsels should rather cause men to study how so
 “ gracious a thing may again be reduced to that first perfection,
 “ than in regard of stains and blemishes sithens growing to be held
 “ for ever in extreme disgrace *.”

III. The third consequence of this supremacy is, *That no member of the established church can be excommunicated, or expelled the society, without the consent and allowance of the magistrate* †. For expulsion being an act of supremacy, it must needs be authorised by him with whom the supremacy is now lodged. Besides, did the church retain this power under an establishment, nothing could hinder but that it might extend to the supreme magistrate himself: and how absurd it would be for the *body* to expel the *head*, any one may judge. That our ancient constitution thus restrained the exercise of this power appears from the old writ of *quære excommunicavit* ‡. But then it is to be observed, that excommunication for *doctrines* and matters of *opinion*, even when authorised by the state, must still (the state having nothing to do with the care of souls, nor the church with the care of bodies) as before the union, be free from civil censures or inconveniencies; other than *accidentally* befall the expelled person from a *Test-law*, in those states where the protection of the church, and the peace of the state, require its assistance. Different in this, from excommunication for *immoralities*; which, under an establishment, hath reasonably and justly civil censures annexed to it §.

From

* L. 1. f. 10.

† In contentionibus de jurisdictione ecclesiastica & seculari, ultimum judicium asseritur supremæ curiæ regni, licentia adempta episcopis jus sibi censuris & excommunicationibus dicendi—Unde sequitur regem nec regios magistratus aut officiales excommunicationibus vel aliis censuris eam ob causam inflicis obnoxios esse. Alioqui majestas imperii minueretur, & a judicium ecclesiasticorum arbitrio penderet. Marca, l. iv. c. 21. F. T.

‡ See note [N], at the end of this Book.

§ Quod autem inter christianos excommunicati, nisi resipiscant, sint infames, & ad
 Vol. IV. T quædam

From this account of the *supremacy* may be deduced this **COLLARY**.

That the conferring on the supreme magistrate, the TITLE OF HEAD OF THE CHURCH, is by no means inconsistent with the nature of our holy religion. This title hath been misrepresented by the enemies of our happy establishment, as the setting up a **LEGISLATOR**, in *Christ's kingdom*, in the place of **CHRIST**. But it hath been shewn, that no other jurisdiction is given to the civil magistrate by this *supremacy* than the church, as a mere political body, exercised before the convention. This, with regard to the title of *Head of the Church*, the famous act 26 Hen. VIII. c. 1. explicetly declares, "The King, his heirs and successors, shall be taken and reputed the only **SUPREME HEAD** in earth, of the **CHURCH OF ENGLAND**.— And shall have full power, from time to time, to visit, reform, correct, and amend, all such errors, heresies, and enormities whatsoever they be, which **BY ANY MANNER OF SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION ARE OR LAWFULLY MAY BE REFORMED, ordered, corrected, or amended.**" That is, which the church, as a society, or political body, concerned only about **SPIRITUAL** things, was before empowered to do. From hence it follows, that if the magistrate's jurisdiction be an usurpation on the rights of *Christ's kingdom*, so likewise was the church's. That the church's was no usurpation, but perfectly consistent with the rights of *Christ's kingdom* may be thus proved; *judaism* was, in every sense, as strictly, at least, and properly the *kingdom of God*, as *christianity* is the *kingdom of Christ*: yet this did not hinder, but that there was, by God's own approbation and allowance, an inferior jurisdiction in the Jewish state. What then shall make the same unlawful in the christian church? *This*, both had in common, to be political societies by

quædam vitæ civilis officia inhabiles, ita ex eo ortum est, quod christiani principes, quoad fieri potest, leges suas ad bonos mores atque evangelicam disciplinam aptent; non quod excommunicatio per se ullo temporali jure bonoque privet. Bossuet, l. v. c. 22. F. T.

divine

divine appointment; but different in *this*, that God, for wise ends, minutely prescribed the whole mode of *Jewish* policy: and *Christ*, on the contrary, with the same divine wisdom, only constituted the church a politic society in *general*; and left the mode of it to human discretion*. But I suspect the matter sticks here: these men will not allow the church, or kingdom of *Christ*, to be a society in any proper sense. This indeed is the darling notion of the enemies of establishments. It is certain, the argument of usurping in *Christ's* kingdom hath no force but on the supposition that the church is no proper society. However, this subterfuge we have totally overthrown; having proved at large that the church indeed composes a society.

Thus have I shewn and explained the mutual privileges GIVEN and RECEIVED by church and state, in entering into this famous CONVENTION. The aim of the state being, agreeably to its nature, UTILITY: and the aim of the church, agreeably to her's, TRUTH. From whence we may observe, that as these privileges all took their rise, by necessary consequence from the fundamental article of the convention, which was, *that the church should serve the state, and the state protect the church*; so they receive all possible addition of strength, from their mutual dependency on one another. This we have reason to desire may be received as a certain mark that our *plan of alliance* is no precarious arbitrary hypothesis, but a theory founded in reason, and the unvariable nature of things. For having, from the real essence of the two societies, and their different natures, collected the *necessity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the compact; we have, from the *necessity*, fairly introduced it; and, from its *freedom*, consequentially established every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask, "Where this charter, or treaty of convention for the union of the two societies, on the terms here delivered, is to be found?" We

* See Hooker's Eccl. Pol.

are enabled to give him a satisfactory answer. It may be found, we say, in the same *archive* with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between magistrate and people, so much insisted on, in vindication of the common rights of subjects. Now when a fight of this compact hath been required of the defenders of civil liberty, they held it sufficient to say, that it is enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that such original compact is the only legitimate foundation of civil society; that if there were no such thing *formally* executed, there was *virtually*; that all differences between magistrate and people ought to be regulated on the supposition of such a compact; and all government reduced to the principles therein laid down; for that the happiness of which civil society is productive, can only be attained by it, when formed on those principles. Now, something like this, we say of our ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But we say more; for,

C H A P. IV.

That the Christian Religion is, of all other, best fitted for such an Alliance with the State as may be most productive of their mutual Advantage: And that our own is the most perfect of all Christian Establishments.

WE have been the fuller in this account, in order to shew our adversaries, how unreasonable, and even impolitic they are, when, in their ill humour with *establishments*, they chuse to pick a quarrel with *their own*; where the national religion is on a footing exactly agreeable to the nature of a *free convention between church and state*, on the principles of the laws of nature and nations. A felicity, (they should have known,) which scarce any other people on the face of the earth can boast of: for let them look around, and tell us, if they can find another place where the
state

state doth not inroach on the church ; or, what is indeed much the commoner, the church on the state. In *England alone*, the original terms of this convention are kept up to so exactly, that this account of *the Alliance between Church and State* seems rather a copy of the church and state of *England*, than a theory, as indeed it was, formed solely on the contemplation of nature, and the unvariable reason of things : and had no further regard to our particular establishment, than as some part of it tended to illustrate these abstract reasonings. So that, fortunately for the motive I had in writing, our adversaries are cut off from all subterfuge. For they can neither condemn this theory as a visionary *Utopia* ; nor approve it as reasonable and fit for practice, and yet think themselves at liberty to carry on their opposition against their own country establishment : because these *two* prove to be one and the same. If in a few minute things they disagree, this disagreement will perhaps, by some, be ascribed to the unfinished parts of an excellent model, which the misfortunes of Edward VI's reign prevented from being carried to perfection. For then it was that this alliance between the *prot-stant* church of *England* and the state was made ; on the natural dissolution of the alliance, between the *popish* church and it. At which time, had not the hypocrisy of some complying churchmen ; the domestic quarrels in the administration ; the factions which fomented those quarrels, and the immature death of that hopeful prince, intervened, we might have expected, they will say, the completest scheme of an ALLIANCE that human policy and pure religion could have produced. Nor have the succeeding ages been remiss or negligent, as fit opportunities offered, to remedy those irregularities. Of this honour, no small share is due to the *clergy* ; to false are the calumnies of their enemies, that *they are always backward in reformations*. For it was the *clergy* which, in the reign of *Charles the Second*, freely gave up to the legislature their ancient practice of taxing themselves. In which they acted with the greatest justice as well as generosity. For the custom of taxing themselves arose from the claim to their revenues

by

by divine right : whereas these being, indeed, the state's donation, an *endowment* at the time of the ALLIANCE, the state had a right to tax them as it did its *lay-fees**. However this be, as there have been many and long, and, as it would seem hitherto, fruitless debates, concerning *tythes*, *bishops seats in parliament*, *spiritual courts*, *convocation*, and *supremacy*, in which men have run into the most contrary conclusions, I judged it not amiss to draw out *corollaries* concerning each of them, that may possibly contribute something towards the putting an end to these ill-founded controversies.

Such then is the uncommon excellence of our happy constitution : And, struck with the beauty of so just and generous a plan of power, a late noble writer, who regarded it no otherwise than as it concerned the state, thus forcibly expresses himself.—“ Some

* Quoad redditus qui vulgo spirituales dicuntur, magna ecclesiarum pars, cum decimis & oblationibus, laicis in feudum datæ fuerant a Pippino, Carolo Magno, & Ludovico Pio, cum consensu ecclesiæ Gallicanæ ; quæ deinde ecclesiasticis viris concessæ sunt ex permisso regum. Itaque principes non destituti sunt ratione ut contendant servitia & debita feudorum in hujuscemodi redditibus imposita, extincta non esse vi consensu regum adhibiti liberalitati laicorum erga ecclesias, qui ea ad ipsas transfulerunt.—Legitimum et æquum est, quod feuda ad ecclesiam pertinentia iisdem legibus subjecta sunt, quibus cætera tenentur.—Permissus est deinde principibus usufructus reddituum ecclesiæ vacantis, contra quam prisce regulæ statuerunt. Si quis vero inquiret in causas tam magnæ immutationis, is reperiet eam esse profectam ex immutatione quæ facta est in conditione & qualitate bonorum ab ecclesia possessorum. Quemadmodum enim in republica quoddam bonorum genus extat quod vulgo *feudum* vocant. Incognitum Romano juri, ideoque novis constitutionibus & antiquarum legum dispositioni contrariis inductum, sic, cum ecclesiæ regum beneficio donatæ fuissent bonis hujuscemodi, necessarium prorsus fuit, ut illæ possiderent feuda iis conditionibus quas in prima feudorum origine invenit publica utilitas. Ergo personæ ecclesiasticæ quæ feuda possidebant, per consequentiam siebant vasalli regum, illisque præstare tenebantur homagium & juramentum fidelitatis, itemque certum militum numerum juxta valorem feudorum. Unde sequitur necessario regem post obitum episcopi quod eo casu feudum vacet, illud ad se recipere posse ac retinere, donec novus episcopus investituram feudi receperit, homagiumque ac juramentum fidelitatis præstiterit. Interim tamen regi competit jus quoddam fruendi redditibus, dum custodia durat. Marca, l. viii. c. 19. 22. F. T.

“ men

“men there are, the PESTS OF SOCIETY I think them, who pretend a great regard to religion in general, but who take every opportunity of declaiming publickly against that *system of religion*, or, at least, against that CHURCH ESTABLISHMENT which is received in *Britain* *.” In truth, this is bearing hard on our new guardians of liberty; who, when they have generously taken up an office they were not called to, and asked nothing for it but the modest title of FREE-THINKERS, are to be called *pests of society* by the POLITICIAN; and branded with the odious name of *infidel* by the clergy. However the author above quoted cannot deny, but that *they pretend a great regard to religion in general*: and this justice is due to them, that they are no enemies to the *name*: for that, I suppose, he means by *religion in general*. *Ideal christianity* they could well away with: *real christianity* somewhat offends them. It does more so under the form of a *society*: but most of all when that society becomes *established*. They could be well content to accept it under the fashionable notion of a divine *philosophy in the mind*; especially if that philosophy were to be received in England on the footing which, Cicero tells us, the Greek philosophy was received in Rome; DISPUTANDI CAUSA, NON ITA VIVENDI †. But to take it for service, and with the magistrate’s stamp to make it current, revolts these great and free spirits. So that, even to those engaged in the cause of a court and ministry, or intrusted in the service of a church, they must speak their mind against so intolerable a grievance. However, a *Religion*, blest’d be God, we yet have; and even an *established* one. It enjoys this advantage for the service it does the state; and that it may no longer be envied the privileges, consequent thereto, I shall now shew, that the CHRISTIAN, of all religious societies, is best fitted to assist the civil magistrate, who is the *minister of God unto us for good*.

* Differt. on Parties, p. 148.

† Orat. pro Mar.

I. Its superior excellence in this service, above the *ancient PAGAN RELIGIONS* of Greece and Rome, is seen in its being infinitely better fitted than those to fall into a firm and lasting society. It is to be observed, that unity in the object of faith, and agreement to a formulary of dogmatic theology, as the terms of communion, is the great foundation and bond of a religious society. Now, in all the Pagan religions, there was only conformity in national ceremonies; there being no room for the object of faith, or a formulary of dogmatic theology; for as to matters of belief and opinion, it was not judged of moment to determine whether their Gods were real persons, or only the symbols of natural powers. And the few speculative points taught in their MYSTERIES, were altogether subservient to the interests of morality. Hence it happened, that these societies, being without their true foundation and support, were, when they became *established*, soon lost and absorbed in the state*.

II. As *christianity* was superior to *Pagan religion*, in its CAPACITY for forming a society: so it is superior to pure NATURAL RELIGION, in being thus actually formed, by *divine* appointment; while natural religion needed to be formed only by *human*. Were there no other evidence that christianity composed a society of *divine* appointment than only this, that the body of the faithful is called the KINGDOM of Christ, *this* would be sufficient to convince those who know the general meaning of the word, and the peculiar use of it in the Jewish oeconomy. But when, in consequence of his right of KINGSHIP, Jesus, and, by his substitution, the apostles, go on to appoint officers, degrees of subordination, and exercise of power, one may well wonder at the strength of that complexion which can hold out against such force of evidence. But something, you must think, there was, which made it worth their while not to be convinced. They imagined, if they could but persuade us, that christianity made no society of *divine* appointment, it was no

* See The Divine Legation of Moses, b. II, sect. 1. and sect. 5. sub fin.

society *at all*; and consequently a *creature of the state*. This was so flattering a conclusion, that they may well be excused a little obstinacy in encountering what obstructed their advances to it. But we have shewn, that let the point of divine institution be determined how it will, yet *Religion* naturally and necessarily composes a *society*, sovereign, and independent of the civil. Very idly therefore were their pains employed, had they proved what they attempted. But to persist against evidence and reason, in support of what can do them no service, must render them doubly ridiculous.

III. Again, as the *Christian* is superior to *natural* religion in being a society by divine appointment; so it is superior to the *JEWISH*, in being perfectly free; and independent of the *civil**. The *JEWISH* religion was, like the *true natural*, which it ratified, essentially fitted to compose a society: and, like the *Christian* (of which it was the first rudiment) made a society by divine appointment. But then unlike the *Christian* in this, that it was not left independent of civil government, to unite with it, at its pleasure, on terms agreed upon; but was, for great and wise reasons†, at once united to it by God himself. Which also God was pleased to do, not by way of *ALLIANCE*, as between two bodies that were to continue distinct‡; and might be separated, from whence results an *established* religion of the nature above explained, but by mutual conversion into one another, and perfect *INCORPORATION*. By which, both church and state, under a separate consideration, were lost, and a new species of government arose from it, that was both and neither. For the state, whose object is a *WHOLE*, having here

* Sunt ab ipso Deo tum religio tum imperium ita constituta, ut & vera religio sine adjuncto sibi imperio, & verum ac legitimum imperium sine adjuncta sibi vera religione esse possit. Bossuet, l. v. c. 5. F. T.

† See The Divine Legation of Moses, B. IV.

‡ Veluti in unum coierunt Christiana fides & regum imperium, nullo partium detrimento, adeo ut regni summo jure nihil per Christianam professionem decesserit—Conjunctæ quidem fuerunt in hoc regno dum illæ potestates, ecclesiasticæ & civiles, sed sine confusione personarum & munerum. Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F. T.

God himself for its magistrate, and consequently being administered by an extraordinary providence, carried its care to *individuals*: And religion, whose object are INDIVIDUALS, having here the magistrate for God, and consequently religious worship having a *public part*, its care was extended to the *whole*. Yet this being truly to be reckoned in the *genus* of those unions which, we have shewn, necessity of state made of so universal practice, we may be allowed to draw an argument from thence for the justice of such unions, whereby a church becomes *established*. For if the advocates of civil liberty may, without suspicion of sophistry or fanaticism *, bring the example of God, in the HOREB CONTRACT, to justify men's common right to erect free republics; I see no reason why the same example, in the union of the Jewish church and state, should not be thought of equal force to vindicate the equity of that *alliance* between the two societies which is made by men; and is productive of an *established church*.

But the CHRISTIAN RELIGION was not only left independent of the state, by not being united to it like the *Jewish* (and being so left, it must needs, by the law of nature, be independent); but its independency was likewise secured by divine appointment, in that famous declaration of its great Founder, MY KINGDOM IS NOT OF THIS WORLD: which bears this plain and obvious sense, “That the *kingdom of Christ*, to be extended over *all mankind*, was not like the *kingdom of God*, confined to the *Jewish people*, where religion was incorporated with the state; and therefore of *this world*, as well in the exercise of it, as in the rewards and punishments by which it was administered: but was *independent* of all civil communities: and therefore neither of this world as to the exercise of it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by which it was administered.” That such is the true meaning of this mistaken text, appears from the delusion in which his followers then were, *viz.* that the *Gospel* was to be administered according to

* See Algernon Sidney's Discourses concerning Government, *passim*.

the œconomy of the *law*. But whoever imagines that from *this independency by institution* the church cannot convene and unite with the state, concludes much too fast. We have observed, that this property, in the *kingdom of Christ*, was given as a mark to distinguish it from the *kingdom of God*. That is, it was given to shew, that this religion extended to all mankind; and was not confined, like the Mosaic, to one only people. Consequently, that very reason which made it proper for the Mosaic religion to be united, by divine appointment, to the state, made it fit the Christian should be left free and independent. But for what end, if not for this, To be at liberty to adapt itself to the many various kinds of civil policies, by a suitable union and alliance: whereby the famous prophecy of Isaiah might receive its ultimate completion *: “ Thus saith the Lord God, Behold I will lift up my hand to the GENTILES, and set up my standard to the *people*—and KINGS SHALL BE THY NURSING FATHERS, AND THEIR QUEENS THY NURSING MOTHERS †:” An *alliance*, then, we must conclude, the Christian church was at liberty to make with the state, notwithstanding this declared nature of *Christ’s kingdom*. So far is indeed true, that it is debarred from entering into any alliance with the state that may admit any LEGISLATOR into *Christ’s kingdom* but himself: which would, indeed, *make Christ’s kingdom of this world*. But, by our *alliance*, no such power is granted by one of the parties, or usurped by the other, as hath been proved in the Corollary concerning the SUPREMACY. And therefore an *established* religion is no violation of this famous declaration.

Such then is the nature of CHRIST’S KINGDOM. It is essentially framed to compose a firm and lasting SOCIETY; it is formed into a SOCIETY by divine appointment; and, in order to fit it for public service, it is, both by nature and institution, declared sovereign, and independent of civil government, that it may adapt itself by free alliance, to the various kinds of human policies. And though from

* See The Divine Legation, B. VI. Sect. 6.

† Isaiah, chap. xlix. 23. See also note [O], at the end of this Book.

this its *nature* alone, it cannot be proved to be of divine original; yet so much may be easily shewn, that, had it not *this nature*, it could not have *that origin*. For if Religion were designed (as no Religionist can doubt) to promote our happiness here, as well as to procure for us greater hereafter, it will follow, that if that religion, which pretends to be the last and consummate revelation of the will of God to man, be not a real *society* and *independent*, its pretences are false and deceitful: because the greatest temporal good from Religion is procured by its becoming NATIONAL; but *national* it cannot be, but through alliance with the state; and no reasonable alliance can be made but between two sovereign and independent societies.

Hence may be seen the folly of those *sects*, which, under pretence that Christianity is a spiritual Religion, fancy it cannot have rites, ceremonies, public worship, a ministry or ecclesiastical policy*: Not reflecting, that without these, it could never have become NATIONAL; nor consequently have done that service to the state which, of all religions, the Christian is most capable of performing.

But we are not to carry off this honour, so fairly won for our Religion, without a warm attack from the famous adventurer of Geneva, who crosses our way, and cries out to us to prepare for the combat.—“ I believe (says Mr. Rousseau †) that in developing
“ HISTORIC FACTS, under this point of view, one might easily re-
“ fute the opposite sentiments of BAYLE and WARBURTON, the
“ first of whom pretends, that NO SORT of Religion is useful to

* See note [P], at the end of this Book.

† Je crois qu'en developant sous ce point de vue *les faits historiques* on refuteroit aisément les sentimens opposes de Baile & de Warburton, dont l'un pretend que nulle religion n'est utile au corps politique, & dont l'autre soutient au contraire que le Christianisme en est le plus ferme appui. On prouveroit au premier que jamais etat ne fut fondé que la religion ne lui servit de base, et au second que la Loi Chrétienne est au fond plus nuisible qu'utile à la forte constitution de l'Etat.—Du Contrat Social, Chap. viii. p. 192.

“the body-politic; while the other, on the contrary, holds, that
 “CHRISTIANITY is its most firm support. One might prove against
 “the first, that there never was a civil society of which *Religion*
 “did not serve for the foundation; and against the second, that the
 “CHRISTIAN RELIGION is, at bottom, MORE HURTFUL THAN
 “BENEFICIAL TO THE FIRM CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE.”

Here I must do our *Citizen* the justice to own that he has not misrepresented me, as he does where he makes me hold the direct contrary to the main principle of my book, namely, that *Politics and Religion have one common object* *. He may, indeed, have misrepresented Bayle; but him, I am not concerned to defend. As to his censure of me and of Christianity, it was natural for one who had pretended to shew that CIVIL SOCIETY itself was hurtful to humanity, to hold that CHRISTIANITY was so likewise. Or, was this intended for a secret recommendation of our *holy faith*, that it will afford no support to an invention so fatal to mankind, as was *civil society*?

But his intention concerns himself, not me: I have only to examine, how he supports his assertion against the Author of the *Alliance*.—“To make myself thoroughly understood (says he) I have nothing to do but to give a little more *precision* to the too vague ideas of RELIGION, as they relate to my subject †.”

He had already given a notable specimen of his *precision*, in the entrance on this achievement; where promising to overturn my assertion, that CHRISTIANITY *is the most firm support of civil society*, he proposes to do the feat, by HISTORIC FACTS; that is, as we shall see presently, “by exposing the mischiefs done to society by the
 “ABUSES and CORRUPTIONS of Christianity.” I but just mention it, to shew, how early his sophistry begins to work. But now for his *more precise ideas of Religion*.

* Il ne faut pas de tout ceci conclurre avec Warburton que la politique & la religion aient parmi nous un objet commun. p. 59.

† Pour achever de me faire entendre, il ne faut que donner un peu plus de *précision* aux idées trop vagues de religion relatives à mon sujet, p. 193.

“Religion,”

“ Religion, considered in its relation to Society, is either general or
 “ particular ; and may also, like society, be divided into two specieses ;
 “ that is to say, the RELIGION OF A MAN, and the RELIGION OF A
 “ CITIZEN. The first, without temples, altars, or rites, and confined
 “ to a worship of the supreme God, merely interior, and to the eternal
 “ obligations of morality, is the pure and simple religion of the Gos-
 “ pel ; true Theism ; and that which one may call *divine natural Right*.
 “ The other, confined to a particular country, gives, to that coun-
 “ try, its gods, who are the proper and tutelary patrons of it. It
 “ has its doctrines, its rites, its exterior worship prescribed by the
 “ laws ; all out of this pale, are to those within, infidels, stran-
 “ gers, and Barbarians. It extends not the duties and devoirs of
 “ men beyond its altars. Such were all the religions of the first
 “ nations. To which one may give the name of *Divine-Civil, or*
 “ *positive, Right* *.”

So strange a heap of nonsense and misrepresentation, sure never came till now, even from the pen of a *modern French philosopher*. Here, we have the *Gospel* confounded with *Natural Religion*, and *Revelation* with *Polytheism*. But it is not so much his spite to Christianity (of which however he appears to have a *philosophic* share), as his abhorrence of CIVIL SOCIETY, that makes him thus reverse and confound all ideas ; and this, he calls, rendering them more PRECISE. What, in the first place, he would infer being plainly this, That besides all those advantages of the *state of nature* over *civil society* (so largely insisted on in his book called *Discours*

* La religion considérée par rapport à la société, qui est ou generale ou particuliere, peut aussi se diviser en deux especes, savoir, la Religion de l'homme & celle du citoyen. La premiere, sans temples, sans autels, sans rites, bornée au culte purement interieur du Dieu Supreme & aux devoirs eternels de la morale, est la pure & simple religion de l'evangile, le vrai theisme, & ce qu'on peut appeller le droit divin naturel. L'autre, inscrite dans un seul pays, lui donne ses Dieux, ses patrons propres & tutelaires : elle a ses dogmes, ses rites, son culte exterior prescrit par les loix : hors la seule nation qui la suit, tout est pour elle infidelle, etranger, barbare ; elle n'étend les devoirs & le droits de l'homme qu'aussi loin que ses autels. Telles furent toutes les religions des premiers peuples, auxquelles on peut donner le nom de droit divin civil ou positif. p. 193.

fur

sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes); this blessed *state* has yet a further advantage, *viz.* that pure Religion is to be found only there; while polytheism and idolatry overrun all the world besides. For I would advise the Reader, that as often as he has to do with our CITIZEN OF GENEVA, he would observe the same caution which an old debauchee recommended to his physician, that whatever was the particular complaint, he would always have an eye to the p——. So whatever be the subject of our philosopher's meditations, whether education, morality, laws, romance, or religion, we should still have an eye to that infection of the mind caught amongst the *Casirs*, at the *Cape of Good Hope*, which has poisoned his constitution, and given him a horror of *civil government*; and is always breaking out in numberless odd vagaries, whenever he sits down to speculate. Without this, we should be utterly at a loss to account for the astonishing absurdities of these few lines.

1. He says, that the RELIGION OF A MAN, as distinguished from the Religion of a citizen, is without temples, altars, or rites, and confined to a worship of the Supreme God merely interior.—This idle fancy I have confuted at large, in the fifth chapter of the first book of this discourse; wherein I have shewn, that what he calls the religion of man, or pure natural Religion, cannot support itself without external acts and offices of devotion, as well as with internal meditations. I have shewn it, I say—from the compound nature of man—from his duty to make an open profession of the relation in which he stands towards his Maker—from the fitness of returning thanks in common, for common blessings.

2. He says, that *this religion, without temples, altars, or rites, is THE SIMPLE RELIGION OF THE GOSPEL*. So gross an insult on common sense has, I think, never before been offered, even in these times of worse than brutal licence.—Is not the Religion of the Gospel the Religion of Jesus Christ? and did not Jesus Christ institute the RITES of baptism and the last supper? Did he not say he would build

build a CHURCH? Is not a CHURCH a *Society* of Christians? And can any *society* subsist without an external administration?

3. He holds, however, that this TRUE THEISM, as he calls it, is the same with the GOSPEL in *doctrine* at least, if not in *discipline*. In which, perhaps, his ignorance, here, may be more excusable than his ill faith, before. The great principle of TRUE THEISM is, that *God is, and that he is a rewarder of them who seek him*; The great principle of the GOSPEL is, that he will reward those who seek him with *the free gift of immortality*.

So far, as to what he calls *the Religion of Man*. Come we next to his RELIGION OF THE CITIZEN. And what he says here is no less fruitful in his usual flowers of speech, with which he is accustomed to strow the way, whenever he is disposed to lead Religion in triumph; I mean, absurdity and falshood.

The Religion of the Citizen (says he) *is in force only in a particular country, it gives to that country its gods, who are the proper and tutelary patrons of it.*—This is the Polytheism of the GENTILES.—*It has* (says he) *its doctrines, its rites, its external worship prescribed by the laws.* All out of this pale are, to those within, *infidels, strangers, and barbarians.*—This is his description of the LAW OF MOSES: and agrees with no other in the ancient world; all of which gave allowance to an universal toleration or intercommunity of worship. Yet, of these two opposite religions, our candid Citizen has made one and the same. And, as before, *pure Theism was* (in his account) *the same with the GOSPEL*; so now, *Polytheism and Idolatry is the same with the LAW*. Indeed, where he says, that this *Religion of the Citizen doth not extend the duties and devoirs of men beyond its altars*, he fills up the measure, and vilely calumniates both PAGANISM and JUDAISM.

But he had left out, it seems, something in his division, where he distinguished between the *religion of man* and the *religion of the citizen*; and therefore now patches up matters by the introduction of a third species, which he calls, *the religion of the priest*. “There is (says he) a third species of religion still more whimsical;
“ which

“ which giving to men two legislatures, two heads, two countries, “ puts them under subjection to contrary duties, and prevents “ them from being, at the same time, good subjects to God and “ to the magistrate. Such is the religion of the Lama, the Japo- “ nese, and the Roman Catholics. This we may call *the religion “ of the priest* *.”

And now let us see, for what end this HONEST ACCOUNT OF RELIGION was given us by our virtuous Citizen of Geneva. In general, it is enough for him if he can but discredit REVELATION, but he is here labouring at one particular topic of discredit; its useflessness or mischief to civil society.—I had said, that *Christianity was its most firm support*. He denies the proposition; and confutes it by this way of reasoning—“ All Religion (says he) is comprised within these three specieses.—1. *A worship merely interior*, which affords not one single mark of religion.—2. *A POLYTHEISTIC worship*, which damns all out of its pale—And *Popery*, which brings in an *imperium in imperio*.” Now, says he, these are all *more hurtful than beneficial to the firm constitution of the state*. And so say I likewise. But he had promised to prove, against me, that the Christian Religion as delivered in the Gospel (the Religion which, I had said, was the most firm support of civil society) *is at bottom more hurtful than beneficial to it*. Now I affirm, and appeal to his own sober self against his other self, that NOT ONE of his *three specieses of Religion* is *Christianity as delivered in the Gospel*; nor can any one of them be called, but by the courtesy of England, even by the vague name of *Christianity*. So that here, a blind argument is lamely conducted, at a vast expence of truth and common sense. How much more compendiously and commodiously has the *New Historian of Great Britain* enforced the same charge against

* Il y a une troisieme sorte de religion plus bizarre, qui donnant aux hommes deux législations, deux chefs, deux patries, les soumet à des devoirs contradictoires & les empêche de pouvoir être à la fois devots & citoyens. Telle est la religion des Lamas, telle est celle des Japonois, tel est le Christianisme Romain. On peut appeller celle-ci la religion du prêtre. P. 193, 194.

Christianity. He divides ALL RELIGION, not into three, but two, species, SUPERSTITION and FANATICISM. And who will pretend to say, that either of these can be serviceable to Society? The CHURCH OF ENGLAND, in particular, that *Janus bifrons*, which had seen both the *old and new world*, he hath taught to play each part with great advantage; to turn its *fanatical* visage, when it opposes Popery; and to become *superstition*, when it sets its other face against the Puritans.

Thus our Citizen, by substituting three fantastic Mornos of his own raising for Gospel Christianity, he leaves my principle, of the *utility of this religion to civil society*, untouched. So that whatever evil influence his three impostures may have on society, my position is no way affected by it. However, let us hear him out. There are *curiosities* in his discourse, which one rarely meets with in common writers.

1. First then, he gives up his *third* species of religion, which brings in an *Imperium in Imperio*, as manifestly naught. And so do I.

2. The *second*, which he calls the *Religion of the citizen*, has in it (he says) something good, and something bad. “It is so far good, that it unites divine worship to a love of the laws—it teaches men, that the service of the state is the service of the *tutelary God*—it is a species of THEOCRACY.—But then it is bad in this, that it is founded in error and lies. It renders men credulous and superstitious. It stifles the true worship of the divinity, in a vain ceremonial. It is much worse when, becoming exclusive and tyrannic, it renders a people sanguinary and intolerant—when it makes them think, they do a holy action in the murder of those who deny their Gods—when it puts them in a state of war with all others; a state very pernicious to their own proper safety *.”

His

* La seconde est bonne en ce qu'elle réunit le culte divin & l'amour des loix [et que faisant de la patrie l'objet de l'adoration des citoyens] elle leur apprend que servir l'état

His spite to the Mosaic law (we see) has made him pollute its sanctity, by mixing and confounding it with Paganism; like him who, for a better purpose, *burnt dead men's bones on the altar of Bethel*: Out of this impure mixture he forms a fantom, compounded of *Polytheism*, a *Theocracy* and *Intolerance*; which never yet existed together but in his own bewildered imagination. He equally belies both PAGANISM and the LAW: the first being founded in, and existing by, universal tolerance; and the other abhorrent of every species of idolatry. One thing is remarkable; it is, his calling Paganism, under a *tutelar deity*, a species of THEOCRACY. I had shewn, in *The Divine Legation of Moses*, that one of the most illustrious distinctions between the religion which he instituted and the several modes of Paganism, was this, that though Both go upon the common idea of a *tutelary God*, yet Moses went further, and proclaimed the God of Israel to be their KING; and, by so doing, put God's peculiar people properly under a THEOCRACY. This no Pagan lawgiver ever dared to attempt. I have explained the reason; a reason so much to the credit of the Mosaic institution. A *tutelary God* not implying an extraordinary or equal Providence, a Gentile lawgiver might, for the sake of the civil uses of it, venture to proclaim. Had he gone further, and made the *tutelary God* the NATIONAL KING, his imposture had been detected; because such a system unavoidably drew after it an *equal Providence*. Moses advanced thus far, and by constituting a THEOCRACY, hath established the truth of his pretensions. To evade this reasoning, the Citizen of Geneva insinuates, that the admission of a *tutelary God* constitutes a THEOCRACY.

l'état c'est en servir le Dieu tutelaire. C'est une espece de theocratie.—Mais elle est mauvaise en ce qu'étant fondée sur l'erreur & sur le mensonge [elle trompe les hommes] les rend crédules, superstitieux, & noie le vrai culte de la divinité dans un vain ceremonial. Elle est mauvaise encore quand, devenant exclusive & tyrannique, elle rend un peuple sanguinaire & intolérant [en sorte qu'il ne respire que meurtre & massacre]; & croit faire une action sainte en tuant quiconque n'admet pas ses Dieux. Cela met un tel peuple dans un état naturel de guerre avec tous les autres, très nuisible à sa propre sûreté. P. 194, 195.

Here let me observe, how much the author of the *Alliance* has, in another work, distressed this whole tribe of unbelievers of the *bonton*, sprung from our English *Freethinkers*, and new-christened, in France, under the name of PHILOSOPHERS, au' please you. The Author* had explained the nature of the Jewish *Theocracy*; and from thence, had not only vindicated the *reasonableness* of the whole Jewish law from the objections of unbelievers; but had shewn how this very form of government itself distinguished and ascertained its divine original above all the pretences of Paganism: whose various modes of religion were built on the worship of *tutelar Deities*. This alarmed our PHILOSOPHERS. However, it furnished their stale declamations with a fresh topic, an abusive misrepresentation of this singular species of divine government, by calling all worship of *tutelar deities*, THEOCRACIES. M. Rousseau leads the way; and he assures us that this worship is, UNE ESPECE DE THEOCRATIE. M. Voltaire has taken the hint, and even borrowed the words of our Citizen.—“ Il semble (says he) que la plupart des anciennes nations “ aient été gouvernées par UNE ESPECE DE THEOCRATIE †.” After these, comes an impious and miserable Rhapsodist ‡, who undertakes to shew, on the same ridiculous abuse of words, That *all the religions of the East were THEOCRACIES*. So that, from the joint labours of these Worthies (the PHILOSOPHERS) we are made to believe that this pretended THEOCRACY of Moses was only productive of superstition in religion, and of tyranny in the state. There is, indeed, a small circumstance, which may be thought a little to discredit this noble discovery. Our PHILOSOPHERS, with all their superior erudition, appear to be ignorant, That the Greeks, so slender was their conception or idea of a THEOCRACY or a THEOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, had not, in all their comprehensive language, so much as a *term* to denote the *thing*. And JOSEPHUS, where he attempts to explain the nature of this species of govern-

* See The Divine Legation, Book V. Sect. 2.

† La PHILOSOPHIE de l'Histoire, p. 51.

‡ In a book called, Recherches sur l'Origine du Despotisme Oriental.

ment (the *Jewish theocracy*), is forced to apologize for the liberty of inventing a *new name* to express his meaning *.

But, to return, we come at length to our citizen's *first* species of religion, the *religion of man, or christianity*; and here his purpose is to prove more directly against me, "That even *christianity*, as delivered in the gospel, is not the most firm support of the state." This were indeed to the point, had he not here again presented us with another of his fictions under that sacred name. But the reader shall not be defrauded of his own words.—"There remains "the *religion of man, or of christianity*, to be considered; not that "which is now called so, but that which we find in the GOSPEL, "a religion altogether different. By means of this religion, holy, "sublime, and true, MEN, the children of the same God, see and "own themselves to be BRETHREN; while the spiritual society "which unites them is never to be dissolved, not even in death. "But this religion having NO PARTICULAR RELATION to the body- "politic, leaves the laws without any other force than what they "draw from themselves, without adding any thing of its own; "whereby one of the principal bonds of a particular society (of "the civil kind) remains without effect. Further, it is so far "from attaching the hearts of citizens to the state, that it with- "draws them, as it were, from all terrestrial things; than "which, I know nothing more contrary to the spirit of society †."

* —ὅς δ' ἂν τις εἴποι β-αστάμενος τὸν λόγον ΘΕΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΝ ἀντιθεῖν τὸ πολίτευμα. Cont. Ap. lib. ii. sect. 16.

† Reste donc la religion de l'homme, ou le christianisme, non pas celui d'aujourd'hui, mais celui de l'ÉVANGILE, qui en est tout-à-fait différent. Par cette religion sainte, sublime, véritable, les hommes, enfans du même Dieu, se reconnoissent tous pour freres, & la société qui les unit ne se dissout pas même à la mort. Mais cette religion n'ayant nulle RELATION PARTICULIERE avec le corps-politique laisse aux loix la seule force qu'elles tirent d'elles-mêmes sans leur en ajouter aucune autre, & par là un des grands liens de la société particuliere reste sans effet. Bien plus: loin d'attacher les cœurs des citoyens à l'état, elle les en detache comme de toutes les choses de la terre: je ne connois rien de plus contraire à l'esprit social. P. 195.

He owns, (we see) *it appears by the gospel, that all men are brethren, the children of the same God, and united in a society not to be dissolved even in death.* Now, if the *same men* be members both of this more lasting society, and of the *civil* likewise, must they not aim, in proportion to the dignity of each society, equally to advance the interests of both? Must not that acknowledged *relationship* of brethren in the *religious* society strengthen their attachment to each other as fellow-members of the same *civil* community? And when they are once persuaded (which every man of common sense will soon be) that to advance the happiness of civil society is the best means of securing the interests of that other, which is never to end, will not their very zeal for their religion dispose them to as warm an adherence to the service of the state? All that can be said in favour of our citizen's ridiculous paradox being only this, that a true christian will prefer the *real* interests of the religious society to the *apparent* interests of the civil, whenever they are made to clash: for none but *real*, and *merely apparent*, can possibly come into competition. But this, on the very principles of our citizen of Geneva, will be so far from being hurtful to the state, that it will be, in the highest degree, beneficial to it. He confesses that the religion of the gospel is *holy, sublime, and true*: in whatsoever matters, therefore, the administration of civil policy clashes with the injunctions of this religion, we may be sure that, so far forth, the civil administration is *prophane, base, or erroneous*: the removal of all which qualities from society directly tends to promote its happiness. For UTILITY AND TRUTH EVER COINCIDE. It is so far then from being true, that GOSPEL RELIGION is of no service to the state, that it is of the greatest, by affording an unerring rule, ever at hand to apply, for the administration of civil policy.

But, as hath been observed before, we must seek for the key to all these strange whimsies, in our citizen's *Discourse sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les Hommes*. The truth is, he regards CIVIL SOCIETY as a thing essentially civil; and so, never to be served or benefited

benefited by a religion *holy, sublime, and true*; for as he in the comedy says, “*The man doth fear God, however it seems not to be in him, by some large jests he will make* *;”—such as the farce of the *Curé of Savoy*, and his own drollery upon *miracles*. In the work we are now upon, he is a little shy of his secret. But in his *Letters from the Mountain*, apologizing for this part of the *social contract*, (where, in the strongest terms, he taxes the gospel with being pernicious “to society +) he says,—“Far from taxing the pure gospel with “being pernicious to SOCIETY, I find it, in some sort, too sociable, “too strongly embracing the whole human kind, to be of use to a “LEGISLATION WHICH MUST BE EXCLUSIVE; a religion rather “inspiring *humanity* than *patriotism*, and tending rather to form “MEN than CITIZENS †.”—Here the secret is out. By *society*, we see, he means NATURAL SOCIETY (the state he so much extols in his *Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité*, &c.); and by a LEGISLATION WHICH MUST BE EXCLUSIVE, he means CIVIL SOCIETY. And were this all, we should have nothing to blame but his bad philosophy and his worse logic. He supposes, that what men call *patriotism* consists in doing all the good they can to their own country, though to the hurt and damage of all others. He mistakes. It is the MOB who so thinks. MEN hold it to consist in doing all the good they can to their own country, but without hurt or damage to any other. He therefore, from his definition, concludes, and rightly, that patriotism and humanity are inconsistent: we, from ours, that they are consistent; just as our own preservation is, with universal benevolence,

“When God and nature link’d the general frame,

“And bad SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL be the same.”

* Shakespeare.

† Je ne connois rien de plus contraire à l’esprit social. P. 195.

‡ —Bien loin de taxer le *par Evangile* d’être pernicieux à la SOCIÉTÉ, je le trouve, en quelque sorte, trop sociable, embrassant trop tout le genre humain pour UNE LEGISLATION QUI DOIT ÊTRE EXCLUSIVE; inspirant l’humanité plutôt que le patriotisme, & tendant à former des hommes plutôt que des citoyens.—*Lettres écrites de la Montagne*, Lett. I. p. 35.

We both abound in our own sense; and, I suppose, with equal complaisancy. So far then nothing is morally amiss.

But when he begins to prevaricate—and surely he prevaricates very grossly, in this apology *from the Mountain*. Did his adversary, in *the plain**, accuse him of taxing the *pure gospel* with being pernicious to what HE calls, SOCIETY, and what others call, *the state of nature*? Was it not for his holding that the *pure gospel* was pernicious to an EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION, which is the name he gives to *civil society*? Certainly with this latter defect: for it is in a discourse, written to confute the opinion of WARBURTON, where our citizen says, *the pure gospel is pernicious to society*.

But it is time to go on with his accusation of christianity, as it is urged in his *social contract*.

This religion, he says, *has no PARTICULAR RELATION to the body-politic*. You may always with justice suspect the man who deduces the force of his argument from vague and evasive premises. We know what is meant by one thing's being related to another. But nothing, I think, is meant by a *particular relation*, when thus employed, but *such* a relation as may best serve the user, to support a feeble system.—That the christian religion, as delivered in the *gospel*, has a *close and near relation* to the body-politic hath been shewn just above, from our citizen's own account of christianity: but more especially from this whole discourse of the *alliance*, written for no other purpose than to shew how this *relationship* began, how it is carried on, and how it may be best improved to the advantage of BOTH SOCIETIES. How it began, has been explained at large in the third chapter of the first book: where it is shewn to have arisen from the natural defect of civil society; which requiring, for its remedy, the assistance of religion, and this not being to be afforded but on conditions; from thence, a *relationship* necessarily arose between them. After this, what must we think of the man who can tell us, that *Christianity leaves the laws without other*

* *Lectures écrites de la Campagne.*

force than that which they draw from themselves, without adding any thing of its own? Bayle delighted in extravagant assertions almost as much as our citizen of Geneva; but he knew how to support them, and that, with a vigour of invention, and a profoundness of reasoning, which covered and secured them from an ordinary attack. Our citizen gives us his misbegotten PARADOXES, as the ostrich drops its young, exposed, abandoned, and left to shift for themselves: and then—as he says, to an argument of the Archbishop of Paris,—*Le lecteur en jugera. Pour moi, je n'ajouterais pas un seul mot* *. But not only the internal virtue of religion in general, but the express precepts of the gospel confute this strange man, when he says, *Christianity, having no particular relation to the body-politic, leaves the laws without any other force than what they draw FROM THEMSELVES, without adding any thing of ITS OWN.*—Doth not the founder of our holy faith say, *Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's: and unto God the things that are God's* †? And this, in answer to a question concerning obedience to the laws of the civil magistrate, in a case where the support of society is most vitally concerned, namely, *the paying of tribute*. Where, we see, the GOSPEL no more leaves the laws to that only force which they draw from their own sanctions, than it leaves the worship of God to that only force which it draws from natural reason. Both civil tribute and religious worship are equally commanded by the sanctions of christianity. St. Paul hath nobly paraphrased this text in his Epistle to the Romans ‡, where he explains the reason of holy obedience to the laws of the state. It is, he says, because

* Lettre à M. de Beaumont, p. 107.

† Matt. xxii. 21.

‡ “Let every soul be subject to the *higher powers*. For there is *no power but of God*: the powers that be are *ordained* of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the *powers*, resisteth the *ORDINANCE OF GOD*: and they that resist shall receive to themselves *damnation*.—For he is *THE MINISTER OF GOD* to thee, for good.—Wherefore, ye must needs be *subject* not only for *wrath*, but also for *CONSCIENCE SAKE*.” Chap. xiii. 1, & seq.

all legitimate power comes originally from God, and is actually ORDAINED by him. Hence he makes the PRIEST and CIVIL MAGISTRATE to be equally the MINISTERS OF GOD; from which, he says, it follows that we must be subject to the state, as well as to the church, for CONSCIENCE SAKE: and thus, disobedience to the laws being disobedience to religion, he makes the punishment of both to be the same; concluding in the words of his divine master, *RENDER therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour*. Yet christianity, as this man tells us, leaves the laws to their own inherent force, *without adding any thing of its own*.

But even this is not the worst. Christianity not only gives no *forensic* strength to society, but takes away much of its *natural*. So says our illustrious citizen.—“Further, christianity is so far from attaching the hearts of citizens to the state, that it detaches them, as it were, from ALL TERRESTRIAL THINGS. I know nothing more contrary than this, to the social spirit*.” With what a commodious fallacy has our citizen here supplied his argument! It required him to shew, that christianity detached us *from society*. He could not do that; he therefore slips in, in the place of *society*—*all terrestrial things*. Had scripture condemned *society*, it had been something to his purpose; for then it might be supposed, that JESUS and the citizen of Geneva had just the same opinion of civil society. But when a detachment from *earthly things* is commanded, it is to be understood COMPARATIVELY; and when the comparison is between *earthly* and heavenly, the command is reasonable and just. Let us see then how the sage propagators of our holy faith have conducted themselves on this delicate question. The learned apostle of the Gentiles directs his followers, that they *use this world AS NOT ABUSING IT*.—*χρῶμενοι ὡς μὴ καταχρῶμενοι*.—He adds a reason—*For*

* Bien plus; loin d'attacher les cœurs des citoyens à l'Etat, elle les en détache comme de TOUS LES CHOSSES DE LA TERRE: je ne connois rien de plus contraire à l'esprit social. P. 195,

*the FASHION of this world passeth away** ;—σχῆμα τῷ κόσμῳ τέτε — *the scene of things in this world.* — The sober advice here given, is to enjoy the blessings which Providence hath bestowed upon us in this state, with TEMPERANCE and JUSTICE : but not to make the most of them, in the sense and language of voluptuous and worldly men, who care not how they get them, or how they employ them when gotten. He shews them, the bad bargain they are likely to make, when they chuse to run any risque in this adventure ; since the shortness of human life makes these ill-purchased advantages of little value.—And is this, *detaching men from society* ? Is it not rather *attaching* them, in the strongest manner, to its true interests ? by keeping them within the duties of good citizens. Look abroad amongst men, and see, whether all the miseries brought upon states and nations, have not been owing to the neglect of this apostolic precept, when citizens *abuse* their situations in society, by letting loose their irregular passions and appetites, in pursuit of its fleeting advantages. Yet the legislating citizen of Geneva *knows nothing more contrary to the social spirit*, than THIS SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY. But, further, our citizen who, from these passages of St. Paul to the Corinthians, has apparently gathered what he collects concerning *the unsocial spirit of christianity*, either did not, or would not see, that the advice here given to the church of Corinth, concerning their *detachment from the world*, in its extreme sense, was a temporary direction, to enable them the better to bear an approaching persecution ; which the apostle, by his prophetic spirit, foresaw they were to suffer under Nero. This, in so many words, he declares to have been his intent.—*I speak for your own profit* † ;—πρὸς τὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν συμφέρον λέγω.

But indeed, the GOSPEL is so far from looking coldly on society ; or from aiming to withdraw our affections from this, or any other of our natural or civil *relations*, that it makes the first and principal

* 1 Cor. vii. 31.

† Ver. 35.

part of religion to consist in imploring Heaven for the welfare of the state. St. Paul directing Timothy, a select minister of the word, in what manner he should form and regulate the discipline of the church over which the Holy Ghost had made him overseer, lays down this principal canon—*I exhort therefore, that FIRST OF ALL, πρῶτον πάντων, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men: FOR KINGS, and for all that are in AUTHORITY; that we may lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all godliness and honesty* *. Now if this were to be done under a Pagan magistracy, which frequently persecuted, at best barely suffered the profession of Christ; how much greater were their effusions of worship to be, in behalf of that community, in which kings and magistrates became NURSING FATHERS of the church? Could any thing more strongly tend to endear civil government to good Christians, than that a recommendation of the STATE and its interests to Heaven, was first and principally required of them, in their holy offices? All the writers on politics, I mean, writers of our author's size of belief, recommend it to the legislator, above all things, to cajole the people into a persuasion, that Heaven interests itself in the welfare of the community; as what would be the only lasting support of civil felicity. Now, the followers of Christ have embraced a religion which assures them, that Heaven doth, indeed, thus interest itself: and that the impression of this truth might be never obliterated, they are enjoined, as often as they assemble to their devotions, to make the first and principal part of them to consist in praying for the peace and prosperity of *kings and all in authority*. Yet our citizen of Geneva tells us, that *he knows nothing more contrary to the SOCIAL SPIRIT, than the SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY, by detaching us from all earthly things*. What must we think? Was he in earnest? Certainly not in good earnest; since here, as in every other part of his discourse, he imposes on his reader that sophism, of all the most hacknied by every

* 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2.

poultry trader in infidelity, THE ABUSE OF THE THING, FOR THE THING ITSELF. The question between us is, *What aspect Gospel-Christianity hath on civil society?* I have attempted to shew that it has the most benign and gracious. The citizen of Geneva says, *it has the most unfavourable, as it detaches men from all earthly things:* and to prove his bold assertion true, he gives us, instead of an honest account of that temper and moderation, which the GOSPEL prescribes in the use of these things, a frightful picture of the superstitious freaks of Monks and Asceticks, of zealots and hypocrites, of fanatics and enthusiasts. This makes the common-place of two or three of his following pages, containing an abusive paraphrase of his truth, “that Christianity is a religion altogether “spiritual; solely occupied in the affairs of Heaven: the Christian’s “country not being of this world*.” To which, all, but that crew of idiots, are ready to reply—“*Nor is our master’s kingdom of this world*, yet his providence governs and supports it. If, therefore, in imitation of this very providence, he bids us strive *to be perfect, as he in Heaven is perfect* †, will not his followers, in their sphere of citizens, contribute all they can to the happiness of that society in which providence hath placed them? instead of becoming, as he pretends, *by this very aim at PERFECTION, detached from all the bonds of society* ‡.” However, continues our citizen, if they should be induced to lend a hand to the public, *it will be with the utmost indifference as to the issue* §. If by *indifference*, Mr. Rousleau means (and if he does not mean so, he calumniates) that the good Christian will consider himself a citizen of the world, as well as of that country to which he particularly belongs; it is

* Le christianisme est une religion toute spirituelle, occupée uniquement des choses du ciel: la patrie du chrétien n’est pas de ce monde. P. 196.

† Matt. v. 48.

‡ A force d’être parfaite, elle manqueroit de liaison; son vice destructeur seroit dans sa perfection même. P. 196.

§ Il fait son devoir, il est vrai, mais il le fait avec une profonde indifférence sur le bon ou mauvais succès de ses soins. P. 196.

true;

true; he will so consider himself: the consequence of which will be, that he will serve his own country, as far as may be done without injury or injustice to another. And what will be the consequence of this? Certain felicity to his own: for that state which observes the rules of justice and equity to all others, is most likely to have, in its turn, the same rules observed in favour of itself. But see the iniquity of these cavillers. Jesus says, *his kingdom is not of this world*. Hence his disciples say, *their country is not of this world*: and for this, christianity is calumniated, as rendering no support to the state; and old idolatrous Rome, which treated all other states with injustice, is preferred before it. Suppose now, Jesus had said, *his kingdom was of this world*; and his followers, in consequence, had maintained that *dominion was founded in grace*, as Pagan Rome did, that its universal sovereignty was founded in the horse's head under the capitol; would Christianity have got better quarter? We know it would not; since the *sovereignty* of, what we call, Christian Rome, has been so often objected to us, in discredit of the gospel.—But the Christian's indifference it seems lies in this,—*that so be, he have nothing with which to reproach himself, he cares little for the issue of things* *. What? Has his *faith* rooted out all the social passions and affections which *nature* gave him? Hath he no regard for his parents, his children, or his posterity? Not the least, says our politician; for *if the state sink, he BLESSETH GOD*. He must needs be a bad citizen indeed, if, in this trying circumstance, he do not, like a man of spirit, **BLASPHEME** his Maker.—*Curse God, and die*, is, it seems, the heroic exhortation both of Job's paganised wife, and of our paganised citizen of Geneva. It had been in vain either for Job, or for me, to tell them, that if the true believer *blesse*s God for the *severity* of his dispensations, as believing that they tend to a good issue, he makes providence his friend; and, under this persuasion, he cannot but go on

* — Pourvu qu'il n'ait rien à se reprocher, peu lui importe que tout aille bien ou mal ici bas. P. 196.

with the greatest alacrity to lend a helping hand to the shaken republic. — But *Christianity makes men dupes to hypocrisy; and a Cromwell, or a Catiline, would find an easy prey of such fellow-citizens* *. Our philosopher must know very little of *Christianity*, if he has not learnt, that it affords the best means of *detecting hypocrisy*. Be this as it may, says the citizen of Geneva, yet *Christian charity doth not easily permit men to think evil of their neighbours* † : And this (he thinks) is enough to shew how *easily* good Christians may be duped. But, before we can admit this consequence, he must prove, that when Christianity gives men charity, it takes away their understanding. — However, says he, admit that a Cromwell may sometimes be detected by the atrocity of his actions. — Well, and what then? — Why then, *it is God's good pleasure that we reverence his ordinance; this abused authority is the scourge of God to punish the offending children of men; and it will be deemed impiety to resist the tyrant's usurpation* ‡. Does not the good Christian regard war, pestilence, and famine, to be the scourges of offended Heaven? and yet what good Christian, in his senses, ever scrupled to guard against, and to repel these evils? But I am tired of this trash; and should not have tired my reader with it, but to shew him, how miserably low this admired *philosopher* and *politician* has descended; and all for the sake of calumniating the Christian faith. What follows, however, is too curious to be overlooked. After all these complaints of the *noxious spirit of Christianity*, he confesses, however, that it makes good soldiers. This is something, however; for the

* — Si malheureusement il s'y trouve un seul ambitieux, un seul hypocrite, un Catilina, par exemple, un Cromwell, celui-là très certainement aura bon marché de ses pieux compatriotes. P. 196, 197.

† La charité chrétienne ne permet pas aisément de penser mal de son prochain. P. 197.

‡ Voilà un homme constitué en dignité; Dieu veut qu'on le respecte; bientôt voilà, une puissance; Dieu veut qu'on lui obéisse; le dépositaire de cette puissance en abuse-t-il? C'est la verge dont Dieu punit ses enfans. On se feroit conscience de chasser l'usurpateur. P. 197.

soldiery,

soldiery, in time of need, is the great support of society. The citizens of this cast, says he, *march without reluctance to the combat: not one of them all ever dreams of flight; they do their duty, but without a passion for victory; they rather know how to die, than to conquer* *. What, now, can the reader conceive wanting, to reconcile our citizen to this part, at least, of the *spirit of Christianity*? A great deal. He wants such a spirit in it, as would make them swear, like old Fabius, and his band of Pagans, that *they would conquer and not die*. “That (says our SOBER CITIZEN) was, according to my taste, A MOST NOBLE AND ILLUSTRIOUS OATH. “They swore to return victorious; and they kept their word. A “Christian army would never have done any thing like it. They “would have thought it, to be a tempting of God †.” It may be truly said of this unaccountable citizen of ours, that he is at a vast expence of morals, metaphysics, and politics; and all to enable him,

CUM RATIONE INSANIRE.

But now comes on his paroxysm. He is even angry at himself for the little grace he hath hitherto shewn to *Christianity*; and will, at last, demonstrate that the profession of it is even inconsistent with a FREE STATE. — “But I deceive myself (says he) when I talk of a “CHRISTIAN REPUBLIC. Either of these terms excludes the other. “Christianity preaches up nothing but servitude and dependence. “The SPIRIT OF IT is too favourable to *tyranny*, for her not always “to take the advantage of it. TRUE CHRISTIANS ARE MADE TO “BE SLAVES. They know it, and submit. This short life is, in “their eyes, of too little value to give themselves any trouble

* Les citoyens marchent sans peine au combat : nul d'entre eux ne songe à fuir ; ils font leur devoir, mais sans passion pour la victoire ; ils savent plutôt mourir que vaincre. P. 197.

† C'étoit un beau serment, à mon gré, que celui des soldats de Fabius ; ils ne jurent pas de mourir ou de vaincre ; ils jurerent de revenir Vainqueurs ; et tinrent leur serment. Jamais des chrétiens n'en eussent fait un pareil ; ils auroient cru tenter Dieu. P. 198.

“ about it *.” This is a fearful picture of *Gospel Christianity*. But what then, the virtuous Citizen of Geneva can never sure be a *calumniator*. However, let us not DESPAIR of the Christian Republic. This may be a monster bred of his own brain perhaps ; or rather of his heart ; and not that *wisdom* which sprung from the head of Jove.

The *slavery* which Christianity inculcates is derived, he says, from the *very spirit* of it. Now the *true spirit of Christianity*, he himself will confess, is to be found, if any where, in the NEW TESTAMENT. The APOSTLES, he will own, understood, if any men did, in what *this spirit* consisted. Let us have recourse then to their writings for our instruction on this important question.

The Citizen of Geneva, you see, affirms, that WHERE THE SPIRIT OF THE LORD IS, THERE IS SLAVERY. St. Paul, on the contrary, assures us, that *where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is Liberty* †. Which of them do you chuse to believe ? Throughout the whole New Testament, the GOSPEL is characterised under the title of THE GLORIOUS LAW OF LIBERTY. It will be objected perhaps, that this word *liberty* always refers to the bondage and slavery of the *Mosaic Law*. It may be so. Nay, on this principle, I support my argument, “ That Christianity naturally inspires the love both of civil and of religious liberty, it raises the desire of being governed by *laws* of our own making, and by the *conscience* which is of God’s own giving.” For consider, I pray you, *the spirit of the Mosaic law*. In religious matters, there was no *toleration* ; and in civil, the government being Theocratical, there was no *popular will* ; in which the idea of liberty is supposed to consist. Now the

* Mais je me trompe en disant une *Republique Chretienne* ; chacun de ses deux mots exclut l’autre. Le Christianisme ne prêche que servitude & dépendance. Son esprit est trop favorable à la tyrannie pour qu’elle n’en profite pas toujours. LES VRAIS CHRETIENS SONT FAITS POUR ETRE ESCLAVES ; ils le savent, & ne s’en emeuvent gueres ; cette courte vie a trop peu de prix à leurs yeux. P. 198.

† 2 Cor. iii. 17.

being set free from *this law*, the apostolic writers call LIBERTY. They instruct us too in the nature of this *Christian liberty*.

1. In the RELIGIOUS PART, it indulges us in a free inquiry concerning the truth of the Gospel. The *Bereans* are distinguished and extolled by the sacred historian for this nobleness and generosity of mind. *These*, says he, *were more noble than those of Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind*—*μετὰ πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ*, which here signifies, the laying aside of all Jewish prejudices—and SEARCHED the Scriptures daily, WHETHER THESE THINGS WERE SO *;—*ἀνακρίνομεν τὰς γράφας*—i. e. examined with a critical application. The virtue for which these Bereans are here extolled, St. PAUL recommends to the whole church, and in a more enlarged way. *Prove all things*, says he, [*δοκιμάζειτε*, sift well and examine] *bold fast that which is good* †. And the arms, with which (by St. Paul's direction) the believer had provided himself, St. Peter advises him always to have in readiness—*Be ready always to give an answer* [—*ἀπολογία*, i. e. a full and formal answer—] *to every man that asketh you a REASON of the hope that is in you* ‡. So consistently, with each other, did these holy men act, in their general direction to the churches. *We have no DOMINION over your faith*,—[*Κυριεύομεν*, we do not Lord it over] says the former of them, *but are HELPERS of your joy* §—[*συνεργοὶ*, fellow-labourers.] Hence it appears, the church is no despotic government, but a free republic. So scandalously (by the way) did the late author of, *Christianity not founded on argument*, misrepresent the Religion of his country!

2. As to the CIVIL PART—A mistake (occasioned by those apostolic triumphs, *where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*) had crept in amongst the early Christians, that the Gospel dissolved the bonds of civil slavery, and manumitted the convert, *foro civili*. To combat an error, which was likely to give much scandal to the state, and to prejudice its citizens against the new religion, St. Paul

* Acts xvii. 11. † 1 Thess. v. 21, ‡ 1 Pet. iii. 15. § 2 Cor. i. 24.

delivers these directions to the church of Corinth—*Let every man abide in the calling wherein he was called. Art thou called being a servant [δούλος, a slave], care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. Ye are bought with a price, be ye not the servants [the slaves] of men. Brethren, let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God* *.

As *the kingdom of Christ is not of this world*, the coming under its dominion makes no change in the civil condition of men. The apostle therefore, to obviate any imputation that *Christianity* disturbed or was unfavourable to civil government, directs those converts who were in a state of civil slavery, to acquiesce, and remain contented under it. But lest this direction should be mistaken to imply, what our Citizen of Geneva has dared to assert, “That *true Christians are made to be slaves*; civil matters being below the notice of saints;” he, at the same time, advises them to change their condition of slavery, to that of free citizens, whenever a fair occasion offers. And to shew them that this was no indifferent matter, he sets before their eyes the height and nobility of the Christian character.—*Ye are bought*, says he, *with a PRICE*; *be ye not the servants [or slaves] of men*. As much as to say, “The dignity of human nature is so highly advanced, by the immense price paid for it, the death and passion of the Son of God, that it would be base and incongruous for any of the REDEEMED, to rest satisfied with a state of slavery; when, without violating the established rights of society, it is in their power to become free.” And this reasoning in favour of CIVIL FREEDOM appeared *so powerful* to St. Paul himself, while he was urging it, that, timely alarmed for the *abuse* it might occasion, he returns to where he set out, and repeats the admonition he began with—*Brethren, let every man wherein he is called, therein abide with God*; i. e. “let him not be ashamed to abide, and appear before God, in that station in which God’s providence hath placed him.” We see then, that according to St. Paul’s idea of Christia-

* 1 Cor. vii. 20, & seq.

nity, the *spirit of liberty*, which it inspires, is not confined to the pale of the CHURCH, but extends its vigour to the STATE; since, as he hath observed, the dignity of man's nature, acquired by the price paid for his *redemption*, obliges him to assert the freedom of the WHOLE MAN, as well *civil* as *religious*. But had St. Paul been less anxious for the plenitude of these rights, and contended only in general terms for *Christian* freedom, the consequence, in favour of *civil liberty*, wherever true Christianity prevailed, would have been still the same; as we shall now shew.

1. It is agreed, that if, *Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*, this *spirit* must recommend and encourage a FREEDOM OF ENQUIRY, like that exerted by the *noble Bereans*; and must support and indulge the FREE EXERCISE OF CONSCIENCE. But men, practised in the exertion, and habituated to the enjoyment, of *religious rights*, can never long continue ignorant of, or bear with patience, the invasion of their *civil*. The human faculties can never long remain in so violent and unnatural a state as to have their operations perpetually checking and defeating one another, by the contrary actions of two such opposite principles, as *love of freedom* and *acquiescence in slavery*. The one or the other must, in a little time, prevail. Either the foul *spirit of tyranny* will defile the purity of religion, and introduce that blind submission of the understanding, and slavish compliance of the will, into the *church*: Or else the *spirit of the Lord* will overturn the usurpation of an unjust despotic power, and bring into the STATE, as well as CHURCH, a *free and reasonable service*. The same spirit, be it which it will, must prevail in both. This, our author himself, in his own example, has shewn us will be the case, whether our passions carry us to love or hate. His paradoxical aversion to SOCIETY, we see, continues just the same, whether the object be the *civil* or the *religious*.

2. Secondly, *True* religion teaches, that its end is HUMAN HAPPINESS, in opposition to all the superstitious fancies of the *false*; which place it in the arbitrary, the selfish, or the capricious manifestations of God's power, or interest, or glory: and this naturally

rally leading us to the end of civil government, will direct us how to form a RIGHT constitution, where the *prince is made for the sake of the people*; when we have, by the foregoing principle of free inquiry, already detected the absurdity of a WRONG; which professes to make *the people for the sake of the prince*.

3. Thirdly, That equitable policy by which *true religion* governs in the church (and true religion as well as false must, as we have shewn, always have a church to govern), will further aid us, when we have now found the *end* of civil society, to attain the *means* likewise, by copying in the state, from that ecclesiastical subordination of power, and limitation of authority, where the SOVEREIGNTY resides in the whole body of the faithful; not, as in the administration of *corrupt religion*, where a servile clergy and a despotic prelate constitute the CHURCH.

4. But, above all, That grandeur and elevation of mind, that sublimity of sentiment, that conscious dignity of our nature, redeemed at so high a price, which *true religion* keeps alive; which holy scripture dictates; and which the Spirit of the Lord inspires, will be ever pushing us on to the attainment and preservation of those CIVIL RIGHTS, which we have been taught by reason to know are ours; and which we have been made to feel by experience, are, of all Ours, the most indispensable to human happiness.

By all these several ways is the SPIRIT OF THE LORD, or *true Religion*, naturally productive of the great blessing, *civil liberty*.

But the most generous and noble constitutions being most liable to abuse, as fruits exalted to their highest degree of perfection are nearest to their state of decay, LIBERTY, the greatest blessing here below, is principally subject to this common infirmity of our nature: On this account, St. Peter, while he recommends, and glories in, Christian *liberty*, yet adds this necessary caution—*As free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants of God**; i. e. *Free as the servants of God*, alluding to what St. Paul had said, *ye are bought with a price* [and therefore being the

* 1 Pet. ii. 16.

servants of God] *be ye not the servants of men.* But lest this indulgence of the spirit of *civil freedom* should be abused, Peter reminds them on what principle it was indulged, namely, by their becoming (on the price paid) *the servants of God*; a principle equally operative to inspire this spirit, and to keep it within just and proper bounds: for he makes their service to their heavenly master the motive of obedience to their earthly—*Fear God, Honour the king* *.

What follows, in our Author's SOCIAL CONTRACT, concerning *the natural spirit of a Christian Militia*, is such a mixture of sophistry and blunder, and in such equal proportions, that I should be ashamed to give it a formal confutation. However, the last paragraph is too curious to be passed over in silence. "Under the
" Pagan emperors the Christian soldiery were brave. All the Christian writers assure us they were so. And I believe it. It was
" plainly owing to an emulation of honour against the Pagan
" troops. When the emperors became Christian, this emulation
" ceased; and when the *cross* had driven away the *eagle*, all the
" Roman valour disappeared †." The *Roman valour* did indeed from henceforward, though not *disappear*, yet, certainly, begin to decay. This all the historians of those times, both Christian and Pagan, unanimously confess. We have reason to believe them, for they assign a cause fully adequate to the effect; which was, the hiring of mercenary troops from amongst the barbarous nations, to fight their battles. But EMULATION, the only thing they had occasion for, to preserve and keep alive their martial spirit, while the Romans and their mercenaries charged together under the same ensign, whether of the *cross* or the *eagle*, they had still, in all its vigour.

* 1 Pet. ii. 17.

† Sous les empereurs payens les soldats Chrétiens étoient braves; tous les auteurs Chrétiens l'assurent, & je le crois: c'étoit une émulation d'honneur contre les troupes payennes. Dès que les empereurs furent Chrétiens cette émulation ne subsista plus; et quand le croix eut chassé l'aigle, toute la valeur Romaine disparut. P. 199.

It may be here just worth while to observe, that our citizen is very apt to forget his own principles. His charge against the unsocial spirit of *Christianity* is founded in *this*, "that its professors are actuated only by *heavenly*, not *earthly* affections." Yet here, to take off all he can from the merit of their acknowledged BRAVERY, he says, it arose from a spirit of military *emulation*.

In conclusion, let me here repeat my complaint, that Rousseau, in this accusation of the *slavish spirit of Christianity*, has once more flurred his usual sophism upon us; and, instead of the *spirit of Christianity*, has given us the *spirit of Popery*; which does, indeed, by stifling all freedom of enquiry in religious matters, prepare us for a slavish submission to civil tyrants. An exploit, in which the church of Rome so much triumphs, that all the advocates of Popery, and all the enemies of the Reformed, from BELLARMINE down to VOLTAIRE, have made the FACTIOUS SPIRIT OF PROTESTANTISM the constant topic of their calumny and abuse.

After all the instances of ILL FAITH here given, with what astonishment must the public hear the Citizen of Geneva boast to the archbishop of Paris, that he is A MAN MADE UP SOLELY OF TRUTH; THE ONLY AUTHOR OF THIS AGE, AND OF MANY OF THE FOREGOING, WHO HATH WRITTEN WITH GOOD FAITH *.

* Mes ennemis auront beau faire avec leurs injures; ils ne m'ôteront point l'honneur d'être UN HOMME VERIDIQUE EN TOUTE CHOSE, D'ÊTRE LE SEUL AUTEUR DE MON SIÈCLE, & DE BEAUCOUP D'AUTRES QUI AIT ÉCRIT DE BONNE FOI. Lettre à M. de Beaumont, p. 65.—Now, with all his *good faith*, he has surely a very unsound mind or memory. In writing against me, he says, as we have seen above, QUE LA LOI CHRETIENNE EST, AU FOND, PLUS NUISIBLE QU'UTILE À LA FORTE CONSTITUTION DE L'ÉTAT. But when he writes against the *French philosophers*, he says just otherwise: NOS GOUVERNEMENTS MODERNES DOIVENT INCONTESTABLEMENT AU CHRISTIANISME LEUR PLUS SOLIDE AUTORITÉ. *Emile*, v. III. p. 200.

C H A P. V.

In which an Objection to the fundamental Principles of this Alliance is removed.

HERE I should have concluded this Second Book, but that it appeared reasonable to obviate an objection, which may seem to affect our fundamental principle, the REALITY of this *free convention*. The objection is this, "That as the two Societies are supposed to be formed out of one and the same number of individuals, those very men who compose the state composing the church also, it is a convention of the same individuals with themselves, under different capacities. Which convention is as trifling and ineffectual as that which one individual would make with himself." The objection, we see, goes upon this supposition, that the circumstances which prevent one individual's compacting with himself do unavoidably attend a compact attempted to be made by many individuals with themselves, under the distinction of two Societies.

Now, to shew the supposition groundless, is to overthrow the objection. But we shall do more; we shall not only shew our *free convention* to have none of the circumstances attending it, which prevent one individual's compacting with himself; but, that it hath all the circumstances that make a compact binding between *two*.

Let us see what it is which prevents a man's contracting with himself. It is of the essence of all contracts that there be, 1. The concurrence of two wills; and, 2. A mutual obligation on two persons for the performance of their mutual promises. But one man having but one *will*, there is no *foundation* for a compact, which requires the concurrence of two wills: and having but one *person*, there is no *efficacy* in the compact; because no obligation: for what a man promises to himself, himself can acquit. There-
fore

fore an obligation, which the obliged can destroy by the sole act of his *will*, is not *real* but *fanciful*. Hence it appears, that a man's contracting with himself is, of all fancies, the most impertinent.

Thus, we see, the defect of that *compact of one individual with himself*, proceeds from the want of two *wills* and two *persons*. If then, two Societies have really two distinct *wills*, and two distinct *personalities*; the subject matter's being one and the same (of which these two artificial bodies are composed) cannot possibly hinder those two societies from entering into compact; nor that compact from having all the effects of such as are adjudged most real.

That two such societies have two distinct *wills* and *personalities* I shall shew. When any number of men form themselves into a society, whether civil or religious, this society becomes a *body*, different from that aggregate which the number of individuals composed before the society was formed. Else the society would be nothing; or, in other words, no society would be formed. Here then is a *body*, distinct from the aggregate composed by the number of individuals: and is called *fæctitious*, to distinguish it from the *natural body*; being, indeed, the *creature of human will*. But a *body* must have its *proper personality and will*, which, without *these*, is no more than a shadow or a name. This personality and will are neither the personality and will of one individual, nor of all together. Not of one, is self-evident. Not of *all*, because the MAJORITY, in this *fæctitious body*, hath the denomination of the *person* and of the *will* of the society. We conclude then, that the *will* and *personality* of a community are as different and distinct from the will and personality of the numbers of which it is composed, as the body itself is. And, that as in the erection of a community, a *fæctitious body* was created, so were a *fæctitious personality and will*. The reality of this *personality* is clearly seen in the administration of the *law of nations*, where two states are considered as two men living in the state of nature.

But the force of this reasoning will be better seen and supported by an example. The writers of the law of nature and nations

allow that the *second convention*, as it is called, in a pure *democratic* state, is as real and binding as the same convention in a state of any other form. The *second convention* is that whereby protection and allegiance are mutually promised by sovereign and people: "For in the collective body (says Hooker) that have not derived the principality of power into some one, or few, the whole of necessity must be head over each part *:" So that here the people contract with themselves. And yet is the contract adjudged most real. This conclusion is founded on the very principle I lay down to prove the reality of the convention between church and state; namely that, in entering into society, a *fætitious person* is created. In a democracy, this person, the sovereign, is the WHOLE: and, with this person, the *natural persons* of all the individuals convene.

If this be the case, then it follows that the self-same number of individuals, which have formed and erected, of themselves, one society or *fætitious body*, endowed with a distinct *personality and will*, may erect, of themselves, as *many such* societies as they please. Because the body, personality, and will, of such societies being all fætitious, the store-house, from whence they come, is as inexhaustible as the wants of mankind. Whereas, were the will and personality of the individuals, the will and personality of the society composed by them, then, on the contrary, the self-same number of individuals could not erect above *one* society: Because their personality and will being already bestowed upon one society, they had them not to give again, in order to animate any other.

Here then we have two societies, made up of one and the same number of individuals, with each its distinct personality and will; each different from the personality and will of the other, and from the personality and will of the individuals. But the different *natures* of the societies not only make their wills and personalities distinct, but their different *ends* will keep them so. For each society being created for one certain end, it hath its own proper views and in-

* Eccl. Pol. B. viii.

terests: and though each be so closely related to the other as to have one common *suppositum*, yet it pursues its proper interests only; without further regard to the interests of the other, than as *these* interests support its own. In this, the *artificial* man, society, is much unlike the *natural*; who being created for *several ends* hath several interests to pursue, and several relations to consult; and may therefore be considered *under several capacities*, as a *religious*, a *civil*, a *rational* animal, &c. and yet they all make but one and the same man. But one and the same political society cannot be considered, in one view, as a religious—in another, as a civil—and, in another, as a literary community. *One* society can be precisely *but one* of these communities *.

But, now it is to be observed, that, let this objection to a real convention, from the want of distinct personalities and wills in the two societies, be as strong as we have shewn it to be weak, yet it reaches only to those two societies under a pure unmixed *democratic* form; in which the sovereignty of the society resides in the whole number of individuals. When both, or either, is under any other form, the objection is more clearly seen to have no weight. Because then the sovereignty of, at least, one of the societies resides not in the whole, but in part only of the body politic. And all conventions between societies being made between the sovereignties thereof, these sovereignties must needs have two personalities and wills, as being composed, not of the same, but of different individuals. But few or no religious or civil societies being under this pure unmixed democratic form, the objection is not directed against any *actual* union between the two societies. However having all

* *Ecclesiastica potestas seu respublica Christiana, quæ sub nomine ecclesiæ sæpe explicatur, eam significat clericorum et laicorum collectionem, qui in unum corpus adunati, ecclesiasticis legibus se subjiunt: non quidem quatenus homines civilem rempublicam componentes, sed quatenus in spiritualem cœtum admissi. Eadem ratione civis respublica dici potest, quæ vel ex infidelibus principibus & rebuspublicis constet, vel quæ ex Christianis hominibus quidem, sed nullo ad religionem respectu habito, componitur.* Marca, l. ii. c. 1. F.T.

along, for the sake of clearness and brevity, considered the two societies under this simple and primitive *democratic* form, I thought it proper to remove an objection which lay against that form, though it lay against that only.

The conclusion from the whole is, that two societies, composed of one and the same number of individuals, in which the personalities and wills not only *are*, but *must* necessarily continue to be and to be kept, distinct, are proper subjects for compact and convention with one another; there being no circumstance, either necessary or commodious, for the making any kind of civil compacts binding, which is not to be found in these. I will only add, that as the administration of both societies can never be in the same hands at once, those *personalities and wills*, which *are*, and are *kept up*, distinct, will be easily understood to be so.

But, to crown the whole, let me observe, that nothing so clearly evinces the importance and necessity of this THEORY for justifying the right which the state hath to interfere in church matters, as the mistakes into which the excellent HOOKER was betrayed, on his missing of that capital idea of an ALLIANCE, when he came to defend *the right of civil princes to ecclesiastical dominion*, in the eighth book of his immortal work, intitled, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY.

Now, although it hath been long doubted, Whether we have received the *three* last books of this work from the Author's most perfect copy, seeing they came not to the press till after his decease; yet that they are indeed of the same hand with the other *five*, cannot I think be doubted by any who have studied the unquestioned books with a due degree of attention.

The subject of this eighth book is, as we have said, a defence of the civil magistrate, in the administration of ecclesiastical supremacy, against the PURITANS of that time, who denied the spiritual legality of such a supremacy, and supported their opposition on this capital argument.—*The church and commonwealth being societies or corporations totally distinct and independent on one another by nature,*
there

there is a separation perpetual and personal between the church and commonwealth *. This argument HOOKER attempts to overthrow. The position of his adversary is loosely worded. But the contest, at that time, subsisting between the *Puritans* and the *Church of England*, shews the meaning to be this, That "that INDEPENDENCY which a *religious* society had by nature, it could never give up to the *civil*."

The argument itself might have been easily answered, as the Reader sees it hath been in this discourse of the *Alliance*, where the PREMISES are not only granted, but by various reasonings established; and the INFERENCE not only denied, but by the same reasonings refuted: It being shewn, that nothing can hinder two distinct and independent societies from entering into compact: and that *only such* societies can contract a free *alliance*. This, which may be done lawfully, I have shewn *must* be done necessarily, before the church can claim the protection of the state; or before the state can engage the service of the church; and both act in the manner in which these reciprocal benefits are given and returned, in the happy establishment under which we live. In other words, I have shewn, how the church became enabled to exercise civil power without *tyranny*; and the state, to exercise ecclesiastical power without *usurpation*.

But, by ill hap, the excellent HOOKER took the contrary method: He denied the PREMISES, instead of questioning the CONCLUSION; and so entangled himself and his cause in inextricable difficulties. He too hastily conceded to his adversaries, that those things which were separated by *nature*, and more especially by divine *institution*, and so, INDEPENDENT of one another, must always continue independent. An absurd assertion! which the Reader will see confuted at large in the *Postscript*, against the reasoning of Lord Bolingbroke, who lately revived this Puritan principle. Instead therefore of exposing the error of the *conclusion*, HOOKER addresses himself (as we said) to confute the PREMISES; and to shew, that *church*

* Eccl. Pol. Book viii. p. 407.

and state were not two societies totally distinct and independent by nature, but rather one and the same society; which, regarded in different views, had different names *. For, (saith he) *the truth is that the church and Commonwealth are names which import things really different.* But THESE THINGS ARE ACCIDENTS; and such accidents, as may, and always should, dwell lovingly together in one SUBJECT †. Which subject, he tells us, is the aggregate body of a people. Or, in other words, church and state are one *society under different names.* He attempts to support this idea from *reason* and *fact*.

1. “We hold, (says he) that seeing there is not any man of the Church of England but the same man is also a member of the Commonwealth, nor any member of the Commonwealth which is not also of the Church of England, therefore, as in a figure triangle, the base doth differ from the sides thereof, and yet one and the self-same line is both a base and also a side; a side simply, a base if it chance to be the bottom, and underlye the rest: so albeit properties and actions of one, do cause the *name of a Commonwealth*; qualities and functions of another sort, the *name of the church* to be given to a multitude; yet one and the self-same multitude may, in such sort, be both ‡.” To this ingenious illustration, it is sufficient to reply, in the great man’s own words, in this very book:—*There is nothing for which some COMPARABLE reason or other may not be given;—i. e. by some simile or other, supported.*

But let us consider the *argument*, on which he founds his illustration, “that the same individuals being members both of church and state must make them but one community, under different names.” An argument which he repeats in the next page.—“When all in the Commonwealth do believe the gospel, and are contained in the name of the church, how should the church remain BY PERSONAL SUBSISTENCE divided from the Commonwealth? The church and the Commonwealth are in this case,

* Page 407. Edit. 1723.

† Page 409.

‡ Page 407.

“therefore,

“ therefore, **PERSONALLY**, one society : which society being termed “ *Commonwealth*, as it liveth under whatsoever form of secular “ law and regiment ; a *church*, as it liveth under the spiritual law “ of Christ *.”—Now all this strange reasoning ariseth, as the reader sees, from not distinguishing between a *natural* and an *artificial* **PERSONAGE** ; which latter every society, community, or corporation, necessarily creates ; as hath been just now shewn at large in this very chapter ; so that when this distinction is applied, the absurdity becomes apparent.

2. The great writer’s argument from *fact* is taken from the *Jewish Commonwealth*, where *church and state* made but one society.—“ Unto the Jews (says he) God so revealed the truth of “ religion, that he gave them, in special considerations, laws not “ only for the administration of things spiritual, but also temporal. “ The Lord himself appointing both the one and the other in that “ Commonwealth, did not thereby distract it into several independent communities, but institute several functions of one and the “ self-same community. Some *reasons* therefore must there be “ alledged why it should be otherwise in the church of Christ †.” These *reasons*, the reader hath seen alledged just above. But with regard to his own reason, shewing whereby the Jewish church and state became *one and the self-same community*, nothing can be more defective ; the true cause of *this incorporation* was peculiar and singular ; it was the natural and necessary consequence of a **THEOCRACY** ; as hath been shewn at large elsewhere ‡ ; and therefore cannot be possibly urged in proof or support of HOOKER’s general principle, “ that church and state make but one society or community.” However, this was an argument *ad homines*. The puritans of that time were accustomed to support their dissent from the established discipline of the church, on peculiarities in the Mosaic œconomy, ill understood, and worse applied. Yet had our great author, instead of opposing their premises, bethought himself to

* Page 409.

† Page 408.

‡ Divine Legation, Part II.

oppose their conclusion, *that the church and state could never allie*, he had had a very easy victory; for all that the Puritans could find to support this proposition, was the principle, which in those days they generally went upon, that *every thing was evil for which men had not the command or the permission of scripture*. Now HOOKER might easily have overthrown this principle, by only observing that there was such *permission given by scripture* to unite the two societies, in the example of the Jewish republic.

But the abhorrence of one extreme, always runs indiscreet disputants into another. Sometimes the most discreet are liable to this abusive conduct, when they have missed of the true medium. This was unhappily the case here. Hooker saw plainly, that the Puritan principle (which held, not only that *the church and Commonwealth were societies totally distinct and independent on one another by nature, but that this separation was to remain perpetual*) necessarily brought in that absurd and fatal evil in politics, an *imperium in imperio*: for they held that the magistrate was notwithstanding *ordained*, and therefore *obliged*, to support the church, and to impart to it of his civil coercive power even while she retained her independency and sovereignty. To combat this principle, which makes the *state a slave to the church*, HOOKER ran into the opposite extreme, which makes the *church a slave to the state*. His words are these: “Another occasion of which *misconceit*,” (*viz.* that the church and state are two distinct independent societies) “is, that things appertaining to religion are both distinguished from other affairs, and have always had, in the church spiritual, persons chosen to be exercised about them. By which distinction of spiritual affairs, and persons therein employed, from temporal, the error of PERSONAL SEPARATION always necessary between the church and Commonwealth hath strengthened itself. For every politic society, that being true which *Aristotle* saith, namely, *that the scope thereof is not simply to live*, NOR THE DUTY SO MUCH TO PROVIDE FOR THE LIFE, as for the means of living well: and that even as the soul is the worthier part of man, so human so-

“cieties

“cieties are much more to care for that which tendeth properly to the soul’s estate, than for such temporal things which the life hath need of. Other proof there needeth none, to shew that as by all men the kingdom of God is to be sought first, so in all Commonwealths, things spiritual ought, above temporal, to be sought for; and of things spiritual the chiefeft is religion*.” This reasoning is founded on the *misconceit*, so thoroughly exploded above, “That civil society was instituted for the attainment of every kind of good it is even accidentally capable of producing:” this he supports by the words of Aristotle ill interpreted; who by the *means of living well* meant no more, than that *society* procured those commodities of civil life, which in a *state of nature* men must be content to live without. Aristotle’s words are literally these, that society was instituted first *for the sake of living, simply; and then for the sake of living happily*—*γινόμενῃ μὲν ἔν τῷ ζῆν ἕξειν, ἕστα δὲ τῷ εὖ ζῆν*. He is extremely concise. But his meaning seems to be this, (as hath been observed above) that the *primary* end of civil society, was to secure men from that mutual violence to which they were exposed in a state of nature: the *secondary*, to promote those *accommodations* of life which civil society only can bestow. And here, I am sorry to observe, that this excellent man, in paraphrasing the words of Aristotle, so as to give a sense to his purpose, (a purpose, the Greek philosopher never thought of) has added,—*nor the duty so much to provide for the life*—meaning *THIS* life.

But to proceed,—Again,—“Christian Kings, within their own precincts and territories, (says he) have an authority and power, *even in matters of Christian religion*: and there is no higher nor greater that can in those cases ever command them, where they are placed to reign as Kings†.” The unavoidable consequence of this doctrine is,

1. THAT *the church becomes a slave to the state*: for if it be the first duty of the civil magistrate to see to the good condition of *things*

* Book viii. p. 408.

† Page 411.

spiritual, the chiefest of which is religion, he must, on being invested with his office, (which HOOKER very rightly derives from the people) be endowed with power to put and to keep *spiritual things in this condition*; which power can be no other than absolute authority in church-matters, or, as HOOKER himself more strongly expresses it, *authority and power in MATTERS OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION*. So that the church as a religious society hath nothing left to be performed, on their part, but a ready obedience to all the commands of the state. And that this is no forced inference drawn from HOOKER's principle will appear evident from hence,—One of the great purposes of Hobbes's LEVIATHAN is to prove, that the church is a creature of the state: and he proceeds to induce his proof, on this very principle of HOOKER, *that a COMMONWEALTH of Christian men and a CHURCH are the same thing called by two names* *. But this is not the worst; for,

2. Secondly, these principles support and authorize *persecution for opinions*: for if, when the magistrate decrees in religious matters, whether of doctrine or discipline, men will not submit, the absolute power here given him justifies him in using force, for *he beareth not the sword in vain*. And to confess the truth, these principles, recommended by so great an authority, soon becoming the principles in fashion; the practice soon followed: the magistrate became a *persecutor*; and so continued; till *civil necessity*, arising from a state revolution, not the *religious choice* of a better theory, put a final stop to this opprobrium of humanity.

To conclude, the PURITANS and their incomparable adversary had, in this famous quarrel (as is the wont) divided truth and falsehood pretty equally between them. The Puritans were right in supposing church and state to be two distinct independent societies: they were wrong in supposing the two societies must always continue so: but right again in holding, that while they did so continue, the civil magistrate had nothing to do with religion. On

* Leviathan.

the other hand, HOOKER was wrong in thinking, *church and state* was only one society under different names. He was right in asserting the civil magistrate's supremacy in religion ; but wrong again in supposing that this supremacy was by *nature*, and not by *compact*. Thus, from right premises, the PURITANS drew a wrong conclusion ; and from wrong premises, HOOKER drew a right one. But if, from the wrong conclusion of the *former*, the supremacy of the magistrate was for ever excluded ; yet from the right conclusion of the *latter*, he was admitted before his time. And all this confusion arose from a common error, admitted on both sides, that if church and state be distinct and independent societies, they must EVER remain distinct and independent.

The result from all we have seen was this, that the PURITAN principle established an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO : and that HOOKER's introduced PERSECUTION FOR OPINIONS.

NOTES TO BOOK II.

P. 79. [A]. **W**E have a remarkable instance of this in the state of Venice, which is a thorough tyranny, if ever there was any. Mr. Bayle tells us [Crit. Dict. Art. *Abelard*, Rem. (P)], that one day asking a friend, who had told him a thousand stories of the disorders of the Venetian ecclesiastics, how it happened that the state would suffer things so dishonourable to religion and society? his informer replied, that the good of the public obliged the sovereign to this indulgence; that the senate was not displeased to find the priests and monks fall under the public contempt for their debaucheries, for that in this condition they would have no credit to raise or foment sedition amongst the people; and that one of the reasons why the Jesuits were not acceptable to the sovereign was, because they knew how to preserve the decorum of their character; and so, gaining respect and reverence by a more decent exterior, had it in their power to excite the populace to sedition.

P. 81. [B]. A jurisdiction somewhat resembling this we find in the famous court of Areopagus at Athens: which city was once the model of *civil prudence* as well as of *religion*, to the improved part of mankind. Isocrates, speaking of this branch of jurisdiction in the Areopagus, says, *It was not occupied to punish crimes; but to prevent them*—ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκού-
πων, δι' ὧν κολάσσει τὰς ἀνομιὰς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν αὖ κατὰσκευάζουσι μηδὲν αὐτὰς ἄξιον
ζημίας βεβλήσθαι· ἀμαρτάνειν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι. ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΛΟΓ.

P. 84. [C]. In this consists the MASTER-SOPHISM which runs through Tindal's whole book of the *Rights of the Christian Church*. He brings all along the *confessed abuse* of ecclesiastical government as an argument that the church

church is an *imperium in imperio*; whereas that evil consists in the *legitimate* exercise of two contradictory sovereign powers in one and the same republic; nothing of which there is, as we have shewn, in a church and state; though both sovereign and independent before *alliance*.

P. 85. [D]. The reason why, throughout this Discourse, I have taken it for granted, "That a full and free toleration, or liberty of worshipping God in the way every one shall chuse, is of natural equity, and consonant to the genius of our holy religion," is because Mr. BAYLE in his *Philosophic Commentary*, and Mr. LOCKE in his *Letters on Toleration*, have exhausted the subject, and vindicated this liberty with the fullest and clearest evidence. And I am not of an humour *actum agere*. Mr. Voltaire indeed has lately undertaken to write in favour of it. How he has acquitted himself is now (since those admirable discourses have been in the hands of all mankind) of little consequence to any but himself. Yet it must needs divert the Reader to observe the air with which he concludes—"Cet ecrit sur la "tolerance est une requête que l'humanité presente *tres humblement* au pouvoir et à la prudence. JE SEME UN GRAIN QUI POURRA UN JOUR PRODUIRE "UN MOISSON."—*I sow a grain of seed (says he) which may, one day, produce a harvest.* He had been much nearer the truth, and that *humility*, which he here pretends to, if, with the man in the parable, he had confessed, that he *had reaped where another had sown*. Or if in courtesy we will allow him his pretensions, of being a labourer in the Lord's heritage, he will have the grace to confess, that he has ill observed the precept of the Law, *not to sow his field with MINGLED SEED*: for his way throughout this discourse is to recommend *toleration* by abusing *religion*.

P. 94. [E]. When the QUAKERS first arose, the clergy generally claimed their tithes by DIVINE RIGHT; and there being nothing in the *light within* to direct those people up to that original, they regarded the exaction of tithes as an *anticristian robbery*; and rather chose to suffer, what they called, *persecution*, than comply with the demand.

In no long time after, the Clergy in general gave up this claim. I think the priest's *divine right* to a tenth part, and the king's *divine right* to the other nine, went out of fashion together. And thenceforward the church and the crown agreed to claim their temporal rights from the laws of the land only.

One would think therefore, that when churchmen had changed their bad principles for better, the quakers might have done so too. To be candid, I will not suppose, they wanted this good disposition. But the smallest change in their religious system would have brought the whole into hazard. For here lay the difference between the *church* and the *conventicle*. The reform of the national religion from the corruptions of popery, was made on the principles of human reason guided by common sense. In which, whatever mistakes the REFORMERS had committed (errors incident to humanity), their successors might redress without blushing; and, what is more, without any danger of dishonouring religion. It was not so with the Quakers. For this sect being founded in *modern inspiration* (which is, by interpretation, *fanaticism*) to alter the least article of their creed was giving the lie to the Holy Spirit, as it came from the mouth of their founder, George Fox.

Payment of tithes, therefore, was still obstinately to be refused. And, to support their perseverance, they had recourse to another fetch of principle, "That whoever contributes to the support of a thing sinful is partaker of that sin." And tithes being apparently sinful, the desired conclusion was within call. This afforded much consolation to FRIENDS. It is true, the expedient was not without its inconvenience: for in the number of things sinful, they held *war*, especially an offensive war, to be one. And then an act of parliament, granting an aid for the support of such a war, brought on a new distress. What was to be done? The king would be obeyed. This they well knew, and therefore in dutiful silence paid their quota, and left it to their ill-willers to detect the prevarication. Thus stands the case at present with these conscientious people.

But to judge what indulgence is fairly due unto them, we should consider a little the true grounds of that complaisance which free-states are always disposed to shew to tender consciences. Now I apprehend they understand it to extend no further than to opinions which have no evil influence on the true and essential interests of society. For to carry the indulgence further would be a species of fanaticism, though of a different kind indeed, yet as mad as that which produces the tender consciences in question.

Of opinions thus injurious, there are various kinds; from that which is least so, the *unlawfulness of tithes*, up through the rising degrees of—the UNLAWFULNESS of *oaths*—of *self-defence*—of *capital punishments*; till we
come

come to a reprobation of *civil magistracy* itself, and the renouncing of all kings *but king Jesus*. It will be allowed, that most of them require suppression, rather than indulgence: and I believe all will own that the last was not unjustly treated, when, in the memory of our fathers, it was exterminated between the king's guards and the gallows. To the first, the obstinate refusal to pay tithes, in defiance of the public laws, some indulgence has been reasonably shewn: and that a wayward conscience might lie as light as possible on their temporal interests, a *justice of peace* was authorized to wrest from them, in an easy and expeditious way, what they could not keep, and were scrupulous to restore.

But now what return did they make for so much favour? Why, from thenceforward they never lost an opportunity of teasing the legislature (of which they have given a recent instance) to exclude the clergy from every other entrance to justice. Their endeavours have been hitherto fruitless; and fruitless, I suppose, they are like to remain: for a more insolent or iniquitous demand was never made on an equal legislature.

These clergy-rights rise upon the same footing with all the lay-rights in the kingdom; to whom every court of law and equity, as is fit, stands open. Yet these, as a sealed fountain, are to be kept shut up for the solace of the saints; and the clergy to be admitted no higher than to the muddy stream of a country justice.

Had the Quakers confined their demand to an exemption from an *ecclesiastical jurisdiction*, some decency of appearances had been kept, for the spiritual courts might have been thought too much a party: not to say that the proper object of their power extends no further than *reformation of manners*. But to attempt a violation, not of this only, but of all civil communities, in which it is the essential right of citizens to have all the courts of justice thrown open to them, is a strain of modesty peculiar to this illustrious sect.

P. 103. [F]. When a modern archbishop of the same see (and, to judge of him only by what follows, one might, though very erroneously, suspect him of the same principles) had entertained us with this flattering story of the archbishop Courtney, he proceeds thus: "Nor has the statute of the 25th of Henry VIII. had any other influence on the state of these assemblies [viz. Convocations] as to this matter [viz. the right of calling themselves] THAN ONLY THIS, that whereas, before, the archbishop might, whenever he pleased, without any other direction, by his own proper motion have summoned his clergy to a synod, now he may not
" do

"do it, but by the king's writ to warrant him therein: but as for the "POWER of calling them, that is still left to him as it was before." *Wake's State of the Church and Clergy of England*, p. 11. I believe, the Reader would suspect me of a design to banter him, if in a similar case I should argue in a similar manner, and say, "The FREE election of a bishop by his "chapter, has received *no change* from what it was in ancient times *but only* "this; that whereas, anciently, the chapter, without any other direction, "might, on a vacancy, by their own proper motion, chuse a new bishop; "now they may not do it, but by the king's writ of *congé d'élire*; which they "must wait for, before they proceed to election. But as for the RIGHT of "chusing their bishop, that is still left them as it was before." For without doubt the incurring a præmunire for summoning a synod, and chusing a bishop before the king's writ comes, or refusing to summon or to chuse after it is come, can never affect the *power* of the one or the *free choice* of the other.—But this will ever be the case even amongst men of the most reasonable principles, when they write, as party, and not as truth, directs their pen.

P. 118. [G]. CARTE the Nonjuror, AN ENGLISHMAN, as he calls himself, was (with a good deal of knowledge in old records, but without judgement) set on work and publicly paid to write a JACOBITE HISTORY OF *England*. This man, to support his doctrine of *indefeasible right*, observes, when he comes to the reign of Henry IV, *That the clergy of England have never THRIVEN under* (what he calls) *an usurpation*. One of their *oppressions* under this reign, being, as he reckons, *to be enrolled in a commission of array to oppose a French invasion*. Now could any thing be more destructive of his avowed purpose than this silly observation, or more recommend an *interrupted* succession to his masters (who I suppose are *Englishmen* too), than that, at such seasons, the encroachments of the clergy on the civil power were wont to receive some check?

P. 128. [H]. But let it be observed, that the CANON LAW rarely cultivated a truth, but in order to graft a lye upon it: as here, under pretence of teaching humility in church governors, and of encouraging the inferior clergy to vindicate their Christian liberty, the real purpose of the COURT OF ROME was to mortify all Catholic bishops, for insolently pretending to be of the same rank and order with the bishop of Rome; by a fair hint that they were BISHOPS but by courtesy, and that they differed from PRESBYTERS only in *name*, given them on no better authority than old doating *custom*

P. 130. [1]. How necessary this SUPREMACY is, for the sake of the state, may be seen by the famous contention between the *House of Commons* and the *Convocation* in 1532, before the Act of Submission of the Clergy to *Henry VIII.*

The *Commons* in the year 1532 represent, in a petition to the King, “that the clergy in *Convocation* have made, and dayly make, divers sanctions or laws concerning *temporal things*; some of which be repugnant to the laws and statutes of the realm, not having ne requiring the royal assent to the same; nother any assent or knowledge of the lay subject; nother to them published and known in their mother tongue; albeit divers of the said laws extend to the King’s person, his liberty, and prerogative royal, and to the interdiction of his laws and possessions, and so likewise to the goods and possessions of his lay subjects, declaring the infringers of the said laws, so by them made, not only to incur the terrible censure of excommunication, but also the detestible crime and sin of heresy; by which, the humble and obedient lay subjects be brought into this ambiguity, whether they may execute the King’s laws, according to his jurisdiction royal, for dread of the same censures and pains comprised in the same laws, so by them made in their Convocation, to the great trouble and inquietation of the lay subject, &c. and the impeachment of the King’s jurisdiction and prerogative royal.”

The answer of the *Convocation* to this representation of the *Commons* was as follows——“We say, that forasmuch as we repute and take our authority of making laws to be grounded upon the scripture of God, and the determination of HOLY CHURCH, which must also be a rule and square to try the justice and righteousness of all laws, as well spiritual as temporal, we verily trust, that, considering the laws of this realm be such as have been made by most Christian, religious, and devout princes and people, how both these laws proceeding from one fountain, the same being sincerely interpreted, and after the good meaning of the makers, there shall be found no repugnancy nor contrariety, but that the one shall be found, as aiding, maintaining and supporting the other. And if it shall otherwise appear, as it is our duty to reform our ordinances to God’s commission, and to conform our statutes and laws and those of our predecessors, to the determination of scripture and HOLY CHURCH; so we hope in God that your highness will, if there appear cause why, with the assent of your people, temper your grace’s laws accordingly.

“ And as concerning the *requiring of your highness’ royal assent* to the au-
 “ thority of such laws as have been by our predecessors, or shall be made
 “ by us in such points and articles as we have by God’s authority to rule
 “ and order by such provisions and laws; we knowing your highness’
 “ wisdom and virtue and learning, nothing doubt but the same perceiveth
 “ how the granting hereunto dependeth not upon our will and liberty.
 “ AND THAT WE, your most humble subjects, MAY NOT SUBMIT THE EXECU-
 “ TION OF OUR CHARGE AND DUTY certainly prescribed by God, TO YOUR
 “ HIGHNESS’ ASSENT, although in very deed the same is most worthy for
 “ your noble, princely, and excellent virtues, not only to give *your royal*
 “ *assent*, but also to devise and command what we should for good order
 “ and manners by statutes and laws provide in the church; nevertheless
 “ considering we may not refrain the doing of our office, we most humbly
 “ desiring your grace, as the same hath heretofore, so from henceforth,
 “ to shew your grace’s mind and opinion to us, which we shall most
 “ gladly hear and follow, IF IT SHALL PLEASE GOD TO INSPIRE US SO
 “ TO DO.

“ Furthermore, whereas your said lay-subjects say, that sundry of the said
 “ laws extend to your excellent person, your liberty, and prerogative
 “ royal, and to the interdiction of your lands and possessions: to this we
 “ say, that having submitted the tryal and examining of the laws made
 “ in the church, by us and our predecessors, to the just and strait rule of
 “ God’s laws, which giveth measure of power, prerogative, and authority
 “ to all emperors, kings, princes and potentates, and all other; we have
 “ conceived such opinion of your majesty’s goodness and virtue, that what-
 “ soever any persons, not so well learned as your grace is, would pretend
 “ unto the same, whereby we may be brought into your grace’s displea-
 “ sure, surmising that we should by usurpation and presumption extend
 “ our laws to your most noble person, prerogative and realm, yet the
 “ same your highness being so highly learned will facilly discharge and
 “ deliver us from that envy, when it shall appear that the said laws are
 “ made by us or our predecessors conformable and maintainable by the
 “ scripture of God and *determination of the church*, AGAINST WHICH, NO
 “ LAWS CAN STAND OR TAKE EFFECT.”

This was such an apology as convinced HENRY that it was time to
 provide for their more perfect SUBMISSION; which he did, soon after, by
 act of parliament. For, how he relished their answer appears from what
 he

he said to the *Commons* when he ordered them to come and receive this answer of the *Convocation*. "We think (says he) their answer will finally please you, for it seemeth to us very *slender*. You be a *great sort of wise men*; I doubt not but you will look *circumspectly* in the matter; and we will be *indifferent* between you."—Without doubt, he meant as an *umpire*, not as a simple *spectator*: For he was more concerned in the matter than either of them. The *Convocation* was intrusted with the welfare of the church: the *Commons* with that of the state; but *HENRY* was intrusted with the welfare of both.

P. 131. [K]. Yet so perverse or ignorant hath the citizen of Geneva shewn himself, that, after reading all this, he hath declared, that "though the King of England hath established himself *head of the church*, yet in England as well as in other places there are two powers, two sovereigns;" and consequently an *imperium in imperio*. His reason is admirable: the *headship* consists rather in a power to preserve religion than to change it; that is, to destroy it. So that to prevent an *imperium in imperio*, nothing will serve him but the right of destroying at pleasure. A right founded on no other principle than this, that religion is a creature of the state, viz. a phantom invented by politicians to keep fools in awe. That this is all the notion which our virtuous citizen of Geneva has of the matter, he declares plainly enough throughout all his writings; and particularly by what immediately follows, "that of all the Christian writers the philosopher, Hobbes, is the only man who has fully seen the mischief [of this *imperium in imperio*], and provided the remedy, by daring to propose a reunion of the two heads of the eagle, and by bringing back every thing to the political unity." But to manifest his good faith, or, at least, his knowledge of the civil constitutions which he thus dogmatically condemns, he says, that *in all places where the clergy make and constitute a body, there they are masters and legislators in their department*. In England the clergy make a body, and a distinct body; yet they are neither masters nor legislators in their department. Their department is *CONVOCATION*: yet there they cannot so much as enter into any business till they have particular and express licence, from the civil magistrate, for so doing. He pretends to have read what is here said of the *Alliance between Church and State*, as it exists at present in England: and there he might see, that the first and most necessary consequence of the King's

becoming *head of the church* is, that without the consent and allowance of the state, the church can exert no act of authority or legislation to decree or change any thing either in the discipline or doctrines of religion.

“ Parmi nous, les rois d’Angleterre se sont établis chefs de l’Eglise, autant en ont fait les czars ; mais par ce titre ils s’en sont moins rendus les maîtres que les ministres ; ils ont moins acquis le droit de la changer que le pouvoir de la maintenir ; ils n’y sont pas *LEGISLATEURS*, ils n’y sont que *princes*. Partout où le clergé fait un corps il est maître & législateur dans sa partie. Il y a donc deux puissances, deux souverains, en Angleterre et en Russie, comme tout ailleurs. De tous les auteurs Chrétiens le philosophe Hobbes est le seul qui ait bien vu le mal et le remède, qui ait osé proposer de réunir les deux têtes de l’Aigle, et de tout ramener à l’unité politique, sans laquelle jamais état ni gouvernement ne sera bien constitué.” *Du Contrat Social*, L. iv. c. 8.

P. 133. [L]. The very learned, the president Henault, in his *Chronological History of France*, speaking in justification of the *CONCORDAT*, which gives the right of nomination of the greater benefices to the King, and of its just preference to the *PRAGMATIC SANCTION*, says—“ Que le *roi représentant la nation*, c’est à lui d’exercer les droits qu’exercoient *les premiers fideles* ; et *qu’ils lui ont remis lorsque l’Eglise a ETE REÇUE dans l’état*, POUR PRIX DE LA PROTECTION que le roi accordoit à la religion ;” p. 603, ed. 8vo ; agreeable to the principles, and in the very words, of the *ALLIANCE*.

P. 135. [M]. As in these *incorporate unions*, it commonly happens that the *fundamental* articles are declared by the contracting parties, to be unalterable ; it hath become a question, whether the new sovereignty can alter such articles without dissolving the *UNION*. The difficulty seems to arise from the very nature of the convention. Two independent states unite in one, on certain conditions, declared, by the contracting parties, to be unalterable. When these two states are *equal*, a new one arises from their incorporation, composed of the other two ; when *unequal*, the less is melted down into the more powerful ; as in this latter case one only of the contracting parties now subsists ; so, in the other, neither of them. But good faith requires, that all contracts shall remain in force, till dissolved by the mutual consent of the contracting parties themselves ; but here the contract-
ing

ing parties are no longer in being: So that these articles of *union* would seem to be perpetual, though that condition had not been expressly stipulated. On the other hand, the incessant flux of human things necessitates society, in course of time, to make changes in the most fundamental parts of the constitution. This is the difficulty: which seems not to be well solved in only recurring to the common power of the sovereignty of repealing and changing the laws; whose very *title* indeed shews the absurdity of an irrevocable law; as such law would tend to destroy the very power which puts it in force; for the reason of this act of power is founded on a supposition, that the laws, revoked by the sovereign, were of the sovereign's enacting; which is not the fact, in the case before us. For the articles of *Union*, made before the incorporation, had for their author, powers different from what are now left for their abrogation; one or both the contracting powers being no longer existent.

To justify any alteration, therefore, we must have recourse to a higher principle; which is not the rights of this or that sovereignty, but of society itself, as such. Contracts between independent states are of the same nature as those between individuals. Now a number of individuals, let it be three hundred, or three hundred thousand, agree, in the state of nature, to form themselves into civil society. The *first convention* (as it is called by the writers on the laws of nature and nations) by which the *form* of government is agreed upon, is between individuals; where the consent of every one is necessary to make him subject to it. And this *form* they declare to be unalterable, as the only one they are willing to exchange for their natural liberty. After this follows the *second convention*; in which protection and allegiance are mutually promised by sovereign and people; whereby the contracting parties in the *first convention* become annihilated, and a new factitious person is produced; as appears from hence, that in the *first convention* the consent of every one is necessary to conclude him; in the *second*, the majority is sufficient. Now who ever doubted but that this new created body had a right of altering the form of government? For the necessity, which arises from the nature of things, requiring an alteration, and the contracting parties being no longer existent, their survivor must needs be deemed their substitute, on whom all their power is devolved.

P. 137. [N]. N. Bacon, in his discourse on the English Government, composed by the assistance of Selden's papers, says, "The common law ever held the supreme cognizance of excommunication within its own power, as upon the writ *de quare excommunicato* may appear," p. 182. It was a law from the Conquest, and all along insisted on, that none of the king's barons could be excommunicated without his leave: For in the feudal times there was so close a connexion between the sovereign and his feudatories, that it was a maxim in this law, that the Lord owes no less to his vassal, than the vassal owes to the lord.

P. 147. [O]. The reader cannot but be much edified with the admirable reasoning of Dr. HOADLY, Bishop of Bangor, against Dr. HARE, Dean of Worcester: who had quoted this text, and understood it in the sense here given to it.—"Can such a writer as this (says his lordship), so warm in a cause touching the authority of the church, forget that the church of Christ is not the CHILD of Kings and Queens becoming christians, but the MOTHER; that the business of a mother is to nurse and feed her children, and not to be fed by them: and that the church is thus represented even by those who are perpetually quoting this text? Nay the dean ought to be put in mind that Christian kings and queens are a part of this very church, to which they are here represented as nurses: and that if this text relates to Christ's church, then Christian kings and queens are to nurse themselves."—*Dean of Worcester still the same*, &c. p. 71.—To all this, I will only suppose the dean to reply, "Can such a writer as this, so warm in a cause touching the supremacy of the civil magistrate, forget that a Christian king, is not the HEAD, but a MEMBER of the church: that the business of every member in a body is to minister to the wants of every other, for we are members one of another [Eph. iv. v. 25.]; not to rule and domineer over all. Nay the bishop ought to be put in mind, that as kings and queens are parts and members of this very church of which they are represented as heads, their headship, instead of being employed to govern others, must be exercised in governing themselves."—But, the force of this ingenious reasoning is more fully seen in the next chapter, where we speak of *natural and fictitious personality*.

P. 148. [P]. Bishop Burnet, in his History of Charles II. p. 538. tells us, that Algernon Sidney's notion of Christianity was, *that it was like a divine philosophy in the mind, without public worship, or any thing that looked like a church.*

church. That an ignorant Monk who had seen no further than his cell, or a mad fanatic who had looked beside his reason, should talk in this manner, would be nothing strange. But that a man so supremely skilled in the science of human nature and civil policy, and who knew so well what religion was able to do for the state, should fall into this error, is indeed surprising. The view of those monstrous abuses which Christianity had done and suffered, in its application to the state's service, through a long age of ignorance, by a bloody and debauched clergy, and all for want of being guided by the principles here laid down, was, I suppose, the thing which struck him with horror, and inclined him to espouse this strange novelty; instead of recurring to that natural remedy, which another great man, embarked in the same *cause*, points out, where he describes the malady.—Primo homines ut tutò ac liberè sine vi atque injuriis vitam agerent convenere in CIVITATEM; ut sanctè et religiosè, in ECCLESIAM: illa *leges*, hæc *disciplinam* habet suam, planè DIVERSAM. Hinc toto orbe Christiano per tot annos bellum ex bello seritur, quod MAGISTRATUS et ECCLESIA inter se OFFICIA CONFUNDUNT. *Miltoni Defens. Pref.*

 B O O K III.

 O F A T E S T - L A W.

C H A P. I.

Of the Origin and Use of a Test-Law.

O MAGNA VIS VERITATIS, quæ contra hominum ingenia, calliditatem, follertiam, contraque fictas omnium insidias, facile se, per se, ipsa defendat*!" Thus breaks out the illustrious Roman, transported by a fit of philosophical enthusiasm. This *force of truth* never shone with greater lustre than on the present occasion: where, by the assistance of a few plain and simple principles, taken from the nature of man, and the ends of political society, we have cleared up a chaos of controversy; proved the justice and necessity of an ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE; deduced the mutual conditions on which it was formed; and shewn them to have an amazing agreement with our own happy establishment. What remains is to vindicate the equity of what our constitution calls a TEST-LAW; which we are now enabled to do *on the very principles of our adversaries themselves.*

* Cicer. Orat. pro Cælio.

The necessity of a NATIONAL RELIGION was, till of late, one of the most uncontested principles in politics. The practice of all nations and the opinion of all sages concurred to give it credit. To collect what the best and wisest authors of antiquity (where the consent was universal) have said in favour of a *national religion*, would be endless. We shall content ourselves with the opinion of two modern writers in its favour : who, being professed advocates for the common rights of mankind, will, we suppose, be favourably heard. “ This (says one of them) was ancient policy [*viz.* the “ union of the civil and religious interests] and hence it is necessary “ that the people should have a public leading in religion. For to “ deny the magistrate a worship, or take away a NATIONAL CHURCH, “ is as mere enthusiasm as the notion which sets up persecution *.” “ Toward keeping mankind in order (says the other) it is necessary “ there should be some religion professed and even ESTABLISHED †.” Indeed not many, even now, will directly deny this necessity ; though, by employing such arguments against a *Test* as would destroy an *establishment*, they open a way, though a little more obliquely, to this conclusion. But it is that unavoidable consequence springing from an *established church* in every place where there are diversities of religions, a TEST-LAW, which makes the judgement of so many revolt ; and chuse rather to give up an *establishment* than receive it with this tyrannical attendant. Although it appears, at first view, so evident that, when a church and state are in UNION, he who cannot give security for his behaviour to *both*, may with as much reason be deprived of some civil advantages, as he, who, before the UNION, could not give security to the state alone.

The matter, therefore, of greatest concern remains to be enquired into ; namely, how *the equity of a test-law* can be deduced from those principles of the law of nature and nations, by which we have so clearly proved *the justice of an Established Religion*. But here, as

* Shaftesbury's Characteristicks, Vol. I. Tr. 1. § 2.

† Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 124.

before,

before, in the case of an *establishment*, it is not to my purpose to defend this or that national form or mode of *test*; for it may so happen (I wish I could say it has not happened) that the very worst may be employed, where the dangers are pressing, or the passions of men inflamed; but to defend a TEST-LAW in general. By which I understand *some sufficient proof or evidence required from those admitted into the administration of public affairs, that they are members of the religion established by law.*

And, in shewing the justice, equity, and necessity of a *test-law*, I shall proceed in the manner in which I set out, and have hitherto observed, of deducing all my conclusions, in a continued chain of reasoning, from the simple principles at first laid down.

Hitherto I have considered *that alliance*, between church and state, which produces an *establishment*, only under its more simple form, *i. e.* where there is but *one religion* in the state. But it may so happen, that either at the time of convention, or afterwards, there may be *more than one*.

I. If there be more than one at the time of convention, the state allies itself with the LARGEST of these religious societies. It is *fit* the state should do so, because the larger the religious society is, where there is an equality in other points, the better enabled it will be to answer the ends of an *alliance*; as having the greatest number under its influence. It is *scarce possible* it should do otherwise; because the two societies being composed of the same individuals, the greatly prevailing religion must have a majority of its members in the assemblies of state; who will naturally prefer their own religion to any other.

With this religion is the *alliance* made; and a full TOLERATION given to the rest, *in esse*, or *in posse* *. Yet under the restriction of a TEST-LAW, to keep them from hurting that which is *established*.

* See note [A], at the end of this Book.

From this account of the origin of a *test-law* may be deduced the following COROLLARIES concerning an *establishment*. For,

1. From hence may be seen the reason why the *episcopal* is the *established* church, in ENGLAND; and the *presbyterian* the *established* church in SCOTLAND; and the equity of that CONVERSION; which our adversaries have represented as so egregious an absurdity, in point of right, that it is sufficient to discredit the reason of all *establishments*.

2. Hence too may be seen the truth of what was before observed, concerning the DURATION of this *alliance*: that it is PERPETUAL, but NOT IRREVOCABLE; *i. e.* it subsists just so long as the church, thereby established, maintains its superiority of extent: which when it loses to any considerable degree, the *alliance* becomes void. For the united church being then no longer able to perform its part of the convention, which is formed on reciprocal conditions, the state becomes disengaged. And a NEW ALLIANCE is, of course, contracted with the now prevailing church, for the reasons which made the *old*. Thus, formerly, the *alliance* between the PAGAN CHURCH and the empire of Rome was dissolved; and the CHRISTIAN established, in its place: and, of late, the *alliance* between the POPISH CHURCH and the kingdom of England was broken; and another made with the PROTESTANT, in its stead.

II. If these different religions spring up *after* the alliance hath been formed; then, whenever they become considerable, a *test-law* is necessary, for the security of the *established church*. For amongst diversities of religions, where every one thinks itself the *only true*, or, at least, the *most pure*, every one aims at rising on the ruins of the rest*: which it calls, *bringing into conformity* with itself. The means of doing this when reason fails, which is rarely at hand,

* See an historical narration of the conduct of the early *Puritans* to make their discipline national in spite of the civil magistrate, in a curious account printed 1593, and intitled, “Dangerous Positions and Proceedings published and practised within this Island of Brytaine, under pretence of Reformation and for the Presbyterian Discipline.”

and

and more rarely heard when it is, will be by getting into the public administration, and applying the civil power to the work. But, when one of these religions is the *established*, and the rest under a *toleration*, then envy at the advantages of an *establishment* will join the *tolerated* churches in confederacy against it, and unite them in one common quarrel to disturb its peace. In this imminent danger, the *allied* church calls upon the state, for the performance of its contract; who thereupon gives her a TEST-LAW for her security: whereby an entrance into the administration (the only way, the threatened mischief may be effected) is shut to all but members of the *established* church. So when the *sectaries*, in the time of Charles the First, had, for want of this law, overturned the *church* of *England*; as soon as the government was restored, and replaced on its old foundations, the legislature thought fit to make a *test-law* * (though with the latest; and, what was worse, with the narrowest views) to prevent a repetition of the like disasters. A law, on its first enacting, confessed, on all hands, so *equitable* as well as *expedient*, that the celebrated lord Digby, then earl of Bristol, eminent for his parts of speculation and business, though at that time a *papist*, largely acknowledged the high wisdom of it, by arguments of great weight and validity. When the bill was first brought into the House of Lords, the noble earl delivered his mind to this effect:—"He declared himself a catholic of the *church*, not of the *court*, of Rome; and therefore spoke as a faithful member of a Protestant parliament. The bill, he observed, was brought up from the House of Commons, the representatives of the people, and consequently the best judges of the temper of the nation. A bill as full of moderation towards Catholics, as of prudence and security towards the religion of the state: all the particulars of it being reduced to this one intent, NATURAL TO ALL SOCIETIES OF MEN, of hindering a lesser opposite party from growing too strong for the greater and more considerable one.

* In 1671.

“ And in this just way of prevention (says he) is not the moderation of the House of Commons to be admired, that they have “ restrained it to this sole point of DEBARRING THEIR ADVERSARIES “ FROM OFFICES AND PLACES? However, the sentiments of a Catholic of the church of Rome may oblige me, upon scruple of “ conscience in some particulars of this bill, to give my negative to “ it, when it comes to passing; yet as a member of a Protestant “ parliament my advice prudentially cannot but go along with the “ main scope of it.”

Thus a TEST-LAW took its birth; whether *at*, or *after* the time of *alliance*. And from this moment the justice and equity of an ESTABLISHED CHURCH began to be called in question. It will be therefore proper, in the next place, to shew that the state is under the highest obligations to provide the church with this security.

C H A P. II.

Of the Necessity and Equity of a Test-Law.

WE have now proved the equity and necessity of the *Alliance between Church and State*; and have therefore a right to use it as a *principle*, in our further inquiry.

I. By this *alliance*, the state promised to protect the church, and to secure it from the injuries and insults of its enemies. An attempt, in the members of any other church, to get into the administration, in order to deprive the established church of the covenanted rights which it enjoys, either by sharing those advantages with it, or by drawing them from it, is highly injurious. And we have shewn, that where there are diversities of religions, this attempt will be always making: the state then must defeat that attempt: But there is no other way of doing it, than by hindering its enemies from entering into the administration: but they can be hindered only by a TEST-LAW.

II. Again,

II. Again, This promise of protection is of such a nature, as is, on no pretence, to be dispensed with. For, protection was not only a condition of alliance, but, on the church's part, the *sole* condition of it. We have shewn, that all other benefits and advantages are *foreign* to a church, *as such*, and *improper* for it. Now the not performing the *sole condition* of a convention virtually destroys and dissolves it : especially if we consider that this sole condition is both *necessary* and *just* : *Necessary*, as a free convention must have mutual conditions ; and, but for *this*, one side would be without any : *Just*, as the convention itself is founded on the laws of nature and nations ; and *this* the only condition which suits the nature of a church to demand or expect.

III. But again, the church, in order to enable the state to perform this *sole condition*, the affording of protection, consented to give up its supremacy, and independency, to the civil sovereign. Whence it follows, that whenever the enemies of the established church get into the magistrature, to which, as we said, the supremacy of the church is transferred by the alliance, she becomes a prey, and lies entirely at their mercy : being now, by the loss of her supremacy, in no condition for defence, as she was in her natural state, unprotected and independent. So that not to secure her by a *test-law* is betraying, and delivering her up bound, to her enemies.

Thus it is seen what obligation the state lies under, from compact, of providing a *test-law* for the security of the *established church* : and, by enforcing this obligation, from the last motive, we have obviated the only plausible objection that could be made to our account of this *condition of protection* : which is, " That if an union between church and state be, as we have represented it, so necessary for the well-being of civil society, how happened it, that that universal charity to mankind, which is the characteristic of true religion, could not engage the church to enter into union, without standing upon terms of advantage to itself : especially such as necessarily introduce a *test-law*, so full of inconvenience to the subject ? "

This

This objection, though already obviated, shall be now considered more particularly. 1. We say, that religion constituting a political society, and it being of the nature of political society to seek support from alliances, the church was in a proper and reasonable pursuit, when it aimed at its own advantage in this convention. 2. We say, that as man, when he entered into civil society, necessarily parted from some of his natural rights, so the church, when it entered into *alliance* with the state, did the same. The right she departed from was her *independency*; which she transferred to the civil sovereign: for no alliance can be made between two such independent societies, till *one* hath given up its *independency* to the other; and this, the law of nations says, shall be the less powerful society; which, in the present case, is the church. Now, as man received an equivalent for the natural rights he gave up; so, in all reason, should the church. 3. But lastly, we say, the church could not enter into alliance, and not stipulate for this condition, without concurring to its own destruction. It hath been shewn just before, that the *dependency* of the church on the state necessarily follows an alliance: and, in the preceding paragraph, that, where a church, in this condition, hath enemies in the magistrature, and without means of defence in herself, she must expect the most fatal issue. Now the great law of self-preservation obliges her to provide against them. But no other provision can be made than engaging the protection of the state. Therefore we conclude, that the church's stipulating for that protection was not only what she in justice *might*, but what in duty she was *obliged* to do.

Here we might have concluded our inquiry; having, in a continued chain of reasoning, drawn from the most simple principles, explained the original and nature of civil and religious society; and, from thence, deduced our main conclusions, The NECESSITY OF AN ESTABLISHED CHURCH, and The JUSTICE AND EQUITY OF A TEST-LAW.

But, that nothing may be wanting to put so important a matter out of controversy,

II. I pro-

II.

I proceed, in the next place, to shew, that had no promise of protection been made, yet the state would have lain under the most indispensable necessity of providing a *test-law* for *its own* security. A celebrated writer, who, as far as *religion* hath to do with *politics*, was no bad judge, either of its essential or accidental effects, speaking of a TEST-LAW, scruples not to pronounce, “ That no man ought to “ be trusted with any share of power under a government, who “ must, to act consistently with himself, endeavour the destruction “ of that very government*.”

It hath been observed, that wherever there are diversities of religion, each sect, believing its own the true, strives to advance itself on the ruins of the rest. If this doth not succeed by force of argument, these partisans are very apt to have recourse to the coercive power of the state: which is done by introducing a party into the public administration. And they have always had art enough to make the state believe, that its interests were much concerned in the success of their religious quarrels. What persecutions, rebellions, revolutions, loss of civil and religious liberty, these intestine struggles between sects have occasioned, is well known even to such as are least acquainted with the history of mankind.

To prevent these mischiefs was (as we have shewn) one great motive for the state's seeking *alliance* with the church. For the obvious remedy was to *establish* one church, and give a *free toleration* to the rest. But if, in administering this cure, the state should stop short, and not proceed to exclude the *tolerated* religions from entering into the public administration, such imperfect application of the remedy would infinitely heighten the distemper. For, before the *alliance*, it was only a mistaken aim in propagating truth, which occasioned these disorders: but now, the zeal for opinions would be out of measure inflamed by envy and emulation; which

* Lord Bolingbroke's Letter to Sir W. Windham; where, if in any place, he delivers his real opinion.

the temporal advantages, enjoyed by the *established* church, exclusive of the rest, will always occasion. And what mischiefs this would produce, had every sect a free entry into the administration, the reader may easily conceive.

Now this being the inevitable fate of every government where religion is *established*, with diversity of sects, and without a test-law; and an *established religion* being proved indispensably necessary to society; we must conclude, that the state has the most pressing reasons to provide a test-law, as well for its own security, as for the discharge of its contract with the church*.

If it be said, That would men content themselves, as, in reason, they ought, with enjoying their own opinions, without obtruding them upon others, these evils, which require the remedy of a *test-law*, would never happen. This is very true: and so would men but observe the rule of right in general, there would be no need to have recourse to civil society to rectify the evils of a state of nature.

C H A P. III.

In which the objections to the equity and expediency of a test-law are considered.

HAVING gone thus far, the argument leads us to give some good account of the principal *objections* against the **EQUITY** of a *test-law*: the way being now cleared to a ready and satisfactory answer.

1. The first *objection*, the sheet-anchor of the cause, is this, "That every qualified subject having a right to a share of the honours and profits in the disposal of the magistracy, the debarring him from these advantages, for matters of opinion, is a violation of the common rights of subjects." This goes directly to the essentials; and attacks the very **JUSTICE** and **EQUITY** of a *test-law*: the other objections being only against the use and expediency of it.

* See note [B], at the end of this Book.

If then it can be shewn, that our adversaries have here taken for granted a thing, which, though by reason of mistaken notions of government, was never in dispute, is yet utterly false; we shall quite overthrow all that ostentatious declamation by which they have endeavoured to discredit a *test-law*. I say, therefore, that this pretended *right of every qualified subject to a share of the honours and profits in the disposal of the supreme magistrate* is altogether groundless and visionary.

Let it be remembered, that, in the third chapter of the first book, it hath been proved at large, that REWARD IS NOT ONE OF THE SANCTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: the only claim which subjects have on the magistrate, for *obedience*, being *protection*.

Now the consequence of this is, that all places of honour and profit, in the magistrate's disposal, are not there in the nature of a TRUST; to be claimed, and equally shared by the subject: but of the nature of PREROGATIVE; which he may dispose of at pleasure, without being further accountable, than for having such places *ably* supplied.

All right of claim then being absolutely at an end; and consequently, all *injustice*, in excluding at pleasure; we might here finish our discourse, having taken from our adversaries the great *palladium* of their cause.

But, secondly, should we for argument's sake suppose, what is absolutely false, that the subject had a *right*; yet still it will be found to be amongst those rights, which are not *claimable*. For let it be again remembered, that in speaking of moral *duties*, we observed, they were of two kinds, of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation: and therefore answerable to these, must needs be the *rights* arising from them. Those which arise from the duties of perfect obligation being *claimable*; and those from imperfect obligation, not so. But an equal dispensation of public honours and profits can never be thought other than in the class of duties of imperfect obligation, such as, in private men, *gratitude*, *hospitality*, *charity*; and conse-

quently the right to them cannot be *claimable*, even when abusively with-held.

But, to leave nothing unanswered, let us, for a moment, wave these advantages; and, for argument-sake, as before, suppose this COMMON RIGHT OF SUBJECTS; and then the proposition will come to this,

That to exclude a citizen from his civil rights, for matters of opinion, is a violation of the common rights of subjects.

This proposition, we see, is founded on these two others, 1. *That opinions cannot be punished, because punishment can be inflicted only for matters in which the will is concerned, and the will is not concerned in matters of opinion.* 2. *If opinions could be punished, they are not within the civil magistrate's jurisdiction; his care extending only to bodies.* Now if it can be made appear that these two latter propositions give no support to the former, we must conclude that the *objection* is, even in this sense, vain and groundless.

To the first proposition I reply, that it is indeed universally true; but not at all to the purpose: the disqualification, by a test-law, being NO PUNISHMENT in the true sense of the word, which is that implied in the proposition. To the second, I say, that it is not universally true: for that when opinions do, directly and necessarily, affect the peace of society, they then come within the magistrate's jurisdiction; and that this exception takes place in the case before us; the opinions, which a test-law makes matter of disqualification, directly and necessarily affecting the peace of civil society.

1. The first assertion is thus proved; evil of all kinds, and whence-soever proceeding, man hath, by nature, a right to repel. Evil which proceeds not from the will is called a *mischief*; and may be simply repelled; and this repulsion is called RESTRAINT: evil which proceeds from the will is called a *crime*; and may, not only, be repelled, but have additional pain, more than sufficient for the restraint, inflicted on the author; and this repulsion is properly called PUNISHMENT. That punishment should not be inflicted for a mischief, that is, for an evil in which the will is not concerned,

is

is plain from hence; the *end* of that additional pain, more than is sufficient for restraint, called punishment, being a *satisfaction to justice*, for *the reformation of the offender*, and for *example to deter others*; it would be absolutely unjust to inflict *avenging* pain for what was involuntarily committed: and altogether impertinent to attempt to deter, by *example*, from involuntary actions. The utmost therefore that can be inflicted for a *mischief* is *restraint*; that is, just so much pain, when the mischief proceeds from a rational agent, as is necessary to repel that mischief. Thus is *restraint* properly annexed to *mischief*; and *punishment* to *crimes*.

Such distinct and precise *moral modes*, one would think, it was not very easy to confound. And yet they have been confounded; so as utterly to embarrass all our reasonings on this subject. It is true, while they are considered in their application to irrational and rational agents, the difference is seldom mistaken; but when they are both applied to rational agents, then it is that men begin to confound the ideas, and lose sight of all these marks of distinction. For 1. *pain* being an inseparable *idea* in punishment; and every *restraint* of a rational agent having some degree of pain attending it; this idea common to both led them to think the two terms, in each of which it was found, were synonymous. 2. *Restraint* of a rational agent being defined to be an infliction of *just so much* pain as is necessary to repel the evil, and *punishment* to be an infliction of *more* than is necessary for that purpose, men considered the difference as only from less to more: and applying *this* to *mischiefs* and *crimes* set together in comparison, instead of applying it to *mischiefs* compared with *mischiefs*, and *crimes* with *crimes*, even this small difference was lost and confounded. Because, where the *mischief* is vastly more obstinate, and difficult to eradicate than the *crime*, there the pain attending the mischief must be more and greater than that attending crime. The use and solidity of our distinction may be illustrated by this example. There are four sects whose principles, our adversaries will not deny, ought to be restrained.—The ATHEIST, the ENGLISH PAPIST, the GERMAN ANABAPTIST, and

and the QUAKER, all hold opinions pernicious to civil society. But these having different degrees of malignity must have different degrees of restraint. The ATHEIST, who is incapable of giving security for his behaviour in community, and whose principles directly overthrow the very foundation on which it is built, should certainly be banished all civil government. The ENGLISH PAPIST, who owns a foreign ecclesiastical power superior to all temporal dominion, should not be tolerated in any sovereign state. The GERMAN ANABAPTIST, who holds capital punishment to be sinful, should be debarred the magistracy; and the QUAKER, who believes even defensive war to be unchristian, should be excluded, in states upon the continent, the common liberty of residing in frontier places. Now these different degrees of pain do not make one a *punishment*, and the other, a *restraint*; but, being every one proportioned to the malignity of their respective evils, and no more than what is just necessary to repel them, they are all equally *mere restraints*. But now extend these pains and penalties, to the burning of the Atheist; to the banishing of the Papist; to the denying of civil protection to the Anabaptist; and of religious toleration to the Quaker; and then, notwithstanding the same diversity of degrees, they are all *punishments*, and none *mere restraints*. Because more pain is, in every case, inflicted than is necessary to repel the respective evils.

I have only then to shew, that the pain inflicted by a test-law is no more than just necessary to repel *the evil of diversity of sects when got into the administration*: and, consequently, that it is a *restraint only*. To make this evident, let us suppose a person able, in one certain place only, to do mischief; and that he is disposed to do it: it is plain, there are no other means of repelling this evil than by debarring his entrance into *that* place. These means then are necessary: but what is necessary to repel an evil is a *restraint only*. But were this pain extended; and, because the person can do mischief in one place, he is debarred entrance into ten, then the *pain* becomes a *punishment*, because more than necessary for repelling the evil. This is exactly the case in hand. Diversity of sects can do mischief only by getting into the
admi-

administration: therefore to keep them out, is, for the reasons above, only a *restraint*. But, were their civil incapacity extended further, then it would become a *punishment*. By the test-law, it is not extended further; therefore it is no punishment, but a restraint only.

Had the force of this reasoning been duly considered, it might, I apprehend, have soon decided a late famous question, yet, it seems, undetermined.

By the custom or constitution of one of our great incorporated bodies, some or other of its members are annually called upon to discharge a very important, though very onerous office. Now, if such a one happens to be a *separatist*, he takes the advantage of the *test-law*, which, under great penalties, forbids his entrance on this office, till he has given certain marks of his conformity to the established worship; to give which, he makes matter of conscience; and from which, he is at liberty to dissent by the act of *toleration*. This renders him incapable of serving. But it having been long the custom for members, thus appointed to this important service, to purchase, of the body, an exemption, at a large price, by way of fine, it was thought reasonable to demand it of the *non-conformist* who cannot serve, as well as of the *conformist*, who will not. And when it was urged, that this fine could only be equitably inflicted on those who willingly declined a permitted office; not on those, upon whom the law had laid an embargo, to stop their entrance into it; it was thought sufficient to reply, "That the law, of which the *non-conformist* would thus avail himself, was never intended for his advantage or emolument: for which, it would be frequently brought to serve, if this plea were admitted." The question therefore to be decided was this, "Whether he who *cannot* serve, is by law, equally obnoxious to the fine, with him who *will not*?"

Now, I humbly conceive that this question can be then only resolved with justice and precision, when the TRUE NATURE of a
test-

test-law has been previously settled. I have laid down the principles which lead to it; and on them I argue thus*.

Were this law ordained to *draw* or to *drive* dissenters into the national *church*, the prohibition from entering on certain civil offices was without doubt intended for a PUNISHMENT. But if the LAW were ordained, only to keep dissenters out of those stations in the *state*, in which, by injuring the establishment, they would violate the peace of society, then certainly the prohibition was intended for a RESTRAINT only; and becomes a *punishment* but by accident.

Now, were it intended for a PUNISHMENT, the customary *fine*, on those who do not serve, would be most LEGAL: and, in such case, the reasoning of the body against the non-complying members, "that the legislature, by this law, never intended the dissenter should receive civil benefit or emolument," will not be without its force; for a *benefit* defeats the end of *such a law*. But if the *test* impose a RESTRAINT only, and it become a *punishment* but by accident; it may, without the least evil influence on that law, become a *benefit* likewise by accident. Nay, to hinder this fair chance, would be cruel and unjust: for if, by the inevitable condition of human things, particulars receive *damage* by a law which respects the general; and which never had such damage in its intention; it is but fit, they should have the like chance of a *benefit*, though equally without the intention of the legislature.

Indeed, where the unprovided for, or unthought of, consequence tends naturally to defeat the purpose of the law, there the authorised interpreters of it will interpose, and declare the advantage taken to be against the law; or, which amounts to the same thing, unsupported by it. But an accidental *benefit* which arises from a simple restraint, seems better calculated to effect the end of the test-

* The following argument was first printed in the spring of the year 1762, in the book called *the Doctrine of Grace*.

law than a *damage*; since the first tends to keep the enemies of the church from office in the state; the second is a temptation to them to get in, by the violation of conscience. The *benefit* is indeed liable to abuse, (and what is there in civil matters which is not?) Yet this abuse does not affect the purpose of the law, which is to keep sectaries out of civil offices.

But let it not be supposed that any thing here said in favour of the honest Sectarian member, is meant to include the OCCASIONAL CONFORMIST. For if such a one can think, that he may, with his conscience unhurt, *conform* for the sake of *lucrative* employments, he should never be permitted, on pretence of conscience, to plead the restrictive law, in order to evade those which are *onerous*. And here let me further observe, that the *dissenters* will not seem to be in the properest disposition to claim the advantage of the distinction here laid down in their favour, till they have a little reformed their ideas of a *test-law*. For they have generally, I think, in order to throw the greater odium on it, represented the embargo which it lays upon them, as a thing inflicted for a PUNISHMENT. Now it hath been shewn, that if our lawgivers intended a *punishment*, it would defeat their whole purpose to connive at its becoming an *accidental benefit*.

But now it appears, both from reason and fact, that the TEST is a *restrictive* and not a *penal law* in the proper meaning of these terms. For,

1. If a law may be understood in two senses, one of which supports its equity, while the other betrays its injustice, reason directs us to adopt the first. To *punish* sectaries, in order to bring them over to the national religion, is plainly iniquitous; but to *restrain* sectaries from injuring the national religion, is evidently just. Therefore, had the intention of the legislature in this case been doubtful, yet a *general law of a free people* would admit of no other interpretation than this latter.

2. But the intention of the legislature is not doubtful. This reasoning is supported by fact. When the law was made, the national church was thought to be in danger equally from *Protestant* and *Papist* sectaries. In the early days, indeed, of the established church, the government had endeavoured to bring both into sub-mission to it, and many PENAL LAWS were enacted for this purpose. But by that time the *test* became a law, so visionary and unjust a project had been long in discredit: and government was now content to confine its care to the *protection*, rather than to the *extension*, of the national church. Had this latter point been their aim, it was to be effected only by a vigorous execution of the old *penal laws* then, and still in being, though long kept dormant. The test added no force to those, but on the contrary greatly relaxed their activity, by disposing government to place their chief confidence, and seek their only remedy for disorders, in this new-made law.

And now the reader may see the strength of that objection made to the *test-law*, as at present enforced to affect the interests of Protestant dissenters, *viz.* "That its original and direct intention was to oppose to the machinations of Popery; and therefore, that the other, being included only by accident, may very reasonably be overlooked." But if the idea here given of the *test-law* be right, it is apparent that the general, though perhaps not the immediate, purpose of the legislature in framing it, was to provide (and this, in behalf of the state) for the safety of the national church, from what quarter soever the danger might arise. At one season it might arise from *Popery*; at another, from *Puritanism*; but the various civil mischiefs, consequent on religious quarrels, were to be repelled as they sprung up with equal vigilance and vigour. But let no one imagine, that a *comparison of demerit* is here insinuated between Popery and Puritanism. As religions, they are no more to be set together, in the opinion of an English episcoparian, than a body irrecoverably corrupted, and one but slightly tainted.

Yet

Yet with regard to the civil mischiefs which religious rancour, when let loose, may occasion, we have constantly experienced, that the *slightest* matters often produce as great, as the most *weighty*. And the surplice and the cross in baptism have set fellow-citizens against each other with as much inveterate hate, as the tyrannic claim of the Pope's supremacy, or the idolatrous worship of dead men deified. However, the nature and genius of the two sects is sufficiently discriminated by law, in *tolerating* the one, and only *con-
niving* at the other, under suspended penal-statutes; but still on the same *civil principles*: these *sanguinary laws*, as they are called, not being directed against the religious errors of the CHURCH, but against the political usurpations of the COURT OF ROME; which, when these laws were made, excited men by Papal edicts to parricide and rebellion; and will not yet suffer its subjects to give any reasonable security to the *civil sovereign*. For, with *religious errors, as such*, the state hath no concern: they are the *civil mischiefs* with which civil society hath to do; mischiefs arising from religious quarrels, where the two parties are nearly equal in power (as, I suppose, Protestant sects, which differ only in smaller matters, would soon be, under a *toleration* without a *test-law*), and are set upon combating one another's ERRORS.

But let me not be misunderstood, as if from what hath been here said, in behalf of *toleration*, I would insinuate, that this law hath altered the nature of the crime going under the name of SCHISM; which is an unnecessary separation from the national church; or because the law hath taken away all civil punishment from Protestant dissenters, some of whom may possibly so offend, that therefore *schism* is become an innocent, and an empty name. And that the law in favour of SCHISMATICS, like that in favour of WITCHES, has dissipated only a frightful phantom. It is true, that in both cases, the legislature acted for the same general end, the *restraint of injustice*; but it was on very different principles: in the first case, they took off civil punishment from a *real crime*, not

cognizable by a human judicatory: And in the latter, they removed an opprobrium from the statute-book, which expressed a sanguinary resentment against an *imaginary one*.

SCHISM, or a causeless separation of a member from the national church, is a crime which, on all the principles of law and reason, deserves condign punishment. But of *separation*, whether with or without cause, there is no adequate judge, but that power who is able to distinguish between a well, and an ill informed conscience. Very justly therefore did this free government remit the question to an omniscient tribunal. But, in so doing, it did not mitigate, but, by its indulgence, rather aggravate the guilt, wherever it shall be found, hereafter, to exist. And how wisely so doubtful a point was remitted thither, we may, in part, see from the answer of the *foreign divines*, to whose judgment, at the beginning of our Reformation (when the quarrel between the Puritans and Churchmen, about habits and ceremonies, ran high) both parties agreed to submit. Those prudent and honest men, when thus appealed unto, gave it as their deliberate judgment, “**THAT THE PURITANS OUGHT TO CONFORM, RATHER THAN MAKE A SCHISM: AND THAT THE CHURCH-MEN OUGHT TO INDULGE THE OTHERS’ SCRUPLES, RATHER THAN HAZARD ONE.**” A wise decision, and reaching much further, in religious matters, than to the single case to which it was applied. But to return.

2. We come now to our second assertion, and say, that *it doth not hold universally true, that the civil magistrate hath nothing to do with opinions*: For, that when they directly and necessarily affect the peace of civil society the coercion of them is in his jurisdiction: and this even our adversaries themselves confess. Which would they uniformly hold, we should take on their words, and proceed. But though they allow this maxim in speculation, yet they can rarely be brought to see its justice or fitness in practice. Which would tempt one to think, that the evident mischiefs arising from some opinions had forced this general confession from them, in spite

spite of principle ; the prejudice of which returning in particular instances drew them back into their old conclusion, that reason and truth were violated by the magistrate's interfering. I will in charity rather suppose this to be the case, than that a spirit of licentiousness makes them retract in practice what they own in speculation ; and shall therefore endeavour to convince them that this coercion, which all parties agree to be necessary, is likewise reasonable and safe.

Not at present then to insist on the argument of its *justice*, drawn from its *necessity* alone, we say, that the final end of every rational creature is happiness : and that the immediate end of such as are destined to two separate states of existence, is the happiness of that state in which they are existing. Otherwise the good of the creature in that station would not have been consulted by its creator. But as this cannot be said, it follows that whatever opposes the attainment of *that* happiness must be repelled ; otherwise the purpose of the creator would be defeated. If this creature (*e. g.* man) be not only destined to two different states, but composed of two different natures, one of which is solely adapted to his present station, then the states must not only be separate, but different ; and so, consequently, must be the *happiness* attendant upon each. But if the happiness be different, so must the *means* of attaining it. Thus the means of attaining man's happiness *here* is civil society ; the means of his happiness *hereafter* is contemplation. If then opinions, the result of contemplation, obstruct the efficacy of civil society, it follows, that they must be restrained. Accordingly, the ancient masters of wisdom, who, from these considerations, taught, that man was *born* for *action*, not for *contemplation*, universally concurred to establish it as a maxim founded in the nature of things, *that opinions should always give way to civil peace*.

Again, if God destined man to two such states of existence, in each of which the happiness of the existing state was to be his end ; it is demonstrable, and almost self-evident, that he, at the same time, so disposed things, that the means of attaining the happiness

of one state should not cross or obstruct the means of attaining the happiness of the other. From whence we must conclude, that where the supposed means of each, namely, *opinions* and *civil peace*, do clash, there *one* of them is *not the true means* of happiness. But the means of attaining the happiness peculiar to that state in which the man at present exists, being perfectly and infallibly known to man; and the means of the happiness of his future existence, as far as relates to the discovery of unrevealed truth, but very imperfectly known by him; it necessarily follows, that wherever opinions clash with civil peace, those opinions are no means of future happiness: or, in other words, are either no truths, or truths of no importance.

Thus we have proved, that the magistrate's restraint of those opinions which are mischievous to civil society, is both reasonable and safe. Desiring to be understood, when we speak here of a *rational creature*, to mean the species; and when we speak of a *civil society*, to mean such as is formed on the principles of public liberty and common rights of subjects. For to unjust and unnatural governments, the most momentous truths will be mischievous and destructive: their end being private, not public utility. It is never then, but where the society stands on legitimate foundations, that its peace is to be preferred to opinions: and there, that preference will be always reasonable and just*.

I SHALL now shew, that what a *test-law* restrains doth directly and necessarily affect the peace of civil society.

Where a determinate principle of some certain sect is particularly opposed to this or that fundamental maxim or usage of society, the malignity is seen, and confessed on all hands. Thus, of those opinions respectively held by the Atheist, the Papist, Anabaptist, and Quaker, mentioned above, there are few who see not their pernicious consequences; or will not own the *restraint* of them to be

* See this further illustrated above, in the proof of the proposition, *that truth and utility do necessarily coincide.*

necessary.

necessary. But where a religious principle opposes, not one certain maxim or usage, but the general constitution of civil society, the mischief of it is not so easily seen; and if it opposes, not so much the nature of civil society, considered alone, as when in union with the church, the mischief will be less observed: and if this be a principle not peculiar to one sect, but common to all, the mischief will be still less understood. This is the case with regard to the pernicious principle thus restrained. It being, as we have observed, that which sets every sect on attempting to establish itself on the ruins of all the rest.

Hence it is that men see the necessity, and seem to applaud the justice of restraint, in the first case; and yet, in the other, cry out against the tyranny of subjecting sects to civil incapacities, which hold no *peculiar opinions* pernicious to the state. But they seem not to apprehend, that the first is not the only legitimate reason which may be urged for the equity of restraint. For where is the difference, with regard to the state, between the principle's being *peculiar* to one sect, or *common* to all; between its injuriously affecting one certain maxim or usage, or the whole frame and composure of a state in union with a church; if so be the restraint be common to all, as well as the principle? Henceforth then we hope to hear no more of the injustice of civil incapacities on a sect which holds nothing *peculiar*, that can injuriously affect the state.

Having now overturned the two propositions, upon which this famous objection stands, it will give us no further trouble, but leave us at liberty to conclude, *That to abridge a citizen of his civil rights for matters of opinion which affect society, is no violation of justice or natural equity.*

But if still our adversaries will persist in affirming a *test* to be contrary to the LAW OF NATURE; one may safely undertake to vindicate it, even on that supposition; as having the universal practice of mankind on our side; who, for the sake of civil society, have ventured, in their municipal laws, to deviate from the law of nature; and this, with as universal approbation.

But,

But, to avoid obscurity, it will be necessary to say, in what sense the *law of nature* is to be understood. For an illiterate tribe of writers have, in this, as in most other matters, done their best to confound all ideas, and remove the marks and boundaries of science: while they make the *law of nature*, as it respects man alone (for that we have only to do with), “to signify what right reason, taking in all circumstances, dictates, in every case, to be done.” Thus confounding the *law of nature* with *civil*, and all other laws. And in this sense, our inquiry into the agreement of a TEST with the *law of nature*, after a *test* hath been proved just and reasonable on the laws of society, would be very impertinent. But, by the LAW OF NATURE, is here meant *that*, which all the best writers on *natural* and *civil laws* thus define—*What reason prescribes, under the sole consideration of men’s nature, and their mutual relations arising from thence, exclusive of all political or civil combinations.* And in this sense, an inquiry concerning the conformity of a *test-law* to the law of nature, may be very proper.

We say then, that it is a practice as approved as it is universal, for states, in compliance to the necessities of society, to form many of their municipal laws in direct opposition to the law of nature. The writings of the civil lawyers are full of these cases. I shall content myself with one or two. The case of that *civil* acquisition called PRESCRIPTION is very famous. This is, when a man, by enjoying for a certain time, without another’s claim or opposition, the other’s property, but possessed by him *bona fide*, acquires a full right in it; in such sort, that the true proprietor has no longer any civil action for the recovery of it. Now this most writers agree hath its sole foundation in the *civil law*. The incomparable Cujacius says expressly, *That the law of prescription directly contradicts the law of nature and nations, because the true proprietor is dispossessed of his own, without his consent* *. And indeed nothing is more evident.

* Rurfus dixerit aliquis, ufucapionem pugnare cum jure gentium, quod ea dominium invito auferat. Est sane ita: pugnat enim hac in re jus civile cum naturali æquitate, sed tamen

dent. For what I once had, I must ever have a right to; till I resign, transfer, or forfeit it by a voluntary act. What then was it which occasioned this general deviation from the law of nature but the public good? It is of the highest concernment to the state that particulars be secure in their possessions without contest. But there can be no security, if the natural proprietor hath, for all time coming, the liberty to reclaim his right. This would obstruct commerce and discourage intercourse amongst citizens. For who would lay out for property, if for ever after old claims might be revived? In a word, the LAW OF PRESCRIPTION is so evidently against the *law of nature*, that those who deny this disagreement are forced to have recourse to that ridiculous signification of the *law of nature* taken notice of above. For they say, *prescription is not against the law of nature, because this law orders, in every thing, what reason says (all circumstances taken in) is fit to be done.* Now which way soever the law of prescription be defended, whether by owning it to be against the law of nature, and justifying the deviation from it, by public utility; or by denying it to be against that law, as here absurdly interpreted; the defence will serve equally for a *test-law*, though we should concede to the objection, that it is against the law of nature; which we do not, having largely proved that it is perfectly agreeable to that law in its true and proper signification.

Another instance may be given of this practice in states, *pro bono publico*, which is more easily understood. When man entered into society; and *property*, in consequence thereof, was thoroughly regulated and established, several things were left out in that general appropriation; and still continued to become, as in the state of

tamen hoc fit bono publico. Ait Caius, BONO PUBLICO USUCAPIO INTRODUCTA EST. *Comment. in Pandect. Tit. de Usurpationibus & Usucapionibus.*—Caius said this on good authority: for the *laws of the twelve tables* give PRESCRIPTION no force in contests between the subjects of one state and the subjects of another; but leave them to the decision of the *law of nature*. ADVERSUS HOSTEM ÆTERNA AUTHORITAS ESTO, say the *twelve tables*; which Cicero explains, “HOSTIS enim apud majores nostros id dicebatur qui nunc PEREGRINUM dicimus.”

nature, the acquisition of the first occupant. Amongst these were what the lawyers call *FERÆ NATURÆ*. Yet, for all this, most states have concurred, against the law of nature, to enact *GAME LAWS*; whereby the right of capture is forbidden to all but those, who, by description, are designed not to be included in the prohibition. And the reason of such *LAWS* is evident: it was not at all for the *public good* to suffer peasants and mechanics to neglect their occupations, and to run up and down the woods and forests, armed: which in time, through their idle habits, and domestic distresses, draws them on to robbery and brigandage: nor to permit the populace, in towns and cities, to have, and carry *arms* at their pleasure; which would give opportunity and encouragement to sedition and commotions.

In this instance we all confess the justice, and see the reasonableness of impinging on the law of nature. How happens it then, that those who own it here will not own it in a *test-law*? Nothing sure, but this: *RELIGION* mixes itself in this latter affair; and the jealousies of its encroachment (which preposterously increase as its influence upon us abates) will not give us leave to judge impartially. And the truth is, *parties* must have a watch-word to carry on their business. There was a time, and that not long since past, when the word was, *THE DANGER OF THE CHURCH*. This served tolerably, while *religion* was seen to have an influence; but since a general spirit of licence hath *possessed* us, it hath been thought proper to change the cry; and we now hear of nothing but the *DANGER OF OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES*.

Having now, as is presumed, entirely overturned this bulwark of the cause,

1. By shewing that the rights pretended to are merely imaginary;

2. That if there be any such, it is no violation of the law of nature, to exclude a citizen from them, on account of opinions;

3. That

3. That though it be a violation of that law, yet still the exclusion may be well justified on the universal practice of society, arising from necessity—

Having, I say, done this, the remaining objections, which conclude only against the EXPEDIENCY of a test-law, may be dispatched in much fewer words.

II. The next objection then is, *That a test-law is injurious to TRUE RELIGION, by encouraging one set of opinions, and discouraging the rest; which is clapping a false bias on the mind, that, in its search after truth, ought to be left entirely free and disengaged.* But it may be made appear, that a test is so far from being injurious to true religion, that it is, in the whole, highly serviceable to it.

Let us, 1st, then, examine how the *discouragement* affects it. Now admitting the *tolerated religion* to be the *true*; and that several of its members, under the discouragement of a test-law, will for the sake of civil advantages leave it, and come over to the *established religion*; we must yet conclude that, considering the smallness of the discouragement, they who leave it on that account, and knowingly embrace a *false*, must be very profligate and abandoned. Such as must disgrace the true religion while they continue of it, and otherwise highly prejudice it. Unless it be supposed to be more for the interests of true religion to have large crouds though of false and unworthy members, than smaller numbers of sincere professors. It is therefore highly for the interests of true religion to have such a touch-stone, or criterion, as the *test*, to discriminate its sincere from its corrupt adherents. Which, on this account, can no more be said to be injured by it, than gold is by fire, when, in trying the *ore*, it reduces its bulk, but increases its specifick value. It is evident then, that this objection cannot, with any shew of reason, be made by a member of the *tolerated religion*.

2. Let us next see how the *encouragement* affects true religion. Our argument now leads us to suppose the *established* the *true*. On this supposition, is it not for the benefit of mankind in all his

interests, that it should be supported by civil power? and can it be supported without a test? But to wave that consideration at present: It is owned, that as the use of religion arises from the real impression it hath upon the mind, the bringing in members, who make only an outward profession, is injurious to religion. However, none have reason to make this objection, but the established church. But considering the *smallness* of the *encouragement*, and the probability of the conformity's being on conviction (for the case supposes the *established* religion, the *true*), we have no reason to think this injury can prove of moment. But be it as it may, Is it fit so great a benefit to civil society should be lost on account of a small and partial injury, it may accidentally occasion? It will be time enough to attend to an answer, when our adversaries bring us an instance of any one signal *benefit* to mankind, in the improvement of civil life, which is not attended with some inconvenience. Till then we shall, perhaps, think ourselves at liberty to support *this*, though it be not exempt from the common lot to which all human things are subject.

But, 3. Admit some small casual *barm* to be thus derived to religion; it is not only abundantly compensated by those vast advantages accruing to the state from thence, but likewise infinitely outweighed in the good done to religion by an *establishment*, on which a *test* is built, and from which it necessarily flows. We have shewn, and it cannot be too oft repeated, that the state entered into alliance with the church, for the sake of public utility: we have proved, and it cannot be too much inculcated, *that public utility and truth do coincide*: Hence it follows, that falsehood, the reverse of truth, must be destructive of public good; and the consequence of this is, that the state must, for the sake of public utility, seek truth, and avoid falsehood: at the same time, as she so well knows in *what* public utility (which is a sure rule and measure of truth) consists, she will be much better enabled to find out truth than any speculative inquirer, with the boasted aids of philosophy and the schools. From all this it appears, that while a state, in union
with

with the church, hath so great an interest and concern in true religion, and so great a capacity for discovering what is true; *religion* is likely to thrive much better than when left to itself; which hath been more fully shewn in treating of the first motive the state had to seek an alliance with the church.

If it should be still urged, that though, indeed, true religion be not injured by a TEST, yet private men are, as having a *false bias* clapped upon their minds, which draws them, by hopes and fears, from the *true* to *false* religion: it may be replied, that were the rewards and discouragements of a test-law so great as to make those who complied *not* with its threats and invitations uneasy in civil life, and, consequently, those who *did*, to fall through mere human frailty, the objection would be plausible. But when these rewards and discouragements are so small as to tempt only the most profligate and abandoned, little injury is done: for what pretence can such men have of a right to be put under cover for every the slightest temptation?

III. The third objection is, *That a test-law may endanger religious liberty. For if, for the good of the state, all, but those of the established religion, may be kept out of the administration; then for the same good, if reasons of state so require, they may be restrained the exercise of all but the established religion. And a pretence will not be wanting; for it is certain that diversities of sects oft produce the worst consequences to a state.* To this it may be replied, 1. That though we have reasoned, from the good of society, to prove the necessity of a test, yet that was not till after we had shewn the justice of it from the clearest principles of the laws of nature and nations. But these laws oppose the taking away religious liberty, that is, freedom to worship God according to one's own conscience, on any pretence whatsoever. 2. But we say further, that those very principles of the laws of nature and nations, laid down in the first part, to prove the equity of an established religion and a test-law, and on which the whole theory depends, do, in an invincible manner, establish the

the DIVINE DOCTRINE OF TOLERATION, or the right of worshipping God according to every man's own conscience. So that this *theory* is so far from giving any entrance (as the objection supposes) to the infringement of *religious liberty*, that it lays the foundations of it on the only solid and impregnable grounds. For on these two cardinal principles on which, as on two hinges, the THEORY is raised and turns, namely, *That the state hath only the care of bodies, and the church only the care of souls*; and *that each society is sovereign, and independent of the other*, is clearly deduced by the indefeasible right of religious liberty. 3. But still further. An easy answer may be now given to the old plea of *necessity of conformity, from the danger, to the state, of diversity of religions*, hinted at in the objection. For the mischief of that *diversity* ariseth solely from the infringement of religious liberty. Do but once grant a toleration, with the establishment of *one*, and an exclusion of all the *rest* from the public administration, and the evil vanishes, and *many* religions become as harmless as *one*. It being only the tyrannic usurpation of the magistrate, upon the rights of religion, that made diversity of opinions mischievous and malignant. 4. But lastly, we say, that, even on our adversaries' supposition, the objection has no force. For had a *test-law* been justified, by arguments drawn solely from the good of the state, yet this very principle, if pursued, would be so far from endangering *toleration*, that it would perfectly secure it. For to make religion serviceable to the state, which is the great end of an *establishment*, it must make a *real* impression on the mind; this is evident from what hath been observed in the first book. Now religion seldom or never makes a real impression on the mind of those who are forced into a church; all that forcing to outward conformity can do, is to make hypocrites and atheists. Therefore, for the sake of the state, the profession of religion should be free. Hence may be seen the strange blindness of those politicians, who expect to benefit the state by forcing to outward conformity: which, making men irreligious, destroys the sole means a church hath of serving the state. But here, by a common fate of politicians,

cians, they fell from one blunder to another. For having first, in a tyrannical adherence to their own scheme of policy, or superstitious fondness to their own scheme of worship, infringed upon religious liberty; and then beginning to find, that diversity of sects was hurtful to the state; as it always will be, while the rights of religion are violated; instead of repairing the mistake, and restoring religious liberty; which would have stifled the pullulating evil in the seed, by affording it no further nourishment; they took the other course; and endeavoured, by a *thorough discipline of conformity*, violently to rend it away; and, with it, they rooted up and destroyed all that good to society which so naturally springs from religion, when it has taken a real hold.

IV. The last objection is, *That a test-law is the novel invention of a bigotted and barbarous Gothic policy: unknown to the polite and happy ages of Greece and Rome, when civil and religious liberty flourished beyond compare.* So near as I now am to the conclusion of this discourse, it would stay me too long to detect our adversaries' gross ignorance concerning the condition of religious liberty in the antient world*: upon which errors the objection is built. It shall suffice, at present, to tell them, they are mistaken in their fact. These happy people had, like us, their ESTABLISHMENTS and TEST-LAWS. Though perhaps it may surprise them, we cannot forbear to tell them, that even *Athens*, their *Athens*, so flourishing and free, had, in its best times, a *test-law* to secure the *established religion*. A test which was exacted of all their youth. For, *Athens* being a democracy, every citizen had a constant share in the administration. And a test it was of the strongest kind, even an oath. A copy of which is preserved by Stobæus†, who transcribed this curious frag-

* See the Divine Legation of Moses, Book II. § 1. 5. and 6.

† Οὐ καίσις χυμὸν ὅπλα τὰ ἱερὰ, ἀλλ' ἱκανοποιῶν τὸν πατριάρχην, ὅταν αὖτε ταχέως. ΑΝΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΥΠΕΡ ΙΕΡΩΝ, καὶ ἐπὶ ἐπίσης, καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ μάλιστα πολλῶν. τὸν πατριάρχην δὲ οὐ καίσις, πατριάρχην παλαιοῦ δὲ καὶ ἱερῶν, ὅταν αὖτε πατριάρχην. καὶ ὑποτάσσον τὸν αὐτὸν πατριάρχην ἱερῶν, καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς ἱερῶν πατριάρχην, καὶ ὅς τις αὐτὸν τὸ πατριάρχην ἱερῶν ἱερῶν, καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν τὸν θεοῖς καὶ μὴ πατριάρχην, καὶ ἐπὶ ἐπίσης, αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ μάλιστα παλαιοῦ. καὶ ΙΕΡΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ ΤΙΜΗΣΩ. ἱερῶν θεοῖς τούτων. Joann. Stobæi de Repub. Serm. xli. p. 243. Edit. Lugdun. 1608.

ment from the writings of the *Pythagoreans*, the great school of antient politics *. It is conceived in these words: "I will not dishonour the sacred arms, nor desert my comrade in battle: I will DEFEND AND PROTECT MY COUNTRY AND MY RELIGION, whether alone, or in conjunction with others: I will not leave the public in a worse condition than I found it, but in a better: I will be always ready to obey the supreme magistrate, with prudence; and to submit to the established laws, and to all such as shall be hereafter established by full consent of the people: and I will never connive at any other who shall presume to despise or disobey them; but will avenge all such attempts on the sanctity of the republic, either alone, or in conjunction with the people: and lastly, I WILL CONFORM TO THE NATIONAL RELIGION. So help me those Gods who are the avengers of perjury."

Here we see, that after every man had sworn, *I will defend and protect the religion of my country*, in consequence of the obligation the state lies under to protect the *established worship*, he concludes, *I will conform to it*: the directest and strongest of all *tests*. But a test of conformity to the established worship was not only required of those who bore a share in the civil administration, but of those too who were chosen to preside in their religious rites. *Demosthenes* has recorded the oath which the priestesses of *Bacchus*, called *Γεραραι*, took on entering into their office: "I observe a religious chastity, and am clean and pure from all other defilements, and from conversation with man: AND I CELEBRATE THE THEOINIA AND IOBACCHIA TO BACCHUS ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHED RITES, AND AT THE PROPER TIMES†."

So that those, with whom the authority of the WISE ANCIENTS have so much weight, will, we hope, from this example in the wisest of them, begin to entertain a better opinion of a *test-law*, and of a religion so *established*.

* See the Divine Legation.

† Ἀλγύω, καὶ οἷμιν καθαρεύω, καὶ ἀσκή ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὃ καθαριεύω, καὶ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν συνουσίαις, καὶ τὰ θεοῖνα, καὶ ἰοβακχίαν γιγνέσθω τῇ Διότιμῃ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθήκουσι χρόναις. Orat. cont. Neæram.

But a stronger evidence of the indispensable necessity of these things, for the support and security of government, can hardly be given, than in the example of the famous *William Penn*, one, who by his principles was most averse to it, who strove most to avoid it, and yet is forced to have recourse to it. We have seen before, how the same man, as *head of a sect*, had, by a side-wind, introduced SOCIETY into religion. We shall now see that, when become a *law-giver*, he found an equal necessity of having that society ESTABLISHED, and securing his establishment by a *test-law*. In his *Frame of Government for the Province of Pennsylvania in America*, we have amongst his *fundamental constitutions* these following; "That all Persons living in this Province, who confess
 " and acknowledge the one Almighty and Eternal God to be the
 " Creator, Upholder, and Ruler of the World, shall in no wise be
 " molested or prejudiced for their Religious Persuasion or Practice in
 " matters of Faith and Worship." And, "That all Treasurers,
 " Judges, Masters of the Rolls, Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace,
 " and other Officers and Persons whatsoever relating to Courts or
 " Trials of Causes, or any other Service in the Government; and
 " all Members elected to serve in Provincial Council, and General
 " Assembly, and all that have right to elect such Members, shall be
 " such as profess Faith in Jesus Christ."

By these laws an *established religion* is first of all constituted, which is the Christian: and, secondly, a *test*, which excludes all, but such, from a share in the administration, even the remotest share, as electing representatives to serve in provincial council and general assembly. And, all this, in as good legal form as the PRIEST himself could wish: only (as arising from a necessity not to be gloried in) a little disguised in the expression, by the use of *affirmative* rather than *negative* terms. As to the large and extensive conditions of this *establishment* and *test*, that is another question. What these CONSTITUTIONS are here cited for is to shew the necessity of the things themselves.

I have but one further observation to make, before I end this chapter : it is, that the grand and palmary argument against a *test* concludes, with equal strength, against an *establishment*; unless, perhaps, our adversaries have discovered, that the clergy are to have no share with the laity, in the *common rights of subjects*. For it hath been shewn above, that one of the essential privileges of an *established* church is a public maintenance for its clergy, given by the state, in reward for their services in teaching the people virtue and obedience. Now as the ministers of all the tolerated churches do, or profess to do, the same; they seem to have something a better pretence to a share in these places of profit, possessed by the endowed clergy, than their lay-brethren have to what the laity of the established church hold from them. At least it must be said, that the *injustice* of debarring either, for matters of opinion, is equal. I make no question but those with whom we have to do like their *principle* the better for this generous and impartial consequence. But it is not their approbation I am so much concerned to procure. I now address myself to the lovers of their country under the present constitution of church and state. I would shew them, in what our adversaries' principles necessarily terminate; *a total subversion of all established religion*. For this last claim puts an end to it at once. And shall we believe it will not be made whenever the other is obtained? Are not the ministers of the tolerated sects amongst the first to push on this demand of the *common rights of subjects*? have they less regard to their own advantage than to that of their flock? or are they, good men, persuaded, that these *common rights* extend not to churchmen?

However, the state, we may be sure, will be impartial in its justice. So that when once we see sectaries of all kinds supply the civil administration; the next place to look for them is in the pulpit and the stall.

CHAP. IV.

Of the mistaken principles on which writers on this subject have hitherto proceeded; the mischiefs and absurdities that followed them; and the remedies which the principles here laid down are able to supply.

I HAVE now, at length, and I hope to the reader's satisfaction, performed what I undertook; which was, *to demonstrate the equity and necessity of an established religion and a test-law on the principles of the law of nature and nations.* It only remains to shew, (as I promised in the beginning of this discourse) what FALSE PRINCIPLE it was which, embraced in common, hath misled both parties; and brought one to conclude, that an *established religion* was of divine right; and the other, that a *test-law* was a violation of all human ones. For, as the excellent *Hooker* says, "a common received error is never utterly overthrowne, till such time as we go from signes to causes, and shew some manifest root or fountaine thereof common unto all, whereby it may clearly appeare how it hath come to passe that so many have beene overseene." By this, likewise, we shall add new strength to our conclusions (as it will afford us a view of the defects in the other scheme of defence), and remove any remaining doubts that may have arisen from the authority of great names against us.

When a love for truth, my sole motive to this inquiry, had engaged me in an examination of the nature and end of *an established religion and a test-law*; and that I had laid down unquestioned principles, and drawn conclusions from them, as I thought, demonstrative; I was yet not a little staggered to find that some great names (to whom, as writers, we owe the highest regard) had, from the very same principles, deduced the very contrary conclu-

sions. This then was to be accounted for, if I expected my argument should have a fair hearing. And, on reflection, I supposed that the error, which seduced them, might be this; the defenders of an *established religion* have all along gone on to support it on the motives of TRUTH, and not of UTILITY. That is, that religion was to be *established* and protected AS IT WAS THE TRUE RELIGION: not for the sake of its CIVIL UTILITY; which is the great PRINCIPLE OF THIS THEORY. For that notion which, *Grotius* tells us, some churches on the Continent had of civil society, seems to have been entertained by the defenders of our establishment.—“*Alii*
 “*diversas [religiones] minus tolerant; quippe non in hoc tantum*
 “*ordinatas a Deo civitates ac magistratus dicunt, ut a corporibus*
 “*& possessionibus injuriæ abessent, sed ut, quo more ipse jussisset, eo in*
 “*commune coleretur; cujus officii negligentes multos pœnam alio-*
 “*rum impietati debitam in se accersisse.*”

Now, unluckily for truth, the best writers on the other side took this mistaken principle for granted; imagining there could be no other possible cause assigned for *established religion*: and, at the same time, finding *this* full, both of absurdity and mischief, too hastily concluded an *established religion* secured by a *test-law* to be a violation of the rights of nature and nations.

But let us take a short view of the absurdities and mischiefs that arise from the hypothesis which builds an *established religion* and a *test-law* on a principle of *religious truth*, and not of *civil utility*.

If religion is to be established and protected by a *test-law*, only because it is the *true religion*, then opinions are encouraged as opinions; that is, as *truths*, not as *utilities*; and discouraged as opinions; that is, as *errors*, not as *mischiefs*. See then what follows, both with regard to an *establishment* and a *test*.

I. An *Establishment* is unjust, 1. Because the civil magistrate as such hath no right to determine, which is the true religion; this power not being given him (as we have shewn) on man's entering
 into

into society. Nor could it be given him; because one man cannot empower another to determine for him in matters of religion. Therefore he not being judge, and there being no other to be found with authority to arbitrate between him and the several schemes of religion, he hath no right to establish his own. Again, it is *unjust*, because, were the magistrate a competent judge of what was *true religion*, he would have yet no right to reward its followers, or discourage its opposers; because, as hath been shewn, matters of opinion belong not to his jurisdiction. He being, as St. Peter * tells us, “sent by God for the *punishment* of EVIL-DOERS, and for “the *praise* of them that DO WELL.” 2. An *establishment* is absurd: it being impossible that the end of it should be attained. This end is the protection and support of *true religion*. But the civil magistrate, who is to establish it, assuming to himself the sole authority of judging which is so, must necessarily conclude in favour of his own; so that the *established religion*, all the world over, will be the magistrate’s: that is, for one place where the *true religion* is established, the *false* will be established in a thousand. And whether this be for the interest of *true religion*, let the maintainers of this hypothesis consider. I will only observe, that, as the civil magistrate had neither by nature, nor by the law of God, this jurisdiction; so it is impossible he should have it; because the very exercise of it would destroy the end for which it is supposed to be given.

II. I MIGHT shew, in the next place, that this hypothesis takes away all the *reason* on which the mutual grants and privileges of church and state, consequent on an alliance, are founded: which must all, therefore, cease: such, for instance, as *the clergy’s right to a public maintenance*: which, now, being for the support of opinions, would be contrary to the fundamental laws of society, by making men contribute to the maintenance of opinions which

* 1 Ep. ii. 14.

they reject and think false. And so of the rest. But why do we talk of mutual grants and privileges, or stated conditions of alliance; When,

III. This scheme of an establishment, not making the alliance between church and state on a free convention, but appointing the state a kind of executor of the church's decrees, the *alliance* can have no stated laws or conditions of union? On the contrary, the privileges of each society must be perpetually fluctuating and various; having no other grounds than the unsettled notions men chance to embrace concerning the extent of that support and protection which the state is obliged to bestow; and notions directed by no rule will never be adapted to the public good. Thus all fixed and precise ideas of an *establishment* being confounded, ill-designing men have a handle to make it what they please. Which, in fact, we find they have done, to the infinite damage of society, in most places, where this notion of its original hath prevailed. So that, instead of this peaceable union so beneficent to civil society (the fruits of a *free convention*, under the stated and well-known conditions, mutually given and received), we see nothing but violent and continued struggles between the TWO SOCIETIES, for power and independency.

IV. A *test-law*, on this scheme, will be absolutely UNJUST. For now opinions being restrained as *errors*, not as *mischiefs*—*restraint* converts into *punishment*. For the design of a test is now, not to keep men of other religions out of the *civil administration*, but to bring them in to the *established church*. And its discouragements are those WHOLESOME SEVERITIES so warmly recommended, to reduce men from the *false* to the *true* religion. Where if the first dose do not succeed, it must be repeated and enlarged till it does. This is *punishment*, properly so called; and punishment, for what is no act of the will, we have shewn to be unjust. But were opinions, as such, liable to punishment, the civil magistrate could not inflict it; because his jurisdiction extends only to the care of bodies.

bodies. Further, this is depriving men of their civil rights for matters of opinion, as such; but this we have shewn to be against the law of nature. On all these accounts, a test-law would be unjust.

V. Again, a *test-law* on this scheme would be most *mischievous*, as directly tending to the destruction of religious liberty. For the end being to reduce men from the false to the true religion, the severities, as we say, must be increased till they have strength to operate effectually. And there is no stopping short, without exposing the scheme to the greatest absurdities. Therefore, the more ingenuous defenders of a *test*, on this scheme, are those who regard a toleration, not as a right of nature due to mankind, but as a concession which the necessities of the times extorted. For it is certain that *toleration* and *such a test* can no more stand together on common principles, than liberty and persecution.

This is but a very short hint of the sad consequences which attend an established religion and a test-law on the common hypothesis; but enough to evince the following conclusions:

I. First, that those great defenders of *civil* and *religious* liberties, whose projects are here opposed, must needs think hardly of an established religion raised on that hypothesis; which so directly tends to the destruction of both.

II. Secondly, that the arguments employed in their various writings, against such establishments, do not at all effect or reach an established religion and a test-law founded on this theory. For that,

III. Thirdly, on comparison, it appears, that *this* removes and keeps clear of all those monstrous mischiefs and absurdities with which the other scheme abounds: as shewing the magistrate's act in the *alliance* to be reasonable, just, and necessary: as stating and fixing the mutual *conditions* of the alliance with the utmost precision and exactness: as proving the equity and necessity of a *test-law*; and

and securing religious liberty by a free *toleration*. And, to shew that nothing of advantage is wanting to make this scheme preferred to the common one, it may be observed, in the last place, that an establishment, made only on the motives of CIVIL UTILITY, secures that very end, which the other pretends solely to aim at in establishing a church; and which yet, by pursuing in a visionary manner, it never attains: I mean, *the advancement of truth*. For if public utility and truth do coincide, then to provide for that utility is, at the same time, providing for truth; its inseparable associate. On the whole then we see that, in this case, to aim at *truth* is losing as well *that*, as utility; but to aim at *utility* is gaining both together.

I will conclude, in requesting my reader to have this always in mind, THAT THE TRUE END FOR WHICH RELIGION IS ESTABLISHED IS, NOT TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRUE FAITH, BUT FOR CIVIL UTILITY, as the key to open to him the whole mystery of this controversy; and the clew to lead him safe through all the intricacies, and perplexities, in which it has been involved.

The settling this matter on true foundations seems to be the only thing wanting to perfect the felicity of the *British* constitution. For while *literary*, *civil* and *religious* liberty, by occasionally undergoing a free scrutiny, have at length become generally understood; *this last remaining question*, of so much importance, concerning an *established religion*, hath been so little examined to the bottom, or the true principles of it searched into, that the one party defended it on *such* as directly tend to overthrow every thing already settled in favour of religious, and even civil and literary liberty: and the other opposed it on *such* as must make all that liberty, they themselves had been long contending for, and had at length obtained, degenerate into the worst licentiousness. Now whether we have contributed any thing to facilitate the removal of this last obstruction to a state of sober and perfect liberty, is submitted to the judgment of the public.

CHAP. V.

The conclusion, in which the remaining objections of both parties are considered.

THE wild *Indians*, amidst their uncultivated wastes, see the beauty and use of every thing around them ; and are not such fools as to complain for want of better accommodations than what they find provided to their hands. Yet as important as this truth is to them, they are little solicitous to enquire from whence all this order and harmony arises : they have received it from their ancestors, that the earth was supported on the back of a huge tortoise ; and they do not take it well to have their tortoise disturbed or laughed at. The friends of our happy establishment have, many of them, a little of this Indian taste.—In their fear of *shaking foundations*, they are unwilling that the weight of the constitution should be removed from the tortoise of old opinion, to rest upon a *theory which they think does not exactly tally with fact, as few theories do.*

This may be thought a notable objection. But on what mistaken principle it stands, I shall now endeavour to shew. The word *THEORY* has been appropriated (as it were) to the explanation of a *natural system*. Now as such theories are good only in proportion to their agreement with *fact* ; and as nature so much withdraws herself from our inquiry ; it is no wonder that it should have grown into an observation, *that few theories agree with fact* ; and that this should be esteemed, what it really is, an objection to theories of this kind.

But our theory is an explanation of an *artificial*, not a *natural* system : in which measures very different from the latter are to be followed. For truth being the end of all kinds of theories, a right

theory of *nature* is to be obtained only by pursuing fact; for God is the author of that system: but in a theory of *politics*, which is an *artificial* system, to follow fact is no certain way to truth, because man is the author of that system. Abstract ideas, and their general relations, are the guides to lead us into truth; and *fact* hath, with good reason, but a subsidiary use. As therefore the method to be pursued is different, so should the judgment be, which is passed upon it: the goodness of this theory being estimated, not according to its agreement with *fact*, but *right reason*. In the former case, the theory should be regulated by the fact: in the latter, the fact by the theory.

But still, *fact*, as we say, hath even here its subsidiary use. For as this theory must be founded on the principles of *right reason* to render it *just*; so, to satisfy us that it is *real*, that it is *practicable*, and no fanciful Utopia, it must be supported by *fact*: that is, it must be shewn that the policy, explained and justified in the theory, hath been practised to the common benefit of all. This is the use, and the only use, of consulting fact in these kinds of theories. And this, I presume, will be enough to recommend the theory of this ALLIANCE: which was written with no other view, than to furnish every lover of his country with reasonable principles, to oppose to the destructive fancies of the enemies of our happy establishment. Not to reform the fundamental constitutions of the state; but to shew they needed no reforming: an attempt, I should think, neither irrational, nor unseasonable.

An example, used before, will illustrate what we have been now saying. The *theory* of civil society, founded on the *original compact*, when it was first urged against the advocates for arbitrary government, had the fortune to fall into ill hands, the enemies of their country; who enforced it, not to defend the liberties we enjoyed, but to alter the nature of the constitution: the consequence was, that the authors being justly obnoxious, the principles were suspected, and then rejected. Afterwards they fell into more temperate hands; and being then employed to justify the subjects' rights under
our

our limited monarchy, they were in a little time generally received; and men were brought to found their liberties on those principles; which liberties, till then, they chose to claim on the precarious grants of ancient monarchs, or the illiberal tenure of more ancient custom.

As to our adversaries, if they thought that the few cant terms of *Natural Rights*, *Civil Liberty*, *Priestcraft*, and *Persecution*, curiously varied by a jargon of sophistical logic, would be sufficient to undo what the wisdom of all ages and people has concurred to *establish*, many of them have lived to see themselves mistaken.

But if reason be what they require, and that they think they have a right to expect a reason for every thing, we have here endeavoured to satisfy them. If they like, as it is probable they will, their own reasons better, it will then come to be a dispute about taste. I have given them corn. They chose to stick by their acorn-husks. Much good may do them.

Nothing remains but to remove an argument *ad invidiam*, the only logic hitherto employed against this *theory*, and which would persuade the reader that it **MAKES RELIGION A TOOL OF POLITICS**. If by this they mean, that I believe there is a *political use of religion*, whereby it may be made to advance the good of civil society; and that therefore I have endeavoured to make this use of it; they do me no wrong. I not only believe so, but I have shewn * that we have not a more illustrious instance of the wisdom and goodness of God, than in his thus closely uniting our present and our future happiness. I believe what the **BEST GOOD MAN** of our order was not ashamed to own before me. “A politique use of religion (says he †) “there is. Men fearing God are thereby a great deal more effectually than by positive laws restrained from doing evil, inasmuch as those laws have no further power than over our outward actions only, whereas unto mens inward cogitations, unto the privie intents and motions of their hearts, religion serveth for

* See The Divine Legation of Moses, Vol. I.

† Eccl. Pol. B. V. Sect. 2.

“ a bridle. What more savage, wilde, and cruell, than man, if
 “ he see himselfe able, either by fraude to over-reach, or by power
 “ to overbeare, the laws whereunto he should be subject? Where-
 “ fore in so great boldness to offend, it behoveth that the world
 “ should be held in awe, not by a vaine surmise, but a true appre-
 “ hension of somewhat, which no man may thinke himselfe able
 “ to withstand. **THIS IS THE POLITIQUE USE OF RELIGION.**”
 Thus the admirable Hooker, where he takes notice how certain
 atheists of his time, by observing this use of religion, were fortified
 in their folly, in thinking it was invented by statesmen to keep
 men in awe. An idle vision, which I have so thoroughly confuted
 in another place *, that, I perswade myself, it shall, for the future,
 be only thought fit to go in rank with the tales of nurses, and the
 dreams of Freethinkers.

But if they mean, that I have endeavoured *to make religion a convenient engine to ambitious and intriguing politicians to work the clergy, as the tools of power, in a separate interest from the community*, this is a very gross calumny. I have expressly declared, that where I speak of religion's serving the state, I always mean, by the state, a *legitimate government*, or civil policy founded on the natural rights and liberties of mankind. And, so far is this plan of *alliance* from contributing to those mischiefs, that it effectually prevents them : and, what is more, is the only scheme of an **ESTABLISHMENT** which can prevent them.

To conclude all, We live in an age when the principles of public liberty are well understood : and, as corrupt as the age is, we must needs imagine, there are many real lovers of their country. But then a certain licentiousness (which is the spirit of the times) is as fatally apt to delude honest men in their ideas of public good, as to infect corrupt men in their pursuit of private satisfactions. Now, as such are always apt to embrace with warmth any project which hath the face of advancing public interests, I do not wonder

* Divine Legation of Moses, B. III. Sect. 6.

they should be drawn in, to think favourably of an attempt which professes only to vindicate the COMMON RIGHTS OF SUBJECTS; or that they should be inclined to judge hardly of a writer, who frankly opposes those pretensions. "Because" (to use the words of the great author last quoted *) "such as openly reprove supposed disorders of state, are taken for principal friends to the common benefite of all; and for men that carry singular freedome of mind. Under this fair and plausible colour, whatsoever they utter passeth for good and currant. That which wanteth in the waight of their speech, is supplied by the aptness of mens minds to accept and believe it. Whereas on the other side, if we maintaine things that are established, we have to strive with a number of heavy prejudices, deeply rooted in the hearts of men, who think that herein we serve the time, and speak in favour of the present state, because thereby WE EITHER HOLD OR SEEK PREFER-
MENT."

* Hooker's Eccl. Pol. Lib. I. Sect. 1.

NOTES ON BOOK III.

P. 203. [A]. **N**O man ever carried *human liberty* to the ridiculous excess, in which we find it in the writings of J. J. Rousseau, the Celebrated Citizen of Geneva. Yet, with the appearance of the like extravagant caprice in the other extreme, he deprives men of that most precious branch of their liberty, the worshipping of God according to their conscience. "As to Religions once *established*, or *tolerated* in a state, I think it (says he, in a letter to the *archbishop* of Paris) unjust and barbarous to destroy them by violence; and that the sovereign hurts himself in maltreating the followers of them. There is a great difference between mens' embracing a new religion, and living and continuing in that in which they were born. The *first only are punishable*. The civil power should neither suffer diversities of opinion to be new planted, neither should it proscribe those which have already taken root. *For a son is never in the wrong for following the religion of his father*: and the *public peace requires* that there should be no persecution."—Lettre à M. De Beaumont, l'Archeveque de Paris, p. 86. I have given the original in another place.

This one might expect from a man of paradox: but, to find so sage an advocate for liberty as M. de Montesquieu speaking in the same strain, appears at first sight, very unaccountable.—"See then (says he) the fundamental principle of civil laws with regard to religion. When the civil power is the master, whether it will receive a *new religion* into the state, or whether it will not, It should not receive it. When it hath already gotten footing in the state, it should be *tolerated*."—Voici donc le principe fondamental des loix politiques en fait de religion. Quand on est Maître de recevoir dans un état une nouvelle religion, ou de ne pas recevoir, il ne faut pas l'y établir; quand elle y est établie, il faut la tolérer.—De l'Esprit des Loix, l. 25. c. x.

This

This decision of these two philosophic legists appears to be as contradictory to their own general principle, as it is absurd and unjust in itself. The only way I know, of accounting for it, is to suppose (and I believe I do small injury to truth in supposing it) that both of them consider RELIGION as a mere ENGINE OF STATE; an useful one indeed, when rightly applied; but very mischievous when not conducted by as able politicians as themselves. Suppose this; and then, as discordant as their decision is to their *civil principles* of liberty, it is very consonant to their *religious principles* of an *engine of state*. For if religion be only thus to be considered, any one mode of it will serve the turn: more than one may be too much, and occasion civil disorders: therefore more than one ought not to be admitted. But if several have already taken root, they are to be *tolerated* and left in peace, for the very same reason: because the attempt to eradicate them might be attended with the same civil mischief which a new introduction of them would produce.

But neither of these celebrated writers seemed to consider, that though THEY regarded *religion as a mere engine of state*, yet that RELIGIONISTS thought otherwise, and esteemed it of divine original; and that consequently, it was matter of CONSCIENCE to *Believers* to worship God according to that mode which they judged most acceptable to him. Now to restrain such in the exercise of what they deem their chief duty, is one of the greatest violations of the NATURAL RIGHTS of mankind: Yet these two ingenious men openly profess, nay boast, that the defence and preservation of THESE RIGHTS was the great and principal end of their learned labours.

P. 210. [B]. The equal conduct of the best and greatest of our monarchs, in his very different stations of Prince of Orange, and King of England, will do great credit to this reasoning. When king James, a *papist*, demanded of his son-in-law, with whom he was then on good terms, his approbation of a TOLERATION and ABOLITION OF THE TEST: The Stat-holder readily concurred with the scheme of a *toleration*, but utterly condemned an *abolition of the test*. When afterwards, he became king of a free people, the *Protestant* Dissenters, likewise, in their turn demanded both: His conduct was uniformly the same: He gave them a *toleration*, but was advised not to give his consent to the abolition of the *test*.

A P P E N D I X

T O T H E

F I R S T E D I T I O N

I N M D C C X X X V I .

THE substance of the preceding discourse being no other than a single chapter of a treatise which I have now by me, and which, therefore, I had oft occasion to refer to as I went along, I thought it not amiss, for these reasons (not to mention others), to give the Reader some short account of a work that may, I hope, on its appearance, engage his further attention. It is intitled, *The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated (on the Principles of a Religious Theist)*, from the Omission of the Doctrine of a Future State in the Jewish Dispensation. For having chalked out a plan for a defence of revealed religion against Deists, Jews, and Mahometans, which we are desirous of raising as a lasting monument to the glory of the Christian name, we were not reduced to that poverty of invention, or ignorance in design, to frame it of old or already-formed materials.—Such second-hand labours are only worthy the adversaries of our holy faith; whose cause relying on the strength of half a dozen plausible sophisms, their business is to cook them up in different disguises, just as the palate of the times, or the fantastic appetite of their followers, give them opportunity or invitation. But truth, which is eternal, and whose relations are infinite, affords unexhausted matter for defense and illustration. The views

in which she may be placed are numberless; and attentive contemplation flashes conviction on every view.

This, if heaven give me life and health, I hope to execute. In the mean time, this *Defense of Moses* was composed as a specimen of what can be performed, in the new road I purpose to take, for a complete defense of revelation.

1. Why I chose to make the *Defense of Moses* the subject of my specimen, was, Because we have of late seen several writers, who profess to believe the Christian Religion, treat Moses and his dispensation so cavalierly that one would suspect they thought the abandoning him could have no consequences destructive of Christianity. And those who profess to think more soberly, are generally gone into an opinion that the truth of the Jewish religion is impossible to be proved but upon the foundation of the Christian. An opinion, that had been long peculiar to the Socinians. Who go so far as to maintain *, *That the knowledge of the Old Testament is not absolutely necessary for Christians.*—As to the first sort of people, if they really imagine Christianity hath no dependence on Judaism, I have nothing further to say to them here. But if, as is most reasonable to think, they only affect this air of indifference when pressed with difficulties too weighty to remove, this Demonstration may not come unseasonably to their relief. As for the other, I shall, I am persuaded, merit their thanks, if I succeed in freeing their reasonings from a vicious circle; that first, prove the Christian by the Jewish; and then, the Jewish by the Christian Religion.

2. Why I chose this medium, namely, *the omission of a future state in the Jewish Dispensation* (before several others of equal strength which I had in my choice), to prove its divine original, was, 1. Because I should be, thereby, enabled to shew, to the confusion of infidelity, that this very circumstance of omission, which those men esteem such an imperfection as makes the dispensation unworthy the author to whom we ascribe it, is, in truth, a demonstrative proof of the divinity of its original. Whereby it will be found, that

* Cuper advers. Trad. Theologico-polit. l. i.

several passages of scripture, which they charge with obscurity, injustice, and contradiction, are, indeed, full of light, equity, and concord. 2. Because this medium affords us an *internal argument for revelation*. Which a late able writer denies can be found for its support. *Strictly speaking*, says he, *there can be no internal evidence of a revelation* *. Now this being a sort of evidence on which my proposed *defense of revelation* will be chiefly built; and it having been hitherto little cultivated, and at length, as we see, its very existence denied, I will beg leave to say a word or two concerning it.

The writers in defense of revealed religion distinguish their arguments under two sorts. The first they call the *internal*, and the other the *external* evidence. Of these, the first is, in its nature, more simple and noble, and even capable of demonstration. While the other, made up of very dissimilar materials, and borrowing aid from without, must needs, on these accounts, have some parts of unequal strength with the rest; and consequently lie open to the attacks of a willing adversary. Besides, the *internal* evidence is, by its nature, perpetuated, and so fitted for all times and periods: while the *external*, by length of time, weakens and decays. For the nature and genius of the religion defended affording the proofs of the first kind, these materials of defense are inseparable from its existence; and so always at hand, and the same. But time may, and doth efface memorials independent of that existence, out of which the external evidence is composed. Which evidence must therefore become more and more imperfect; without being affected by that whimsical calculation to which a certain Scotsman † would subject it. Nay so necessary is the *internal* evidence, that even the very best of the external kind cannot support itself without it. As may be seen from hence, that when the miracles, performed by the founders of our holy faith, are, from humane testimony, irre-

* Dr. Conybeare's Defense of revealed religion, second edit. 8vo. p. 431.

† Craig, Theologiæ Christi. Principia Mathematica. Lond. 1699, 4to.

fistibly established, the consequence, that therefore they come from God, cannot be deduced till the nature of that doctrine is examined, for whose establishment they were performed. But was there no other benefit in cultivating the internal evidence, yet the gaining, by it, a more perfect knowledge of revealed religion would fully recompence the pains. And this is best acquired in that pursuit.

Notwithstanding these superior advantages, it has so happened, that the *internal evidence* hath been hitherto used as an introduction only, to the *external*: and while, by this latter, men have proved our religion actually divine, they have gone no further with the former, than to shew it worthy, indeed, of such original. But from this observation, a late writer, as I have said, hath drawn a quite contrary conclusion. I, from the small progress hitherto made in it, exhort to its better cultivation; he, from the same fact, concludes, that *strictly speaking there can be no internal evidence at all of a revelation*. He supposes this small advance to be owing to a defect in the nature of the proof; I, to the negligence of its cultivators. Which of us is in the right, a few pages will, I hope, discover.

What may have occasioned this neglect, in my view of it, is not so easy to find out. Whether it be that writers have imagined that, in general, the labours and difficulties attending the effectual prosecution of the *internal method* are not so easily surmounted as those which the writer in the external is engaged in. While they suppose, that this latter, to be master of his subject, needs only the common requisites of church history, diligence and judgement. But that the reasoner, on the *internal proof*, must, besides these, have a thorough knowledge of humane nature, civil policy, the universal history of mankind, an exact idea of the Mosaic and Christian dispensations, cleared from the froth and grounds of school subtilties, and church systems: and, above all, should be blessed with a certain sagacity to investigate the relations of humane actions through all the combinations of natural, civil, and moral
complex-

complexities. What may suggest this opinion may be the reflection, that in the *external evidence* each circumstance of fact, that makes for the truth of revealed religion, is seen to do so as soon as known; so that the chief labour, here, is to search and pick out such facts; and to place them in their proper light and situation: but, that in prosecuting the *internal evidence*, the case is widely different. A circumstance in the frame and composition of this religion that, perhaps, some time or other may be discovered to be a demonstration of its divinity, shall be so far from being generally thought assisting in its proof, that it shall be esteemed, by many, a prejudice against it. As, I think, I have given a remarkable instance in the subject of the treatise I am now upon. And no wonder that a religion of divine original, constituted to serve many admirable ends of Providence, should be full of such complicated mysteries, the view of which filled the great apostle Paul with raptures. As, on the other hand, this religion being for the use of man, we need not despair, when we have attained a proper knowledge of man's nature, and the dependencies thereon, of making still growing discoveries, on the *internal evidence*, of the divinity of its original.

Now though all this may perhaps be true; and that, consequently, it would appear ridiculous arrogance in an ordinary writer, after having seen the difficulties attending this method, to hope to overcome them by the qualities above said to be required: yet no modest examiner need be discouraged. For there are, in revealed religion, besides those interior marks of truth before described, which require the most delicate operation of a great genius and master workman to bring out and polish *, others, also, no less illustrious, but more univocal marks of truth, which God hath been pleased to impress upon his dispensations; which require no great qualities but humility and love of truth, in him who would from thence

* A noble instance of this, a great writer hath given us in the fourth *asseriation* of the *Life and Intent of Prophecy*, &c. intitled, *Christ's Entry into Jerusalem*.

investigate the ways of God to man. The subject of this discourse is one of those illustrious marks; from which the discoverer claims no merit from any long, learned, or laborious search; it is honour enough for him that he is the first who brings it out to observation. If he be indeed the first. For the demonstration is so beautiful, and, at the same time, appears to be so easy and simple, that one cannot tell whether the pleasure of the discovery, or the wonder that it is now to make, be the greater.

In this treatise, I pretend to have carried the *internal evidence* much further than the proofs for revelation are usually carried. Even to the height of which it is capable, a demonstration, little short of mathematical. In which, nothing, but a mere physical possibility of the contrary, can be opposed. Only allowing me this single postulatam,

“That a skilful legislator establishing a religion, and a civil policy, acts with certain views and for certain ends; and not capriciously, or without purpose or design.”

From thence I proceed to erect my demonstration, solely, on these three very clear and simple propositions.

1. “That the inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, is necessary for the well-being of civil society.”

2. “That all mankind, especially the most learned and wise nations of antiquity, have concurred in believing that this doctrine was of that use to civil society. And,

3. “That the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Mosaic dispensation.”

Propositions so clear and evident, that one would think one might directly proceed to those mediums whereby we deduce our conclusion.

“*That therefore the law of Moses is of divine original.*”

But so great is the love to paradox and system, that these, with all their clearness, have need of a very particular defence: The infidel
having

having disputed the first, and many Christian writers thought fit to deny the last. The discourse, therefore, is divided into six books. The first is in defence of the first proposition: The second and third, in defence of the second proposition: The fourth and fifth, in defence of the third proposition: And the last is employed in deducing those mediums whereby we erect this important demonstration. I shall crave leave to give the Reader a short account, in gross, of what each book contains.

1. The first book opens with an account of the original of civil society; the natural defect in its plan; and how that defect is supplied by religion only. But it being shewn, that religion cannot subsist or support itself without the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, it follows, that that doctrine is of the highest use to society. In the next place, the objections, which licentious wits have brought against the service of religion to the state, are fully answered. In particular, the arguments employed by Mr. Bayle, and interspersed in his famous work, intitled, *Pensées diverses à l'occasion de la comete, &c.* are methodized, set in the strongest light, and confuted. In which, amongst divers other matters of importance, are settled and explained the true grounds of moral actions. The book concludes with a short, but full, detection of the fundamental sophisms on which the execrable doctrine of the book called *The Fable of the Bees* is solely built. The writer of which ventured to go one step further than any other atheist, or apologist for atheism. Those who preceded him having only maintained, that a state might subsist without religion, because moral virtue might be had without it; this writer, that moral virtue, the fruit of religion alone, was destructive of a great and flourishing society, whose grandeur could be supported only by vice.

2. The second Book is employed in defence of the second proposition. It begins with shewing the sense all mankind had of the utility of religion to the state, by the doctrine of a future state's being universally taught in all ages and nations of mankind the
Jew.sh

Jewish only excepted. And it is proved, by the deduction of many particulars, that the reception and preservation of that doctrine was owing to the general sense of this its utility. It proceeds to an examination of the conduct of the ancient legislators : and delivers, and explains, at large, the various arts and contrivances they employed, to support and propagate religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in particular. The history of these arts, *from the first*, which was a pretence to inspiration, *to the last*, which was the *establishment of religion* (that hath afforded matter for the treatise to which this short account is an appendix), is here delivered. In which I pretend to have unfolded the whole mystery of ancient legislation. A subject little known or attended to. And by deducing the history of its rise, progress, and decay, from the old Egyptians to the latest Grecian sophists, we presume to have given light and congruity to an infinite number of passages in *Greek and Roman* authors.

3. The third book, continuing the defence of this proposition, opens with a collection of testimonies from the antient historians and philosophers. By which it appears there was an universal concurrence in opinion concerning the indispensable use of religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular, to civil society. And in order to shew the strength of this persuasion, in the fullest light, the public teaching of the philosophers, on this point, is examined into. Where it is proved that this utility was the sole motive to all of them for propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. This necessarily engages us in the history of the rise, progress, and decay of the ancient Greek philosophy. In which is shewn its original, like that of legislation, from Egypt : The several revolutions it underwent in its character ; constantly attendant and conformable to the several revolutions of civil power : Its gradual decay, and total absorption in the schools : Where it is shewn, that, as it sprung from the fountains of the true Egyptian wisdom, so it ended in the corrupt and
spurious.

spurious. In which account will be found the true original and use of the twofold method of philosophising ; hitherto we presume, much mistaken : Which will help to unravel the most embarrassed questions concerning the true nature and genius of the Greek philosophy ; and to reconcile an infinite number of supposed contradictions which the most eminent founders of it have fallen into. This universal consent of legislators and philosophers concerning the use of religion to the state, and their arts and endeavours to propagate it, being largely proved and illustrated ; lest it should be mistaken and perverted. This book concludes with a confutation of the atheistical pretence *that religion was the offspring of statesmen*. —The absurdity of it is exposed, and the impossibility of it demonstrated. The original, and authors of this monstrous paradox are animadverted on ; particularly, the *third letter of Toland to Serena concerning the Origin of Idolatry and Reasons of Heathenism*, which is a formal defence of it, is examined and refuted.—So far in support of the second proposition.

4. The fourth book enters upon the third proposition. And, as amongst the several arguments brought to prove that the doctrine of a future state was not in the Jewish dispensation, one, and the most considerable, is taken from the nature of the Jewish policy, this book is employed in explaining the true nature of that policy. In order to which, the character of Moses, with the concessions of the Infidels concerning him, is premised. And that long debated question, whether the Jews borrowed some of their customs, and the Greeks all their ancient learning and religion from the Egyptians ; or whether, on the other hand, both Greeks and Egyptians received all they had of value in these matters from the Jews, is examined to the bottom, on such principles as may, possibly, enable us to determine it with certainty. The way being thus cleared, the true Jewish policy is then attempted to be delivered and explained. The consequence of which policy is shewn to be, the dispensation of an extraordinary Providence promised and believed. The book goes

on to examine how long this policy lasted ; and whether it was ever changed while the Jews continued a people, under their own laws : and concludes with a very momentous attempt, namely, to demonstrate, from the true nature of this policy, as here delivered, the agreeableness of every thing which Scripture tells us, God commanded ; *did* to others ; or represented of himself ; the agreeableness, I say, of all this to truth, and the rights of nature and nations. In which will be obviated every thing of moment the Deists urge, particularly the late author of *Christianity as old as the Creation*, to prove those things contrary to reason, truth, and justice. Such as are the law for punishing opinions ; which Mr. Bayle, after many endeavours to justify, gives up, as impossible to be defended on the principles of the tolerants ; the extirpation of the seven nations ; the destruction of the people for having been numbered by David ; the representation of the Godhead with human passions and the like.

5. The fifth book continues to prosecute the subject of the third proposition. Many other arguments are now produced, to prove that the doctrine of a future state neither was, nor could be, part of the Mosaic dispensation. Then the arguments of those who are of another opinion are considered ; where it is shewn, that they are all built on false principles, which in this, and in the foregoing book, have been detected and confuted. And, in the last place, the true history of the rise and progress of the doctrine of a future state amongst the Jewish people is delivered. It is first told, from what quarter the slow dawnings of it first appeared. In doing which, there was occasion to settle the chronology of several books of the Old Testament : particularly the book of *Job*, which we hope is exactly done from infallible internal characters. In this part of the history of the doctrine, we have been invited to give, what our main principle enables us to do, some good account of the contradictory methods which God in different places of holy Writ declares to use in dealing with sinners : and to shew how reconcilable those

those different methods are to truth, to equity, and to one another. A circumstance that is now become the offence of every snatterer in infidelity. The book proceeds to an account of the progress and establishment of the doctrine of a future state amongst the Jews. And, as, we find, it was thoroughly digested and established, among them, at Christ's advent; the time, it first became a popular doctrine, is endeavoured to be discovered; which directs us to the occasion of its propagation: as the mode of it doth to the authors from whence they received it. All which particulars, it is shewn, do in a remarkable manner contribute to the induction and illustration of our main conclusion. So far in support of the third and last proposition.

6. The sixth and concluding book is taken up in searching out, and illustrating, by the foregoing books, all those mediums whereby we establish our great conclusion, *that therefore the law of Moses is of divine original*. The sum of the proof is in a word to this effect. The first book proved, that religion, which teaches an overruling Providence, the rewarder of good men, and the punisher of ill, is necessary for society, to help out the magistrate in the execution of his office, by restraining irregularities he could never reach, and by giving a sanction to his decrees. But that the apparent irregularities in the dispensation of things, here below, would destroy the belief of a Providence, and consequently all religion, were it not supported by the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, where all those irregularities are set right. This was so evident a truth, that, as is shewn in the second book, all nations concurred to cherish and support this doctrine; all the legislators established it; and all the philosophers invented reasons to give it credit. Which could be for no other end than its confessed service to society: Because, it is shewn, that several of these latter who endeavoured most to propagate it, believed it not. Amidst this universal consent, arises a little state, which, by the confession of the deists themselves, was the best policied of any that ever ancient

legislation formed; the author of which pursued his scheme by methods, and on principles, so resembling the best pagan legislators, as Minos, Solon, Lycurgus, Numa, that those Deists believe him to be of the same species and class with these; and to have just the same pretences to inspiration. But, what must call up the attention of every one, there was this very singular difference between his institution and all the other institutions of mankind; that though he, like them, taught an overruling Providence, and a religion, yet it was *without the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments*: as is largely proved in the fourth and fifth books. This omission makes the whole deistical scheme with regard to Moses, to the last degree, inconsistent, absurd, and ridiculous. For first, according to their own representation of Moses, he was the wisest of all legislators, and therefore must needs see the service that doctrine was of to society. He had been bred up in the Egyptian schools, and, as the Deists believe, had all his knowledge in legislation, and religion, from thence: But it is proved in the second and third books, that this doctrine was invented (from the most early times) by the Egyptians, and invented for the sake of the state. Now the Deists say, he transferred all that was good and profitable, from their institutions into his own. Why not, then, this most useful of all doctrines? Again, the Jewish people, it is confessed on all hands, had most largely imbibed the Egyptian customs; and the Deists observe, that Moses, as a wise legislator who understood human nature, accommodated his institutions to the inveteracy of such prejudices and prepossessions: But, of all opinions, this of a future state, as is shewn in the second book, is the most pleasing to the mind, gets the quickest possession of it, and most difficultly suffers a divorce: and, being at the same time most useful, it is therefore impossible a wise legislator, acting with design, such as the Deists represent Moses, could omit to inculcate it. Nor doth it avail to say, Moses did not himself believe this doctrine; for we have shewn, in the second and third books, that many of the wisest

wisest ancients (legislators and philosophers) believed it not, yet sedulously inculcated it for its confessed utility to society. So that Moses had no reasons for not teaching, but, the most momentous and forceable, to teach it. As, 1, its most apparent use. 2. His prepossession in favour of it; being brought up in a school of legislation in which this doctrine was the most indispensable and essential part. 3. The prepossession of his people in favour of it. And, 4. The particular necessity the Jewish state had of this doctrine, above all other states, if it was of mere human institution, as the Deists imagine: which necessity is largely shewn in this book. Thus supposing Moses to be a mere human legislator, his conduct, in this matter, must be owned to be to the last degree absurd, capricious, and irrational. But now, take the account as Scripture gives it us, that he was a man chose by God to give laws to his people, and all these difficulties vanish and disappear: and the great legislator shines out again in one uniform course of splendour. For then, an extraordinary dispensation of Providence, exactly rewarding and punishing (which we shew, in the fourth book, to be a necessary consequence of the Jewish policy) made the doctrine of a future state needless, to all the ends of civil society: and every thing, as we have shewn, tended, in the Mosaic dispensation, to those ends. For the doctrine being propagated by statesmen, only as a succedaneum to an unequal providence, when that inequality was rectified, there was no further occasion for it. The consequence is, that that extraordinary providence over the Jewish people, as recorded in Scripture, was *real*: And if so, then MOSES, TRULY THE MESSENGER OF GOD. If it should yet be objected that the *preaching up* this extraordinary Providence to popular belief, without the *reality of its existence*, was enough to supply the want of the doctrine of a future state; it is here shewn, that this pretence of an extraordinary Providence was made use of by all the ancient legislators: who, yet, found it totally insufficient, for the ends of society, without this doctrine: which, therefore, was every where

sedulously

sedulously inculcated. If lastly it should be objected (which is the only remaining objection can be made) that Moses might really believe an *extraordinary Providence* when there was none, and on the strength of that belief might omit the doctrine of a future state, as useless; this case is shewn to be impossible. For first this supposes him to be very enthusiastical, which the Deists are far from taking him to be; and which we have clearly proved he was not. 2. It supposes that a space of above forty years in which he conducted his people, and the long experience of that time, could not cure him of his enthusiasm, with regard to so clear a point that must be perpetually thrusting itself upon his observation. He must in that case have been stark-mad: which is so monstrous a fancy that all mankind will be ashamed of it. The book goes on to shew, that if Moses had a divine mission, and consequently what he had delivered of the extraordinary Providence of God was true, there was not only no need of the doctrine of a future state; but that a great many wise ends, becoming infinite wisdom, were served by omitting it: nay, that it could not, for many important reasons, have been taught. To support this, a view is given of the universal dispensation of God to man as a religious agent: and the coincidence and dependence of his several revelations to him are explained and illustrated: In which, the true nature of his last and perfect revelation by the ministry of his Son is we presume more rationally explained. From whence will appear the wonderful harmony of the whole; and *the depth and riches of the wisdom and goodness of God* made manifest, in a series of observations, that, we hope, have in them as much solidity as novelty. And with this concludes the last book.

This is a very slight and imperfect general view of a work, where a vast variety of circumstances, not hinted at in this short account, do, we presume, so strongly contribute to the establishment of our conclusion, that nothing, as we said, remains against it but a mere physical possibility of the contrary. And, *this*, on the principles
of

of the Deists themselves. And from those very marks of resemblance they pretend to have discovered between Moses and the ancient pagan legislators; and from many others, which, in the course of this work, we have brought out to observation. So well founded was the triumphal confidence of this great missionary of God, who, as if he had foreknown this objection that scoffers of the latter age were to make to the divinity of his character, dared rest the truth of his pretensions on an appeal to those legislators themselves, and their Pagan followers; where, in his last moments, he thus exultingly cries out, *THEIR ROCK IS NOT AS OUR ROCK, OUR ENEMIES THEMSELVES BEING JUDGES.

* Deut. xxxii. 31.

P O S T S C R I P T

T O T H E

F O U R T H E D I T I O N

In MDCCLXVI.

LORD Bolingbroke, in his large posthumous work (on what motives, those volumes sufficiently declare) hath laboured at a full and formal confutation of the preceding discourse; after having done the same honour to another of the author's works, *The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated*. But the pains he had taken, and the opposition he had found in the *argument* of that book, had, by the time he came upon this second adventure, so ruffled his temper and discomposed his polite manners, that he now breaks out into much opprobrious language, not only against the system, but the person of the writer. To understand the cause of his lordship's resentment, so far only as it arose from the nature of my discourse, it may not be improper to say a word or two further concerning the occasion of my writing, and the principles on which the discourse is composed.

After the many violent convulsions our country had suffered since the REFORMATION by the rage of the religious parties (in which, at one time, liberty of conscience was oppressed; and at another, the established church over-turned and desolated) it pleased Divine Providence to settle our religious rites on such fundamental

VOL. IV.

M m

principles

principles of justice and equity, and to secure the civil peace on such maxims of wisdom and true policy, as most effectually guarded both against the return of their respective violations: and the means made use of were the giving, on proper terms of security to the national religion, a free toleration to those who dissented from the established worship. This seemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious communion as the long distracted state of the Christian world would suffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in possession of this blessing before they grew weary of it, and set on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old disorders. For it is to be observed with sorrow, that this reform of the English constitution happened not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of TRUTH, and carried on upon the principles of charity: but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE; at one time, vainly perhaps, anxious for the established religion *, at another, wisely provident for the support of civil liberty †. So that when succeeding dissensions in church and state had made this newly reformed constitution the subject of enquiry, the parties who managed the debate being those who before had both persecuted and suffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the discussion of the question were not such perhaps as were best fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their partialities. *One* side seemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itself, and only a temporary expedient to prevent a worse; while their conduct shewed, they lay at watch for the first occasion to break in upon it. This was enough to mislead the *other*, and dispose it to consider the TEST-LAW, which covered and secured the established religion, as no better than a new species of persecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this shadow of a grievance; “To have divine worship
“ really free, they said, no religious profession should be attended

* Ch. II.

† Will. III.

“ with

“ with civil incapacities ; a TEST had made that distinction amongst God’s worshippers ; it was therefore to be set aside.” But every man saw (and perhaps the enemies of the *test* were not amongst the last who saw it) that to set aside this law, which, under a general *toleration*, was the only security the *established* church had to trust to, was exposing the national worship to all the inroads of a sectarian rabble. This mischievous project, arising out of abused liberty, was at first entertained, as we may well suppose, by the tolerated churches only. Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of *fear*, on the discovery of that bigotted principle in their adversaries, which considered *toleration* as only a temporary expedient. And where was the wonder if those who believed they had no security for what they had got, while such principles prevailed, should endeavour to put it out of the power of their adversaries to do them harm ? Others of a more politic turn cherished it from views of ambition, and in hopes of sharing the emoluments of the established church. It was some time before any member of the Church of England joined with Dissenters in their clamours against a *test-law*, or, more properly speaking, against *their own establishment*. This monstrous coalition did not happen till a warm dispute on certain metaphysical questions* (if considered in one light, too sublime to become the subject of human wit ; if in another, too trifling to gain the attention of reasonable men) had started new scruples concerning church-subscription. And to get rid of this necessary ENGAGEMENT TO PEACE, and acquiescence in the established religion, these *wise* and *faithful* ministers of the national worship were amongst the foremost to discredit it, and the busiest to trample down all its fences and securities.

Bigotry, you see, was at the bottom of the first set of principles ; and FANATICISM, at the top of the other. In their separate appeals to the sense of mankind, there was this remarkable difference : all

* The Trinitarian controversy.

ages had felt the mischiefs of religious restraint and persecution ; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Christian times, of the evils attending the *want of an established religion*. The fanatics therefore were perpetually urging their experience against persecution, secure in not having the argument retorted on them. But, in this imaginary advantage they deceived themselves ; and the very *want* of examples was the greatest real advantage the bigots had over them : who if they had no instance of the evils attending the *want* of an establishment, to retort upon their adversaries, it was because such *want* was never known : the necessity of a national religion for the support of society being so indispensable, that men even in the wildest times, the sworn enemies of religious establishments, and *leagued* together for their destruction, were no sooner become able to effect their purpose, than they found, in beginning to new model the state, which they had subdued by the superiority of their arms, that there was even a necessity of supporting an established church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the *INDEPENDENT republic* *, and in the *protectorship* of OLIVER ; both of which, under their several usurpations, were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the religion they most hated, into a NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed ; the distempers of the state still further contributed to inflame those of the church : and, on the accession of the present royal line to the throne, a long, a famous, and a regular dispute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the two SOCIETIES, was begun and carried on by two parties of churchmen. But as the several disputants had reciprocally assigned too much, and allowed too little to the two societies, and had erected their

* In April 1649, the House (says Whitelock) came to these resolutions—*That the government to be ESTABLISHED in England shall be the PRESBYTERIAN government.*

That a way shall be provided for ADMISSION of all such churches as tend to Godliness and to advance the kingdom of Jesus Christ, TO BE FREE WITHOUT DISTURBANCES. Memor. of English Affairs, p. 393.

arguments on one common fallacy: the maintainers of an establishment supported a test-law on such reasoning as destroyed a toleration *; and the defenders of religious liberty argued against the justice of that security on such principles as concluded equally against a national church †.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the author of *the Alliance between Church and State* found the sentiments of men concerning religious liberty and establishments, when he proposed his *theory* to their consideration: a theory calculated to vindicate our present happy constitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjusting the precise bounds of either society; by shewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their union: and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who dissented from the national worship.

He first shewed the use of religion to society, from the experience and practice of all ages: he inquired from whence the use arose, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very essence and plan of civil society. He went on to the nature of religion; and shewed how, and for what causes, it constituted a society: and then, from the natures of the *two societies*, he collected, that the object of the civil is only the *body* and its interests; and the object of the religious, only the *soul*. Hence he concluded, that both societies are sovereign, and independent; because they arise not out of one another; and because, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to clash; the sameness of *original*, or the sameness of *administration*, being the only causes which can bring one, of two distinct societies, into natural subjection to the other.

* Sherlock.

† Hoadly.

To apply religion therefore to the service of civil society, in the best manner it is capable of being applied, he shewed it was necessary that the two societies should **UNITE**: For each being sovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the service of religion in any solid or effectual manner. But no such union could arise but from *free compact* and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unless each society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two societies, explained what those motives and advantages were. Whence it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives, of the two societies, thus united, with the civil magistrate at their head, were indeed those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find established and enjoyed under our present happy constitution in church and state: the result of this was, that an **ESTABLISHED CHURCH** and a free **TOLERATION** are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a **TEST LAW**. This law therefore the author, in the last place, proceeded to vindicate, on the same general principles of the law of nature and nations.

This is a true though short analysis of *the Alliance between Church and State*; with the principles on which the theory is conducted.

Let us now consider what his lordship has to object to it. I shall take him paragraph by paragraph, in his native disorder, as he lies: for when a writer is confused beyond redress, as our noble author is here where he reasons against the book of the *alliance*, an attempt to reduce his discourse to order becomes suspicious; as the reader may chance to fancy that the *obscurity* as well as the *order* were of the answerer's making. Therefore the safest, as well as fairest way in this case is to take the writer as you find him. The obscurities in thought and expression will be then seen to be his own; and nothing can be objected to the answerer, but a few repetitions, which, in this method of answering, can never be avoided.

“THE

“THE notion (says his lordship) of a FORMAL ALLIANCE between church and state, as between two independent, distinct powers, is a very groundless and WHIMSICAL notion. But a fraudulent or silent compact between princes and priests became very real, as soon as an ecclesiastical order was established *.” The latter part of this period is but too true; and the theory of the *alliance* (misrepresented in the former part) was proposed to remedy these mischiefs. It is this theory only which I shall undertake to vindicate against his lordship’s objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what should he mean else?) one actually executed in form; and supposes that the author of *the Alliance between Church and State*, asserted the actual execution of such a one, we may, with more justice perhaps, apply to his lordship what he says of the author, concerning DE MARCA and BOSSUET, *that he gives a character of the book called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it.* Give me leave to quote my own words—“From all this it appears, that our plan of alliance is no precarious arbitrary hypothesis, but a theory founded in reason, and the invariable nature of things. For having, from the essence, collected the necessity of allying, and the freedom of the compact; we have from the same necessity fairly introduced it; and from its freedom consequentially established every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask where this charter or treaty of convention for the union of the two societies, on the terms here delivered, is to be met with? we are able to answer him. We say, it may be found in the same archive with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between magistrate and people; so much insisted on, in vindication of the common rights of subjects. Now when a sight of this compact is required of the defenders of civil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that such original compact is the only legitimate foun-

* Vol. IV. p. 515, 516.

“ dation of civil society : that if there was NO SUCH THING FORMALLY executed, there was, *virtually* : that all differences between magistrate and people ought to be regulated on the supposition of such a compact ; and all government reduced to the principles therein laid down ; for that the happiness, of which civil society is productive, can only be attained by it, when formed on those principles. Now something like this we say of our *Alliance between Church and State* *.”

Let this serve too, for an answer to his lordship’s insulting question in another place—“ But where shall we look for the conditions of that *original contract which was made between the religious and civil society*, I know not ; unless we suppose them written on the back of Constantine’s grant to Sylvester †.” Does his lordship know where to look for the ORIGINAL CONTRACT made between the prince and people, in any place of easier access ? Or will he, when at a loss, send us to the *back of Constantine’s grant to Sylvester*, for this contract likewise ?

But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverse use of words, his lordship means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* between king and people ; this indeed I do venture to say, and not only to say, but to prove likewise.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, his lordship says, stands upon a WHIMSICAL principle : So, in his opinion, did the argument of the Divine Legation of *Moses*, from the omission of a future state. Indeed his lordship seems to have been as much distressed by WHIMSICAL DIVINES, when he turned philosopher, as he was by WHIMSICAL POLITICIANS, while he continued a statesman ‡. However, the *whimsical* principle in question is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

* Alliance, third edition, p. 165, 166, 167.

† Vol. IV. p. 419.

‡ See his Letter to Sir William Windham.

This principle his lordship rejects : and it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly : for he who makes religion itself a fantom, can surely have little or no idea how it should become imbodyed.

“ NEITHER NATURE NOR REASON (says his lordship) could ever lead men to imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT SOCIETIES IN THE SAME SOCIETY. This imagination was broached “ by ecclesiastical ambition *.”

A GRAVE sentence ! which to me seems equivalent to this, that *neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine that ONE was TWO*. In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how such a thing could ever come to be broached (as his lordship says it was) by any *imagination* not more disordered than it usually is by *ecclesiastical ambition*. SCHOOL-LEARNING, indeed, might do much ; for there his lordship has fixed his theological Bedlam : but *church ambition*, he assures us, is of another mould ; which, as it never failed, he says, to aim at, so it seldom failed to obtain, *immoderate wealth and exorbitant power*. What then are we to think ? That his lordship meant, that *neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent societies in the same COMMUNITY* ? for community being the genus, several *societies*, as the species, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to suppose, merely for my own ease ; because when his lordship is well understood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph, then, are contained these two propositions :

1. That the church does not compose a *society*.
2. That it does not compose a *society independent and sovereign*.

Let us examine his reasoning on these points as it lies in his works ; for as disorderly as it lies, it is intended, I assure you, to overturn the whole theory of the *Alliance*.

* Vol. IV. p. 412.

“ A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (says his lordship) BY WHICH IS MEANT, ON THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY, is, or is not, a creature of the state. *If the first*, it follows, that this order no more than others, which the state has instituted for the maintenance of good government, can assume any rights, or exercise any powers, except such as the state has thought fit to attribute to it, and that the state may and ought to keep a constant controul over it, not only to prevent usurpations and abuses, but to direct the public and private influence of the clergy, in a strict conformity to the letter and spirit of the constitution ; the servants of which, in a much truer sense, they are, than what they affect sometimes to call themselves, the ambassadors of God to other men. *If the last* is said, if it be asserted, that the church is in any sort independent on the state, there arises from this pretension the greatest absurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of *imperium in imperio* ; an empire of divine, in an empire of human institution *.”

Thus far his lordship, who is here reasoning against the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his dilemma with telling the reader, that the author of that book has defined a *religious society*, to be the *body of the clergy* — *A religious society, by which* (says he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, is, or is not, a creature of the state †.

The reader cannot, I believe, see this assertion without some surprize, when he observes, that the author of the *Alliance* has defined a religious society to be A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS BEINGS ASSOCIATED ‡. — When he observes, that the author makes it one of the principal cares of a religious society, to provide an order of men, to be set apart for ministering in holy things, or in other

* Vol. IV. p. 413.

† So again, *this order of men which we call the religious society*.—v. iv. p. 440. And again, *the religious society, as we have accustomed ourselves to call the clergy*. v. iv. p. 561.

‡ *Alliance*, p. 48, 49.

words, a CLERGY.—“ The greatest care is to be had, that the acts
 “ of religious worship be preserved simple, decent, and significative.
 “ But this can be done only by providing persons set apart for
 “ this office ; whose peculiar employment it shall be to preside in,
 “ direct, and superintend the acts and services of religion, &c. *”—
 When he observes, that the author makes the *end* of religious so-
 ciety to be, *Salvation of souls*, and one of the *means*, the order of
 the *clergy*.—Lastly, when he observes, the author of the *Alliance*
 opposes the *church* and the *clergy* to each other. “ It is unjust in
 “ the CHURCH to aim at the propagation of religion by force, and
 “ impertinent to aim at riches, honours, and powers. But what
 “ motives the CLERGY OF A CHURCH might have, is nothing to
 “ the purpose of our inquiry. We have only to consider what the
 “ CHURCH had, WHICH, as a religious society, CONSISTS OF THE
 “ WHOLE BODY OF THE COMMUNITY, BOTH LAITY AND CLERGY†.”
 Nay, the very Popish clergy, even DE MARCA himself, that
time-serving priest and great flatterer, was more honest than his
 lordship chuses to represent the body of the *English* clergy, as
 he might have seen by the quotation at the bottom of this very
 page of the *Alliance*.—ECCLESIAE CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OM-
 NIUM COMPAGE CONSTITUITUR.

In a word, the author of the *Alliance* was at much pains to
 prove that a religious society, or *church*, does not mean the *clergy*,
 but the whole body of the faithful : and this for two reasons,
 for the sake of truth in general, and of his own system in
 particular.

1. It shocks common sense to call one order or rank in society,
the society : it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a
 substance, *the substance*.

2. It subverts the theory of the *Alliance* to make the *clergy* con-
 stitute the *church* : for then the church could neither be a distinct
 society, nor independent ; both of which it must be, to make it

* Alliance, p. 52.

† Ibid. p. 87.

capable of an alliance with the state. It could not be a distinct society; for an order of men, as I observed just before, is the same in politics, as a quality is in physics; the one must inhere in a *society*, the other in a *substance*: and these being the substrata of the other, to talk of a distinct, much more, of the independent existence of an *order*, or of a *quality*, is the profoundest nonsense in politics and physics. But admitting such a church were capable of allying with the state, the author has shewn, in the place quoted above, that it's *motives* for allying would be such as the state could never comply with, either in justice or policy.

EXTREME necessity (to do his lordship all the right we are able) forced him upon this bold and violent falsification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He saw no other way of discrediting the opinion of an *independent religious society*, than by making it believed, that such a society would be an "*imperium in imperio, an empire of divine, in an empire of human institution*;" a mischief, against which the state is always on its guard. And if a religious society signified the church, and the church, only the CLERGY, the claim to independency would imply such an *imperium*. But the author of the *alliance* goes upon other principles; he holds that the church signifies the whole body of the faithful; that though this society be independent, yet, from its independency, no such solecism in politics can arise as an *imperium in imperio*. This argument, which the author has drawn out at large, the noble person, in the following words, misrepresents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

"An *imperium in imperio* (says he) is in truth so expressly contained in the very terms of the assertion, that none of THE
 "TEDIOUS SOPHISTICAL REASONINGS, which have been employed
 "for the purpose, can evade or disguise it. One of these I will
 "mention, because it has a CERTAIN AIR OF PLAUSIBILITY, that
 "imposes on many; and because, if it cannot stand a short and
 "fair examination, as I think it cannot, the whole edifice of eccle-
 "siastical independency and grandeur falls to the ground. It
 "has

“ has been said then, that *religious and civil societies are widely distinguished by the distinct ends of their institutions, which imply necessarily distinct powers and a mutual independency; that the end of the one is the salvation of souls, and that of the other the security of temporal interests; that the state punishes overt acts, and can punish nothing else, because it can have cognizance of nothing that passes in the mind, and does not break out into criminal actions; but that the church employing her influence to temper the passions, to regulate the inward dispositions, and to prevent sins, as well as crimes, is that tribunal at which even intentions are to be tried, and sins, that do not ripen into crimes, nor immediately affect civil society, are to be punished*.*”

This, I will suppose, his lordship intended as a fair representation of the author's argument for the *independency* of the church. But the argument, as it stands in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different *powers* belonging to the two societies; as those *powers* are deduced from their different *ends*. But different powers implying different administrations, they create a mutual independency; and different administrations implying an incapacity of their clashing with one another, shew plainly that such an independency can never produce an *imperium in imperio*. This is the natural order of the argument, as it stands in the *Alliance*. Let us see now, how his lordship represents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of souls, and security of temporal interests*: but, proceeding to speak of the different *powers*, adapted to those different ends, *viz. coercion* in the state, and *persuasion* only in the church (from whence arises a mutual independency), he mistakes the CONSEQUENCES of these powers, which are *punishment of overt acts, and subdual of the passions*; he mistakes them, I say, for the *powers* THEMSELVES; from which *consequences* indeed no independency ensues; because *subdual of the passions* may, in his lordship's opinion at least, be obtained by coercive power, as well as *punishment*

* Vol. iv. p. 413, 414.

of overt acts. And if both societies have *coercive power*, one must needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this mistake only to shew, what a poor and imperfect conception his lordship himself had of the argument of the *Alliance*. Had he told us, though in fewer words, that the author's reasoning against the pretence of an *imperium in imperio* arising out of a mutual independency, was this, that the state having *coercive power*, and the church having *none*, the administration of the two societies could never clash; so as to induce the mischief of an *imperium in imperio*; had he told this, I say, we should have seen, that at least he *understood* his adversary.

But let us consider how he goes about to answer what he so ill represents.

"Now in answer to all this (says his lordship) WE MAY DENY, with truth and reason on our side, that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil society are so distinct as to require distinct powers, and a mutual independency. The salvation of souls is not the immediate end of civil society, and I wish it was not rather the pretence, than the end of ecclesiastical policy; but if to abstain from evil and to do good works be means of salvation, the means of salvation are the objects of civil government. It is the duty of princes and magistrates to promote a strict observation of the law of nature, of private and public morality, and to make those, who live in subjection to them, good men, in order to make them good citizens. For this purpose, the balance and the sword are put into their hands, that they may measure out punishment to every one, who injures the community, or does wrong to his neighbour; and a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, for both are intrusted to the same men, is the surest way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an habitual inward disposition to the practice of virtue *."

We may, says his lordship, *deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil society, are so distinct*.—Here he contradicts his master LOCKE. This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contradicts truth, and the whole system of human affairs, both in the constitution of laws and in the administration of justice.—But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.—*We may*, says his lordship, *deny that the AVOWED ends of religious, and the REAL ends of civil society, are so distinct, as to require distinct powers and a mutual independency*. The *avowed ends*, does he say? *Avowed* by whom? Common sense requires he should mean, *avowed* by those who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have said *real*: for the *avowed* and the *real* ends are the same: he *should* have said *real*; for the fair use of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require this adjective. But by what he predicates of these *avowed ends*, viz. their *not requiring distinct powers*, we see he means *avowed* by corrupt churchmen. (*The salvation of souls* (says he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of ecclesiastical policy*;) and these *ends* are church uniformity for the sake of spiritual dominion. Now these *avowed ends*, I readily confess, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his lordship, after all his declamation against spiritual tyranny, coming at last, in the true spirit of a free-thinking politician, to profess that religious persecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as justly and reasonably employed in matters of conscience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now though this be altogether upon principle (for what should restrain a statesman, who believes nothing of the truth of religion, and sees all the mischiefs of diversity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?); yet the reader would not have *expected* it in this place, where his lordship is defending religious liberty, against the priest-craft of the *Alliance*; nor would you have *found* it, had not the distresses of controversy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle,

ciple, that the church was a society, independent of the civil, as not having coercive power like the civil. To overturn this argument, his lordship was forced to deny the minor, and so unawares has brought in PERSECUTION as one of the natural powers of the church. But to compass this matter neatly, and without noise, he has recourse to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expression, the *abuse* of the thing for the thing itself.—*The avowed ends of religious—the real ends of civil society.*—But it was so evident a truth, that the *salvation of souls* was the real end of religious society, and *the security of temporal interests*, the real end of the civil, that he must have lost his senses who could be brought to believe that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the first as the second; or that *instruction and exhortation* were as proper to promote the second as the first: one of which two things, his assertion, *that the church and state have not distinct powers*, necessarily implies: to disguise this absurdity therefore, for, *real*, which fair argument required him to use, he substitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cause required him to abuse. And under this cover, he denies, that the two societies are *so distinct as to require distinct powers*.—Well, this however we understand; and have thoroughly considered. But what mean the words that follow?—AND A MUTUAL INDEPENDENCY. The author of the *Alliance* indeed had said, that the ends of the two societies were so distinct as to require *distinct powers*. But he was not so absurd to add—and a *mutual independency*; because, *independency* was not the MEAN of attaining an end, like *distinct powers*, but a CONSEQUENCE of those powers: for if the powers, by which two societies are administered, be different, those societies (seeing their administrations can never clash) must needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a fresh instance of the cloudy apprehension this great statesman had of a plain argument, the argument of the *Alliance*, built on the first principles of law and politics.

Let me now proceed to his reasoning. He is to prove, what he had asserted, that the two societies *are not so distinct as to require distinct*

distinct powers. He is writing against the book or rather against the author of the *Alliance*; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the religious is *salvation of souls*; the end of the civil, *security of temporal interests*. To this his lordship replies, that salvation of souls is only the *pretended* end of the religious; but it is the *real*, though not *immediate* end, of the civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all distinction between the two societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the first part of his assertion. I come now to the other, *that salvation of souls is the real, though not immediate, end of civil government*. Here the meanness of his sophistry is still more apparent, than in the former part. It stands thus,—“The *immediate* end of civil government is confessed, on all hands, to be *security of temporal interests*.—This is done by restraining men *from evil*, and exciting them *to good works*—*Good works are the means of salvation*—Therefore the *means of salvation are the objects of civil government*; or, in other words, the salvation of souls is at least the *real*, though *mediate* end of civil society.”

The author of the *Alliance* had obviated all this poultry chicane in the following words: “Civil government, I suppose, will be
“allowed to have been invented for the attainment of some cer-
“tain end or ends exclusive of others: and this implies the ne-
“cessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction
“arises from the different properties of the things pretending.
“But amongst all those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in
“fact obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil government, there
“is but one difference in their properties, as *ENDS*: which is this,
“that one of these is attainable by civil society only, and all the rest
“are easily attained without it. The thing then with the first-men-
“tioned property must needs be that *genuine end* of civil society.
“And this is no other than *security to the temporal liberty and pro-
“perty of men* *.”

* Alliance, p. 37.

But his lordship's sophism consists in the ambiguity of the word **END**; which either signifies the consequence or issue of a *mean*, simply; or, the consequence and issue, with intention and forethought. In the first sense it may be true, that salvation is the mediate end of civil society; but then it is nothing to the purpose. In the second sense it is to the purpose, but not true. The civil magistrate, all men see, had not this consequence or issue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his punishments to the various species of unlawful actions, he doth not proportion them to the heinousness of the offence, as estimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* religion, but to their malignant influence on civil society. A plain indication, that when he measured out punishments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* considerations in his view. But you shall hear what the Author of the *Alliance* has said on this subject, who had confuted his lordship's sophism even before he had conceived it.

“ We have shewn (says this writer) that it was the care of the
 “ *bodies*, not of the *souls* of men, that the magistrate undertook to
 “ give account of. Whatever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his
 “ Jurisdiction; whatever to the *soul*, is not. But, and if there be
 “ that which refers equally to both (as *morals* plainly do) such
 “ thing must needs be partly within, and partly without his pro-
 “ vince; that is, it is to be *partially* considered by him; his care
 “ thereto extending so far only as it affects civil society. The
 “ other consideration of it, namely, as it makes part of religion,
 “ being in the hands of those, who preside in another kind of
 “ society. Again, with regard to civil practice; if we cast our
 “ eye on any digest of laws, we find that evil actions have their
 “ annexed punishment denounced, not as they are *VICES*, *i. e.* not
 “ in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right:
 “ nor as they are *SINS*, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation
 “ from the extraordinary revealed will of God; which two things
 “ indeed coincide: but as they are *CRIMES*, *i. e.* in proportion to
 “ their

“ their malignant influence on civil society. But the view in which
 “ the *state* regards the *practice of morality* is evidently seen, in its
 “ recognition of that famous maxim, by which penal laws in all
 “ communities are fashioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY OF
 “ THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PROPORTION TO THE
 “ PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME. A maxim evidently *unjust*, were
 “ actions regarded by the state, as they are in themselves only ;
 “ because the *law of nature* enjoins only in proportion to the ability
 “ of performance ; and human abilities abate in proportion to the
 “ contrary propensities : evidently *impious*, were actions regarded by
 “ the state as they refer to the will of God, because this state-
 “ measure directly contradicts his method and rule of punishing.
 “ But suppose the magistrate’s office to be what is here assigned, his
 “ aim must be the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*, or of those actions which
 “ malignantly affect society ; and then nothing can be more rea-
 “ sonable than this proceeding ; for then his end must be the good
 “ of the *whole*, not of *particulars*, but as they come within that
 “ view. But the good of the whole being to be procured only by
 “ the *prevention* of crimes, and those to which there is the greatest
 “ propensity being of the most difficult prevention, the full severity
 “ of his laws must of necessity be turned against these *.”

But, his lordship goes on to inform us, What those *means* are which princes and magistrates employ to procure this *mediate end* of civil society, the *salvation of souls* ; and they are, he says, COERCIVE force.—*For this purpose, the balance and the sword are put into their hands, that they may measure out punishment to every one who injures the community or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the surest way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward disposition to the practice of virtue.*

Who would have expected that it should come to this at last,
 That a vigorous and exact distribution of rewards and punishments

* Alliance, p. 38, 39.

under the MAGISTRATE'S PROVIDENCE (which indeed is the only one his lordship thinks worth a rush) should be so far from *taking away merit and making virtue servile*, that it is the *surest way of creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue*! i. e. the surest way of making virtue *free and meritorious*. When in the case of an *extraordinary Providence* he had affirmed, that "an immediate" and visible interposition of Providence, in behalf of the righteous "and for the punishment of the wicked, would interfere with the freedom of moral agents, and not leave room for their trial, &c. *." There is something marvelously perverse in his lordship's reasoning. The exact distribution of rewards and punishments by heaven, makes virtue worthless and servile, though the administration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way if any, of *creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. While, on the other hand (if the reader will go on to give him credit), the exact distribution of rewards and punishments by the civil magistrate makes virtue free and meritorious, though the magistrate's administration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any thing can do it) to make virtue worthless and *servile*.

But to come to the point, which these observations naturally lead to. The very means his lordship assigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely *coercive force for salvation of souls*, entirely subverts his principle, and shews that salvation of souls could be no end of civil society, since the *means* are in no wise calculated to promote the *end*; it not being action simply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now on these motives (which resolve themselves into what we call conscience) force, or coercion, has no influence. Force may make hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of religion can make men lovers of virtue.

* Vol. II. p. 258, 259. and vol. V. p. 428.

In a word, if it be by such kind of reasoning as this, that the *whole edifice of ecclesiastical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground* (to use his lordship's big language) church power was never worth the rearing.

To proceed. His lordship, with much gravity, tells us next, that "A clergy might co-operate with the civil magistrate very usefully, no doubt, by exhortations, reproofs, and example.—This they might do as assistants to the civil magistrate, in concert with' him, and in subordination to him. *To what purpose therefore do they claim and affect independency on him?* Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to *punish intentions?* The very pretence is impertinent. Would they erect it to *punish where no injury is offered, nor wrong done?* The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of casuists. Would they erect such a tribunal *to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Such a one is erected in some countries, under the name of the inquisition, and is justly detested in all. To what end and purpose then can SPIRITUAL COURTS and COERCIVE POWERS, ATTRIBUTED TO THE CLERGY, serve, unless it be to make them judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned *?"

His lordship, it must be remembered, is here reasoning with the author of the *Alliance*, against his notions of the rights of a clergy in an established church. And the noble person's first misrepresentation, we see, is, that amongst these rights, the claim of INDEPENDENCY on the state, during their establishment, is one; and that the coercive power exercised by them, under the alliance, is exercised as *inherent* in their order. *To what purpose* (says his lordship) *do they* [the Clergy] *CLAIM AND AFFECT independency on him,*

* Vol. IV. p. 415, 416.

the civil magistrate? And again, *To what end and purpose can spiritual courts, and coercive powers, ATTRIBUTED to the clergy, serve?* And, as if this were not plain enough, in the very next page, addressing himself to POPE, he says, "Amongst all the fallacies " which have been employed by churchmen, one of the most absurd has been advanced, though not INVENTED *, by a paradoxical acquaintance of yours," (meaning the author of the *Alliance*) "and it is to maintain the INDEPENDENCY of the church, " and to suppose, AT THE SAME TIME, a sort of original contract " between the church and state, the terms of which, every whimsical writer, EVEN THIS SCRIBLER, adjusts as he pleases †."

The Reader shall now hear what the author of the *Alliance* holds on these two points, and from his own mouth. First, as to the *independency*.—"Let us see next (says he) what the STATE gains " by it [the *Alliance*.] These [advantages] in a word may be comprized in ITS SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIASTICAL. " THE CHURCH RESIGNING UP HER INDEPENDENCY, and making " the magistrate her SUPREME HEAD, without whose approbation " and allowance, she can administer, transact, or decree nothing ‡."

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. "The third and last PRIVILEGE " THE CHURCH GAINS by this alliance, is the being INTRUSTED " WITH A JURISDICTION, INFORCED BY COACTIVE POWER §."

His lordship assures us, the author of the *Alliance* holds, that the *independency* of the church is *retained* under an establishment: the

* It was invented, it seems, by one Dr. Senior; of whose preaching about Moses and Aaron, he tells a curious tale, on the authority of his friend LEWIS; and from thence, he says, "Warburton POSSIBLY took his HINT, and turned it to serve his purpose, to "banter mankind if he could, &c." Vol. IV. p. 515. Warburton must have been very quick at taking a *hint*, since he tells us the sermon was preached before Charles II. at Newmarket, and conveyed to his lordship only by tradition. But he, who can falsify a book which is in every body's hands, deserves little credit for what he says of a sermon preached, as he tells us, *in the days of passive obedience*, and now existing only in the memory of old Mr. LEWIS.

† Vol. IV. p. 417.

‡ Alliance, p. 130.

§ Ib. p. 123.

author himself says, that it is *given up*. His lordship assures us, the author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the church; the author himself says, that *coercive power is a grant of the state*, during the alliance. Who now is the SCRIBLER?

And here the Reader may observe, how greatly his lordship has improved upon his MASTERS, the authors of the *Rights of the Christian Church*, and of the *Independent Whig*. They had ventured indeed to charge both these doctrines on the body of the English clergy: But as one can never be sure what an indiscreet or corrupt member of so large a body may have said, the confutation of their calumny was not so easy. His lordship is more bold; he charges these opinions on a particular member of the established church, by name: but then he is more fair; he puts it in the power of the person injured to do himself justice; for it so happens, that this person not only denies the independency of the church under an establishment, and all claim to *inherent* coercive power whatsoever, but has laid down principles to discredit, and rules to prevent the return of, those usurpations. The author of the *Alliance* had vindicated the *English Clergy* * from the calumnious prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON; and without doubt it was not for want of good-will, that none of them have lent a charitable hand to vindicate *him* from the same calumnies, when revived by this noble lord.

As, therefore, no independency in alliance is either claimed or affected, and no *inherent* coercive power is attributed to the clergy; we will suppose his lordship's simple question to be, "For what end is that tribunal, called a *spiritual court*, erected?" And had he been so candid to let the Author of the *Alliance*, to whom he directs his question, speak for himself, he had not waited for an answer. For the author tells us, in the most conspicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* †. But, as if the author of the *Alliance* had entirely left us to ourselves to conjecture how he intended to employ this

* Alliance, p. 62, et seq.

† Ib. p. 123.

spiritual tribunal, his lordship falls a guessing: and there is no kind of absurdity, he does not propose, as favoured by his adversary, though they be such as his adversary had formally exploded.

To what purpose, says his lordship, *do the clergy claim and affect INDEPENDENCY on the magistrate?* Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. *Would they erect a tribunal to PUNISH INTENTIONS?* *The very pretence is impertinent.*

Before I come to his lordship's *conjecture*, give me leave to say one word of his skill in *induction*. This *tribunal*, or this coercive power, which his lordship makes to follow *independency*, is so far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the church till it has given up its *independency*. The author of the *Alliance* assigns a plain reason. "The state (says he) having, by
" this alliance, bestowed upon the clergy a jurisdiction with coac-
" tive power, such privilege would create an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO
" had not the *civil magistrate*, in return, the *supremacy of the church*
" *conferred upon him* *."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, says he, *to punish intentions?* The author of the *Alliance* says, no; it is for *reformation of manners only*. But we shall not understand half his lordship's drift, unless we consider these questions as proposed to insinuate, that the author of the *Alliance* held the absurdities contained in them. So here, for instance, we are to understand, that the author held that this tribunal was to *punish intentions*. However, I will acquit his lordship of malice; it seems to be a simple blunder. The author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a TRIBUNAL *regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and by ill luck, the noble person mistook this tribunal for a SPIRITUAL COURT. The author's words are these—
" The effectual correction of such evils [as arise from the *intempe-*
" *rance of the sensual appetites*] must be begun by moderating and
" subduing the passions themselves. But this, civil laws are not
" understood to prescribe, as punishing those passions only when

* Alliance, p. 131.

" they

“ they proceed to act ; and not rewarding the attempts to subdue them. *It must be a TRIBUNAL regarding irregular Intentions as criminal which can do this ; and that is no other than the TRIBUNAL OF RELIGION.* When this is done, a coactive power of the civil kind may have a good effect, but not till then. And who so proper to apply this coactive power, in such cases, as that society, which fitted and prepared the subject, for its due reception and application * ?” This *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*, the author calls the TRIBUNAL OF RELIGION (*forum conscientiae*), and distinguishes it from that other tribunal, which is invested with *coactive power of the civil kind*, called SPIRITUAL COURTS : he makes the first a preparative to the other. Yet, strange to believe ! his lordship mistook this *tribunal of religion*, so described and distinguished, for a *spiritual court* ; and upbraids the author of the *Alliance* for supporting a *tribunal with coercive powers, to PUNISH INTENTIONS.* But we shall see more of his lordship’s wonderful Acumen as we go along.

His second charge against the principles of the *alliance* is in these words—*Would they erect this tribunal to punish, where NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE ? The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of CRIMES are determinate and fixed. The magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of SINS are more confused and vague ; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of casuists.*

To punish where, no injury is offered, nor wrong done, is his lordship’s periphrasis for the *punishment of vague lust*, which the author of the *Alliance* makes one branch of the reformation of manners, and consequently an object of spiritual courts. But his lordship’s own opinion of the *quality* of vague lust, intimated in this periphrasis, is but a second consideration. His principal purpose in giving it, was to expose the tyranny of spiritual courts, in punishing where *no injury is offered.* For a lord to forget his BIBLE is a

* Alliance, p. 81.

small discredit; but to forget his HORACE is a disgrace indeed. Now this honest Pagan reckoned the prohibition of *vague lust*, as one of the chief objects of *civil laws*.

“ Fuit hæc sapientia quondam

“ Publica privatis secernere, *sacra profanis* ;

“ CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO ; dare jura maritis.”

All this is so very extraordinary, that the Reader will not readily believe his lordship could design the *punishment of vague lust*, by the words—*punishing where no injury is offered nor wrong done* ; nor would I neither, did he not so clearly explain himself, in his curious distinction between CRIMES and SINS : which, because it was occasioned by, and alludes to, a passage in the *Alliance*, it may not be amiss previously to transcribe that passage : “ If we cast our eye “ on any digest of laws, we find that evil actions have their annexed punishment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right : nor as “ they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their deviation from the “ extraordinary revealed will of God ; which two things indeed “ coincide ; but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to their “ malignant influence on civil society *.” I said this, to shew that the civil magistrate does not concern himself with religion, AS SUCH. His lordship borrows the same distinction between *Crimes* and *Sins*, to shew, that it is arbitrary and unjust to punish *sins*, as *spiritual courts* undertake to do : for, says he, *the ideas of CRIMES are determinate and fixed : The ideas of SINS are more confused and vague.* From this, it appears, that his lordship mistook *vices, sins, and crimes*, for different actions ; whereas they are the same actions under different considerations : either as they respect *natural light, revealed religion, or civil laws* ; and so have different names given to them. The *ideas* therefore of these three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally *determinate and fixed*, or all equally *confused and vague*. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his

* Alliance, p. 38, 39.

lordship to object to the *confused and vague ideas of sins*, since this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Gospel, which, in a hundred places of his *ESSAYS*, his lordship tells us, coincides with the eternal *rule of right*; a rule acknowledged by him to be the most determinate and fixed of all things.

But he says, *the MAGISTRATE cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the CASUIST may, the idea of sins*. That is, the magistrate cannot give the name of crimes to innocent actions. What should hinder him? He had two advantages above the casuist: First, *coercive power*: Secondly, the *vague and confused* measure to which *crimes* refer; namely, to the influence of actions on society. Matter of fact confirms this observation. Look round the world; enquire through ancient and modern times, and you shall find that the *magistrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuse in ranging actions under the idea of *crimes*, than the *casuist*, in ranging actions under the idea of *sins*. This was not improper to be observed in answer to his lordship's *EXPERIENCE*, which ushers in his old sophism, ready at every turn to help him out, the *abuse* of the thing, for the thing itself—*We know*, says he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of sins vary in the minds, or at least in the WRITINGS of casuists*. By which it would seem, the noble author has as little acquaintance with *casuists*, as with any other sort of learned men, whose characters he has treated so *LORDLY*. For corrupt casuistry does not so much consist in *varying the ideas of sins* (concerning which they are generally agreed) as in contriving to evade the punishment denounced against them.

His last conjecture about the use of an ecclesiastical tribunal, on the principles of the *alliance*, is, that it is erected for the punishment of opinions. *Would they erect*, says he, *such a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, says the author of the *ALLIANCE*, in as plain terms as he can speak;—*NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION* *: And he not only says it, but proves it too †.—*To what end and purpose then,*

* Alliance, p: 124.

† lb. p. 124, 125.

says his lordship, can *spiritual courts and coercive powers serve, unless it be to make the clergy judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned?—To what end?* The author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But such an answer did not serve his lordship's turn. He will make the author say as he would have him; or injoin him silence, and answer for him, himself. He insinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the clergy is concerned, and where they become judges in their own cause. Hear then what the author of the *Alliance* says upon this head likewise: "CIVIL MATTERS (in which, sure, matters of property are eminently contained) which temporal courts may conveniently inspect, can never belong to an ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It hath been shewn, that this court was erected as a succedaneum to the civil, to take cognizance of such actions as the civil could not reach, or could not remedy: which shew, the state could never intend to put those things under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction that fall most conveniently under its own. Besides, for ecclesiastical courts to engross matters that belong to the civil jurisdiction, as it can possibly have no good use, may very possibly be attended with this evil, of inviting and encouraging the church to aim at more power than is consistent, either with her own good, or the good of the state. The great Founder of our religion said, *Who made me a judge or divider between you?* And what he would not assume to himself, he would hardly bestow upon his church: and that the state should ever intend to give her what was the peculiar right of temporal courts, is as difficult to suppose. We must conclude then, that such practice, wherever it is found, was derived not from the reasonable laws of this *alliance*, but from the authority of old papal usurpations*." Thus far the author of the *Alliance*; where the reader may find a great deal more to the same purpose.

* *Alliance*, p. 126.

But

But his lordship goes on with his confutation.—“ By admitting
 “ the independency of the church on the state, the state acknow-
 “ ledges an original independency in the church, derived from a
 “ greater authority than her own : and the supposed terms of *union*
 “ may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious society
 “ to the civil. for the sake of order and peace, than grants of the
 “ civil to the religious society. Thus religion and the church are
 “ set on the same foot : no human authority can alter one, but
 “ must receive it in *the terms* in which it has been revealed ; and so
 “ may a good casuist prove on this hypothesis, that no human
 “ authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the
 “ other. Thus the state becomes no better than a coordinate, but
 “ inferior power *.” I once met with a philosopher of deep
 thought, who professed the same reverence for artificial nonsense,
 that the Turks pay to natural folly. His system on this point was
 very singular. He supposed that, as in the *material* world there
 was an universal, though very subtle fire, diffused in secret through
 all bodies ; which, by a late contrivance, might be allured or drawn
 out from the most inactive and lumpish matter ; so, in the *intellec-*
tual, that there was a certain witty spirit, which lay dormant in
 the most inexplicable nonsense, and only wanted the application of
 some engine of analogous invention to rouse it, and set it free. Till
 such a one be discovered, we must search in the dark for his lord-
 ship’s meaning.

By admitting the independency of the church on the state (says he)
the state acknowledges an original independency in the church derived
from a greater authority than her own. If, by *church*, he means the
 Christian church in general, it is confessed, that its independency
 is derived from a higher authority than what the state claims for any
 of its rights. The church holding of God immediately, and in
 an extraordinary manner ; the state, only mediately, and in a com-
 mon way. But what are the consequences his lordship would de-

* Vol. IV. p. 417.

duce from thence? The first is, that *then the supposed terms of union may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious society to the civil, for the sake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious society.* The *supposed terms* are terms of alliance between two independent societies. These terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than **MUTUAL concessions** and **MUTUAL grants**. What then does he mean, by their being *construed to be rather concessions of the religious society than grants of the civil?* By the *supposition* on which his lordship condescends to reason, When the church in alliance gives up its *original independency*, it is without doubt a **CONCESSION**; because it is giving up a right: And when the state in alliance, confers a *coercive power* on the church, this is certainly a **GRANT**; because an original independent religious society can have no inherent coercive power. However some meaning, it is likely, his lordship had: and perhaps it may be this, "That if the church have an original independency, no such *alliance* as is supposed could be made: for that the terms, on the side of the church, would not be conditional, but voluntary concessions, the state having nothing to give in return." This would be talking sense at least, though not truth. But, first to *suppose* the fact, that the terms of this union are mutual grants and mutual concessions; and then to deny mutual grants and mutual concessions, is giving such a form to his argument as will need a *first logic* to turn into sense, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *first philosophy* (as he calls these lucubrations) to turn into truth. Thus much however you may see; some cloudy conception his lordship plainly had, that a society of *divine* original could never enter into alliance with another, only of *human*. When the sons of God came down amongst the daughters of men, we are told they begot **GIANTS**. His lordship betrays his apprehensions, that this coalition between the civil and religious societies would produce an issue altogether as monstrous, a kind of **STATE LEVIATHAN**. Indeed, he charges the author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a pander or procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his

his apprehensions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a philosopher and a statesman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath shewn from the nature of things, that religion composes an independent society : the GOSPEL, by divine institution, hath declared the Christian religion to be an independent society. His LORDSHIP hath shewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent society of the civil kind : and the LAW, by divine institution, hath declared the Jewish republic to be an independent civil society, Now I would ask his lordship this question ; If nothing hindered this *civil society of divine original* from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reasons, excepted by name ; what should hinder this *religious society of divine original* from entering into alliance with the state ?

Another consequence his lordship draws from an original independency in the church is, that RELIGION *and the CHURCH are set on the same foot*. That is, if I understand him right, for he might have expressed himself better, the DISCIPLINE of the church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE : the inference from which is, that *the state must receive the CHURCH on the terms in which its faith was revealed* : from whence his lordship draws another consequence, that *no human authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the church* : and, from thence another, (for his lordship's false conceptions are always attended with superfetations) that *the state becomes an inferior power, or creature to the church*. All these brave consequences, we see, arise out of this principle, " that, in a " church of divine original, the *discipline* is as unalterable as the " *doctrine*." And of the truth of this principle his lordship is so confident, that he calls his adversary a *stupid fellow* for not owning it. " The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this paradox in English, " did not see how ill the parts of it hang together, nor that if eccle- " sistical government was, by divine appointment, independent of " civil, no such contract as he supposes could be made. The reli- " gious society, notwithstanding their known moderation, could " not

“ not have parted from that independency AND SUPERIORITY over
 “ the civil power, which God had given them *.”

It is true, this STUPID FELLOW did not see it. And I don't well know how he should ; since, on the other hand, he saw it to be impossible that any *such contract as he supposes* could be made, unless the church or religious society were *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which I suppose to have been made between church and state ? I tell the reader in express words, it is a *mutual compact* by FREE CONVENTION †. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleasure of the contracting parties. But parties, who have this liberty, must needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reason, such as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The religious society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency, AND SUPERIORITY, over the civil power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flourishing, we are come to the point ; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT ? This is in truth a question worth debating : and the negative, as we have seen above, was the old Puritan plea against the King's supremacy. But as his lordship rarely suffers an important proposition, which he is set either upon denying or depraving, to pass through his hands without first perplexing it *in the expression*, with an absurdity or an equivocation, I shall be obliged, before we can pass forward, to free this from the BOLINGBROKIAN embarrasss. *The religious society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the civil power which God hath given them.* Now, as the author of the *Alliance* contends only for the INDEPENDENCY of the church *before alliance*, and as his lordship's reasoning confesses that the question is only concerning *independency before alliance*, he must needs suppose by

* Vol. IV. p. 418.

† Alliance, p. 74.

adding, AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil*, that this *superiORITY* is a consequence of *independency*. And so, indeed, he speaks of it more plainly just before,—*Thus*, [i. e. from the *independency* of the church] *the state becomes no better than a co-ordinate, BUT INFERIOR, power*. Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the law of nature and nations, *superiORITY* is so far from following *independency*, that it cannot subsist with it. For why is religious society by nature *independent* (as I shew it is) but for the reason I give, that it is *essentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* * ? But there is no ground for superiority of one person or society over another, but where some *natural* relation or connexion exists between them: none such exists in this case; therefore a pretence of superiority on the one side, and of dependency on the other, is absurd. However, as I am well persuaded his lordship did not know enough of these matters even to PREVARICATE NEATLY in the point in question, I consider it as an innocent blunder, arising from the following words of the *Alliance*, shamefully, indeed, misunderstood. — “ Such then is the nature of “ Christ’s kingdom [*i. e.* the Christian church]: it is essentially “ framed to compose a firm and lasting society; it is made such by “ divine appointment; and, in order to fit it for public service, it “ is both by nature and institution declared SOVEREIGN, and inde- “ pendent of civil government, that it may adapt itself by *free* “ alliance to the various kinds of human policies †.” Now *sovereign in itself and independent of civil government*, this great writer hath paraphrased to signify, *independency and superiority over the civil*.

“ Blest, for his sake, be human reason,

“ Which came at last, though late in season ‡.

But, to proceed to the question; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT.

* Alliance, p. 54.

† Ibid. p. 147.

‡ Prior.

His lordship determines in the negative. *For if, says he, ecclesiastical government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the religious society could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, made free and independent; therefore, according to this reasoning, he could not part with his *independency*, and become subject to civil laws. Hold, says his lordship, man was made free, that he might be subject to no laws but those to which he had given his consent; and as he needed protection from laws, he had a right to part with his independency if he could get protection upon no other terms. And is not this the very case of the religious society in question, which is only an artificial man, by nature and institution free, and standing in need of protection?

But his lordship's assertion, you will find, bottoms at last upon this principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL ITS LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES: an error which *bigots* and *fanatics* indeed are equally fond of indulging; and hath been indulged by them to the infinite disservice both of civil and of religious society: but that a *philosopher* and a *statesman* should know so little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly astonishing. The first elements of his profession might have taught him, "That the *authority* by which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in the *essence* of the thing." Natural and positive duties retain their respective natures in the code of religion. Natural duties are eternal; positive duties are revocable. Of these latter, some are lasting as the dispensation to which they belong; others only temporary. Of the temporary, some cease not till they are expressly revoked; others cease with the occasion that enjoined them. These last are again to be distinguished into *privileges* and *duties*; privileges may be receded from at pleasure; but duties must either be revoked, or the occasion must be plainly seen to cease. Now the INDEPENDENCY in question is one of those qualities in the divine law which ceases with the occasion; and is, besides, a *privilege*, which may

may be receded from, at pleasure. Again, in the divine laws, some things are enjoined to be believed as truths; others to be practised as utilities. Of utilities some are general; others particular: the first of these are permanent and constant; the second variable. Of the first, is the church's composing a *society*: of the second, is its *peculiar mode*. Thus Jesus seemed to institute, for the then occasion, an equal ministry; the apostles, episcopal government; and modern churches have chosen one or the other, as best suited the various forms of civil regimen, with which they had *allied* themselves.

As christianity was, by divine institution, a *society at large*, to authorize and to enable the several churches to give particular forms to ecclesiastical government; so the *independency* was bestowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free alliance with the state. When God himself allied the Jewish church with the state, he did not leave that religion a *society at large*; neither did he ordain it *independent*: he prescribed, in the minutest manner, the form of church government; and made it dependent on the state. But the book of the *Alliance* tells this story better. “The Christian religion
 “ was not only left *independent* of the state by not being united
 “ to it like the Jewish (and being so left it must needs by the
 “ law of nature be independent); but its independency was likewise
 “ secured by divine appointment, in that famous declaration of its
 “ founder, *my kingdom is not of this world*; which bears this plain
 “ and obvious sense, *that the kingdom of Christ, to be extended over*
 “ *all mankind, was not like the kingdom of God, confined to the Jewish*
 “ *people, where religion was incorporated with the state; and there-*
 “ *fore, of this world, as well in the exercise of it, as in the rewards*
 “ *and punishments by which it was administered: but was indepen-*
 “ *dent of all civil communities; and therefore, neither of this world,*
 “ *as to the exercise of it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by*
 “ *which it was administered.*—But whoever imagines that, from
 “ this *independency by institution*, the church cannot convene and
 “ unite with the state, concludes much too fast. We have ob-

“ served, that this property in the *Kingdom of Christ* was given as
 “ a mark to distinguish it from the *Kingdom of God*, that is, it
 “ was given to shew that this religion extended to all mankind ;
 “ and was not, like the Mosaic, confined to one only people. Con-
 “ sequently, that very reason which made it proper for the Mosaic
 “ religion to be united by divine appointment to the state, made
 “ it fit, the Christian should be left free and independent. But
 “ for what end, if not for this, to be at liberty to adapt itself to
 “ the many various kinds of civil policies, by a suitable union and
 “ alliance?—An alliance then we must conclude the Christian
 “ church was at liberty to make, notwithstanding this declared
 “ nature of *Christ's Kingdom*. So far is indeed true, that it is
 “ debarred from entering into any such *alliance* with the state as
 “ may admit any LEGISLATOR in Christ's kingdom but himself
 “ [that is, a power in the magistrate to alter DOCTRINES.] But
 “ no such power is granted or usurped by the *supremacy* of the
 “ state * :” [which extends only to DISCIPLINE.]

From all this it appears, that the *unalterable* part of the law of Christ is the DOCTRINE : and the only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE : but it is the latter, with which society, as such, is chiefly concerned, when it enters into *alliance* with the church. Therefore, when his lordship says, *Religion and the church being set on the same foot, no human authority can alter one, but must receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed* ; if he means, there can be no alteration in *discipline*, I have shewn he is mistaken : if he means, there can be no alteration in *doctrine*, he is certainly right ; and I must then consider his lordship's observation as a complaint that, by the constitution of the Christian church, the magistrate cannot tyrannize over conscience.

In the mean time, we see to what little purpose this great philosopher and statesman had read his HOOKER ; of whom he confesses something is to be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have shewn

* Alliance, p. 146, 147, &c.

him, that divine authority does not reduce all its laws to one and the same species——“Positive laws (says this truly great man) are either permanent or else changeable, according as the matter itself is, concerning which they were first made. Whether God or MAN be the maker of them, ALTERATION they so far forth admit, as the MATTER doth exact. Wherefore, to end with a general rule concerning all the laws which God hath tied men unto: those laws divine, that belong, whether naturally or supernaturally, either to men as men, or to men as they live in politique society, or to men as they are of that politique society which is the church, without any further respect had unto any such variable accident as the state of men, and of societies of men, and of the church itself in this world, is subject unto; all laws that so belong unto men, they belong for ever, yea although they be positive laws, unless, being positive, God himself, which made them, alter them. The reason is, because the subject or matter of laws in general is thus far forth constant: which matter is, that for the ordering whereof laws were instituted, and being instituted are not changeable without cause, neither can they have cause of change, when that which gave them their first institution remaineth for ever one and the same. *On the other side, laws that were made for men, or societies, or churches, in regard of their being such as do not always continue, but may perhaps be clean otherwise a-while after, and so may be required to be otherwise ordered than before; the laws of God himself which are of this nature, NO MAN ENDOWED WITH COMMON SENSE will ever deny to be of a different constitution from the former, in respect of the one's constancy, and the mutability of the other.**”

So much for this country parson. And how poorly does his lordship figure before him with his assertion, that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the church, equally unalterable?* Yet this noble haranguer, thus ignorant of the very first elements of

* Eccl. Pol. 1. i. sect. 15.

law, can dictate with the authority of an oracle, and be received with the reverence due to one, concerning *civil liberty, church usurpations, a patriot king, and the balance of power*. But master Hooker will tell you how easily all this may be done by any one, without knowing more than their neighbours.

——“ Thus far therefore (says he) we have endeavoured in
 “ part to open, of what nature and force laws are, according unto
 “ their several kinds : the law which God himself had eternally
 “ set down to follow in his own works ; the law which he hath
 “ made for his creatures to keep ; the law of natural and necessary
 “ agents ; the law which angels in Heaven obey ; the law where-
 “ unto, by the light of reason, men find themselves bound, in that
 “ they are men ; the law which they made by composition for
 “ multitudes and politique societies of men to be guided by ; the
 “ law which belongeth unto each nation ; the law that concerneth
 “ the fellowship of all ; and lastly the law which God himself hath
 “ supernaturally revealed. *It might peradventure have been more PO-*
 “ *PULAR AND MORE PLAUSIBLE TO VULGAR EARS if this discourse*
 “ *had been spent in EXTOLLING THE FORCE OF LAWS, in shewing*
 “ *the GREAT NECESSITY OF THEM, when they are GOOD, and in*
 “ *AGGRAVATING THEIR OFFENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS ARE*
 “ *INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. But forasmuch as with such kind of*
 “ *matter THE PASSIONS OF MEN are rather stirred one way or other,*
 “ *than THEIR KNOWLEDGE any way set forward* unto the trial of
 “ that whereof there is doubt made, I have therefore turned aside
 “ from that BEATEN PATH, and chosen, though a LESS EASY, yet
 “ a more profitable way, in regard of the end we propose *.”

Great names, however, are still of good use to his lordship : for though he cannot profit by their lights, he can shine at their expence : and, having well chicaned their expressions, can afterwards convert the truths contained in them to his own use. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind. HOOKER and

* Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.

LOCKE have been supposed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil government. Alas ; *nil sine theſeo*. There is nothing ſo well done, which his lordſhip cannot mend. He reproves both of them, with much ſolemnity, for *repreſenting mankind to themſelves, like a number of ſavage individuals out of ſociety, in their natural ſtate, inſtead of conſidering them as members of families from their birth*. “ This “ (he ſays) has made them reaſon INCONSISTENTLY, and on a “ FALSE FOUNDATION. *Inconſiſtently*, becauſe they ſometimes ac- “ knowledge paternal government to have preceded civil, and yet “ reaſon about the inſtitution of civil, as if men had then firſt aſſem- “ bled in any kind of ſociety, or had been ſubject to any kind of “ rule ; for to ſay that the law of nature was of itſelf ſuch a rule, “ and that every one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth “ did or might exerciſe juſtice for himſelf, and others on thoſe “ who violated the law, was language unworthy of Mr. LOCKE, “ and unneceſſary to his ſyſtem.—*Faſtely*, becauſe it is eaſy to “ demonſtrate that mankind never was in ſuch a ſtate *.”

To ſay the truth, *eaſy* enough, and like *demonſtrating* day-light. A man need only open his eyes to ſee that a mother does not abandon her infant as ſoon as ſhe has dropt it, nor the father immediately renounce the care of it and her. Is it poſſible then that HOOKER, LOCKE, and their followers, ſhould want to be told by his lordſhip ſo obvious a truth, that, before civil ſociety, mankind did not ſtart up like muſhrooms, a number of ſavage individuals at once, but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then, you aſk, did not HOOKER and LOCKE ſo conſider them, when they were deducing the origin of CIVIL SOCIETY ? For very important reaſons ; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

Fiſt, becauſe the real origin of civil ſociety being equally ſhewn on either ſuppoſition, the truths which followed from it were

* Vol. V. p. 125, 126.

clearer seen, as they were less embarrassed, by considering mankind before civil society, as individuals.

But this was not all. Had they considered men before civil society as ranked under tribes, the *rights* belonging to the heads of families, thus brought into view, though neither relative to, nor connected with, those of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that absurd system, which derives *political* rule from *patriarchal*; a system which, both for its absurdities and mischiefs, it was the purpose of LOCKE and HOOKER to expose and discredit. The former therefore did judiciously, to assert, as he might do it truly, (for the *exercise of justice* no more belonging to fathers of families, as such, than the *exercise of regal prerogative*) that, before the institution of civil society, *every one of these independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exercise justice for himself and others, on those who violated the law.* Yet this, his lordship calls language unworthy of his master. Nay, so great a stranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the representation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we see it was done to keep the unwary from the sight of circumstances of no use to assist their judgment, and easily abused by designing men, to mislead them*.

—But to proceed with our subjects. His lordship goes on against the book of the *Alliance* in this manner. “This imaginary contract, in short, whether well or ill made, never existed at any time, nor in any country; though, to have been real, and really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries where Christianity was propagated. Political societies make and alter and break their *alliances*, as the varying reason of state suggests. Different orders of civil government in the same society change, and with them the whole constitution of such governments, as reason or passion, the interests or the dispositions of men determine them. *But a religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* And therefore if a religious society with

* See Alliance, p. 47; and Note (E) p. 67.

“certain

“ certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to
 “ preserve it so, the *order and constitution* of such a society must be
 “ *invariable* too. The CHURCH must be established by the same
 “ divine authority as the RELIGION, and be by consequence inde-
 “ pendent of the state. But nothing of this kind has been. Christ’s
 “ *kingdom was not of this world*. He sent out his apostles to teach,
 “ and to baptize; and the utmost power he gave them, besides that
 “ of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off
 “ the dust of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of those
 “ who refused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The
 “ apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in
 “ the same office, the office of teaching and baptizing. The
 “ apostles could give no more power than they received; and no
 “ argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing that passed, or
 “ from any thing that these men did for the maintenance of their
 “ sect, while Christianity was a sect *.”

This imaginary contract (he says) *never existed at any time or in any country*. If he means, a *contract* actually and formally executed, I have answered that already, and shewn, that the objection holds equally against *the original contract between king and people*; which I suppose his lordship will allow not to be so *imaginary* but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the conditions ascribed to it. But you shall hear the book of the *Alliance* on this matter.

“ † When I say that *all* regular policied states had *an established religion*, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing civil society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produces, affirm that all nations had a *civil policy*. For as this writer could not be supposed to mean that every one constituted a free state, on the principles of public liberty, which yet was the only society he purposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good; because it is notorious, that

* Vol. IV. p. 419, 420.

† Alliance, p. 88—90.

“ the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different
 “ principles, or abused to different ends : so neither would I be un-
 “ derstood to mean, when I say all nations concurred in making
 “ this *union*, that they all exactly discriminated the natures, and
 “ fairly adjusted the rights of both societies, on the principles here
 “ laid down ; though an *establishment* resulting from this discrimi-
 “ nation and adjustment be the only one I would be supposed to
 “ recommend. On the contrary, I know this union has been gene-
 “ rally made on mistaken principles ; or, if not so, hath degene-
 “ rated in length of time ; by which means the national religion in
 “ the Pagan world hath been most commonly a slave to the state ;
 “ and in the Christian system, the state sometimes a slave to the
 “ established church. And as it was sufficient for that writer’s pur-
 “ pose, that those societies, whether good or bad, proved the sense
 “ all men had of the benefits resulting from civil policy in general,
 “ though they were oft mistaken in the application ; so it is for
 “ ours, that this universal concurrence in the two societies to *unite*,
 “ shews the sense mankind had of the usefulness of such an *union*.
 “ And lastly, as that writer’s principles are not the less true on ac-
 “ count of the general deviation from them in forming civil socie-
 “ ties ; so may not the plain ones of *alliance* here delivered ; though
 “ so few states have suffered themselves to be directed by them in
 “ practice ; nor any man before delivered them in speculation ;
 “ especially if, as in that case, so in this, we can derive such *mif-*
 “ *take* and *degeneracy* from their causes. It would draw me too far
 “ out of my way to explain distinctly the causes of the *mistake* ; and
 “ the intelligent reader, who carefully attends to the whole of this
 “ discourse, will not be at a loss to discover the most considerable of
 “ them ; some of which I have already hinted at ; and others, I
 “ may possibly, in the sequel of this discourse, take occasion to men-
 “ tion. As for the *degeneracy*, we have observed, that the *Alliance*
 “ is of the nature of the FOEDERA INÆQUALIA : now, the common
 “ issue of such, *Grotius* acquaints us with, in these words : *Interim*
 “ *verum*

“ *verum est accidere plerumque, ut qui superior est in fœdere, si is*
 “ *POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM PRO-*
 “ *PRIE DICTUM USURPET : PRÆSERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM*
 “ *SIT **.”

But if, by, *never existed*, his lordship means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either society, which naturally follow such an *alliance*, were never actually exercised and enjoyed by the two societies, his assertion is false. They are at this present actually exercised and enjoyed by the two societies, in ENGLAND, under our happy constitution of church and state. And it was a principal purpose of the book of the *Alliance* to shew they are so, in order to realize the theory. Here again it may not be improper to give the Reader the words of the *Alliance* : “ We see how unreasonable
 “ and even how impolitic our adversaries are, when, in their ill
 “ humour with *establishments*, they chuse to pick a quarrel with
 “ their own ; where the national religion is on a footing exactly
 “ agreeable to the nature of a *free convention between church and state*,
 “ on the principles of the laws of nature and nations. A felicity,
 “ they should have known, that scarce any other people on the
 “ face of the earth can boast of. In *England* alone the original
 “ terms of this *convention* are kept up to, so exactly, that this ac-
 “ count of the *alliance between church and state* seems rather a copy
 “ of the church and state of *England*, than a theory, as indeed it
 “ was, formed solely on the contemplation of nature, and the un-
 “ variable reason of things †.”

To make this contract (says his lordship) *real, and to be really au-*
thorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries
where Christianity was professed. In plain terms, RIGHT waits to
 receive its nature from man's acceptance of it : or, in still plainer,
Right becomes WRONG when rejected by him. How would this
 political aphorism of his lordship's sound when applied to the ORI-

* De jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. I. cap. iii. § 27.

† Alliance, p. 140, 141.

GINAL CONTRACT between prince and people ?—*to make it real and to be really authorised, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.*

But *political societies* (he says) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reason of state suggests.* If he would be here meant to speak of such which make these alterations *justly*, the same may be said of the *alliance between church and state.* I have shewn that, in this respect, the alliances of political societies with one another, and the alliance of the political with the religious, stand just upon the same footing. “ If there be more religious
“ societies than one at the time of convention, the state allies itself
“ with the largest of those religious societies. It is *fit* the state
“ should do so, because the larger the religious society is, where
“ there is an equality in other points, the better enabled it will be
“ to answer the ends of the alliance. It is *scarce possible* it should
“ be otherwise, because the two societies being composed of the
“ same individuals, the greatly prevailing religion must have a ma-
“ jority of its members in the assemblies of state, who will natu-
“ rally prefer their own religion to any other. Hence we see the
“ reason why the *episcopal* is the established church in *England*;
“ and the *presbyterian* the established church in *Scotland.* Hence
“ too we see the reason of what was before observed, concerning
“ the duration of this alliance; that it is *perpetual*, but not *irrevo-*
“ *cable*: i. e. It subsists just so long as the church thereby estab-
“ lished maintains its superiority of extent; which when it loses to
“ any considerable degree, the alliance becomes void. For the
“ united church being then no longer able to perform its part of
“ the convention which is formed on reciprocal conditions, the
“ state becomes disengaged; and a *new alliance* is of course con-
“ tracted with the now prevailing church, for the reasons which
“ made the *old.* Thus formerly, the alliance between the *pagan*
“ *church* and the empire of Rome was dissolved; and the *Christian*
“ established in its place: and of late the alliance between the *popish*
“ *church*

“ *church* and the kingdom of England was broken ; and another
 “ made with the *Protestant*, in its stead *.”

Different orders of civil government, in the same society, change (says his lordship); *and with them the whole constitution of such governments, as reason or passion, the interests or dispositions of men determine them.*— And is it not the same in Church-government ? It is here Episcopacy ; there Presbytery ; and in another place Independency.

But, *a religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* In its DOCTRINE it is. Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewise (says his lordship), and thus I prove it. *If a religious society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it so, the order and constitution of such a society must be invariable too.* The inference is just. But what principle of the *alliance* (against which his lordship is here arguing) supposes, that *one certain set of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, is necessary to preserve a religious society in that state and condition ? This theory says, that religion composed a society before it had any of those *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives* ; and will remain a society after it has lost them. For it had none of them till it came into alliance with the state, and will hold none of them longer than that alliance continues. But, if by a strange liberty of expression his lordship means, by *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, so far forth as it is a society ; I own that this is *necessary to preserve a religious society* in the state and condition of a society : But then, give me leave to say, it does not follow from thence, that *the ORDER and CONSTITUTION of such a society must be invariable too* : Because Church-government may be administered by an Episcopacy, a Presbytery, or an Independency. The specific form of Church-government amongst the Jews was prescribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, because *Moses* united the religion to the state, under the collective name of LAW : The specific form of Church-government amongst Christians was

* Alliance, p. 204.

not prescribed, and therefore none seems intended to be invariably followed, because *Jesus* did not unite his religion to the state, but left it to particular churches to follow such as were most agreeable to the forms of those civil societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that *Jesus* instituted his religion, a *society*, by directing the members of it to *bear the church*, and by appointing officers, as its organs, to convey its decisions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the book of the *Alliance*, which, speaking of the *Jewish* and *Christian* churches, says, "This, Both had in common, to be political societies by
 "divine appointment; but different in this, that God, for *wise*
 "ends, minutely prescribed the whole mode of *Jewish* policy: and
 "CHRIST, on the contrary, with the same divine wisdom, only
 "constituted his church a politic society at large, and left the
 "mode of it to human discretion *."

Those ends, the book explains, in another place. "The *Jewish*
 "religion was, like the true *natural* (which it ratified), essentially
 "fitted to compose a society; and, like the *Christian* (of which it
 "was the first rudiment), made a society by divine appointment.
 "But then unlike the Christian, in this, that it was not left inde-
 "pendent of civil government, to unite with it at its pleasure, on
 "terms agreed upon; but was for great and wise reasons at once
 "united to it, by God himself. Which also he was pleased to do,
 "not by way of *alliance* as between two bodies that were to con-
 "tinue distinct, and might be separated, but by mutual conversion
 "into one another, and perfect incorporation †."

His lordship then owns, that if *the church be established by the same divine authority as the religion* (that is, if religion be formed into a society) *it is by consequence independent of the state*. I am apt to suspect, he here grants more than he is aware of: for it follows from this concession, that if the Christian religion even composes a society by natural right, though not by divine appointment, it must

* Alliance, p. 138, 139.

† Ibid. p. 145.

be *independent* of the state : because the *independency* does not arise from the authority which formed it, but from the *nature* it possesses : and the author of the *Alliance* hath shewn * that religion composeth a society by natural right. His lordship's endeavour therefore to avoid the *consequence*, its *independency*, by affirming that *the church was not established by the same divine authority as the religion*, would be to no purpose even though he could have proved it. However let us hear how he supports his assertion.

His first argument is the declaration of *Jesus* himself, that *his kingdom was not of this world*. The question is, Whether *Christ's* religion composes a society, and a society independent ? And his lordship quotes a declaration of *Jesus* to prove it does *neither*, which, in the very terms, implies that it does *both*. For what is a *kingdom*, but a *society* ? And what is the *not being of this world*, but a declaration of *independency* ? Indeed, the author of the *Alliance* employed the *subject* of the proposition, *Christ's kingdom*, to prove it was a SOCIETY ; and the *attribute*, its not being of *this world*, to prove, that church and state are INDEPENDENT of one another. For were *Christ's* religion a *kingdom of this world*, the consequence would be, that either the state is *dependent* on the church, or the church on the state ; because, in that case, both having COERCIVE POWER (as all *kingdoms of this world* have) a mutual *independency* would make that solecism in politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO : Whereas, *Christ's kingdom not being of this world* ; and *his apostles*, as his lordship rightly observes, having *no power (besides miracles) but that of teaching, exhorting, and protesting against infidelity*, i. e. having no COERCIVE power, there remained no pretence for its *dependency* on the state.

His lordship's second argument against the *independency* of the church is, that *Jesus sent out his apostles to teach, and to baptize ; and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles, to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their feet, and to pro-*

* Book I. c. 5.

test against the infidelity of those who refused to receive them, and the gospel they published. The apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same office of teaching and baptizing. The apostles could give no more power than they had received.

1. He is to prove that the Christian religion did not compose a society by institution. And how does he set to work? With an argument which shews it to be a society by *institution*, and without *coercive* power, the very society which the author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jesus sent out his apostles—they ordained others to accompany and to succeed them.* Here a society is plainly instituted; for you find officers appointed; and these provide for a succession.—*The utmost power they had was to teach and baptize those who willingly received the gospel.* Here all *coercive* power is excluded; and that exclusion makes the society *independent*. What more may be inferred from this account (and which his lordship should have inferred) is, that though a society was instituted, yet the particular form of church-government was left to human discretion: But his lordship could find no society of Christ's appointment, where he saw no particular form of church-government minutely marked out, as in the Mosaic dispensation. Though, had he found any such, it would, when he least suspected it, have been most to his purpose: for of such, and only of such, he might have said truly, that being *given by God* [for that purpose] *it is in its nature invariable.*

2. His observation, that the *apostles could give no more power than they had received*, insinuates that the author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the church; which is a gross misrepresentation of this author; who expressly affirms that the church hath no such power, while *unallied*; and when *allied*, receives it in a very limited manner from the state; and enjoys it no longer than the *alliance* continues. But these misrepresentations are things essential to his lordship's polemics. So again, "To pretend" (says he) "that the church has a right to the former [*i. e.* wealth
" and

“ and grandeur] by *compact* or by virtue of an *alliance* with the state, “ would be to say whatever comes uppermost in a WHIMSICAL. “ HEAD *.” This is to insinuate that the author of the *Alliance* pretends that the *wealth and grandeur* of the church necessarily arises from its *alliance* with the state : But let him speak for himself, and you shall hear him saying the direct contrary—*the acquisition of honours, riches, and power, could not be a motive for alliance.* His reason is, that *it would be impertinent in a church to aim at them, because they are things a church could neither use nor profit by* †.

His lordship concludes this long paragraph in these words—*No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that passed, nor from any thing that these men [the apostles] did for the maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a sect.* His lordship here forgets, as usual, the personage he at present assumes, which is that of a believer, who supposes, the apostles acted, in all things, by the direction of their Master : consequently, *an argument of RIGHT MAY be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a sect.* It is true, if we suppose the apostles to be politicians like his lordship, or a sort of men who put in practice all kind of means to support and maintain their cause or party, no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing they did or said. But when God directs the actions and organs of his ministers in the propagation of religion, we are assured, from the knowledge we have of his attributes, that no rights of humanity or society will be violated ; and consequently that from every such action, *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his lordship meant no more in this profound observation, than that, from what the apostles did to assert and maintain the *independency* of Christ’s religion while it remained a *SECT*, *no argument of right can be drawn* to prove it must continue *independent* when it becomes *ESTABLISHED*, I perfectly agree with him : and I have but one objection to the understanding him in so rea-

* Vol. IV. p. 604.

† Alliance, p. 87.

sonable a sense, which is, that it supports the theory of the *Alliance*; a purpose, I presume, not in his lordship's view. Besides, it contradicts what he so much labours to prove, That, if the *independency* of the church was of divine institution, the church could not give it up, when it entered into alliance.

In a word, the whole of his lordship's reasoning against an *alliance between church and state* from the *nature of a church*, may be reduced to these four propositions :

1. If Christianity be not a society by divine institution, it is no society at all.
2. If Christianity be an independent society by divine institution, it could not give up its independency to the state.
3. If Christianity be a society by divine institution, a certain form of church-government must be explicitly prescribed.
4. If such a form be explicitly prescribed, then that form, and the discipline which attends it, must be as unalterable as the doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of the supposed alliance.

Now I have shewn, that every one of these four propositions is utterly devoid of all truth, reason, and common sense.

After these exploits, nothing was wanting to make his lordship's victory complete against ALLIANCES and ESTABLISHMENTS, but to discredit that first and most famous one of all, made by CONSTANTINE. " This great revolution (says his lordship) was " effected in part by circumstances I have mentioned, and by others " that favoured the growth of Christianity. The imperial autho- " rity did the rest, but did it ill; so ill, that the chief of those " political views which Constantine had in making this ESTAB- " LISHMENT were defeated by it, and the admission of a religious " society into the state, in the manner in which he admitted it, was " the cause of all the ecclesiastical and theological evils that have " followed from his time to ours, and *that are so falsely imputed to* " religion

“*religion itself* *. We may be assured, that the SOCIETY co-
 “operated with the COURT, to bring about a revolution so much
 “to their advantage; and thought themselves happy enough to be
 “*dependent*, not *independent* on the emperor; his *instruments*, not
 “his *allies*, whatever appearances he might give, or suffer them
 “to assume, in those solemn ecclesiastical farces, wherein he con-
 “descended to act, in some respects, a second part.—But while he
 “recalled to his mind, as he did most probably, the great service
 “religion was of to ancient Rome, he seemed to forget, that when
 “that religion flourished, and was of so much service to the state,
 “it was under the immediate inspection of the state. There was
 “no council but the senate to define doctrines, nor to regulate dis-
 “cipline. And men were at the head of the religious, because
 “they were at the head of the civil, administration; instead of
 “being at the head of the latter, because they were at the head
 “of the former.—He [*Constantine*] meant that this [spiritual power]
 “should be distinct from the civil; THAT THEY SHOULD BE IN-
 “DEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER, and both dependent on him †.”

That noblest part of legislation, to adjust the rights and privi-
 leges, to settle the bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, *to know*,
 as the poet expresses it,

“Both spiritual power and civil, what each means,
 “What severs each ‡”——

his lordship, we have seen, is much a stranger to. Indeed every
 new paragraph makes his ignorance but the more conspicuous, by
 his endeavouring to disguise it; for his attempts are generally made
 at the expence of a contradiction.

* And, strange to tell, by no one so much as by his lordship himself, throughout
 all his bulky posthumous works.

† Vol. IV. p. 432—445.

‡ Milton.

In the establishment of religion under CONSTANTINE, the church, he says, became dependent on the supreme civil magistrate. *They thought themselves happy enough to be dependent, not independent on the emperor; his instruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the same breath, he tells us, that this very emperor was contented to *act a second part* to these his *instruments*, or, in other words, to become *theirs*: Nay, he expressly affirms, that Christianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganism had been in the old: Now Paganism, he tells us, was the *instrument* of the supreme magistrate. Christianity then must be an *ally*, not an *instrument*, to the supreme magistrate. His lordship says, this establishment was *very ill made*: however that be, every body sees it is *very ill* represented. It was and it was not an *ally*; it was and it was not an *instrument*.—*It defeated all Constantine's political views, all the good he intended.* Were his premisses true, the consequence was likely enough to follow. We have an example before us, in his lordship's *essays* throughout, that his *contradictions* can *defeat* all the evil he *intended*; and this (let me add to the honour of his lordship's abilities) is doing something more; for malice is not so easily defeated as benevolence.

But if you ask, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's establishment, the church is one while made the *instrument*, and another, the *ally* of the civil magistrate? I will tell you. His lordship had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was, he says, in FACT, such an alliance. To countenance this assertion, CONSTANTINE's establishment must be represented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the church became the tool and instrument of the civil magistrate. But then again, he was to shew that such an alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very mischievous to the state: This turns the tables; and then CONSTANTINE must mean that the *spiritual power should be distinct from the civil, and that they should be INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER*

ANOTHER (for he all along misrepresents the theory of the *Alliance*, as making the church keep its *independency* even after the union) indeed he says—and *both dependent on himself**; but this was added only to soften the absurdity.—To such wretched shifts do his principles ever and anon reduce him: the religious and the civil society are independent of one another; yet the religious is dependent on the supreme magistrate; *i. e.* on him who represents the civil society, and is at its head.

But now let us examine the ground-work, the canvas, of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He says, *the church was happy enough to be dependent*, NOT INDEPENDENT, *on the emperor; his instruments*, NOT HIS ALLIES. This sentence is made up of a false insinuation, and a mistaken consequence. The false insinuation is, that the Author of the *Alliance* holds, the *independency* of the church on the magistrate, during an establishment. The mistaken consequence is, that if the church be *dependent*, it is the Instrument, not the Ally, of the state. But GROTIUS, as he is quoted in the book of the *Alliance*, might have set his lordship right in this matter. “This (say I) is “what GROTIUS calls *fœdus inæquale*. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic in-
“telligo quod ex ipsa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆDATIONEM quan-
“dam alteri donat: Hoc est ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium
“ac majestatem conservare, ut POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, in-
“feriori plus auxilii deferatur. *De jur. B. & P.* l. I. c. iii.
“sect. 21 †.” Hence we see, in the opinion of this great man; great by nature, great by discipline, and not *made great*, after the modern mode, in the workhouse of vanity and faction; we see, I say, that *alliance* and *dependence*, are very consistent things.

* Vol. IV. p. 445.

† Alliance, p. 75.

In ancient Rome, says his lordship, there was no council, but the senate, to DEFINE DOCTRINES, nor to REGULATE DISCIPLINE. Now in ancient Rome it so happened, there were no DOCTRINES to define *. And as to DISCIPLINE, this was regulated not by the senate, but by the colleges of the priests. When the senate imagined the necessities of state required the observance of religious rites, they sent to the priests for their directions concerning the choice and regulation of them. The senate were the masters whether they would have any celebrated; but if they had decreed for a celebration, they were tied down to the rules and directions of the sacred books, as the sense of them was represented and interpreted by the priests.

This conferred so much power on the priesthood in civil matters in the opinion of Cicero, that he does not scruple, in the person of his brother, to say,—“in quâ et reges, augures, et postea privati eodem sacerdotio præditi, rempublicam religionum auctoritate rexe-runt †.”

When the Romans had entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, “Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti consules majoribus hostiis rem divinam facerent *quibus diis ipsis videretur*, cum precatione ea: quam rem, &c.” He then tells us that the consuls made their report to the senate; and there we find the part their priests had in this matter.—“Quum pronuntiassent consules; rem divinam RITE perfectam esse, et precationem admisisse Deos ARUSPICES RESPONDERE, *lætæque exta esse* et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi.”—L. xxxi. c. 5. But the state further ordered that the consul, to make the Gods propitious, should according to old custom make a vow; and on this occasion we have a more explicit account of the share the old Pagan church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the se-

* See Div. Leg. b. ii. sect. 6.

† De Divin. l. i. c. 40.

nate, but the college of priests which regulated discipline, or, if his lordship will have it so, DEFINED DOCTRINE. “*Civitas religiosa* (says the historian) *ne quid prætermitteretur, quod aliquando factum esset; ludos Jovi, donumque vovere consulem jussit moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non posset in bellum usui esse; reponi statim debere, nec cum alia pecunia misceri. Quod nisi factum esset, votum RITE solvi non posse.* Quamquam et res, et *auctor movebat*; tamen ad COLLEGIUM PONTIFICUM *referre* consul jussus, si posset *recte* votum incertæ pecuniæ suscipi. Possit rectiusque etiam esse, PONTIFICES DECREVERUNT. Vovit in eadem verba consul, *præeunte maximo pontifice* *.” Again, by the Papirian law all consecrations of houses, lands, or altars, to RELIGION, were forbidden, without the express command of the people. But then, when the people had commanded it, the ceremony could not be performed by a tribune, or any other civil magistrate, but by one of the college of priests only. Which was just such a supremacy of the state in religious matters, as that which is exercised in England, and justified on the principles of the ALLIANCE.

On the whole, his lordship assures us, that CONSTANTINE *established the church very ill*. It would indeed appear so from his account of it; which when set against the principles of the ALLIANCE, it either much shames *Constantine’s establishment*, or at least the noble reporter of it.

1. CONSTANTINE *made the church* (his lordship says) *his instruments, not his allies*. The ALLIANCE makes the church, the ally, and not the instrument, of the civil magistrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil administration, because they were at the head of the religious*. The ALLIANCE places men at the head of the religious, because they were at the head of the civil administration.

* L. xxxi. c. 9.

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himself the title of supreme head of the church under God and Christ.* The ALLIANCE makes the supreme magistrate head of the church under God and Christ.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the church without assuming this supremacy or headship.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the church, conferred the supremacy on the civil magistrate.

His lordship's conclusion from this long and suspicious story of CONSTANTINE, is this, that he and his successors raised that spurious ritual tyranny, which was established and grown into full strength "before CHARLES THE GREAT *." And what could we expect less, when, if his lordship reports truly, every term in the *Alliance* was violated or neglected? This was just as natural as that civil tyranny should grow to a head, when the terms of the *original compact* between prince and people, had not been adverted to, or observed? In a word, the mischiefs which his lordship pretends did follow from *Constantine's establishment*, would, if true, be the best recommendation of the *theory of the Alliance*; a theory formed, as it were, and fitted to avoid and guard against them: it has in fact done so, and rendered our present constitution of church and state the most happy and prosperous of any on the face of the earth.

At last, as if on set purpose to recommend the *theory of the Alliance*, his lordship concludes his section concerning CONSTANTINE in these words: "Thus it seems to me that the great and fundamental error, from whence so many others proceeded, and which
"CONSTANTINE COMMITTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
"CHRISTIANITY, was this, *he admitted a clergy into an establishment, on the same foot, on which this order had stood, while Christianity was the religion, and these men were the heads, the directors, the governors, and magistrates of a sect, by no authority, but*

* Vol. IV. p. 446,

“ *that of the sect itself.* He admitted them vested with this authority, which might be necessary as long as Christians made a sect apart, out of the protection of the laws; and which became unnecessary and dangerous, when Christianity had a legal establishment.—The conduct of Constantine on this occasion must needs appear extremely absurd to every one who considers the consequences it had *.” Can there be a greater encomium on the principles of the ALLIANCE? The *fundamental error* of CONSTANTINE’S establishment was, it seems, suffering the Church to RETAIN ITS INDEPENDENCY. The fundamental condition of establishment on the theory of *Alliance* is, that the Church shall GIVE UP ITS INDEPENDENCY. But all this is only taking advantage of his lordship’s mistakes concerning CONSTANTINE’S ESTABLISHMENT.—A man who understood this part of ecclesiastical history infinitely better than his lordship, gives a very different account of it.—“ *Et si enim ecclesiam (says Mosheim, speaking of Constantine) civitatem quandam a republica distinctam in civitate, qualis ante ipsum fuerat, manere patiebatur: SUPREMUM sibi tamen in hanc civitatem IMPERIUM, atque jus eam sic constituendi et temperandi, uti salus rei publicæ posceret, sumebat †.*” And again,—“ *Multa quæ totius ecclesiæ fuerant, ad imperatores eorumque præfides et magistratus transferant.*” We see here an abridged but exact description of the *Alliance between Church and State*: And one is much better pleased to have our theory recommended on the authority, than at the expence, of that great instrument of Divine Providence.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuse of the ALLIANCE? “The sole intention and sole effect of [the theologic system of the schools] was to establish an ecclesiastical empire, under that spiritual monarch the Pope, and his spiritual ministers the clergy. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF THAT SUPPOSED ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND STATE ‡.”

* Vol. IV. p. 438, 439.

† Instit. Hist. Eccl. p. 155.

‡ Vol. IV. p. 621, 622.

Before, it was CONSTANTINE *and his successors, who raised that spiritual tyranny* * : and it was done, he says, by means of his *establishment* ; which suffered the church to retain its INDEPENDENCY, and admitted it on the same foot on which it has stood while it was a sect †. But now, it is the *supposed ALLIANCE between church and state* which raised this spiritual tyranny ; an alliance which will not suffer the church to retain its INDEPENDENCY ; nor admit it on the same foot on which it stood while it was a sect.

We have seen such amazing instances of his lordship's CONTRADICTIONS, as not to be surprized at the boldest of them. Sometimes, when rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his *contradictions*, what the man in the play did by his *ingratitude*, he strives to cover the monstrous bulk of them, by a proportionable *size of words* ‡ ; sometimes again, to shew his utter contempt of the public, he chuses to follow the advice there given ; *to let them go naked, whereby men would see them the better*. But, when he masks his double face, the FALSIFICATION of the *theory of the Alliance* always affords him the best play. He constantly takes it for granted, or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument against the book, that the author contends for and maintains the *independency of the church on the state, under an establishment*. This brings CONSTANTINE's establishment, as he has represented it, and the establishment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the same thing ; so that the mischiefs ascribed to one may be safely transferred to the other.

And here, reader, in conclusion, the odd fortune of this book of the ALLIANCE is worth thy notice. It had been written against by many nameless scribblers, before his lordship : and had their force been equal to their fury, its innocence had been no protection to it. *Their daggers backed one another* §, *not in the sides of my system*, but in the unfeeling fronts of the assassins

* Vol. IV. p. 446.

† Timon of Athens.

‡ Vol. IV. p. 438.

§ Shakespeare.

themselves.

themselves. Three capital crimes had been imputed to it. One, that it established an *imperium in imperio*; another, that it made the church a creature of the civil magistrate; and a third, that it made the civil magistrate a creature of the church: while one shameless fellow, as I remember, in a thing he called a *Comment on the Alliance*, charged it with all these three crimes at once: so that his *lordship*, whose care is for the STATE, and my *disfenting adversaries*, who are as anxious for the CHURCH, will come in but for shares in the full merit of that illustrious Commentator.

INDEX

I N D E X

TO THE

ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

- ACTIONS*, evil, from what considerations punished by civil laws, 39.
Alliance between Church and State, Preface to the edition in 1739, 1.
 — Dedication to the Earl of Chesterfield of the edition of 1748, 7.
 — Advertisement to the edition of 1766, 11.
 — M. de Silhouette's Letter to Cardinal Fleury sent with a translation of the Alliance, &c. 13.
 — the principles on which it is treated, 20.
 — the mutual influencing motives to, 74.
 — produced by free convention, 75.
 — the reciprocal terms and conditions, 90.
 — what the Church receives from the State by the Alliance, 92, 123.
 — federated, and incorporated union distinguished, 136.
 — the reality of the convention-argued, 139.
 — when carried into execution in England, 141.
 Vol. IV.
- Alliance between Church and State*, the objection how it may be framed between two societies composed of the same individuals, removed, 176.
 — a security for the behaviour of individuals due to both, 202.
 — under what circumstances dissolved, with instances, 204, 205.
 — the occasion of writing on this subject, 265.
 — analysed, 269.
 — summary of the allegations against it, 314.
Alliances and establishments, examination of Lord Bolingbroke's account of those under Constance, 314.
Anabaptists, German, why they ought to be excluded the magistracy, 214.
Areopagus, court of, its jurisdiction explained, 188.
Articles of faith, the expediency of, deduced, 51.
Atheists, why they ought to be banished all civil governments, 214.
Athens, shewn to have a test-law to secure an established religion, 231.

U u

Backbit,

B.

- Bacchus*, the oath taken by the priestesses of, from Demosthenes, 232.
- Banishment*, opposed to *provision*, and considered as a punishment, 30.
- the opinion of several learned men, “*whether a banished man be a subject of the state from which he had been expelled*,” 65.
- Bishops*, in what quality they enjoy seats in Parliament, 95, 108.
- Not a distinct estate, 98.
- An enquiry into their parliamentary peerage, 113.
- how their right of trying, and of being tried by their peers, in capital cases, fell into disuse, 114.
- their peerage not affected by the privileges they have lost, 118.
- and Presbyters, the distinction between, according to canon law, 127.
- Bolingbroke, Lord*, his concession in favour of the church establishment in Britain, 143.
- answer to his cavils against Alliance, 265.
- his notions concerning religious society, 270.
- examination of his notions, &c. 274.
- concerning spiritual courts, 285.
- the independency of the church, 295.
- of the Alliance between religious and civil society, 304.
- summary of his reasoning against the Alliance, 304.
- examination of his account of the establishment of Christianity under Constantine, 305.
- Brissot, Earl of*, his speech in favour of a test-law, *temp. Car. II.* 203.

C.

- C. lipi*, the Saracen, contrasted with the Roman Pontiffs, 70.
- Cæsar*, the main views of, explained, 192.
- Cæsar*, remarks on the principles manifested in his History of England, 192.
- Charles I.* his idea of church government, 82.

- Chesterfield, Philip Earl of*, Dedication of the Alliance between Church and State to him, edit. 1748, 7.
- Christ*, his kingdom, in what respect not of this world, 146, 311.
- Christian liberty*, the nature of, explained, 170.
- Christianity*, its superior advantages over Paganism, 144.
- over natural religion, 144.
- over Judaism, 144.
- The religion best calculated for a beneficial alliance with the civil magistrate, 144.
- proved to enforce the observance of civil laws, and social duties, in refutation of Mr. Rousseau's assertion to the contrary, 161.
- the law of liberty, 169.
- the nature and difference of internal and external evidences of, 251.
- Church*, its encroachments on the civil power, how maintained, 56, 60.
- ill consequences of its independence on the State, 85.
- as also of its absolute dependence on the State, 84.
- inference to the advantage of a free alliance, 85.
- distinguished from the clergy of it, 87, 275.
- when it properly became one of the three estates of the realm, 100.
- when it constituted an estate in Parliament, 100.
- how it lost this establishment, 103.
- now represented by the Commons, 107.
- its assemblies and their proceedings, by authority of the civil power, 133.
- ought previously to be consulted as to alterations in its government, 135.
- instances of its disposition toward reformation, 141.
- and conventicle, the difference between, stated, 190.
- Bp. Hooadly's opinion of the church being the mother of kings and queens, examined, 198.
- Lord Bolingbroke's opinion of the independency of, examined, 295.
- Churchmen*, improper ministers of the crown in a civil capacity, 90.
- all their civil jurisdiction derived from the civil power, 109.
- Civil society*, its insufficiency in restraining mankind,

mankind, without the aid of religion, pointed out, 25.
 — its two great functions, 28.
 — the nature and end of, explained, 36.
Conformity, the absurdity of enforcing, 230.
Constantine, examination of Lord Bolingbroke's account of Alliances and Establishments under him, 314.
 — Mosheim's account of the alliance, 321.
Controversy, the proper method of proceeding in, 19.
Convocation, first rise, and chronological anecdotes of, 102.
 — propriety of the laity assisting in, hinted, 136.
 — their right of calling themselves, examined, 191.
 — its representation to the King, in the controversy with the Commons concerning supremacy, *temp. H. VIII.* 193.
 — its meetings and proceedings under permission of the civil power, 196.
Courts, ecclesiastical, the end and use of, deduced, 81.
 — consequence which would attend the abolishing them, 124.
 — how far opinions cognizable by them, 125.
 — not intended to interfere with the jurisdiction of temporal courts, but to supply their insufficiencies, 128.
 — the judiciary proceedings and forms of, the same with these of civil courts, 128.
 — appeals from, to the civil courts, in all cases, 129.
Crimes and sins, confounded by a mistaken view of the Jewish Dispensation, 44.
 — in some cases easily mistaken, 46.
Cujacius, his opinion of the law of prescription, 244.

D.

Dependency in societies, an enquiry into the nature of, 54.
Dissenters from religious establishments, not unjustly treated by excommunication, 60.
 — why, and in what respect, justly subjected to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the established church, 127.
 — an examination into their plea for exemption from fining for slieriff, 215.

Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated, first notice given of that work, 249.
 — plan of that work, 249.
 — reasons for undertaking it, 250.
 — general view of the contents of the first six books, 255.
Drunkards, their punishment in Greece for striking a person double to that of a sober person, 39.
Duties, of perfect and imperfect obligation, distinguished, 26.

E.

Ecclesiastical courts. See *Courts Ecclesiastical.*
Enthusiasm and superstition distinguished, 52.
Established religion, to be found in the civil communities of all ages, 88, 267.
Establishment of religion, mistake of the true office of the civil magistrate, springing from, 46.
 — and a test, absurdity and mischief attending the hypothesis which builds them on a principle of religious truth, rather than of civil utility, 236.
Estate of the Kingdom, distinguished from an estate in Parliament, or in Convocation, 107.
Evil, present, its influence on mankind stronger, than good in expectation, 24.
Evils, political, distinguished, and how to be repelled, 212.
Excommunication, the only just exertion of power belonging to a church, 58.
 — a power essential to the being of every society, 59.
 — the power of, how vested, under the alliance of the church with the civil magistrate, 137.

F.

Faith. See *Articles.*
Fornication, why never adequately punished in flourishing communities, 25.

G.

Game laws, the equity of, considered, in reference to the law of nature, 226.

Government, the common error of new plans for the reformation of, 32.

Grants of the clergy, historical memoirs of, 100.

Grotius, his account of the conduct of the Reformers in Holland, 45.

H.

Hale, Lord Chief Justice, his opinion concerning the Bishops' seat in Parliament, 110.

— his account of the powers of the clergy, 132.

Henault, Professor, his notion of the ecclesiastical rights enjoyed by the crown, 196.

Headly, Bp. his opinion of the church being the mother of kings and queens, examined, 198.

Hobbes, his treatment of Christianity compared with that of Bayle, Collins, Tyn-dal, Bolingbroke, &c. 70.

— an assertor of rigorous conformity, 71.

Hobbism and Popery, contrary in speculation, but of the same tendency in practice, 56.

Hooker, his opinion of religious councils and synods, 136.

— the mistaken argument of his eighth book of the laws of ecclesiastical policy, analysed, 180.

— his account of the political use of religion, 243.

— his ideas of divine laws, 301.

Humr, his representation of religion, 153.

I.

Incorporate Union, its nature explained, 196.

Independent Whig, the design and conduct of that work pointed out, 63.

Industry, the necessity of, to cultivate natural good, 35.

Instinct, super-added to reason in mankind, 22.

Intellectual nature of man, how improved by religion, 48.

Intentions, before what tribunal cognizable, 80.

Isaiab, his famous prophecy, ch. xlix. 23, how fulfilled, 147.

Isocrates, his account of the jurisdiction of the court of Areopagus, 188.

Judaism, a short comparative view of, 145.

— an alliance between religious and civil society justified from, 146.

K.

King, not the first estate in Parliament, 108.

L.

Land, Archbishop, the father of the High-Church Clergy, 79.

Law of nature, an enquiry into, 223.

— misunderstood, 223.

— true definition of, 224.

Lawus, only able to check *open* transgressions, 26.

Laws municipal, frequently formed in direct opposition to the law of nature, 224.

Lords, House of, the nature and constitution of that assembly, 108.

Love of our country, the first duty of society, 27.

M.

Magistrate, and people, mutual stipulations in the compact between, 31.

Magistrate, civil, his province confined to the *body*, without considering the *soul*, 37.

— the mistakes concerning his real office traced, 42.

— his character distinguished from that of a father of a family, 68.

Man, described in a state of nature, 23.

— reflexious on his twofold state of existence, 221.

Marriage, the nature of that compact enquired into, 126.

Ministers of state, the part they have to act, 9.

Monarchy, and paternity, distinguished, 48.

Montesquieu, his opinion of human liberty in matters of religion, 246.

Morals, partly cognizable by the civil magistrate, and partly under the care of religion, 37.

Mt. Seim, his account of the Alliance under Constantine, 321.

Orbit,

O.

- Orbit*, the nature and sanction of, explained, 40, 47.
 — danger to be apprehended from multiplying them, 66.
Opinions, the punishment of, not the province of the civil magistrate, 37.
 — With exceptions, 40.
 — how far subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 125.
 — when they become cognizable by the civil magistrate, 220.
 — whether a citizen can be justifiably excluded from his civil rights, for matters of, 230.
Opinions concerning the deity, their influence in practical religion, 51.

P.

- Papists, English*, why they ought not to be tolerated, 214.
Parliament, when the church first became one of the three estates in, 100.
 — when the states of first sat apart in different houses, 100.
 — the only right to seat in, founded on temporals, 108.
Passions, how to be restrained, 80.
Patriot, happiness to be expected when he becomes a minister, 8.
Patriotism, true, and that of the mob, distinguished, 159.
Peer, the term defined, and sense ascertained, 120.
Peers, whether limited to hereditary baronies, 114.
 — its feudal origin, 121.
Penn, Wm. detected in supporting an establishment, 233.
Pittacus, reflection on his law against assaults committed in drink, 39.
Papery and Puritanism, distinction between, 218.
Power, coercive, where properly residing, 57.
Presbyters and Bishops, the distinction between, according to canon law, 127.

- Prescription*, in a legal sense, compared with the law of nature, 224.
Prince and priest, their distinct character, 70.
Property, national, how to be considered, 100, 108.
Punishments, legal, disquisition concerning, 30.
 — enquiry into the propriety of the degrees of, 39.
 — the nature and application of, explained, 212.
Parsons, their mistake in the work of reformation, 45.

Q.

- Quakers*, the tenets of that sect displayed, 53.
 — their pleas for the refusal of the payment of tythes, examined, 189.
 — why they ought not to be suffered to inhabit frontiers on the Continent, 214.
 See *Penn.*

R.

- Religion*, the true end of its establishment, 240.
 — the difference between its being of political use, and being a tool of politics, distinguished, 243.
Religion, reformation in, unable to restrain the excesses of mankind without the aid of the civil magistrate, 23.
 — supplies the defects of civil society, 34.
 — how checked, 44, 46.
 — the nature and end of, deduced, 48.
 — adapted to the twofold nature of man, 49.
 — an established one to be found in the civil communities of all ages, 58.
Religious, divisions of, the bad consequences of in a state, 180.
 — natural remedy for, 180.
Religion, natural, the necessity of argued, 202.
Religion, Pagan, its connection with civil society, traced, 43.

Religious

Religious society, the two essential characters of, 57.

— the great foundation and bond of,

144.
Reverend, the function of, in civil society, why not capable of being enforced, 29.

— to be supplied only by religion, 33.

Rights of the Christian church, design and tendency of that work pointed out, 62, 188.

Rites, the validity of those of Christianity argued, 150.

Roman bravery, cause of its decline under the Christian Emperors, explained, 174.

Rome, Pagan, how religious discipline was regulated there, 308.

Rome, Papal, the conduct of the popes of, contrasted with the Saracen caliphs, 70.

Russias, his mistakes respecting the subject of this treatise, corrected, 65.

— his misrepresentations of the Christian religion, detected, 148, 158, 160.

— his account of the religion of man, 151.

— of a citizen, 152, 154.

— of the religion of the priest, 152.

— of theocracy, 156.

— criticism on his account of the English constitution, 195.

— his opinion of human liberty in matters of religion, 246.

S.

Salvation of souls, no object of civil society, 37.

Scijism, the guilt of, not lessened by a toleration, 219.

Scripture, consequences of admitting it as the only rule of action, 67.

Scisms, four especially necessary to be restrained, 214.

Self-preservation, the strongest appetite in nature, 22.

Sheriffs. See *Deffenders*.

Sidney, Algernon, his notions of Christianity examined, 198.

Silhouette, M. de, his letter to Cardinal Fleury, sent with a translation of the Alliance, &c. 13. *Quin. 6a.*

Sins and crimes, confounded by a mistaken view of the Jewish Dispensation, 44.

— in some cases easily mistaken, 46.

Societies, civil and religious compared; and the limits of their jurisdictions ascertained, 54.

Society, the progress of traced, from the state of nature, 23.

— the mistakes of several sectaries relative to, 36.

— wherein as a body it differs from the individuals which compose it, 177.

Spiritual courts, the end and use of, deduced, 81.

— consequence which would attend the abolishing them, 124.

— how far opinions cognizable by them, 125.

— Lord Bolingbroke's opinion of them, examined, 266.

State, where several religious societies subsist in, allies itself with the largest, 203.

Subjects, their general right to share the honours and profits in the disposal of the supreme magistracy, denied, 210.

Superstition and enthusiasm, distinguished, 52.

Supreme head of the church, enquiry into the nature and foundation of that title, 138.

Supremacy, in matters ecclesiastical, conferred by the church on the civil magistrate, 130.

— in what it consists, 131.

Synodical assemblies, the cause of the disputes and heats arising from, pointed out, 136.

T.

Toll-law, its origin and use, 201.

— an enquiry into the principles upon which it is founded, 203.

— Earl of Bristol's opinion of it, 205.

— necessity and equity of, 206.

— a restrictive not a penal law, 214.

— no violation of the law of nature, 224.

— whether injurious to true religion, 227.

— to religious liberty, 229.

— brief historical view of, 266.

— See *Establishment*.

Tories, why it so seldom agrees with fact, 241.

Toleration, judgment of the foreign divines concerning, at the time of the English Reformation, 220.

— how rendered equally secure to the established church, and to liberty of conscience, 230.

Truth and utility, the coincidence of proved, 77.

Tythes, on what plea the right of the clergy to them stands, 92.

Tythes,

Just, this settled provision not injurious to the state. 93.
 — refusal of payment by Dissenters unjust. 93.
 — only due to an established church, 94.
 — the Quakers plea for refusal, examined, 189.

Uniformity of worship, the expediency of, and how attained, 59.
Union, the nature of examined, 196.
Voltaire, remarks on his treatise on Toleration, 189.
Utility, universal, indicative of truth, 77.

W.

V. U.

Venice, the disorderly conduct of the ecclesiastics there, accounted for, 183.

Wants, real and fantastic, 27.
William III. his sentiments and conduct with regard to a test and toleration, 247.

J U L I A N:

O R,

A D I S C O U R S E

C O N C E R N I N G T H E

E A R T H Q U A K E A N D F I R E Y E R U P T I O N ,

Which defeated that EMPEROR's ATTEMPT to rebuild the

T E M P L E A T J E R U S A L E M .

I N W H I C H

The Reality of a Divine Interposition is shewn ;

The Objections to it are answered ;

A N D

The nature of that Evidence which demands the assent of every
reasonable man to a *miraculous* fact, is considered and explained.

Nesciunt Necessaria, quia supervacanea dedicerunt. SENECA.

INTRODUCTION.

A SOVEREIGN contempt for the authority of the FATHERS, and no great reverence for any other, is what now-a-days constitutes a Protestant in fashion. But, as I imagine Religion loseth somewhat, and Learning a great deal more, by the neglect in which the FATHERS lye at present, I should have been tempted to say a word or two in their behalf, even though the subject of the following sheets did not require that they, whose testimony I make some use of, should have their pretensions fairly stated, and their character examined. But what is here insinuated to the discredit of the *present* mode in theology with regard to the FATHERS is by no means said in favour of the *past*, but of *that* which good sense seems disposed to place between them.

Their authority had now, for many ages, been held *sacred*. Although by taking the Greek philosophy, in which they had been nurtured, for their guide in explaining the nature and genius of the GOSPEL, they had unhappily turned religion into an *art*; which their successors, the SCHOOLMEN, soon after turned into a *trade*. But, as in all matters where reason doth not hold the balance, that authority, which had been extravagantly advanced, was, on the turn of the times, as extravagantly undervalued: It may not therefore be amiss to acquaint the English reader, in few words, how all this came to pass.

When the avarice and ambition of the church of Rome had, by working with the superstition and ignorance of the people, erected what it calls the HIERARCHY, which was the digesting an ecclesiastical policy on the ruins of gospel liberty, they found nothing of such use for the administration and support of this spiritual system* as the making the authority of the FATHERS sacred, and consequently decisive. For this church having introduced numerous errors and superstitions, both in rites and doctrines, which the *silence* and the *declarations* of scripture equally condemned, they were obliged to seal up those living oracles, and open this new warehouse of the dead. And it was no wonder if, in that shoal of writers which *the great drag-net of time* (as a poet of our own calls it) had inclosed and brought down to us, under the name of FATHERS, there should be some amongst them of a character suited to countenance any kind of folly or extravagance. Their decision, therefore, it was thought fit should be treated as laws; and collected into a kind of code, under the title of the *Sentences*.

From this time every thing was tried at the bar of the *fathers*; and so unquestioned was their jurisdiction, that when the great Defection was made from the *Church of Rome*, the Reformed, though they shook off the tyranny of the POPE, could not disengage themselves from the unbounded authority of the FATHERS; but carried that prejudice with them (as they did some others, of a worse complexion) into the REFORMATION. For, in religious matters, novelty being suspicious, and antiquity venerable, the Reformed thought it for their credit to have the FATHERS on their side. They seemed neither to consider antiquity in general as a thing *relative*, nor Christian-antiquity as a thing *positive*: either of which confi-

* Comme l'autorité fait le fondement de cette étude [la théologie] il est juste de deferer ABSOLUMENT non seulement à l'*Ecriture sainte*, mais encore aux sentimens des *Peres*, qui nous ont expliqué la tradition, sur tout à ceux que l'Eglise a canonisez, pour ainsi dire, par son approbation, ou en tout ou en partie. *Traité des études monastiques*, par Mabillon, p. 360.

derations would have shewn them, that the **FATHERS** themselves were modern, compared to that authority on which the Reformed founded their churches; and that the **GOSPEL** was that true antiquity on which they should repose their confidence *. The effect of this error was, that in the long appeal to truth between Protestants and Papists (both of them going on a common principle, that the authority of the **FATHERS** was decisive), the latter were enabled to prop up their credit against all the evidence of common sense and sacred scripture.

At length an excellent writer of the *Reformed* religion, observing that the controversy was likely to be endless (for though the gross corruptions of Popery were certainly later than the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, to which the appeal was usually made, yet the seeds of them being then sown, and beginning to pullulate, it was but too plain there was hold enough for a skilful debater to draw the **FATHERS** to his own side, and make them water the sprouts they had been planting); M. Daillé, I say, observing this, wisely projected to shift the ground, and force the disputants on both sides to vary their method of attack as well as of defence. In order to this he composed a discourse of the *true use of the Fathers* †. In which,

* The Roman Catholics have long objected to us the *antiquity* of their church, as one of its greatest supports. But none of them have been so ingenuous as the excellent author of *L'Esprit des Loix*, to point out wherein the force of this argument consists. “L'antiquité (says he) convient à la Religion, parce que souvent nous croyons plus les choses à mesure qu'elles sont plus reculées : car nous n'avons pas dans la tête des idées accessoiress tirées de ces tems-là qui puissent les contredire.” Vol. II. p. 203, 8vo ed. Force we see it has. But then unluckily it lyes in the supposition of Popery's being a *false*, not a *true* church. For though *false* religion acquires an advantage from the oblivion of those discrediting circumstances which attended its original, and of which by *time* we are now deprived; yet *true* religion receives much damage from the same effects of time; because several circumstances, long since lost, which accompanied its birth, must needs have greatly confirmed its character. For it is as much in the nature of things that the circumstances attending truth should confirm it, as that the circumstances attending error should detect it.

† *De l'Emploi des Peres.*

with

with admirable learning, and force of argument, he shewed, that the FATHERS were incompetent Deciders of the controversies now on foot ; since the points in question were not formed into articles till long after the ages in which those FATHERS lived. This was bringing them from the bench to the table ; degrading them from the rank of judges, into the class of simple evidence ; in which, Daillé too was not for suffering them to speak, like *Irisb* Evidence, in every cause where they were wanted, but only to such matters as were agreed to be within their competence. Had this learned critic stopped here, his book had been free from blame ; but then in all likelihood his honest purpose had been rendered ineffectual : for old prejudices are not to be set strait by barely reducing the obliquity to that strait line which just restores it to its rectitude. He went much further : and by shewing, occasionally, that they were absurd interpreters of scripture ; that they were bad reasoners in morals ; and very loose evidence in facts ; he seemed willing to have his reader infer, that, even though they had been masters of their subject, yet these other defects would have rendered them very unqualified deciders.

However, the work of this famous foreigner had great consequences : and especially with us here at home. The more learned amongst the nobility (an order, which, at that time, was of the republic of letters) were the first who emancipated themselves from the general prejudice. It brought the incomparable Lord *Falkland* to think moderately of the FATHERS, and to turn his theological inquiries into a more useful channel. And his great rival in arts, though not in virtue, the famous Lord *Digby*, found it of such use to him, in his defence of the Reformed religion against his cousin Sir *Kenelm*, that he has even epitomised *l'emploi des Peres*, in his fine Letter on that subject. But, what it hath chiefly to boast is, that it gave birth to the two best defences ever written, on the two best of subjects, *Religion* and *Liberty* ; I mean Mr. *Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants*, and Dr. *Jer. Taylor's Liberty*
of

of Prophecy. In a word, it may be truly said to be the storehouse, from whence all who have since written popularly on the character of the FATHERS have derived their materials.

Dr. Whitby, in whose way they fell as *Interpreters of Scripture*, hath, in imitation of the pattern Daillé set him, made a large collection from their writings, to expose their talents for *criticism* *. In the same manner, and in a larger volume, Mr. Barbeyrac afterwards treated their pretensions to the science of *Ethics* †: And now of late the very learned and ingenious Dr. Middleton, finding them in the support of Monkish miracles, hath written as largely to prove their *testimony* in matters of fact to be none of the strongest.

So that these several constituent parts of their character being thus taken up in their turns; and the whole order exposed, as incompetent judges of doctrine, as trifling interpreters of scripture, as bad moralists, and as slippery evidence; it is no wonder the English reader, who only measures them by such representations, should be disposed to think very irreverently of these early lights of the Christian Church.

But, let us divest ourselves of prejudice, whether we think with the few or the many; and we shall soon understand that in the heat of a contention evidence will be apt to be over-rated. Nay, when fairly estimated, no reflecting man will think himself able to form a true judgment of a character, when no more of it is laid before him than a collection of its blots and blemishes.

Till of late, there were always some who could preserve their candour and moderation, which in religion and politics, where our highest interests are concerned, is no easy matter; and these men were wont to say, “That though we should indeed suppose the fathers to be as fanciful divines, as bad critics, and as unsafe moralists, as Daillé, Whitby, and Barbeyrac, are pleased to represent them, yet

* *Dissert. de S. S. interpretatione secund. Patres.*

† *La Morale des Peres, &c.*

this would take little from the integrity of their evidence : and what we want of them is only their testimony to facts." But now, even this small remain of credit is thought too much to be allowed them ; and, of this, the learned author of the *Free Inquiry*, by exposing their excessive credulity in point of false miracles *, hath laboured to deprive them. But, controversy apart, their testimony to *common facts* may yet stand good. I see no reason why their veracity should be brought in question when they bear witness to the state of religion in their own times, because they disgraced their judgment, in giving ear to every strange tale of Monkish extraction. The most learned and virtuous divine of the barbarous ages is the venerable Bede ; and the honestest as well as most discerning historian of those, or perhaps of any age, is Matthew Paris : yet their propensity to recount the wonderful exceeds all imagination. Neither learning, judgment, nor integrity, could secure them against the general contagion. Now if this disposition was in them (as is confessed) only the vice of the *times*, is it not unjust to ascribe the same disposition in the *fathers*, to the vice of the *men* ?

But our folly has ever been, and is likely to continue, to judge of antiquity by a modern standard : when, if we would form reasonable ideas of it, we should weigh it with its own. We examine the *conceits* of a BASIL or an AUSTIN, on the test of the improved reasoning of our own times. And we do well. It is the way to read them with profit. But when, from a contempt of their logic, which follows this comparison, we come to despise their other accomplishments of parts and learning, we betray gross ignorance or injustice. To know the true value of the *fathers*, we should place them by their contemporaries, the Pagan writers of greatest estimation : and if they suffer in their neighbourhood ;

* " Videmus, quanto dignitatis detrimento hic error credendi recipiendique omnis
 " facilitas affecerit ex ecclesiasticis historiis nonnullas ; quæ nimis faciles se præbuerunt,
 " in prodendis transcribendisque miraculis, à martyribus, eremitis, anachoretis, et aliis
 " sanctis viris, atque ab eorum reliquiis, sepulchris, facellis, imaginibus editis." *Bacon*
de Augm. Scien.

e'en let them stay, where most of them already are, with the grocers. But it is a fact none acquainted with antiquity will deny, how great a secret foe ever modern divines may make of it, that as *polite scholars* (which is the thing their despisers now most affect to value) the Christian writers have indisputably the advantage, both in eloquence and ethics. And we may venture to say that there are some of them who have successively rivaled the best writers of the higher and purer antiquity. St. Chrysostome has more good sense than Plato; and the critic may find in Lactantius almost as many good words as in Tully. So that if, on the principles of a classical taste, we discard the *fathers*, we should send along with them the *Pagan writers* of the same ages; unless the wonderful theology of the latter can atone for (what they both have in common) their false rhetoric and bad reasoning.

These imperfections, therefore, in both, being equal, it is plain they were the faults of the times. For whatever advantages the ancients had over us in the arts of poetry, oratory, and history, it is certain, we have over them in the *science of reasoning*, as far as it concerns the investigation of moral truth.

Those who are not able to form a comparison between them, on their own knowledge, may be reconciled to this conclusion, when the *peculiar hindrances*, in the ancient world, to the advancement of moral truth, on the principles of a just logic, have been laid before them.

The cultivation of the art of reasoning was, in the most early times of learning, in the hands of their ORATORS and SOPHISTS. Whatever was the profession, the real business of the *orator* was not to convince, but to persuade; and not in favour of truth, but of convenience or utility: which, again, was not general utility (for that coincides with truth), but particular; which is often at variance with it. So that their art of reasoning

was as much an art to *binder* the discovery of truth*, as to *promote* it. Nor was that part which was employed in the support of error merely lost to the service of truth. The mischief went further. It brought in many fallacious rules and modes of reasoning, which greatly embarrassed and misled the advocate when employed in a better cause. Particularly those by *similitude* and *analogy*: which had their rise from hence; and soon spread, like a leprosy, over all the argumentation of antiquity.

We need not wonder then, if under this management truth was rarely found. What seems to be more wonderful is, that, when it was found, its value was so little understood that it was as frequently sacrificed to the empty *vanity*, as to the more solid *interests* of the disputer. For the *sophists*, the speculative inquirers after truth, made their wisdom (from whence they took their name) to consist in bringing truth to the side of their reasoning; not their reasoning to the side of truth. Hence it became the glory of their profession to demonstrate for, or against any opinion, indifferently: and they were never better pleased than when that proposition (let it be what it would) was prescribed to them for their subject, which their auditors had a mind should be the truth. The difficulties they frequently had to encounter, in support of so extravagant a character, introduced into the ancient reasoning new modes of fallacies, a set of *metaphysical quibbles*; which being the invention of these *SOPHISTS*, or *wise men*, are fitted only to impose on others as *wise*.

But though so much had been done to betray, to discredit, and to estrange us from truth; yet common sense revolts against every thing when it becomes, to a certain degree, unnatural. This insolent abuse of reason, now proceeding to an open mockery of truth, brought the *sophists* into public contempt: and gave room to another set of men, of a modester denomination, to raise themselves upon their ruins.

* Ubi verò animis iudicium vis afferenda est, et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abduccenda mens, ISI PROPRIUM ORATORIS OPUS EST. Quint. l. vi. c. ii.

These

These were the PHILOSOPHERS : and to these, it must be owned, the Gentile world owed all its real improvements in the art of reasoning, and advancement in truth. But the defects of their constitution, the errors of their principles, and the folly of their conduct, were so great, that truth was kept in that state of inferiority, in which, we say, it came to and was unhappily espoused by the *fathers*. It would ill suit the confined nature of this discourse to explain these things at large : we can only hint at some of the most considerable of their errors.

They soon ran into the two extremes, of *scepticism* and *dogmatizing* ; of all other, the two disorders of the mind, most hurtful to sound reason. These maladies they contracted of the stock from which they sprung, the *sophists* : who, by their custom of disputing for and against every thing, brought every thing, in its turn, according to the temper of the recipients, to be firmly embraced, or wantonly suspected. For extremes *often* beget, and, when they have begot, *always* support one another.

A second violation of right reason was that principle, which they all held in common, *that truth was ever to give place to utility*. A principle which had the appearance of modesty, as seeming only to imply, what is too true, that we are less able to judge of *causes* than *effects* ; but, indeed, the natural issue of the inveteracy and absurdity of popular Paganism, and of its incorporation with the state.

Another principle as universal, and no less injurious to the rights of reason, was that the fundamental doctrines of each sect were to be held unquestioned by its followers. For, in most societies, truth is but the second care ; the *first* is to provide for themselves : and as this can be done only by uniformity of opinions, and opinions will continue no longer uniform than while they remain unquestioned, an *ipse dixit* was the *rule* of all, though the *badge* only of a single sect. These several defects in the constitution of ancient *philosophy* had, in course of time, brought on others. The dog-

matists, as was natural, grew *enthusiastic*; and the sceptics *immoral*. The two worst disorders that can befall a searcher after truth; for her abode is neither in the clouds, nor on the dung-hill.

Take then all these things together, and we shall see, they must be insuperable bars to any great improvement, in the science of moral reasoning.

But to this it will be said, that those two famous instruments of truth, LOGIC and MATHEMATICS, were, the one invented, and the other highly advanced, in these very ages. It is certain they were. But if the plain truth may be told, the use of these boasted instruments goes no further than to assist us, the one in the FORM of *reasoning*, the other in the METHOD of *discourse*.

Aristotle's invention of the *Categories* was a surprising effort of human wit. But, in practice, *logic* is more a *trick* than a *science*, formed rather to amuse than to instruct. And, in some sort, we may apply to the *art of syllogism* what a man of wit * has observed of *rhetoric*, that it only tells us how to *name* those tools, which nature had before put into our hands, and habit taught the use of. However, all its real virtue consists in the *compendious* detection of a fallacy. This is all the service it can do for truth. In the service of Chicane, indeed, it is a mere juggler's knot, now fast, now loose; and the *schools*, where this legerdemain was exercised in great perfection, are full of the stories of its wonders. But its true value is now well known: and there is but little need to put it lower in the general estimation.

However, what *logic* hath lost of its credit, *mathematics* have gained. And *geometry* is now supposed to do wonders as well in the system of man as of matter. It must be owned, the real virtue it hath, it had acquired long since: for, by what is left us of antiquity, we see how elegantly it was then handled, and how

* Butler.

sublimely it was pursued. But the truth is, all its use, for the purpose in question, besides what hath been already mentioned, seems to be only habituating the mind to think long and closely : and it would be well if this advantage made amends for some inconveniencies, as inseparable from its study. It may seem perhaps too much a paradox to say, that long habit in this science incapacitates the mind for reasoning at large, and especially in the search of moral truth. And yet, I believe, nothing is more certain. The object of geometry is demonstration ; its subject admits of it, and is almost the only subject that doth. In this science, whatever is not demonstration, goes for nothing ; or is at least below the sublime inquirer's regard. *Probability*, through its almost infinite degrees, from simple doubt up to absolute certainty, is the *terra incognita* of the geometer. And yet here it is that the great business of the human mind, the search and discovery of all the important truths which concern us as reasonable beings, is carried on. And here too it is that all its vigour is exerted : for to proportion the assent to the probability accompanying every varying degree of moral evidence requires the most enlarged and sovereign exercise of reason. But, as to excel in the use of any thing, the habit must always be in proportion to the difficulty, it seems very unlikely that the *geometer* (long confined to the routine of demonstration, the easiest exercise of reason, where much less of the vigour than of the attention of mind is required to excel), should form a right judgement on subjects, whose truth or falshood is to be rated on the degrees of moral evidence. I venture to call mathematics the easiest exercise of reason, on the authority of Cicero, who observes, *that scarce any man ever set himself upon this study, who did not make what progress in it he pleased**. But besides acquired inability, prejudice renders the veteran mathematician still less capable of judging

* Quis ignorat, ii, qui mathematici vocantur, quanta in obscuritate rerum, et quam recondita in arte et multiplici, subtilique versentur ? quo tamen in genere ita multi perfecti homines exstiterunt, ut nemo fere studuisse ei scientiæ vehementius videatur, quin quod voluerit, consecutus sit. De Orat. l. i.

of moral evidence. He who hath been so long accustomed to lay together and compare ideas, and hath reaped demonstration, the richest fruit of speculative truth, for his labour, regards all the lower degrees of evidence as in the train only of his mathematical principality: and he commonly ranks them in so arbitrary a manner, that the *ratio ultima mathematicorum* is become almost as great a libel upon common sense, as other sovereign decisions. I might appeal for the truth of this, to those wonderful conclusions which *geometers*, when condescending to write on history, ethics, or theology, have made from their premisses. But the thing is notorious: and it is now no secret that the oldest mathematician in England is the worst reasoner in it. But I would not be mistaken, as undervaluing the many useful discoveries made from time to time in moral matters by professed mathematicians. Nor will any one so mistake me, who does not first confound the genius and the geometer; and then conclude that what was the achievement of his wit, was the product of his theorems.

Yet still it must be owned, that this discipline habituates the mind to think closely; and may help us to a good method of composition. In those most unpromising ages, when the *forms* of the schools were as tedious and intricate, as the *matter* they treated was absurd or trifling, it hath had force enough to break through the bondage of custom, and to clear away the thorns that then perplexed and overgrew the paths of learning. Thomas Bradwardin, a mathematician, and archbishop of Canterbury, in the fourteenth century, in his famous book *De causa Dei*, hath treated his subject, not as it was wont to be handled in the schools, but in the better method of the geometers. And in another instance, of more importance, he hath given the age he lived in an example to emancipate itself from the slavery of fashion; I mean, in his attempt (as by his freedom with the *fathers* it seems to be) of reducing their extravagant authority to more reasonable bounds. But yet, so true is the foregoing observation, that though mathematics, in good hands,

hands, could do this, it could do no more : all the opening it gave to truth could not secure Bradwardin from the dishonour of becoming advocate for the most absurd opinion that ever was, the *Anti-Pelagian* doctrine of St. Austin; in which the good archbishop was so much in earnest, that he calls the defence of it, *the cause of God*.

To return. Such was the state and condition of the human understanding in the ancient world, rather a *mechanical* than a moral or intellectual cultivation of reason, when CHRISTIANITY arose; and on such principles as were best fitted to correct those errors and prejudices, which had so long and so fatally retarded the progress of truth. It would require a just volume to treat this matter as it deserves. The nature of my work will not permit me to do it. I shall only give a single instance, but an instance of importance, namely, the use of those principles in discovering the true *end* of man; and in directing him to the right *mean* of attaining it.

The knowledge of the ONE GOD, as the moral and immediate Governor of the Universe, directly leads us to the *Supreme Good*; and the doctrine of FAITH in Him, directly inspiring the *love of Truth*, enables us to procure it.

In Paganism, the *end* was totally obscured, by its having always kept the true God, the supreme good, out of sight, which therefore must be needs sought in vain; and the true *mean* entirely lost, by the introduction of a number of false ones.

These were amongst the great principles revealed by heaven for the advancement of *moral knowledge*: and in time they had their effect: though indeed somewhat with the latest. For it is not to be dissembled, that here, as in most other cases in the moral world, the perversity of man soon ran counter to God's good Providence; which had so admirably fitted and disposed things for a general reform.

I have said the *fathers* were, at least, equal, if not superior, to those Gentile writers, their contemporaries, whom we most affect to.

to admire : I shall now explain the unhappy causes (in which *Religion* and *Reason* suffered equally, as they always will suffer together) why the fathers did not, in the exactness of their *logic*, and in the purity of their *ethics*, infinitely surpass them.

The first preachers of the Gospel were the inspired messengers of the word. They committed its dictates to writing ; and with that purity and splendor in which they drew them from the fountain of truth.

Their immediate followers, whom we are wont to call the *apostolic fathers*, received at their hands the doctrine of life, in all the simplicity of *understanding* as well as *heart*. It cannot be said that their writings do much honour to the rational sublimity of our holy religion : but then they have not hurt or violated the integrity of sacred truth. For *false philosophy* had not yet made havock of the *faith*. If, in their writings, we see but little of that manly elegance of reason, which makes the writings of their inspired predecessors so truly admirable ; and is so striking a proof of the reality of that inspiration : yet still there is as little of those adulterate and polluted ornaments, which their successors brought from the brothels of Pagan philosophy, to stain the sanctity of religion. And let me add, that though the early prospect of things may not be, in all respects, what we could wish it ; yet there is one circumstance, which does great credit to our holy faith : It is this, that as the integrity and dignity of its simple and perfect nature refused all fellowship with the adulterate arts of Grecian learning ; so the admirable display of divine wisdom in disposing the parts, and conducting the course of the grand system of redemption, was not to be tolerably apprehended but by an improved and well-disciplined understanding. Both these qualities suited the nobility of its original. It could bear no communion with *error* ; and was as little fitted to consort with *ignorance*.

The men of *science* were not the first who attended to the call of the Gospel. It was not to be expected they should be the first. Their station presented many prejudices against it. It was taught
by

by simple unlettered men, whose condition they held in contempt ; and it required that they, who had been till now the teachers of mankind, should become learners. The doctrines of the Gospel had indeed this to recommend them, that they were *rational* ; but the philosophers were already no strangers to those principles of natural religion which Christianity adopted, such as the unity of the Godhead, his moral government, and the essential difference between good and evil. The *attestations* to its truth were wonderful ; but these, their principles of false philosophy enabled them to evade : so that their passions and prejudices, for some time, supported them in holding out against all the conviction of gospel-evidence.

But it was not thus with plainer men. They submitted to its force with less reluctance. Philosophy had secreted from the prophane vulgar the high truths of natural law, which is taught to the initiated concerning the one true God and his worship. When the Gospel openly proclaimed these truths, with others of the like repose and comfort to the human mind, these *prophane vulgar* eagerly embraced it. And as Grecian wisdom could not keep them from believing what was thus revealed ; so neither did that wisdom, falsely so called, tempt them to viciate it, after they had embraced it. They were apt, indeed, to run into the opposite extreme, and, reflecting of how little use philosophy had ever been to the body of mankind, and how violently it now opposed the new religion, which had the body of mankind for its object, they became much disposed to avoid or neglect all prophane literature, without distinction. They saw, in the power of miracles, a more efficacious way of propagating the faith : and they thought they saw, in St. Paul's censure of the Grecian wisdom, the condemnation of all human literature, in general. St. Paul had himself abstained from their meretricious eloquence, and had cautioned posterity against their magical philosophy. The *first*, lest it should occasion a suspicion that the faith had made its way rather by the arts of human speech, than by the power of the spirit : The *latter*, because he

saw it was fatally framed to infect religion; and had some experience, and more divine foreknowledge, that it would speedily do so.

Indeed the time was at hand. For the convictive evidence and rapid progress of the Gospel had so shaken and disconcerted learned pride, that the next age saw a torrent of believers pour into the church, from the schools of their rhetors, the colleges of their philosophers, and the cloisters of their priests. The sincerity of these illustrious converts in embracing a religion which did not hold out, so much as in distant prospect, any advantages of the temporal kind, cannot be fairly brought in question. Their discretion, their prudence, were the things most wanted. For that passion of new converts, *zeal*, which is then least under the direction of *knowledge* when zeal most needs it, hindered them from making their *advantages* of the principles of revelation; so admirably fitted, as we have shewn, to improve human nature on that side where its perfection lies, I mean, in the high attainments of moral science. For, instead of reasoning from truths clearly revealed, and so, from things known, to advance, by due degrees, in the method of the mathematicians, to the discovery of truths unknown, They travestied obscure uncertainties, nay, manifest errors, into truth; and sought in philosophy and logic analogies and quibbles to support them.

Their two great objects, as became them, were to increase the number of believers; and to defend the faith against infidels and hereticks.

Amongst the means they employed for the speedy conversion of the world, one was to bring Christianity as near to the genius of the *Gentile religion*, and of the *Greek philosophy*, as could be done without giving offence to themselves or their brethren. They thought it but prudent to avail themselves of the prejudices of Paganism; and perhaps they themselves were not free from all remains of those prejudices. The Jewish law, ill understood, satisfied them in the propriety of these means. They saw there,

com-

compliances made by God himself to the prejudices and superstitions of the times. But this was all they saw : They did not reflect that a local worship, instituted for peculiar and temporary ends, was to be conducted on maxims different from what was required in an universal religion, erected on the general principles of spirit and truth. They did not reflect that *one* mean was to be pursued when the end was to keep a chosen family from the contagion of idol worship ; and *another* when an idolatrous world was to be invited to the profession of SAVING FAITH.

It is very observable, that, while the *fathers* were thus dishonouring Christianity by giving it the fashionable air of Paganism, the *philosophers*, on their side, were as busy in reforming and purifying their systems on the model of the great truths of Revelation *. And, what is yet more strange, this mutual approach still kept them at an irreconciled distance. For the advances on both sides were made for no other end than that each might the better keep their own ground ; the *philosophers*, by conciliating the reason ; the *fathers*, by indulging the passions ; into which various conduct they were alike betrayed by the condition of our common nature, unable either to bear pure and simple truth, or gross and undisguised error.

There were two things in Paganism, which, as they excited and kept up that amusing exercise of the mind, *admiration*, did, more strongly than any else, hold the people attached to idolatry ; and these were MYSTERIOUS RITES and HIDDEN DOCTRINES.

One would have thought it hard to find an equivalent for these in so simple and perfect a religion as the Christian ; yet the figurative expressions used in the institution of the *Lord's supper*, and the frequent mention of mysteries throughout the New Testament (though it be of mysteries which the genius of the gospel had *revealed* and *explained*, not of mysteries which it invented and kept hidden), gave occasion to accommodators to ancient prejudices to

* See The Divine Legation.

to speak of the *last supper* as a mysterious rite, to which they ventured to apply all the terms in use at the celebration of the Pagan mysteries; and to speak of REDEMPTION as of one of those hidden doctrines, which the fanatic *Platonists* of that time boasted they had in trust, for the purification and advancement of human nature.

This will account for a circumstance that never fails of giving scandal to the readers of Church-history: which is, that the principles and doctrines of the ancient *Heretics* were infinitely more shocking and absurd than those of any modern *sectaries*. The reason (we see) is, that the ancient Heretics formed their tenets on the principles of *Pagan philosophy*; while the modern sectaries form theirs on the books of *sacred Scripture*. And though the one was on philosophy reformed and purified, and the other is on the Bible perverted and misunderstood, yet the difference in favour of the latter becomes immense.

This mysterious genius of Paganism, together with its popular absurdities, naturally produced a method of teaching, which always pleases the imagination in proportion as it disgusts the judgement, that is to say, the use of *allegory*. A practice, excellently fitted to cover the early follies of *vulgar* Gentilism, and to ornament the late knaveries of the *philosophic*; but very abhorrent of the genius of Christianity, where every doctrine was rational, and therefore every rite should have been plain and open. Yet as allegory was become the general vehicle of instruction, and that which particularly distinguished the school of *Plato*; the FATHERS, who leaned most towards that sect, thought fit to go into that fashionable mode. They allegorized every thing; and their success was such as might be expected from so absurd an accommodation. Here again they were misled in their ignorance of the nature of the Jewish law: a law full of allegories, and figurative representations. And with great propriety so, as that religion was dependent on, and preparatory to the *Gospel*: which, being its *end* and completion, required to have some shadow of itself delineated in the steps which led to it.

But

But this, which shews the use of allegories to be reasonable in the *Old Testament*, shews the folly of expecting them in the *New*. For when the substance was advanced, and placed in full light, the shadow was of course to be cast behind. Yet, by the most unaccountable perversity, the very reason which the apostle gives for the necessity of interpreting the *law* figuratively, that *the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life*, was made the authority for using the *Gospel* in the same manner.

We have said, that the school to which the FATHERS chiefly inclined, was the *Academy*. There is a passage in St. Austin, which shews to what excess the authority of Plato was carried. In his *Confessions*, he returns thanks to God for having made the books of Plato an instrument of redeeming him from the errors of *Manicheism*. His partialities for that philosopher must have strangely blinded him; for, humanly speaking, nothing could have more contributed to keep him a Manichean than the doctrines of Plato, who held two coeternal principles, *God* and *matter*, and that the latter was the cause of evil. This fondness for the academy arose partly from its being the philosophy in vogue, and partly because (in consequence of that) several of the fathers came from that school into the church; but chiefly because they had entertained greater hopes of bringing over the Platonists to the faith, which, as Plato was in the highest credit, would be deemed a victory over philosophy in general. What they seemed to ground their hopes upon was the sceptical disposition of the academy as in its first institution. The earlier Platonists professed to seek truth; and were not ashamed to own they could not find it. It was therefore imagined they would gladly receive it, in doctrines so rationally deduced, and so clearly revealed. But in this they were deceived: for uncertainty is not the *state and condition* of the sceptic's knowledge, but the *principle and the genius* of it, and it was departing from the fundamental laws of their profession to acknowledge any thing certain. As for the enthusiastic part of this sect, which was now daily getting ground, the *magic*, to which they were so madly given,

given, kept them confined within its circle. This, and some manifest mischiefs, which even the warmest of the *fathers* could not but perceive, made them ever and anon, when in ill humour with a heretic, to execrate the schools of *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Pythagoras*, &c. and denounce each of them, in their turns, to be the great nurseries of error : as Tertullian did of the chief of them, who calls *Plato the common cook and seasoner of heresy**. But, falsely supposing that the evil arose from this or that particular sect, when it had its root in the constitution of them all, they went on exclaiming against their *particular doctrines*, and theologizing and reasoning on their *general principles*. We say the fathers would sometimes call the Greek philosophy the nursery of heresy. Nothing is more true. And yet all the difference between the *orthodox* and the *heretics*, as far as concerned their application of philosophy to religion, was only from less to more. The orthodox employed it to *explain* articles of faith ; and the heretics to *invent* them.

Thus much for a taste of the *didactic* theology of the fathers. Their *polemic* favoured as strongly of the same impure mixture. For, the form of argument, and force of confutation, came from the same shops : from the teaching *rbetors*, they learnt the art of reasoning by *similitudes* and *analogies* ; from the talking *orators*, that capital argument, called, *ad hominem* ; and from the wrangling *philosophers* of the academy, the address of *using any sort of principles*, to support their own opinions, or confute their adversaries. The three lasting bars to the discovery and advancement of truth.

But matters still grew from bad to worse ; till one black cloud of blind credulity had over-spread the Western world : this soon brought on a spiritual dominion, which took advantage of the confusions occasioned by the continued inroads of fierce barbarians, to strike its roots deep and wide into the fat and lumpish soil of

* *Omnium Hæreticorum condimentarium.*

Gothic ignorance. For as a *temporal* tyranny supports itself by corrupt *manners*, so a *spiritual* establisheth it's usurpation by corrupt *doctrines*. And, as in large empires subject to the temporal, the luxury of vice runs into *delicacies*; so, in those subject to the spiritual, the absurdity of doctrines hides itself in *subtilities*. Hence the original of the SCHOOLMEN's art; as we find it completed in the PERIPATETIC code of *sums* and *sentences*. And this was in the order of things: that what the *fanatic visions* of the *platonick* philosophy had brought into the faith, the *frigid subtleties* of the *Aristotelian* should support*. And it is observable, that the use the *schoolmen* made of their disputatious genius, was just the same the *sophists* had made before them. For triumphant dulness commonly grows wanton in the exercise of imputed wit†. And the *Sic* and *Non* of *Peter Abelard* was now as famous as heretofore the *προβάλλει* of *Gorgias*.

At length truth shot its ray into this chaos of disordered reason: but it came not directly from its source; but from the ferment of such passions as error and corruption are apt to raise amongst those who govern in, and benefit by, that state of confusion. For when a reform happens to arise from within, it cannot be supposed to have its birth in a *love* of truth; hardly, in the *knowledge* of it. Generally, some corrupt passion gratifies itself by decrying the grosser errors, supported by, and supporting, those it hates. The

* It is remarkable, that the *Mahometan Arabs*, by the assistance of the *same* philosophy, invented the same kind of *scholastic theology*: and, as with superior refinement, in proportion to the subtiler wits of that people; so, with better judgment: for that which obscures reason, will always be a cover for absurdity.

† It was held disgraceful when the *subtile Doctor* was so pressed by his opponent as to have no other way of extricating himself than by quoting Scripture (an expedient, in his ideas, like that of introducing *the God in the Machine*, which bungling poets were wont to have recourse to). M. Menage tells us he found the following entry in the register of the faculty at Paris—"Solida die sexta Julii ab Aurora ad vesperam fuit disputatum, et quidem tam SUBTILITER, ut ne verbum quidem de tota scriptura fuerit *allegatum*."

machine

3:6 INTRODUCTION TO JULIAN.

machine thus set a-going, truth hath fair play: she is now in turn to procure friends, and to attach them to her service. This was the case in the revolution we are about to speak of; and is the case of religious reformatations in general. For if, in the state of such established error, Providence was to wait till a love of truth had set men upon shaking off their bondage, its dispensations could never provide that timely aid, which we now find they always do to distressed humanity. For when the corruption hath spread so wide, as to make truth, if by chance she could be found, an indifferent object; what is there left, to enable men to break their fetters, but the clashing interests of the corruption itself? And it is knowing as little of the *religious*, as of the *moral* course of God's providence, to upbraid those, who have profited of this blessing, with the *baseness* of the instruments that procured it *.

However, the love of truth came afterwards in aid of those, whom St. Paul himself did not think fit to discourage, such as *preach Christ even of envy and strife*, to carry on the work of reformation. For though the *grossness* of the corruptions did not straitway make them *suspected*; yet, being tyrannically imposed, they soon became *bated*; and that hatred brought on the enquiry; which never ceased but with their detection. And then, those, whose honesty and courage emboldened them to make a secession from an Anti-Christian Church, found no way of standing in their new-recovered liberty, but by supplying their want of power with a superior share of knowledge.

To this every thing contributed. They were led, even by the spirit of opposition, to the fountain of truth, the Scriptures; from which they had been so long and violently excluded. And the Scriptures, as we observed, had, amongst their other advantages,

* " Si on veut réduire les causes des progres de la réforme à des principes simples, on verra, qu'en Allemagne ce fut l'Ouvrage de l'Interêt, en Angleterre celui de l'Amour; et en France celui de la Nouveauté, ou peut-être d'une *Chanson*." Voyez, *Memoirs pour servir à l'Histoire de Brandebourg de main de Maitre*, p. 27.

this

this peculiar virtue, to direct and enlarge the mind ; by providing it with such objects as were best suited for its contemplation ; and presenting them in such lights as most readily promoted its improvement by them. Such too was the gracious disposition of Heaven, that, at the very time these servants of truth were breaking open the recovered treasury of holy writ, the largest source of human learning was ready to pour in upon them. For a powerful nation of fierce enthusiasts, the enemies of the Christian name, had just driven Grecian literature from its native seats, and forced it to take refuge in the North West of Europe.

How admirable are the ways of Providence ! and how illustrious was this dispensation ! It directed the independent, the various, and the contrary revolutions of *these times*, to rectify the mischiefs occasioned by the *past* : whereby that very learning, which, in the first ages, had been perverted to corrupt Christianity, was now employed to purify and restore it : that very philosophy, which had been adopted to invent and explain articles of faith, was now studied only to instruct us in the history of the human mind, and to assist us in developing its faculties, and regulating its operations : and those very systems which had supported the whole body of *school divinity*, now afforded the principles proper to overturn it.

But in the course of this reform, it was not enough that the bad logic, on which the school-determinations rested, should be reduced to its just value. The service of truth required the invention of a better. A better was invented : and the superiority that followed from its use was immediately felt : So that our adversaries were soon reduced to avail themselves of the same advantages. Thus the true science of humanity opened and enlarged itself : It spread and penetrated through every quarter ; till it arrived at that distinguished height in which we place the true glory of these later ages.

The advantage of the *modern* over *ancient* times, in the successful pursuit of moral science, is now generally acknowledged.

And the impartial reader, who hath attended to these brief reflections, will, we presume, find no other cause, to which it can be so reasonably ascribed, as to the *genius* and the *constitution* of the Christian religion; whose *doctrines* reveal the great principles of moral truth; and whose *discipline* establishes a ministry consecrated to its support and service.

It is true, indeed, the concurrence of several cross accidents had for many ages deprived the world of these advantages: They had defeated the natural virtue and efficacy of the *doctrines*; and rendered the *discipline* vain and useless. For these two parts of the Christian system cannot act but in conjunction: separate them, and its doctrines will abound in *enthusiasms*, and its discipline, in *superstitions*. But now, since the cold and heavy incumbrance of *human inventions* hath been removed out of the *Lord's vineyard*, the ministers of religion have been enabled to produce that fruit which, from the beginning, they were enabled to cultivate and mature. So that greater improvements were made, during the last two hundred years, in the science of humanity, than in all the preceding ages put together.

Nor let any one, from what he may have seen not very conformable to these ideas, suspect the truth of this representation. It was never pretended that these advantages prevailed equally or constantly in all places, to which the influence of their causes had reached. As time would improve them in some, so it would impair them in others. All nature is in a constant flux, and every modification of it, however circumstanced, when considered locally, must have its period; and such as are most valuable, have, very often, the quickest. Of the advantages spoken of above, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND had made the best use: and the *system of man*, that is, of ethics and theology, had received there almost as many improvements, as the *system of nature*, amongst the same people, hath done since. It would have received more but for the evil influence which the corrupt and mistaken politics of those times have had upon it. For
politics

politics have ever had great effects on science. And this is natural. What is strange in the story is, that these studies gradually decay under an improved Constitution. Infomuch that there is now neither force enough in the public genius to emulate their forefathers; nor sense enough to understand the use of their discoveries. It would be an invidious task to enquire into the causes of this degeneracy. It is sufficient, for our humiliation, that we feel the effects. Not that we must suppose, there was nothing to dishonour the happier times which went before: there were too many: but then the mischiefs were well repaired by the abundance of the surrounding blessings. This church, like a fair and vigorous tree, once teemed with the richest and noblest burthen. And though, together with its best fruits, it pushed out some hurtful suckers, receding every way from the mother plant; crooked and misshapen, if you will, and obscuring and eclipsing the beauty of its stem; yet still there was something in their height and verdure which bespoke the generosity of the stock they rose from. She is now seen under all the marks of a total decay: her top scorched and blasted, her chief branches bare and barren, and nothing remaining of that comeliness which once invited the whole continent to her shade. The chief sign of life she now gives is the exuding from her sickly trunk a number of deformed fungus's; which call themselves of her, because they stick upon her surface, and suck out the little remains of her sap and spirits.

To conclude: my more immediate concern in these observations was to justify the FATHERS from the injurious contempt under which they now lye. But, in the course of this apology, I have endeavoured to serve a greater purpose; which was, to vindicate our holy Religion from its supposed impotency and incapacity to direct and enlarge the reasoning faculties, in the discovery and advancement of moral truth.

So far then as to the *genius and literary talents* of the *Fathers*: their *moral* character is a distinct question; and would well bear, and does deserve a full examination. But I have already gone beyond

my limits. However, this I may venture to say, that the men most prejudiced against them, though they talk, will never be able to prove, that the *Fathers* had an immoral intention to deceive. If there be any learned man who thinks otherwise, I would advise him, before he attempts to prosecute this charge against them, to weigh well the force of the following remark, though made on somewhat a different occasion. “Whenever” (says the fine author of the *Spirit of Laws*) “one observes, in any age or government, “ the several bodies in a community intent on augmenting their own “ authority, and vigilant to procure certain advantages to themselves “ exclusive of each other’s pretensions, we should run a very great “ chance of being deceived if we regarded these attempts as a cer- “ tain mark of their corruptions. By an unhappiness inseparable “ from the condition of humanity, moderation is a rare virtue in “ men of superior talents. And as it is always more easy to push “ on force in the direction in which it moves, than to stop or divert “ its moment ; perhaps, in the class of superior geniuses, you will “ sooner find men extremely virtuous, than extremely prudent *.”

• Lorsque dans un siècle, ou dans un gouvernement, on voit les divers corps de l’état chercher à augmenter leur autorité, & à prendre les uns sur les autres de certains avantages, on se tromperoit souvent, si l’on regardoit leurs entreprises, comme une marque certaine de leur corruption. Par un malheur attaché à la condition humaine, les Grands-hommes modérés sont rares ; & comme il est toujours plus aisé de suivre sa force que de l’arrêter, peut-être dans la classe des gens supérieurs, est-il plus facile de trouver des gens extrêmement vertueux, que les hommes extrêmement sages. L’Esprit des Loix, V. II. p. 334. 8vo edit.

A
D I S C O U R S E

ON THE ATTEMPT OF THE
E M P E R O R J U L I A N

TO REBUILD THE
T E M P L E O F J E R U S A L E M.

B O O K I.

IN reflecting on the state of this new controversy, concerning MIRACLES, *two* things seemed to be wanting, though very useful to oppose to the insinuations of licentious readers, who are commonly more forward to come to a conclusion than the disputants themselves; the *one* was, to shew that *all* the miracles recorded in *church-history* are *not* forgeries or delusions: The *other*, that the evidence of most of them doth *not* stand on the same foot of credit with the miracles recorded in *Gospel-history*. For most theological debates amongst churchmen, notwithstanding the service they do to truth, occasion this sensible mischief to the people, that the enemies of religion spread abroad *their own* consequences from them, as the consequences of the *doctrines advanced*, how contrary soever to the express reasonings and declarations of the parties concerned.

To

To obviate therefore the ABUSES arising from the management of the present question, I have taken upon me to *defend* A MIRACLE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY; and to *enquire into the nature of that evidence, which will demand the assent of every reasonable man to a miraculous fact.*

The first part of this plan is prosecuted in the following sheets: The second will afford a subject for another discourse.

My chief purpose here is to prove the miraculous interposition of Providence, in defeating the attempt of JULIAN to rebuild the TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM.

As my design in writing is in behalf of our common Christianity, and not to support or to discredit the particular doctrines of this or that church or age; I have taken for my subject a miracle worked by the immediate hand of God, and not through the agency of his servants.

So that, whether the power of miracles as exercised by the apostles, and their first followers, ceased with them, or was conveyed to their successors of the next age, is a question that doth not at all affect the present subject: for, God's shortening the hands of his servants doth not imply that he shortened his own.

C H A P. I.

WHEN God, in his mercy, had decreed to restore mankind to the state of immortality forfeited by Adam, he saw fit, in order to preserve the memory of himself amidst a world running headlong into idolatry, to select a single family, which, advanced into a nation, might, in the interim, become the repository of his holy name. To this purpose he took the seed of Abraham, in reward of the virtues of their forefathers, and, in due time, brought them, by leaders chosen from amongst themselves, to the land he had appointed for them.

In

In compliance with the religious notions of those times, he condescended, when he communicated himself as the Maker and Governor of the Universe, to adopt them for his peculiar people, under the idea of their *tutelar Deity*, or the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And, the better to secure the great end of their separation, assumed likewise the title and office of their *King*, or Civil Governor.

Hence their Religion came under the idea of a *Law*; and was so considered and denominated. And their Law was, in the strictest sense, *Religion*, as having all the sanctions of a divine command.

In a word, those two great rules of human conduct, which are, elsewhere, kept so distinct by their different originals, and different administrations, were, here, by the sameness in both, specifically lost in a perfect incorporation. And the whole œconomy (as every thing in this dispensation was relative to the Jews as a body) went under the common name of *LAW*.

From this account of the Jewish constitution, it follows, That Religion, which, elsewhere, hath only *particulars* for its subjects, had, Here, the nation or *community*: And what, elsewhere, as far as concerns the divine origin of religion, is only a *private* matter, was, Here, a *public*: For the Deity being both their tutelary God and civil Governor, the proper object of his care, in each capacity, was the collective body: and, whether we consider the observance due to him under the idea of Law or Religion, it was still the body which was the proper subject of it. Not but that religion had there a *private* part, or particulars for its subject: But then it was that religion we call *natural*; founded in what reason discovers of the relation between the Creator and the creature; an aid, which revelation is so far from rejecting, that we find it constitutes the ground of every extraordinary dispensation vouchsafed by God to mankind. For, *he that cometh to God [i. e. by revelation] must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him* *.

* Heb. xi. 6.

From this account of the Hebrew Government, one natural consequence ariseth, That the principal rites of their *religion* and *law* were to be performed and celebrated in some determined place. This, the object and subject of their *ceremonial* seemed equally to require. For, the ideas of tutelary God and King implied a local residence : and a national act, created by the relations arising from these things, required a fixed and certain place for its celebration : and both together seemed to mark out the capital of the country for that purpose.

This consequent practice, which the nature and reason of things so evidently point out, the institutes of the Hebrew constitution expressly order and enjoin. During the early and unsettled times of the Jewish state, the sacrifices, prescribed by their ritual, were directed to be offered up before the door of an ambulatory tabernacle : but when they had gained the establishment decreed for them, and a magnificent temple was erected for religious worship, then all their sacrifices were to be offered at Jerusalem only.

Now, sacrifices constituting the substance of their national worship, their religion could not be said to subsist longer than the continuance of that celebration. But sacrifices could be performed only in one appointed temple : so that when this was finally destroyed, according to the predictions of the prophets, the institution itself became abolished.

Nor was any thing more consonant to the *nature* of this religion, than the assigning such a celebration of its rites. The temple would exist while they remained a people, and continued sovereign : and when they ceased to be such, they would indeed lose their temple, but then they had no further use for it ; because the rites there celebrated were relative to them, only as a civil politic nation.

These consequences are all so necessarily connected, and were so clearly understood, that when Jesus informs the woman of Samaria of the approaching abolition of the law of Moses, he expresses himself

self by this circumstance, that men should *no longer worship at the temple of Jerusalem* *.

As on the other hand, when the false witnesses against Stephen deposed that they heard him say, that *Jesus of Nazareth would destroy the holy place, the Temple*, they drew their own inference from it, that he *would change the law and customs which Moses had delivered them* †.

If, from the *nature* of this religion, we go on to consider its *end*, we shall find, in it, all the marks of a religion, preparatory and introductory to another more complete and perfect; of which it contains the rudiments, and presents the shadow. Such as the confining its fundamental doctrine, the worship of the true God, within the limits of one small country. Such again, as its multifarious and enigmatic ritual; of which no reasonable account can be had, but that part was instituted to oppose the reigning superstitions, in order to preserve the separation; and part to prefigure, by types or symbols, the essential circumstances of some future dispensation. And part again by the admirable contrivance of divine Wisdom. Both opposed the reigning superstitions, and prefigured the future dispensation.

But Christianity, which established its pretensions by the power of miracles and the purity of doctrine, doth in fact support these conclusions, by representing Judaism as only the rudiments and shadow of its own more complete œconomy.

This being premised, we say, that the more perfect dispensation could not take place till the less perfect, which prefigured it, and prepared its way, was set aside and abolished.

But now, if the mere voluntary adherence to a religion, or men's calling themselves of it, were enough to prevent its abolition, the perverseness and obstinacy of our nature are such, that

* John iv. 21.

† Acts vi. 13, 14. And in this the falshood of their testimony seemed to consist. For Stephen could never have spoken so crudely of the destruction of the *Law*, when his Master had said, he was *not come to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it*, Matt. v. 17.

they might, and, in fact, would lie in the way, and obstruct the purposes of Providence.

Therefore has the great Disposer of all things so divinely constituted this preparatory religion, as to put it out of the power of human perversity even to delay or retard its destined abolition ; by so constituting the natures, and disposing the order of his dispensations, that those essential rites, which made the Jewish religion to be what it was, should of necessity require a fixed local celebration, which it was not possible to perform longer than while the Jewish people continued a nation, and in possession of the sovereignty of Palestine. St. Chrysostom has an elegant observation to this purpose : “ From the necessity (says he) of a local worship, God covertly withdrew the Jews from the rage of ritual observances. “ For as a Physician, by breaking the cup, prevents his patient “ from indulging his appetite in a hurtful draught ; so God withheld them from their sacrifices, by destroying the city itself, and “ making the place inaccessible to all of them *.”

It may not be improper, in this place, to take notice of an objection, though indeed it be already obviated. It is, “ that the sacrificing at Jerusalem being a mere ceremony, we can hardly conceive how the want of it should annihilate the whole system of a religious institution. The objection goes upon ideas foreign to the subject. The *essence* of the Jewish religion was *ceremonial*. Hence it is, that there is no word in the Hebrew language that signifies what we mean by *ceremonies* : nor, if what we have delivered, concerning the nature and genius of the Jewish religion, be true, could there be any such. The same is observable in the Greek language. And the reason is the same. It hath been shewn elsewhere †, that this nature was common both to the Jewish and Greek religions ; rational indeed, in the former ; but altogether absurd in the other.

* Διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀνάγκης λαοθανόντος αὐτὸς ἀπέργασε, τῆς σιμὶ τὸ πρῶτον μακρίας—ἀσπερ ὅτι ἰατρὸς ἴσται τῆς ἀκαίρου ψυχροποσίας τὸν ἄρρωστον, τὸ σκεῖν ἀφαιήσας, ὅτι καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τὸν θυσιῶν ἀπέργασε, τὸν πόλιν αὐτὴν καθύλων, καὶ ποιήσας αὐτὴν ἀβυσσὸν πάντων. Homil. VI. advers. Jud.

† Divine Legation.

Yet it will be said, the Romans had a word to express *ceremonies*. It is true, they had. And the reason of their having it will shew why the Jews and Greeks had it not. Their lawgiver, Numa, instituted a kind of system of *natural* religion for their *national* use ; which, time and craft soon corrupted with gross idolatries. So that as superstitions accumulated, they would be under a necessity of inventing a word to signify that specific mode of worship, through which such superstitions were conveyed.

Thus Judaism being of necessity to cease on the establishment of Christianity, we see for what reason it was predicted, that when *Sbilob came, the sceptre should depart from Judah*. Admirable are the ways of Providence ! and so will they be always found, whenever we happen upon the clue, that leads us to the right opening.

If then, from the nature of things, it doth appear, that the **TEMPLE WORSHIP** must fall with the rise of that which is *in spirit and in truth* ; and that the abolition of the Mosaic law is essential to the establishment of the Gospel ; we cannot but conclude, that a matter of this importance (so illustrious a proof of the relation and dependance between these two religions !) must be predicted, both by the prophets of the *old*, and the Founder of the *new* dispensation.

They both, indeed, have done it. And fully to comprehend the force and just value of their expressions was the end for which we have here deduced things from their original, and given this general view of the course and order of God's moral œconomy ; on which, the sense of the prophecies relating to it must needs be determined : and without which, the several predictions of the destruction of the temple, expressed in general terms, would be subject to cavil, as in themselves implying only a *total*, and not a *final* subversion. Whereas now, from the nature of the dispensations, we understand that a destruction, thus foretold, necessarily implied a *final* one.

The prophet Isaiah, predicting, as usual, the triumphs of the Gospel under the terms of a temporal deliverance of the Jews from their hostile neighbours, delivers himself in the following words : “ And in this mountain [*viz.* of Zion] shall the Lord of Hosts “ make *unto all people* a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the “ lees, of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well re- “ fined. And he will destroy in this mountain *the face of the cover- “ ing cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations.* “ He will *swallow up death in victory* *.” And to shew, that some great event in a remote and future age was the principal object of his prophecy, he introduces it with this song of triumph : “ O Lord, “ thou art my God, I will exalt thee, I will praise thy name ; for “ thou hast done wonderful things ; *thy counsels of old are faithful- “ nefs and truth* † ;” *i. e.* What thou hast originally decreed, thou wilt, in the latter ages, bring to pass. Therefore having, in the *sixth* verse, enigmatically described that salvation which should arise from mount Zion ; in the *seventh*, he more openly intimates the abolition of the Temple-worship, by the figure of destroying that *veil*, which, at the crucifixion of the Lord of life, the evangelist informs us, *was rent in twain from the top to the bottom* ; called by the prophet, from the confined nature of the Jewish religion, the veil that hid truth from the nations. In this sense St. Paul appears to have understood the prophecy ; for he applies the concluding words to the last triumph of Christ over *death* ‡.

Conformably to these ideas, Jesus says to the woman of *Samaria*, “ Believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this “ mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father.—But the “ hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall wor- “ ship the Father in spirit and in truth §.” And to secure the honour of this great event, Providence had decreed that the city and temple of Jerusalem should be destroyed ; of which the angel

* Chap. xxv. ver. 6, 7, 8.

† Isai. xxv. 1.

‡ 1 Cor. xv. 54.

§ John iv. 21, 22, 23.

informs

informs Daniel in the following words: “ And after threescore and
 “ two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself; and the
 “ people of the prince that shall come shall destroy the *city* and the
 “ *sanctuary*; and the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto
 “ the end of the war *desolations* are determined. And he shall con-
 “ firm the covenant with many for one week: and in the midst of
 “ the week he shall cause the sacrifice and oblation to cease, and
 “ for the overspreading of *abominations*, he shall make it *desolate*,
 “ even until the consummation, and that determined shall be poured
 “ upon the desolate *.” In which we see a plain and circumstan-
 tial description of the overthrow of the city and temple by the
 Romans under Titus. Jesus foretels the then approaching event in
 the following manner: “ And when Jesus was come near, he
 “ beheld the *city*, and wept over it, saying—The days shall come
 “ upon thee, that thine enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and
 “ compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side, and shall
 “ lay thee even with the ground, and thy children within thee;
 “ and they shall not leave in thee one stone upon another †.” Two
 other evangelists ‡ inform us, “ that Jesus went out, and departed
 “ from the *temple*; and his disciples came to him for to shew him
 “ the buildings of the temple. And Jesus said unto them, See ye
 “ not all these things? Verily, I say unto you, there shall not be
 “ left here one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.”
 And when the disciples *privately* asked him *when these things should*
be, he answered, *When ye shall see the abomination of desolation spoken*
of by Daniel the prophet, standing in the holy place; referring to the
 prophecy quoted above. Hitherto we see a total destruction inde-
 finitely predicted. The following passage of St. Luke’s Gospel
 marks the fixed duration of it. “ And Jerusalem (says Jesus) shall
 “ be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles
 “ be fulfilled §.” But, of the period here meant, commentators

* Dan. ix. 26, 27.

† Luke xix. 41, 43, 44.

‡ Matt. xxiv. 1, 2. 15. Mark xiii. 1, 2. 14.

§ Luke xxi. 24.

differ :

differ : Some, as Hammond, suppose it reaches no lower than till the empire became Christian : others, as Dr. S. Clarke, that it extends to the future conversion of the Jews.

Amidst this uncertainty, arising from the general expressions of these prophecies considered alone, the only way of coming to the truth, *i. e.* to know whether they mean a *final* destruction, or, if not, what sort of restoration ; and when it is to succeed ; the only way, I say, is to recur to what hath been discoursed above, concerning the *nature* of the TWO DISPENSATIONS : In which we have shewn, that *Christianity* and the *Temple-worship* cannot subsist together : and so must conclude, that these prophecies foretel not only the *total*, but the *final* destruction of the Jewish temple.

And now, What are we to conclude from all this, to the case in hand ?—It is evident, a *repugnancy* in the co-existence of Judaism and Christianity, would require God's interposition to prevent the restoration of the temple : it is as evident, that a *prophecy* of its *final* destruction would do the same. *Either* of these facts therefore being sufficient to establish our point, so much discourse had not been employed on *both*, had they stood independent of one another. But the *prophecies* being *so* delivered, as to be of themselves ambiguous, there was a necessity of calling-in the *nature* of God's dispensations, to explain their precise meaning ; which prophecies would, then, reciprocally support what we infer from the different *genius* of the two religions.

If it be asked (as there is now no secret in the counsels of God but what audacious man will ask the reason of) “ Why the *final* destruction of the temple was so doubtfully delivered, that there was need of our having recourse to the nature and genius of the two dispensations, to comprehend the full meaning of the prophecy ;” I answer, in general, that it seems very irreverent, when God hath clearly made known his will to us, to cavil with his wisdom, for not doing it in that way which to us may seem the most direct and simple. But, in this case it happens, that we see great *ends* obtain-

ed,

ed, by the very *way* he hath been pleased to use. For by obliging us to have recourse to the nature of his *dispensations*, in order to ascertain the full meaning of his *prophecies*, he hath put us under the necessity of having always in view a circumstance of great moment, which we might otherwise be apt to forget; a circumstance which impresseth on us the strongest ideas of the divine wisdom. Had the abolition of Judaism, on the establishment of Christianity, been only *expedient*, and not *necessary*, as even in that case we may be assured it had been in God's counsel never to suffer the temple to be rebuilt, so we may well believe that the revelation of this counsel by prophecy had been in the express terms of a *final* destruction; because, from the *expediency* only of an abolition, general terms could never lead us to conclude the predicted destruction to be *final*. But now as the abolition was *necessary*, that alone would suffice to fix the precise meaning of general terms. And as the use of general terms would oblige us to have recourse to those circumstances on which the necessity was founded, and the constant view of those circumstances is highly useful for religious purposes, therefore were general terms very wisely employed.

It may perhaps be further objected, "That the reasons here given for the necessity of abolishing Judaism, on the coming of Christianity, reach no farther than to a *virtual* abolition: whereas it is an *actual* abolition only that can serve our purpose."

To this I reply, That the abolition of a preparatory religion, on the appearance of that which was to follow, is not a matter of every day's experience. There is but this one instance in the world, and never will be another. Let us divest ourselves, therefore, of all those common notions we form from analogies, and we shall see that reason leads us to expect an *actual* abolition. Indeed, according to our ideas of the general nature of religion, an *actual* abolition could not be certainly had, without a force upon free-will; hence, in such cases, a *virtual* abolition is all we are to expect; and, from a consideration of the general nature of religion, we are misled into this objection. But the religion in question was of a peculiar

peculiar kind. The *essential part* of it was a *local worship*. This might be *actually* abolished without any force upon the will. When therefore an abolition was *foretold*, and the *necessity* of it seen, must we not conclude such a one to be meant? On the whole, a *virtual* abolition of *circumcision*, *purification*, *distinction of meats*, &c. which regarded particulars directly, and the body, only obliquely, was all that could be expected: but the nature of things seems to require an *actual* abolition of what concerned only the body as such; which was the *temple-worship*. To these many other reasons might be added, such as the apparent necessity of shewing, that this nation was no longer God's *peculiar*; which could hardly be done while they were in possession of a worship, that was the characteristic mark of God's *peculiarity*: and such as the transferring the kingship of the Jews from God to *Christ*; which would not appear to be done while the temple-worship, the specific act of allegiance, was in being. There are various considerations besides of equal weight. But we may seem perhaps to have already exceeded the proportion that the parts of this discourse should bear to one another.

And yet I am tempted to make one observation more, which, I hope, the importance of the subject will excuse.

The prophecy of Jesus, concerning the approaching destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, is conceived in such high and swelling terms, that not only the modern interpreters, but the ancient likewise, have supposed that our Lord interweaves into it a *DIRECT* prediction of his second coming to judgement*. Hence arose a current opinion of *those* times, that the consummation of all things was at hand; which hath afforded a handle to an infidel objection in *these*, insinuating that Jesus, in order to keep his followers attached to his service, and patient under sufferings, flattered them with the near approach of those rewards which compleated all their views and expectations. To which, the defenders of religion have opposed this answer, That the distinction of short and long, in the

* See Divine Legation.

duration of time, is lost in eternity; and, with the Almighty, *a thousand years are but as yesterday, &c.*

But the principle both go upon is false; and if what hath been said be duly weighed, it will appear, that the parts of this prophesy which mark a speedy advent do not respect God's *second* coming to judgement, but his *first*; in the abolition of the Jewish policy, and the ESTABLISHMENT of the Christian: that *kingdom of Christ*, which commenced on the total ceasing of the *theocracy*. For as God's reign over the Jews entirely ended with the abolition of the *temple-service*, so the reign of *Christ, in spirit and in truth*, had then its first beginning.

This was the true ESTABLISHMENT of Christianity, not that effected by the *donations or conversions of Constantine*. Till the Jewish Law was abolished, over which the *Father* presided as King, the reign of the *Son* could not take place; because the sovereignty of *Christ* over mankind, was that very sovereignty of God over the Jews, *transferred*, and more largely extended.

This therefore being one of the most important æras in the œconomy of grace; and the most awful revolution in all God's religious dispensations; we see the elegance and propriety of the terms in question, to denote so *great an event*, together with the *destruction of Jerusalem*, by which it was effected: for in the old prophetic language* the change and fall of principalities and powers, whether *spiritual* or *civil*, are signified by the shaking heaven and earth; the darkening the sun and moon, and the falling of the stars; as the rise and establishment of *new ones* are by processions in the clouds of heaven, by the sound of trumpets, and the assembling together of hosts and congregations†.

Thus much, therefore, being premised, we enter directly on our subject; it being now seen, that the truth of Christianity must stand or fall with the ruin or the restoration of the temple at Je-

* See The Divine Legation, vol II.

† Matt. chap. xxiv.

rusalem ; for if that temple should be rebuilt for the purpose of Jewish worship, Christianity could not support its pretensions ; nor the Prophets, nor Jesus, the truth of their predictions.

C H A P. II.

THERE was a time when the *powers of this world* were all opposed to the progress of the *gospel* ; and as they continued thus opposed for some ages, it would have been a miracle, as rare as most of those by which it was supported, if, amongst the various attempts to suppress and discredit it, there had not been a project formed to give the lie to those prophecies which denounced lasting ruin and desolation to the *Jewish Temple*.

The first attempt upon Christianity was such as was most natural to this *power*, the suppressing it by brutal force : and the subjection of the whole civilized world to the despotic will of one blind persecutor, gave that force its utmost moment. The violence of its effort was TEN times repeated ; and as often, by the blood of the martyrs, victoriously repelled.

Though this may be justly reckoned amongst the marks of its divinity, yet it must be owned, that brutal force was not the most artful or dangerous way of procuring the ruin even of what they thought it, a mere human contrivance. The utmost which force can do (and that it often fails in) is to stop the progress of a profession : while the same advantages of power, employed towards a rational conviction of its falsehood, proceed more fatally to its subversion. But this method of attack required a comprehensive knowledge of human nature, and of the doctrines to be suppressed.

Few of the persecuting emperors had either. M. Antoninus had the one ; Julian only, who closed the scene, had both. Till his time, the sole engine was simple force. Antonine himself used no other. And yet his knowledge of men might have shewn him the folly of so unmanly a proceeding. But then he knew no more of
 Chris-

Christianity than the most ignorant of his courtiers. Philosophy, which should have led him to enquire into a religion that all were running eagerly to embrace, was the very thing that restrained his curiosity. For Stoical pride (of which sect he was) would confess no need of the knowledge of falsehood to perfect its followers in truth : It despised the oblique genius of the Academy, which made all truth to depend on the knowledge and detection of falsehood.

Julian was the first who got enough acquainted with the Gospel to apply such arms against it as must have ended in its ruin, had it been nothing more than what he affected to think it, a human invention. And here we shall be forced to confess, that Providence seems to have raised up this extraordinary man on set purpose to do the last honours to the Religion of Jesus ; to shew the world what *human power*, with all its advantages united, was able to oppose to its establishment. For we find in this emperor all the great qualities that a projector could conceive, or an adversary would require, to secure success to so daring an opposition. He was eloquent and liberal ; artful, insinuating, and indefatigable ; which, joined to a severe temperance, an affected love of justice, and a courage superior to all trials, first gained him the affections, and, soon after, the peaceable possession of the whole empire.

He was bred up in the Christian religion from his infancy : and was obliged to profess it (or at least to disguise his passion * for Paganism) to the time he assumed the purple. His aversion to his uncle Constantine, and his cousin Constantius, for the cruelties exercised on his family, had prejudiced him against the Christian religion : and his attachment to some Platonic sophists, who had been employed in his education, gave him as violent a bias towards Paganism. He was ambitious ; and Paganism, in some of its Thœurgic rites, had flattered and encouraged his views of the diadem : He was vain, which made him aspire to the glory of re-estab-

* A rudimentis pueritiæ primis inclinatio erat erga numinum cultum, paullatimque adulescens desiderio rei flagrabat. Am. Marc. l. xxii. c. 5.

lishing the ancient rites: he was extremely knowing, and fond of Grecian literature; the very soul of which, in his opinion *, was the old Theology: But above all, notwithstanding a considerable mixture of enthusiasm †, his superstition was excessive, and what nothing but the blood of *hecatombs* could appease.

With these dispositions he came to the empire; and, consequently, with a determined purpose of subverting the Christian, and restoring the Pagan worship. His predecessors had left him the repeated experience of the inefficacy of downright force. The *virtue* of the first Christians then rendered this effort fruitless; the *numbers* of the *present* would have now made it dangerous. He found it necessary therefore to change his ground: his knowledge of human nature furnished him with arms; and his knowledge of the faith he had abandoned, enabled him to direct those arms to most advantage.

He began with re-establishing Paganism by law ‡, and granting a full liberty of conscience to the Christians. On this principle, he restored those to their civil rights, of what party soever, who had been banished on account of religion; and even affected to reconcile, to a mutual forbearance, the various sects of Christianity. Yet notwithstanding, his own historian assures us, he put on this mask of moderation and equity, for no other purpose than to inflame the dissensions in the church §. And his subsequent conduct fully justifies the historian's observation.

He then fined and banished || such of the more popular clergy as had abused their power, either in exciting the people to burn and

* Vid. Ep. Jul. xlii.

† Οὗτος [Ἰουλιανὸς] ἰς τὸ τοιάυτ' ὑπερίστας Δαίμονων.—Libanii Or. de ulc. Juliani nece.

‡ Planis absolutisque decretis aperiri templa, arisque hostias admoveri ad deorum statuit cultum. Am. Mar. l. xxii. c. 5.

§ Utque dispositorum roboraret effectum, dissidentes Christianorum antistites cum plebe discissa in palatium intromissos monebat, ut, civilibus discordiis confopitis, quisque, nullo vetante, religioni suæ serviret intrepidus. Quod agebat ideo obstinate, ut dissensiones, augente licentia, non timeret unanimantem postea plebem. Idem ib.

|| Nazian. Orat. i. cont. Jul.

destroy pagan temples, or to commit violence on an opposite sect. And it cannot be denied but that their turbulent and insolent manners deserved all the severity of his justice.

He proceeded to revoke and take away those immunities, honours, and revenues*, which his uncle and cousin had granted to the clergy. Neither was his pretence for this altogether unreasonable. He judged the grants to be exorbitant; and besides, as they were attendant on a *national religion*, when the *establishment* came to be transferred from Christianity to Paganism, he concluded they must follow the religion of the state. But there was one immunity he took away, which no good policy, even under an establishment, should have granted them; which was an exemption † from the civil *tribunals*.

The Apostate went still further; he disqualified the Christian laity for bearing office in the state: and even this, the security of the established religion may often require.

But his most illiberal treatment of the Christians, was his forbidding the professors, who were of that religion, to teach *humanity* and the sciences, in the public schools. His more immediate design, in this, was to hinder the youth from taking impressions to the disadvantage of Paganism: His remoter view, to deprive Christianity of the support of human literature ‡.

Not

* Κληρικῶς μίλοι, ὡς πρὸς ἀτίλητον καὶ τιμὴν καὶ τὰ σιτηρίσια ἀποδίδωμι Κωνσταντῶν [Κωνσταντῶν Val.] Soz. l. v. c. 5.

† Τοῖς βουλευμένοις ἀποδίδωμι. Soz. l. v. c. 5.

‡ This edict is to be found amongst the works of Julian; and goes under the name of his xliid epistle. It forbids the Christian Professors to *teach* human literature. But because the ancients, such as Gregory Naz. Socrates, Sozomene, Theodoret, and Rufinus, expressly say, that he forbade Christians to *learn* it; some modern critics have embarrassed themselves in according this imaginary difference. Baronius and Valeſius, who could not find it was forbidden, by this edict, to *learn*, concluded there was no such prohibition. Tillemont and Fleuri will not allow the fathers to be mistaken; and therefore imagine there was another edict, which extended the prohibition to the case in question. Tillemont supposes this the more readily, because he thinks the xliid letter is indefinite and obscure. It appears to me very clear and precise; and it seems
strange

Not content with this, he endeavoured even to destroy what was already written in defence of Christianity. With this view he wrote to Ecdicius the governor of Egypt, and to Porphyry the treasurer-general, to collect up, and send to him the library * of George bishop of Alexandria, who for his cruelty and tyranny had been torn in pieces by the people.

strange none of these critics saw, that, as this prohibition is circumstanced in the edict, the not being allowed to *learn* was the necessary consequence of being forbid to *teach*. For the Professors are not only disallowed to explain Pagan authors to Pagan auditories, but to Christian likewise; as appears from the following words, *But if they* [the Christian professors] *think these authors give a false and unworthy account of the tremendous majesty of the immortals, let them go and explain Matthew and Luke in the churches of the Galileans.* εἰ δὲ οἱ εἰς τιμωρίαν ὑπελαμβάνουσι περιλαῖνθαι, βαδίζοντες εἰς τὰς τῶν Γαλιλαίων ἐκκλησίας, ἐκρηγοῦμεν Μάρκῳ καὶ Λουκᾷ. But why was this said, if they were at liberty to teach the Christian youth the sciences? If they were not, Where could they go for instruction but to the schools of the Pagan Professors? Hither, indeed, they are invited by the edict itself. *Those of the* [Christian] *youth* (says Julian) *who are desirous of frequenting* [the schools of the Pagan professors] *are by no means to be excluded.* Ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν τῶν φιλοῦν, οὐκ ἀποκλείουται. This was kind; but would by no means be accepted. Here the bait was half off the hook; and discovered, that to draw them thither was one end of the edict: which he imagined would necessarily reduce things to this state, either to dispose the Galileans, during their youth, in favour of Paganism; or to disable them, in their adult age, to defend Christianity. So that it appears, from hence, his forbidding Christian professors to *explain* Pagan writers to any audience whatsoever, fully amounted to a prohibition of *learning* them. The Fathers, we see, did not scruple directly to affirm it. And that they believed it, appears from their finding no other way of avoiding the dilemma of *corruption*, or *ignorance*, than by composing Epic poems, tragedies, and other classic compositions upon a Christian plan, and on subjects taken from sacred story. This circumstance (had Baronius and Valetius attended to it) was alone sufficient to shew them, that the Fathers have told us no more than what they saw and felt, when they said, that Julian forbid them to *learn* human literature, as well as to *teach* it. Let me add, that nothing but this interpretation of his edict can account for the severe censure which his own historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, passes upon it, in the following words; “illud autem erat inclemens, obtrundum perenni silentio, quod arcebat docere magistros “rhetoricos et grammaticos, ritus Christiani cultores.” Lib. xxii. c. 10.

* Ep. ix. and xxxvi.—πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν φιλόσοφα παρ’ αὐτῷ, πολλὰ δὲ ἑλεμένα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν διανοουμένων Γαλιλαίων διδασκαλίας, ἃ βουλόμην μὲν ἡρσιάζεσθαι πάλιν. Ep. ix.

Nay, to such a length did his aversion to the name of CHRIST carry him, as to decree, by a public edict, that his followers should be no longer called Christians, but *Galileans* *. Not but there might be a mixture of policy in it too, as knowing the efficacy of a *nick-name* to render a profession ridiculous. However, it is more than probable, superstition had its share in this unprinciply edict. The fanatic Platonists, to whom *Julian* had entirely given himself up, were much besotted with the mysterious *power of names*. These having been struck with the wonders performed by the name of *Christ*, and finding so many difficulties oppose themselves to their master's exterminating scheme, might well fancy there was a certain *charm* in the word *Christian*, which rendered the religion, so denominated, invincible. And this seems to be the ground *Gregory Naz.* went upon (if he had any) for saying, that the reason of this extraordinary law might be, that *Julian* trembled at the name of *Christ*, just as the *Demons* did, who suffered torments as often as they heard it pronounced †.

A man so transported by a train of the most ungoverned passions, we may well suppose, would stop at no means, how low and vile soever, to carry on his project. His letters afford us an instance of one so dishonourable, that no testimony but his own could make it credible. Titus, bishop of Bosra, and his clergy, in an address presented to *Julian*, acquaint him with their care in keeping the flock committed to them (then equal in number to the Pagans) in due obedience to the laws. The return *Julian* makes for this act of duty, is to acquaint the people of Bosra, that their bishop was become their delator; that he had represented them as prone to sedition, and even capable of the last excesses,

* Γαλιλαίως ὁπλὴ Χριστιανῶν ὀνομάσας· τι καὶ καλεῖσθαι ἀμελετήσας. *Greg. Naz. Orat. ii. conf.*
Jul.

† ἡ ζυβώμενός γε τὸν δόγματι τῆς περυσιοῦρας, ἀπὸ τοῦ οἱ δαίμονες· καὶ διὰ τούτου μεταβαλὼν ἐξ' ἑαυτοῦ, ὄνομα τῶν ὡς ἐκαλεῖτο, ὡς γινώσκων. *Orat. iii.*

Καὶ οἱ μὴ δαίμονες φερίτωσι εἰς ἑνὶ καὶ οὗτον Χριστὸν καλεσμένον, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς καλίας ἀμὰ ἐξέταλος γόργου ἢ τοῦ δεινὰτος τούτου δόγματος. *Orat. i.*

but that he and his clergy kept them in order. For this crime therefore, which he calls the taking to himself the merit of the people's good behaviour, he advises them to expel the bishop from their city *.

After this, no instance of baseness or injustice will be thought strange. On pretence that the Arian church of Edeffa was too rich, and had not used the Valentinians with temper, he seized on every thing belonging to it, and divided the plunder amongst his soldiers. And, to add the bitterness of contumely to his injustice, he told them he did it to ease them of their burthens, that they might proceed more lightly, and with less impediment in their journey to Heaven †.

But Socrates, the historian, tells us, that he imposed a tax or tribute, proportioned to every man's circumstances, on all who would not sacrifice ‡. This was persecution in form: and yet he did not stop here, but proceeded to still greater extremities.

Though he did not persecute to death by laws, that being directly contrary to his edicts of toleration, which he had with so much ostentation and frequency repeated; yet he connived at the *fury* of the people, and the *brutality* of the governors of provinces; who, during his short reign, brought many martyrs to the stake. For he put such into governments, whose inhumanity and blind zeal for their country-superstitions were most distinguished. And when the suffering churches presented their complaints to him, he dismissed them with cruel scoffs; telling them §, their religion di-

* Ep. lii. Βορυσάκης. It is remarkable, that the author of the *Characteristicks*, in his third volume of *Misc. Ref.* hath given us a translation of this letter, for a *pattern*, as he tells us, *of the humour and genius, of the principle and sentiments, of this virtuous, gallant, generous, and mild Emperor*, p. 87, & seq. 4th ed. It is true, his translation drops the affair of Titus, their bishop. So that nothing hinders his reader from concluding but that the Emperor might indeed be as *gallant* and *generous* as he is pleased to represent him.

† Ep. xliiii. Ἐπεὶ δὲ.

‡ Hist. Eccl. l. iii. c. 13.

§ Greg. Naz. i. Orat. cont. Jul. Socrat. Eccl. Hist. l. iii. c. 14.

rected them to suffer without murmuring. So that we have little reason to doubt what the ancients * say of his declared intention (had he returned victorious from the Persian war) to subject the whole Christian world to the honest persecution of fire and sword †.

These were the efforts of the Emperor Julian to overturn Christianity. However he took care to avoid the absurdity of our modern apostates, who are for abolishing the faith in which, like him, they have been bred, without substituting any other religion in its stead. Julian's attempts to destroy Christianity did not precede, but went hand in hand with his projects to support and reform Paganism.

He wrote and he *preached* in person, in defence of Gentile superstition: and has himself acquainted us with the ill success of his ministry ‡. Of his controversial writings, his answerer Cyril hath given us a large specimen; by which we see he was equally intent to recommend Paganism and to discredit Revelation.

His reformation of Gentile superstition turned upon these points,
1. To hide the absurdity of its traditions by moral and philosophic

* Greg. Naz. ii. Orat. contr. Jul. Ruff. Eccl. Hist. l. i. c. 36. How well all this agrees with what the author of the Characteristics says of Julian, in the following words, I leave the admirers of that noble writer to determine: [Julian] *was a great restrainer of persecution, and would allow of nothing farther than a resumption of church lands and publick schools; without any attempt on the goods or persons, even of those who branded the state religion, and made a merit of affronting the public worship.* Vol. I. p. 25, 4th edit.

† What his creature and confident Libanius tells us, as part of his panegyric, makes this account of the Christian writers very credible. He says that Julian took up arms against Constantius, to restore the Pagan religion: Οὗτος δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν. De Ulcif. Juliani nec.

‡ — εἰς τὸν Βίβλινον ἱστορίαν—Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τῶν θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον ἔχων μὴ ἀπαρῆς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῖς ἐλθὼν πάντες, καὶ οὗτοι οἱ καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἡμῶν λόγων ἰδὼν ἔχον ἰσχυρῶς ἐλάττω δὲ ὅπως παρρησίας ἀπορρίψαντες τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀποθνήσκου. Ep. xxvii. Λοιπὸν οὐδὲν.

allegories*. These he found provided to his hands, principally, by philosophers of his own sect, the Platonists. Who, not without the assistance of the other sects of Theists, had, ever since the appearance of Christianity, been refining the theology of Paganism, to oppose it to that of Revelation; under pretence, that their new-invented allegories were the ancient *spirit* of the *letter*, which the first poetical divines had conveyed down, in this envelope, to posterity. A noble design! of which some *letters*, lately published, *concerning mythology*, will give the reader a very tolerable idea.

2. He then attempted to correct the morals of the Pagan priesthood, and regulate their manners on the practice of the first Christians. In his epistle to Arsacius, he not only requires of them a personal behaviour void of offence; but that they reform their household on the same principle: He directs that they who attend at the altar should abstain from the theatre, the tavern, and the exercise of all ignoble professions: that in their private character they be meek and humble; but that, in the acts and offices of religion, they assume a character conformable to the majesty of the immortal Gods, whose ministers they are. But above all he recommends to them the virtues of charity and benevolence†.

With regard to discipline and religious policy, Nazianzene and Sozomene tell us, he had planned an establishment for readers in divinity; for the order and parts of the divine offices; for a regular and formal service, with days and hours of worship; that he had decreed to found hospitals for the poor, monasteries for the devout, and to prescribe and enjoin initiatory and expiatory rites, with a course of instruction for converts, and of penance for offenders; and in all things to imitate the church discipline of that time‡.

* See his discourse composed in honour of the *Mother of the Gods*.

† Ep. xlix. Ἀρσασίῳ ἀρχιερεὶ Γαλατίας. Eragmentum Orationis Epistolæve.

‡ Greg. Naz. i. Orat. cont. Jul. Sozom. l. v. c. 16,

C H A P. III.

BUT the indifference and corruptions of Paganism, joined to the inflexibility and perseverance of the Christians, kept his project from advancing with that speed which his malice as well as zeal demanded. So that, impatient of delay, he struck out a new and daring project to alter the whole face of things at once. With this view he planned the famous scheme of rebuilding the TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM. Its final destruction had been foretold both by Jesus and the Prophets: and it was, as he imagined, reserved for this favorite of the Gods*, to give the lye to their predictions.

He had before (in pursuance of his general scheme of opposing Revelation to itself, by setting one sect against another) written to the body or community of the Jews†, in which he assured them of his protection; his concern for their former ill usage; and his fixed purpose to screen them from future oppression, that they might be at liberty, and in a disposition to redouble their

* His confident, Libanius, compliments him on his close communion with the Gods, and on the familiar intercourse with which they honoured him. This he speaks of as a peculiar favour, as indeed it was, both to *hear* and *see* them.—Καὶ μόνος σὺ τὰς θεοὺς ἰδὼν καὶ ἀκούων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄλλος τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔχει. Legat. ad Julian. This was doubtless at an *initiation*; for Libanius informs us, in another place quoted above, that Julian had been joined in communion with Demons in all the *mysteries*. Of one of these initiations, Gregory, in his first oration against Julian, tells a remarkable story; that as he descended into the initiating cave, he was terrified with the visions that passed before him [see the account of the *mysteries* in the Div. Leg.], which, on his making the sign of the cross, fled and disappeared. I think this not incredible; for the sign of the cross was then the common security against all sudden and unusual terrors; and whatever the Demons did, the priests certainly did not like it. How they turned this farce to their advantage, in the present case, may be seen in Gregory.

† Ἰουδαίους τῇ κοινῇ.

vows for the prosperity of his reign. And concluded with a promise, that, if he came back victorious from the Persian war, he would rebuild Jerusalem, restore them to their possessions, live with them in the holy city, and join with them in their worship of the great God of the universe *.

So that, after this, a proposal of beginning with the Temple, we may well think, would be eagerly embraced by them. Till this was rebuilt, their religion, as we have seen, was in a state of inanition; sacrifices, which were essential to it, being forbidden to be offered in any other place. Hence the Jews had attempted, more than once, to restore it, in defiance of the power to which they were subject; first, in the reign of Adrian, and afterwards, under that of Constantine †: but reasons of state defeated the former attempt; and reasons of religion, the latter. Adrian regarded and punished it as a rebellion; Constantine, as an impiety. They were now invited, as *good subjects* and *faithful worshippers of the true God*, to second the Emperor's design in restoring them to their city and religion.

But here if any one should ask, how it appears that Julian had the purpose we accuse him of? we shall refer him to the whole plan of Julian's conduct for an answer. For men's purposes are best declared by their actions. He had formed a design to ruin Christianity. He had played off the round of his machines to no purpose; and was got, by due degrees, to this; the only battery that was left untried. He had strove in vain to weaken its *influence*; he would now, as his last effort, attack its *pretensions*: and his knowledge of the *two* religions enabled him to chuse his ground to advantage. This is the utmost evidence the case will afford. For sure no man can be so absurd to imagine, that Julian (supposing this to be his

* Καίνούσιν τὴν βασιλείαν ἐπὶ τὰ κάλλιστα, καθάπερ προσηυρέμεθα, ὅτι καὶ ποιῶν ὑμεῖς, ἵνα κατὰ τὸν τῶν Περσῶν πόλεμον διαβυσσάμενοι, τὸν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν ἐπιθυμημένον σας' ἑμῶν ἰδίων οἰκισμένην πόλιν ἁγίαν Ἱερουσαλὴμ, ἡμεῖς καμῆτοισι ἀποκαθάρσεις οἰκήσω, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ δέξαι δάσω μετ' ἡμῶν τῇ κρήνῃ. Ep. xxv.

† Chrysoſt. advers. Judæos, passim.

intention) would proclaim his purpose by edict, or, what was the same thing, would tell it at court, till he had seen the issue of the event: though had that proved fortunate, we cannot doubt but the Imperial Sophist would have descanted on his triumph over the Galilæan, in all the forms of the chancery, and in all the modes of the schools. But as his project was so effectually disgraced, it would be still more absurd to expect, that either he, or any of his band of sophists, should be forward to divulge the secret to the world. Indeed, their shyness in mentioning the *disaster at Jerusalem*, when their subject requires it, and the affected disguise they throw over it, when they cannot avoid it, are, to me, the strongest proofs of some conscious guilt, or severe mortification.

But the Christians of that time saw no cause to defer accusing Julian of this *purpose*, till he himself should think fit to confess it; and, therefore, with one voice, they proclaim it, and charge it on him without scruple or hesitation. And the church was too attentive to his motions to be the dupe of his professions, in any thing that concerned religion. The RUINED TEMPLE was the trophy of Christ's victory over his enemies; so that a project to restore it, could not but give them the alarm. They collected, as we do now (but with far better opportunities of so doing), what was Julian's *real purpose*, from his general character, and his particular behaviour towards them. Nor is it unlikely but they might get further intelligence from something dropt by his confidants, the Sophists, a people vain and talkative, and at no time renowned for secrecy.

Thus much is certain, that the Christian writers are unanimous in what they say of Julian's motive: and seem to be so well assured of its not being brought in question, that they generally content themselves with calling it indefinitely, a *pernicious project, destructive of Christianity* *. But Sozomene goes further, and assures

us,

* Τίθε' ἱερῶν καὶ τὸ Ἰουδαίων φῶλον ἡμῶν—Καὶ ἀποκτενέμεναι εὐνοίας πλάσσειν τὸν ἱερέαν—Greg. Naz.—Καὶ κατ' ἄλλοι δὲ τρίτοις ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸς Χριστιανὸς βλάπτειν σπουδάζει—Soz. Διηγεῖται καὶ

us, that not only Julian, but all the Gentiles, who assisted in it, pushed it forward upon that very motive; and for the sake of *that*, suspended their aversion to the Jewish nation *. For an aversion they always had, and that, no small one, if we may credit the best Pagan writers themselves.

However this is not to be forgotten, that let Julian's motive be what it would, as the successful execution of his design must have impeached the veracity of the prophecies, there was a *necessity* for some interposition to defeat it.

But, besides the principal purpose of utterly discrediting the Christian name, there were other auxiliary motives to push Julian on to a speedy execution. He liked the Jews for their bloody sacrifices, to which he himself was extravagantly given; he liked them better for their implacable hatred to the Christians, in which he far outwent them; and he soothed his family revenge, in favouring those whom Constantine had persecuted, and persecuted for this very attempt. To which we may add that which Marcellinus assigns as his principal motive, the glory of achieving so bold an enterprize †.

But Julian, who aimed at higher matters than obtaining the good-will of the Jews, would not intrust so important a design to their inclinations or abilities. He assumed the care of it himself; and carried on the project (as far as it was carried) under the Imperial authority. He assigned for this purpose immense sums out of the public treasury. The superintendancy of it he committed

ἐν κατὰ τὰς ἐκκλησίας.—Καὶ τὸς Ἰουδαίους καθύπευκται κατὰ τὸν εἰς Χριστὸν περιτινέσθαι.—Theodor.—
 * Ὅτι ἀποράξας φησὶ Ἰουδαίους τὸ Ἱερουσόλυμα ἀνοικοδομηθῆναι, ὡς ἂν τὰς ἐπὶ αὐτῶν δυστοκίας ἀρρήσεις
 ἄνθρωποι; ἐλίσξῃ. Philost. apud Photium.

* Πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διέτιμα ἢ τῷ ποιουμένῳ, βασιλεῖ ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσι, ἢ πᾶσι Ἰουδαίοις οἱ
 μὲν γὰρ ὅτι Ἰουδαίους εὐσεβεῖς, ἐκινῶντες αὐτοῖς τῆς σπουδῆς, ἐπολαβεῖν δύνανται καθέθεν τὸ ἱερόν, ἢ
 ἢ ψευδῶς ἀπειλῶντες τῷ Χριστῷ τὰς ἀρρήσεις. Sozom.

† Imperii sui memoriam magnitudine operum gestiens propagare. Am. Marc. l. iii.
 c. 1.

to his bosom friend, Alypius * ; to whom he joined, for his assistant, the governor of the province. Alypius was one who had been much obliged by Julian †, and for this reason, as is the nature of princes, was as much beloved by him : but their strongest tie was an equal malice, and congenial aversion to the Christian name ; qualities, doubtless, for which Alypius was preferred to that employment. This man, in conjunction with the Jews, and under the sanction of the Imperial authority, entered upon the business. They laid in immense quantities of materials ; they assembled vast numbers of workmen ; the Jews, of both sexes, and of all degrees, bore a share in the labour : they entered upon the ruins, cleared away the rubbish, and opened the old foundations.

An account of this attempt (to wave the testimony of Christian authors) is transmitted to us by a contemporary writer, of noble extraction, a friend and admirer of Julian, and his companion in arms ; a man of affairs, a lover of truth, learned, candid, and impartial ; qualities which rendered him the best historian of his time ; who, although neither ignorant of the doctrines, nor bigotted against the followers of our faith, yet was strongly attached to the superstition of his ancestors, and, in one word, a Pagan professed and declared ‡.

So

* The xxixth and xxxth epistles of Julian are written to him, in the latter of which he calls him, Ἀδελφεὶ καὶ συνδουλὲ καὶ φίλῳ καὶ ἑταίρῳ.

† See the xxixth Epistle.

‡ As there have been critics absurd enough to suspect that Ammianus Marcellinus might be a Christian ; it may be just worth while to quote a passage of the celebrated Hadrian Valesius, who, in few words, has well exposed this groundless conceit. “ Petrus Pithæus ad latus Ammiani sui manu sua notavit, eum Christianum fuisse, propterea quod in libro xxvii. scripsit, *Antistites quosdam provinciales*, id est, episcopos Christianorum, parco victu, vili veste, & demissis oculis, *perpetuo numini verisque ejus cultoribus* ut *parcos commendari* & *verecundos*. An ideo Ammianus Christianus habendus est, quod Deum Christianorum *perpetuum numen*, id est, Deum æternum, & Christianos *Antistites veros perpetui numinis cultores appellat* ? Quasi non *veros perpetui numinis cultores* Ammianus vocaverat Gentiles ipsos ac sui similes, quibus quidam etiam Christianorum episcopi
“ in

So much then the most sceptical reader must be forced to grant. To doubt of this, would be subverting the very foundations of human credit; and it might as well be questioned whether Cæsar was assaulted in the senate, as whether Julian *attempted* to rebuild the Temple of Jerusalem.

What

“ in provinciis sanctitate vitæ & verecundia commendarentur ac placerent. Ita tamen
 “ de Ammiano sensit & Claudius Chiffletius, cum verbis ejus supra laudatis, tum aliis
 “ levissimis conjecturis adductus. Sed qui attente legerit, quæ præter cætera in fine
 “ libri xiv de Adrafi vel Nemesi, quæ in libro xvi de Mercurio, quæ in libro xxi de
 “ numine Themidis, de Haruspicina, de Auguriis, variisque artibus futura prænoscenti,
 “ veteres theologos suos, & physicos, ac mysticos secutus scripsit: profectò fateri coge-
 “ tur, eum cultui Deum additum ac devotum fuisse. Certè de diis gentium tanquam
 “ de suis semper loquitur; de Christianis sacris mysteriisque non item. Nunquam Chris-
 “ tianis se adjungit; nunquam & nusquam eorum se numero adscribit; & Julianum A.
 “ quem suum heroa fecit, hanc præcipuè ob causam mihi videtur toties & tantopere
 “ laudare, quod à religione Christiana ad numinum cultum desciverit. Quà tamen erat
 “ prudentiâ, adeo modestè atque sincerè, ac nonnumquam etiam benevolè de Christianis
 “ rebus commemorat, ut aliqui unum ex nostris putaverint. Nimirum, sicuti existimo,
 “ vir bonus, integer & sapiens religionem Christianam non sequi, tuto se posse intelli-
 “ gat: eandem principibus suis acceptam & toto ferè orbe Romano diffusam palam dam-
 “ nare non audebat, sed & forsitan religionum diversitates non improbavit, persuasumque
 “ habuit (sicut ait De notitia Dei Symmachus) unâ viâ non posse pervenire ad tam grande
 “ secretum.” Præf. in post. Am. Marc. editionem. To these a thousand other proofs
 might be added. I shall content myself, at present, with one, taken from those very
 words which Chifflet has given as the strongest evidence of his Christianity, where,
 speaking of Constantius, he says, “ Christianam religionem absolutam & simplicem anili
 “ superstitione confundens; in qua scrutanda perplexius quam componenda gravius, ex-
 “ citavit discidia plurima; quæ progressa fusiùs aluit concertatione verborum.” Lib. xxi.
 cap. 16. By these words (as the critics observe) are doubtless meant those two famous
 party badges, the *ἀνιλικὴ* and *ἀνιλική*. Now it seems odd, the historian should cha-
 racterize a temper of mind, arising from a dispute of this kind (which has rather the
 appearance of a *philosophic* than a *popular* bigotry) by the name of *anilis superstitio*. On
 a supposition, that the censurer was a Christian, it appears very odd: but consider him
 as a Pagan, and nothing is more natural: He must then see this question, concerning
 the *Sen* of God, in the same light he did what their *mythology* taught concerning
 the paternity and filiation of their gods; which the learned amongst them ranked in
 the first class of their *aniles superstitiones*. It is true, Ammianus thought more reverently
 of

What now was the condition of the church at this juncture ! and how were the fears of the good people alarmed ! It had long combated, and at length triumphed over, the prejudices of the people, the arts of the philosophers, and the violence of civil power. It had bent the obstinacy of superstition by the superior force of miracles : it had confounded the meretricious confidence of Grecian Sophistry, by the simple majesty of Truth ; and had wearied out the rage of tyranny, by constancy and contempt of suffering. But it was now summoned to a severer trial, and pushed upon the very crisis of its fate. Its enemies, supported by the whole power of the empire, had brought a decisive scheme to its projection ; a scheme that was

of the *Christian martyrs* than the famous philosophic emperor had formerly done (who called their virtue a *mere brutish obstinacy*, *ψαλὸν ἀσθένειαν*, Lib. xi. § 3.) for he says of them,—“ *Qui deviare a religione compulsi, pertulere cruciabiles pœnas, adusque gloriosam mortem intemerata fide p̄gressi nunc Martyres appellantur.*” Lib. xxii. cap. 11. But Antoninus was entirely ignorant of the Christian religion : We have shewn above what kept him from the knowledge of it. The historian knew it well, as appears from the character he gives it, of *absolute & simplex* ; and the dying in defence of such a religion could not but be, in his opinion, *mors gloriosa* : he being, as appears throughout his history, a *religious Theist*, and untainted with the *Naturalism* of Tacitus ; for Christianity had produced this good effect in the quarter of its enemies, that it had entirely discredited the schools of Strato and Epicurus, as Julian himself informs us. Ammianus, then, was Pagan, if his religion may be gathered from the reflections he makes upon his facts. It is true, this way of reasoning cannot be safely applied to any but to an original Writer of History. Compilers and Abbreviators of other men’s works are not supposed to have any sense of their own ; they take their colours, like the Camelion, from the various matter on which they feed ; and, with the facts, often epitomize the sentiments of their originals. George Elmacine, an Eastern Christian, whose chronicle of the Saracens is translated from the Arabic by Erpenius into Latin, and by Vattier into French, is so regularly changeable in this respect, that Vattier very justly says of him, “ *Quand il parle de quelque chose concernant la religion de Mahomet, on diroit qu’il est Mahometan : Quand il parle des Catholiques, qu’il est Catholique : Quand il parle des Jacobites, de mêmẽ.*” The translator’s reflection upon it is extraordinary, “ *Grand perfection, à mon advis, pour un historien : pour un historien Chrestien, je n’en parle point.*” Every one sees the ridicule. However the maxim he had in view is a good one, *That the historian should not appear to be of any sect or party.* But this is very different from being of *all* in their turns.

to reflect eternal dishonour upon the *Oracles of Truth*. The credit of God's servants, the authority of his word, and the very pretensions of revelation, were all vitally interested in the event. The long struggle between SUPERSTITION and RELIGION was now to be finally decided. The God of the Christians was publicly challenged: his power was defied to protect his Dispensation against this impending stroke. Destitute of all human aid, their only reliance was on heaven. And no *believer*, but must conclude, that God would indeed interpose to vindicate the character of his son: no *man*, but must confess, that to support a Religion like this, was an occasion worthy the interposition of the Lord of all things.

Well, the impious attack was made; and the expected protection afforded*. The same great and impartial historian, who acquaints us with the attempt, informs us likewise of the defeat of it. His account is in these words: "Julian (having been already thrice consul) taking Sallust, prefect of the several Gauls, for his colleague, entered a fourth time on this high magistracy. It appeared strange to see a private man associated with Augustus: a thing, which, since the consulate of Dioclesian and Aristobulus, history afforded no example of. And although his sensibility of the many and great events, which this year was likely to produce, made him very anxious for the future, yet he both pushed on the various and complicated preparatives for this expedition with the utmost application, and, having an eye in every quarter, and being desirous to eternize his reign by the greatness of his achievements, he projected to rebuild, at an immense expense, the proud and magnificent temple of Jerusalem; which (after many combats, attended with much bloodshed on both sides, during the siege by Vespasian) was, with great difficulty, taken and destroyed by Titus. He committed the conduct of this affair to

* τότε δὲ Κέρλλος ὁ τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων Ἐπίσκοπος, τὸ τῷ Προφῆτῳ Δανιὴλ κατὰ τὸν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐν Χριστῷ ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις εὐαγγελίῳ πιστοφραγίσαιτο, πολλὰς τι προέβλεψε, ὡς ἄρα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ λαοῦ ἐπὶ λίθον ὡς ἐν μόνῳ εἰς τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ Σεβήρῳ λόγῳ πλεονεκτήσῃ. Socrat. Hist. Eccl. lib. iii. cap. 20.

“ALYPIUS of Antioch, who formerly had been lieutenant in Britain. When, therefore, this Alypius had set himself to the vigorous execution of his charge, in which he had all the assistance that the governor of the province could afford him, horrible balls of fire, breaking out near the foundations, with frequent and reiterated attacks, rendered the place, from time to time, inaccessible to the scorched and blasted workmen; and the victorious element continuing, in this manner, obstinately and resolutely bent, as it were, to drive them to a distance, Alypius thought best to give over the enterprize*.”

Thus did the vigilance of Providence not only vindicate the honour of our holy faith in the open view of all men, but, in its goodness, secured the *memory* of this impious attempt by the testimony of the most unexceptionable witnesses. For were infidelity itself, when it would evade the force of evidence, to prescribe what qualities it expected in a faultless testimony, it could invent none but what might be found in the historian here produced. He was a Pagan, and so not prejudiced in favour of Christianity: He was a dependent, a follower, and a profound admirer of Julian, and so not inclined to report any thing to his dishonour: He was a lover of truth, and so would not relate what he knew, or but suspected, to be false: He had great sense, improved by the study of philoso-

* Julianus jam ter consul adscito in collegium trabes Sallustio, præfecto per Gallias, quater ipse amplissimum inierat magistratum: & videbatur novum, adjunctum esse Augusto privatum, quod post Dioctlesianum & Aristobulum nullus meminerat gestum. Et licet accidentium varietatem sollicita mente præcipiens, multiplicatos expeditionis apparatus flagranti studio perurgeret: diligentiam tamen ubique dividens, imperiique sui memoriam magnitudinè operum gestiens propagare, ambitiosum quondam apud Hierosolymam templum, quod post multa & interneciva certamina, obsidente Vespasiano postesque Tito, ægre est expugnatum, instaurare sumptibus cogitabat immodicis: negotiumque maturandum Alypio dederat Antiocheni, qui olim Britannias curaverat præfectis. Cum itaque rei idem fortiter instaret Alypius, juvaretque provincie Rector, metuendi globi flammæ prope fundamenta crebris assultibus erumpentes, secere locum exustis aliquoties operantibus inaccessible: hocque modo elemento destinatus repellente, cessavit inceptum. Amm. Marc. lib. xxiii. cap. 1.

phy and knowledge of the world, and so would not easily suffer himself to be deceived : he was not only contemporary to the fact ; but, at the time it happened, resident near the place : He recorded the event not on its first report, when, in the relation of journalary occurrences, much falshood blends itself with truth ; but after time and enquiry, which separates this impure mixture, had confirmed what really happened : He related it not as an uncertain report or hearsay, with diffidence ; but as a notorious fact, at that time, no more questioned in Asia, than the project and success of the Persian expedition : He inserted it not for any partial purpose in support or confutation of any system ; in defence or discredit of any character : he delivered it in no cursory or transient manner, nor in a loose or private memoir ; but gravely and deliberately, as the natural and necessary part of a composition the most useful and important, a general history of the empire ; on the complete performance of which the author was so intent, that he exchanged a court life, for one of study and contemplation ; and chose Rome, the great repository of the proper materials, for the place of his retirement.

C H A P. IV.

BUT the evidence given by the adversaries of our faith to the truth of this illustrious miracle does not rest upon a single witness : I propose to shew, that Libanius, the friend and favourite of Julian and even JULIAN himself, whose impiety brought this disgrace upon Paganism, have both confessed the hand by which he was overcome ; though with that obscurity, and confusion of tongue, which always attends the graceless shame of impenitent offenders.

And I shall be the fuller in weighing the value of their testimony, as it hath hitherto, I think, been entirely overlooked, and, by reason of an affected disguise, passed the critics unobserved. †

Libanius,

Libanius, in the *History of his own Life*, speaking of the fate of Julian, says, "The Persians, indeed, were informed by a deserter, of the state to which fortune had now reduced our affairs: but not a single man * amongst us at Antioch, knew any thing of the matter. It is true, the calamity seemed to have been foretold by certain *earthquakes in Palestine*, which overthrew some cities, and damaged others. For it appeared to us, as if God had pre-signified some great event by these disasters: and, while we were making our vows for averting the evil we apprehended, came a messenger, &c †." Again, in his *funeral oration on Julian's death*, he says, "The temple of Apollo consumed by fire, presaged this misfortune—as did those *earthquakes* which shook all the land, the messengers, as it were, of the following disorders and confusion ‡." It can admit no doubt but that the *earthquakes* spoken of in both passages, and said to have happened *before* the death of Julian, are the same. The *first* says they were in Palestine; the *second* fixes them to the time of burning the temple at Daphne: all which laid together brings us directly to the *earthquake at Jerusalem*. And though, either out of malice, imperfect information, or wrong conception of what he heard, he lessens the event by the omission of one circumstance, and aggravates it by the invention of others, yet the characteristic marks of *time* and *place*, which he has left to it, prevent his putting the change upon us, if that was

* Ἀνθρώπων μὲν ὁδός.—The words are remarkable, and, I suspect, *emphatical*. It looks as if he used them to discredit a common report then in the mouths of the people; and which hath since figured in ecclesiastical history, to this effect, "That Libanius, about this time, meeting a certain schoolmaster in Antioch, asked him, in derision, What the carpenter's son was doing? To which the other replied, Making a coffin for your hero."

† Τῷ μὲν δὲ Πέρσῃ, παρ' αὐτομάτῃ τινὲς μαθητὴν ὑπαρξέν, ἐν ὅτῳ εἰς τέρχους ἤμην διὰ τοῦ Ἀνθοχυσίου. ἀνθρώπων μὲν ὁδός. Στοιχοὶ δὲ ἐγγιγνοῖσι τῷ κακῷ μύθῳ, πόλειον τῶν ἐν τῇ Παλαιστίνῃ [Παλαιστίνη] Συρίῃ, τῶν μὲν μέγῃ τὰς δι' ὅλης κατενεσθόσιν. ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐ Θιός, μεγάλους πάθισι, μέγα σημαίνον· εὐχόμενοι δὲ μὴ τὰ ὅλα δεξάζειν, σιωπῇ, &c.

‡ Τὸτο ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος πυρὶ καταπύματος—τὸτο στοιχοὶ γὰρ πᾶσαι διανοίαι μαλλόντα· ἀγέλιον τὰς σαχῆς τι καὶ ἀπειρίαις.

his

his intention, as it seems to have been, if we reflect, that the circumstance of *destroying cities*, and *shaking the whole empire*, belong to an earthquake which happened about a year and half after Julian's death *, and of which he was well apprised, as appears by his *oration to avenge the death of Julian*, addressed to Theodosius: in which he tells the emperor, the Gods were angry that Julian's death had not been hitherto avenged: and had given evident marks of their displeasure by the frequent slaughters of the Roman people; and a dreadful earthquake, which shook both *land* and *sea* †. Hitherto Libanius, notwithstanding the disguisements taken notice of above, hath reasonably well distinguished these two different earthquakes, the one in Palestine, and the other over all the Roman empire; by expressly affirming, that the first happened *before* the death of Julian; and the second, some time *after*. Yet, in another place, in his *oration on the death of Julian*, he seems totally to have confounded them with one another ‡.

But the carelessness or the perversity of the writers of these times, whether Christians or Pagans, is equally to be lamented. We have observed the arts Libanius employs to hide the *earthquake at Jerusalem*, and seen with what pomp he ascribes the disaster occasioned by *that*, which happened under the first consulate of Valentinian and his brother, to the anger of the gods for the unavenged murder of Julian. On which account, I suppose, it is, that Sozomene affirms, that this earthquake happened in the time of Julian §,

* Kal. Aug. consule Valentiniano primum cum fratre horrendi terrores per omnem orbis ambitum grassati sunt subiti.—concutitur omnis terreni STABILITAS ponderis, MAKEQUE dispulsum retro fluctibus evolutis abscellit.—innumera quædam in civitatibus & ubi reperta sunt ædificia complanarunt.—Am. Marc. l. xxvi. c. 10.

† Ο αλλῶς δὲ φότος ὅτι τῇδ', ὅτι ἐν Ῥώμῃ, Δαμνῆται ἐγγὺς μνησί, δι' οὗ οἱ μὴ ἀπίστησαν, οἱ δὲ ἱμελλαν. ἡ φέβῃ ΓΗΝ τι ἴσμε καὶ ΘΑΑΑΤΤΑΝ. c. 10.

‡ Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γῆ, καλῶς τι ἥσθη τῷ πάθει—ἀποσυναρμύνη, καθάπερ ἴσα ἀναδάτην, σίλαι τόσας καὶ τόσας ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ πολλὰς τὰς Διδύμην ἀπάσαι, &c.

§ Ἀμίαιλοι παρὰ πάσαι τοὶ χρόνοι ταύτης τῆς βασιλείας ἀγανακτοῦν ὁ θεὸς Ἰσραὴλ—τῇ; τι γὰρ γῆς συνιχῶς ὑπερχαλιπυλάται σισμῶν τινασσομένων—συμβάλλει δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρόν, ἡ βασιλεία αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σχῆμα τῆς βασιλείας ἵσθη καὶ τὸ συμβᾶν τοῖς πρὸς Αἰγυπτίον Ἀλεξανδριῶσι γήτοι πάθει, &c., Lib. vi. c. 2.

and

and makes it one of the marks of God's displeasure at his apostasy. So again because Libanius had with excessive impudence accused the Christians of the death of Julian, Gregory Naz. to be even with him, charges Julian with the murder of Constantius. Each, I dare say, with equal justice; both, I am well satisfied, with the same spirit.

I come now to the testimony of Julian. His letter to the *community of the Jews* has been already mentioned. From that part of it, wherein he informs them how he had punished such as had given their people unjust vexation, it appears to have been written early in his reign; on his first coming to Constantinople, when he purged the city and palace of spies, informers, and the like pests of a corrupted court *. The principal design of it is to acquaint them with his

* Sozomene takes notice of this letter, ἡ πατριάρχης καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὁλόθι ἐχρήσαντο, ὡς χριστοὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῶ καὶ τῆς αὐτῶ βασιλείας. Notwithstanding which, those who have conveyed it down to us have stamp'd this mark of doubt and suspicion on the face of it, αἰ γινώσκουσιν. Without question, they believed it to be forged by the Jews. The writer of it styles the injuries offered to the Jews, *impious*; as if they were a holy nation—καὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης δυσφημίας ἀτίθωμα ἰδιωτῶν ἱεροσάμου γινώσκω: tells them that he had precipitated the delators into horrible dungeons with his *own hands*, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ ἐν χερσὶν ἑμαῖς λαβόμενος, εἰς βίβραν ἄσας ὤλεσα: calls the patriarch, *brother*, τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰωάννη τὸν αἰδιομέντατον πατριάρχην: and promises, that when he had restored their city, he would come thither, and live and worship with them. All these particulars, the critics conceived to smell strongly of imposture.

But what probably most confirmed their suspicions, was the *use* the Jews made of it, to evade a miracle that so much humbled them: We see it only promises their restoration *after* his Persian expedition. And one R. David Gaüs, of the sixteenth century, in the second part of his book, called *Zamach*, quoted by Wagenfeilius, in his *Tela ignea Satanæ*, p. 231. appears to have made this very use of it. “Julianus Cæsar præcepit
“ut restitueretur templum sanctissimum, magno cum decore & pulchritudine, huicque
“rei ipse sumtus suppeditavit. Verum cœlitus impedimentum injectum est ne perficere-
“tur fabrica, καὶ Cæsar in bello Persico periit.”

But what Greg. Nazianzen, in his second *Invektive*, tells us of the conference that followed this letter, plainly shews it to be genuine. Julian, he says, assured the leaders of the Jews, he had discovered, from their sacred books, that the time of their restoration was

his purpose to rebuild their city, on his return from the Persian war. And without doubt he then intended to defer the re-establishment of the Jewish religion till that war was at an end. But his various attacks upon Christianity not succeeding to his hopes, he grew enraged by his defeat, and resolved to put this last effort of his malice in immediate execution.

We may be assured, this letter had brought the principal Jews, from all quarters of the world, to court. The manner in which

was at hand. ἰσχυρά τε δίδωι ἐν τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ βίβλῳ ἢ ἀποκρίσιν, ὡς πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίσιν εἶναι καὶ λαλοῦντες εἰς τὸν λαόν ἢ πρὸς ἀπαρίσταται, ἢ τῶν παλίων τὸ κρῖνος ἀνατίσθαι ἢ ἀποκρινόμενοι αὐτοῖς πλάσματι τῶν ἰσχυρῶν.—It is not a mere curiosity to enquire, what prophecy it was, that Julian perverted; because it tends to confirm the truth of Nazianzen's relation. I have sometimes thought it might possibly be the words of the Septuagint, in Dan. ix. 27. Συνέλαμα δόξασται ἐπὶ τὸν ἐρήμῳ. The ambiguity of which Julian took the advantage of (against Hellenistic Jews, who, it is probable, knew no more of the original than himself) as signifying, *the tribute shall be given to the desolate*, instead of, *the consummation shall be poured upon the desolate*. For the letter in question tells us, he had remitted their tribute; and by so doing, we see, was for passing himself upon them for a kind of second Cyrus.

All this (that is to say, the authenticity of the letter, the truth of Nazianzen's relation, and this conjecture concerning the prophecy Julian pretended to go upon) seems greatly to be supported by what the Christian writers say of the behaviour of the Jews while the project was in agitation. Socrates assures us, that they menaced the Christians, and threatened to treat them as they themselves had been treated by the Romans, L. iii. c. 20.—*ὅτι οἱ τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς ἰσχυροῦσαν λαόν, ἡλαζυνόμενόν τε κατ' αὐτοῦ, ἰσχυροῦσαν τοσαῦτα ποιήσαν, ὅσα αὐτοὶ παρὰ Ῥωμαίων πάσαι πεποιήσαν.* And Rufinus says, *they were as vain as if they had had a prophet of their own at their head.* And this they might well be, when they had an emperor who promised to live and worship with them, and set himself up for the restorer foretold by their prophets.

There is only one thing in the letter, which remains to be accounted for; and that is, the strange boast of his personal atchievement, in *brushing down the delators into dungeons with his own hands*: in which the Imperial character is so little preserved, that the learned M. de la Bleterie is almost tempted, on this single circumstance, to give up the letter for a forgery. But he here forgets what he himself had before mentioned of the strange escapes of this fantastic monarch. “Saint Gregoire Nazianze dit, que Julien chassoit à coups de *pié* & de *poing* de pauvres gens qui venoient lui demander des “graces. Ces *pauvres gens* (says M. de la Bleterie) pouvoient bien être des *DELA-TEURS.*” Vie de Julien, p. 314. 2d edit.

he

he appeared to interest himself in their quarrel, could not, but persuade them, that the apostate from Christianity was become more than half a profelyte to Judaism. While he, on his part, flattered himself, that those who adhered so obstinately to bloody sacrifices might be easily cajoled into idolatry.

These, apparently, were the men, then residing at court, and waiting for his favours, whom, Chrysostome and Gregory Nazianzen tell us, he called together, to enquire, Why they did not offer sacrifices as the *law* directed; at a time when the empire stood so much in need of the divine protection, and the emperor was so well disposed to implore it from all quarters. They replied, that it was not lawful to sacrifice but in the *temple of Jerusalem* only. This was what He would be at: so he took the advantage of their answer, to facilitate his secret purpose; which was to give the lie at once to all the prophets and messengers of God.

For we are by no means to suppose him so ignorant as not to know what the *law* in this case required. That very letter to the *community* plainly insinuates he did know it. His acquaintance with Scripture must have informed him of it: for if there was any part to which he would give greater attention than the rest, it was the ritual of sacrifices, a species of worship, to which he was inordinately addicted. Besides, in his *discourse* against the Christian Religion, he occasionally, but in express words, declares, that it was of the nature of the Mosaic Law, to offer sacrifices at Jerusalem only*. But as this *discourse* was written some time after the consultation in question, I would lay the less weight upon it.

However, no one, I think, can doubt, but that the whole conference was a farce; that Julian only wanted a screen for his impiety; and that the pretence of procuring the means of their intercession with the God of the universe, for the prosperity of the empire, was no other than a decent cover for putting this last effort

* Ὑμῶς δὲ οἱ τὸν κατὰ θεοὺς ἀσπίς, οὐκ ἀδύνατον τῆς Ἱερουσαλὴμ, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου;—apud Cyril, p. 306. Spanh. ed.

of his malice in present execution. The Jews eagerly fell in with his project; and the issue was as we have related it.

This great event happened in the beginning of the year CCCLXIII, as appears from the words of Ammianus Marcellinus, quoted above. Julian, who then wintered at Antioch, was preparing for his Persian expedition; for which he did not set out till the month of March. So unexpected a traverse, we must suppose, would be immediately carried to him *, with all the circumstances that attended it: Alypius could not but assure him, that the repeated eruptions made it impracticable to persist in the attempt; and that the consumption of the materials utterly disabled his agents from speedily renewing it. What his first sentiments were, on this occasion, we have no certain or particular account: how he resented the disgrace in his cooler hours, I am now going to shew.

There is, amongst the writings of Julian, a notable fragment of an *oration*, or *epistle*, call it which you will, first given us by Peta- vus, wherein the emperor, with great abilities and learning, pre- scribes and marks out a method to reform Paganism, and set it up for a rival to the Gospel, in all the plausible pretences to piety and virtue. This, and his books against the Christian Religion, were the two master wheels of the same machine: the one was to de- grade Christianity, the other to advance superstition: and there- fore it is no wonder we find them written at the same time. St. Jerom expressly says †, that the books against our holy faith were

* ταῦτα ἤκουσε μὲν Ἰουλιανός. Theod. l. iii. c. 20.

† Ep. lxxxiii. ad magnum oratorem. And his historian tells us, that, even to the last, while harrassed with famine and the Persian cavalry, he continued to employ the silent hours of the night, in his usual sophistic exercises of reading and composing: which Ammianus, to do his master honour, says, was in imitation of Julius Cæsar.— Ipse autem ad sollicitam suspensionemque quietem paulisper protractus, cum somno (ut solebat) depulso, ad æmulationem Cæsaris Julii quædam sub pellibus scribens, obscuro noctis, altitudine sensus cujusdam philosophi teneretur, vidit squalidius, ut confessus est proximis, speciem illam genii publici, &c. lib. xxv. c. 2. And it is not improbable but his favourite Libanius had those very writings in his eye, when he said that the life of his master, Julian, was then equally divided between his cares for *religion* and the *state*. Οὗτος γὰρ ἔτι δ' ὑμῖν αὐτῷ τὸν βίον εἰς τὴν εἰς τὰς ἐπιγὰς τῶν ἁνθρώπων, εἰς τὴν εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσκήσας. De ulcisc. Julian. nece.

composed during the Persian expedition. Libanius, indeed, intimates, they were written in his winter quarters at Antioch. Their accounts may be easily reconciled, in supposing that this part was planned and begun before his remove. However, the other part, the directions for the reformation of Paganism, was as late as the Persian expedition; for this, we have the author's own word, where, speaking of the customary honours paid to the Gods, he says—"which not THREE years, nor three thousand have established: but all past ages, amongst all the nations upon earth*." By the *three years* he evidently alludes to his restoration of idolatry; which, at any time sooner than the Persian expedition, was not intitled to so high a date. For he was first saluted Augustus in the spring of the year CCCLX, and the Persian expedition was in the spring CCCLXIII.

At this time, therefore, he had well digested his defeat at Jerusalem. What effects it left upon his temper, the following passage of this fragment will inform us; where, after having justified the Gods for suffering their temples, images, and most devout worshippers to be injuriously treated, he goes on thus:—"Let no man, therefore, because he hath seen or heard of those who have insulted their images and *Temples*, entertain any doubts concerning their superintendency. For this reason too, let them not think to delude us with their sophistry, nor terrify us with the cry of *Providence*. For, the prophets amongst the Jews, who so much upbraid us with these disasters, what will they say to their own temple? that temple of theirs, which has been now a third time destroyed †, and is not raised again to this day. I say

* —ἢ; ἐποθέμενοι ἐν ἱερὺς, ἀλλ' ἐρηχύνοντες αὐτὰς δὲ ἡ ἀπολαύων αὐτῶν ἐν αἰῶνι τοῖς τοῖς γὰρ ἡμεῖς. p. 294. Spanh. Ed.

† The learned J. A. Fabricius thinks this ἐπεὶ ἀνακαταβύθη includes the defeat of Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple; and so, in his *Lxx Evangelii*, he brings it to prove Julian's own acknowledgement of the miracle: in which he has been followed by M. de la Bletterie and others. But 1. Defeating an attempt to rebuild cannot,

“ say not this to upbraid them ; for I myself, after so long a desolation, would have rebuilt it *, in honour of the God which was there worshipped. But I now mention it only as I was willing to shew, that nothing human is exempt from the injuries of time. As to the prophets, who write in this manner, they merely rave, and cant to the capacities of dreaming old women. Not that I would insinuate, the God they worship is not great and mighty : but this I say, he hath no good prophets, nor interpreters of his will, amongst them. The reason is, they never applied themselves to purge and purify the mind in the circle of human science, nor tried to open their eyes which ignorance had shut up, nor strove to drive away the darkness in which they lay involved : but are as men, who through mists or clouds see the great light of heaven + neither clearly nor distinctly,

in any known figure of speech, he called the overthrow of a building. 2. Ἐργασίαν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν can never be said of a building destroyed but two months before. In a word, Fabricius is mistaken ; the three subversions here meant, were—that by the Assyrians,—that by Herod, the son of Antipater,—and that by Vespasian. And though Herod’s demolition of it was only in order to rebuild it more magnificently, yet it was such a destruction as Julian might properly enough urge for the support of his argument, against an objection, that supposed *stability and duration* amongst the qualities to be looked for in the domicile of the *true* God ; which the Pagan temples not having, were concluded to belong to the *false*.—Or it may possibly be, that, instead of Herod’s demolition, he might allude to the prophanation of it by Antiochus, as a learned friend suggests. But what is decisive against Fabricius’s interpretation is this : Julian in one and the same paragraph could never call his project a destruction of the temple, and an attempt to rebuild it.

* Ἐργεῖν τοσούτοις ἔτεσιν χρεῖται ἀνατίσασθαι δευτέρῳ αὐτῶν—I do not urge this independent declaration (which implies some hindrance of his purpose) against the unbelievers, “ because they will say, “ the hindrance appears to have been the Persian expedition ; “ Julian having told the Jews, in his Letter still extant, that he would rebuild their “ temple when he had ended that war, which implies his inability of doing it “ before.”

† Julian, by θεὸς μέγας, means the *Sun*, as before, Θεὸς μέγας, *the God of the universe*. For, θεὸς καθαρὸς, which follows, was, I believe, never used by these fanatic platonists, for a *terrestrial* fire, it being the term they gave to their *holy light*, or αὐτοπλοῦς ἡγαλμα.

Julian

"tinctly, and mistake that ethereal splendor for an impure terrestrial fire; and, stark blind to all nature working round them, roar out with frantic vehemence, *Fear and tremble, ye inhabitants of earth! Fire, lightning, the sword, darts, death*, and all the frightful words that express that one destructive property of FIRE. But of these things it is more expedient to speak in private, where we may shew, how much these masters of wisdom, who pretend to be sent from God, are inferior to our Poets *."

The reader, who consults the fragment from whence this long passage is transcribed, will perceive, that it is a mere digression. But if it were foreign to his subject, we shall see it concerned a matter very intimate to his thoughts. The persecuted church of Christ was, at this time, triumphant, and loudly exulting in the divine protection so miraculously afforded it. The apostate, when the power of the empire failed him, had recourse to this last expedient, the arms of calumny, to vent his rage, and cover the shame of his disappointment. And then it was that, exchanging the *Imperial* for the *Sophist's throne* †, he composed the two dis-

Julian thought nothing more holy than the Sun.—He did not add the article, because he is here expressing the idea of the mistaken beholder,—a *great light*, though, by *ibat*, he himself meant, *the great light*.

* Μυθὶς ὅς ἀπειρεῖται θεοὺς ἱστῶν καὶ ἀμύνει ἐνέχουσάν τινες εἰς τὰ ἀγάλματα καὶ τὰς ΝΑΟΥΣ. Μυθὶς ὅς ἀπαλείπει λόγους· μὴδὲ ταρσύνειται περὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀμῆς· οἱ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐνεδίδοιεν τοιαῦτα, τῶν Ἰουδαίων οἱ Περσέται, τί περὶ τοῦ καὶ οὐ φέρεται; τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ τρίτον ἀναλαμβάνει, ἰσχυρὸν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· Ἐγὼ δὲ οἶκον οὐκ ἐμυθίζω ἑαυτοῖς, ὅτι τοσούτοις ἔστιν χρίστας ἀναστήσασθαι διανοήσας αὐτὸν εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ ἀληθείᾳ· ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ, διὰ τοῦ δὲ ἰσχυροῦ αὐτοῦ, διζῆται βελομίνθη, ὅτι τῶν ἀνέχουσιν οὐδὲ ἀφελος εἶναι δύναται· καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα γράφοντες· ἔλεγον περὶ αὐτοῦ, γράφοντες ψυχροῖς ἐμμελῆς. Οὐδὲν, δὲ, οἶμαι, κελύει τὸν μὲν θεὸν εἶναι μέγα καὶ μὴ σπουδαῖον ἀποφύων οὐδὲ ἐξηγῶν τυχῶν, αἶτις δὲ ὅτι τὸν ἰσχυρὸν ψυχρὸν, ὁ παρὰ τοῦ ἀποκαθάρσει τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς μαθημασιν· ὅτι αὐτοῖς μινυμένης λίαν τὰ ὅρματα· οὐδὲ ἀποκαθάρσει τὸν ἰσχυρὸν αὐτοῖς ἀχλὺν. Ἄλλ' οἷος φῶς μέγα δὲ ἐμύχλης οἱ ἀνθρώποι βλέποντες ὁ παρὰ τοῦ, οὐδὲ εἰλημῶν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν νοσημῶντι οὐκ ἔστι φῶς· αὐτὸς, ἀλλὰ ΠΥΡ, καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἰσχυρὸν ἀφελος, βούσι μέγα· φρίκη· φρενῶν· εὐρ, φλῆξ, θάλασσα, μαχαίρα, ῥυμφαία· πολλοὶ ἐνέχουσιν μίση ἐξηγῶνται τὸν βλαπτικὸν τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τούτοις ἰδία βόλῃς παρὰ τοῦ, αὐτὸν φαυλίσματα τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ· ὅτι αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν λέγουσιν ἀφελος.

p. 195. Spanh. Edl.

† ἐπὶ θεῶν τοῦ ἐφ' αὐτὸν μέγα· Ἰσχυρὸς καὶ Ἰσχυρὸς. Themist. Orat. 1.

courtes

courses mentioned above. Now, to be altogether silent on a subject, that was plainly the occasion of his writing, would have been an affectation that had rather betrayed, than covered, his self-conviction. On the other hand, the soldier's pride of heart, the pedant's contempt for his unclassical adversaries, and the monarch's delicacy for the imperial dignity, would not suffer him to enter on a formal altercation. Besides, in this case, he must either have confessed or denied the fact. The one would have completed the triumph of his adversaries; and the other offended the ingenuity of his friends. He therefore chose a middle way: and, under shew of exposing the denunciations of the Jewish prophets against past idolatries, as the ravings of enthusiasm, he covertly condemns the present triumphs of the church as the workings of the same spirit, upon the ground of a natural event.

For, taking occasion (though the subject of the work before us was the *reformation* of Paganism) to vindicate that ancient worship from the dishonours it had from time to time suffered, in the overthrow of its temples and idols, he observes, that those who exulted most in its disgraces, the Jewish *prophets* (whose writings, indeed, abound with exclamations and denunciations on the folly of idolatry, the impuissance of idols, and the destruction to which both were devoted) had of all men the least reason to triumph; since their own TEMPLE had been thrice destroyed, and at that very time lay in ruins. This leads him to the subject he wanted to touch upon: he therefore adds, that he spoke this out of no ill-will to the *community of the Jews*, for that he was himself *desirous of rebuilding their temple*. No, but only to convince them that neither the overthrow of their temple, nor the temples of Paganism, was to be ascribed to *divine wrath*, but to the natural condition of earthly things. And, enraged at the contrary principle, which occasioned these exultations in the Christian church, he attempts to shew, in the character he gives of the Jewish prophets, which he trusted the intelligent reader would apply to the
Christian

Christian ministers, that it was the issue of ignorance and superstition. These prophets he represents as despising human science, and acting upon the principles, and preaching to the capacities of ignorant and superstitious women, a character which was, and might be, objected to the Christian *ministry*, whose writings are full of exclamations against Grecian literature, but what by no means suited the Jewish *prophets*, who appear to have had as much of the barbaric learning of those early times as any of their Pagan neighbours. But, lest this should not sufficiently mark his purpose, by an elegant similitude, in which he employs his favourite idol, the Sun, to shew the root of these superstitions to be the ignorance of nature; he makes those, whom he supposes under its illusions, to cry out in the very exclamations that then resounded from one end of the Christian world to the other, *Fear and tremble, ye inhabitants of earth!—Fire, lightning, the sword, darts, death, and all the frightful words* (says he) *which express that one destructive property of fire.*—By which he plainly enough insinuates that this boasted miracle, by which his purpose was defeated was only a natural eruption: but that the Christians were as ignorant of natural causes as men who seeing the Sun through mists mistake it for a globe of terrestrial fire. But as if now he had run riot, he suddenly checks himself, and observes, that this was a subject proper for a *private* audience. And here the genius of Paganism came to his aid very opportunely; which, when pinched and distressed, was always as ready to cry out MYSTERY, as he says the church was to call out FIRE. To say the truth, it was full time to draw back. He had confessed his inclination and purpose of rebuilding the Jewish temple; and had evidently enough hinted at the exultations of the Christians on his defeat; so that he had indeed nothing to do, but to put off the cause to a *private* audience.

On this exposition of the passage, let me just make the following remarks.

. . IF

1. If we understand Julian's reflections as *indefinite*, nothing can be more disjointed or absurd. The Christians of that time were wont to draw an argument of the impuissance of polytheism from the repeated disgraces the heathen temples and their idols had suffered in every period of the world. Julian undertakes to solve this objection; but, instead of directing his answer to the Christians, who now make it against *him*, he retorts it upon the Jews, who, many ages ago, had made it against *others*. These he wantonly provokes at a time his views made them necessary to him. Again, he characterises these *prophets* in so ambiguous and loose a manner, that you may either take them for the writers of the Old Testament, or the heads of the Jewish community of that time: which no rule of composition can account for, but that which allows cautious writers to explain one system of things by the names that belong to another. Lastly, he speaks of *terrifying exclamations* as made by the prophets, which they never did make; and which, though made by Christ and his Apostles, are applied by them to the punishments of a *future state*; whereas he is speaking of what the worshippers of one God say of the dispensation of his providence in the *present*. We must conclude therefore, that the exclamations ridiculed in this passage must needs be those which the recent event at Jerusalem had just occasioned.

2. Take the passage in this *determined* sense, and nothing can be more artful than the conduct of the imperial sophist. Our religion was at this juncture properly victorious. It was exulting over Paganism in the destruction of the temple at Daphné*; it was

* The Oracle of Apollo in the temple at Daphné near Antioch had been dumb for some time. When Julian came thither, he urged the God himself to declare the cause of his silence. The Oracle replied, that he was hindered by the bones of St. Baby-las, which were then enshrined in his neighbourhood. These Julian ordered to be removed: And soon after the temple at Daphné was burnt to the ground. The Christians (says Sozomene) affirmed it was by lightning from Heaven: but the Pagans laughed at this, and said it was fired by the Galileans.

exulting

exulting over Judaism in the divine opposition to the restoration of that at Jerusalem; and over the Apostate Emperor in the disgraces of both. This spirit Julian wanted to repress and mortify. In the case of Apollo's temple he had no reason to be delicate. As to *that* of the God of Israel, we have shewn, it would not bear a professed mention. How has he conducted his discourse? By retorting upon the Jews, in the case of their old ruined temple, the Christian objection arising from that at Daphné: which recrimination served a double purpose; to introduce what he had to say on his own baffled attempt; and to say it (which was the point) obscurely and darkly. Thus the Christian triumphs, which he introduces to ridicule, are so represented as to have a more obvious reference to the temple at Daphné, and a covert one to the temple at Jerusalem, by the choice of several words and circumstances which necessarily extend it to that further meaning. Thus, for instance, the circumstance of their *ignorance of nature*, τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ πάντων ὅλης ἀθίᾳτοι, by which he would insinuate, that the readiness in believing miracles arises from that ignorance. But he could never intend this observation should be applied to the temple at Daphné, which he did not believe was set on fire by lightning. And thus again the words θάνατος, μάχαιρα, ρομφαία, *the sword, darts, death*, which he adds to πῦρ, φλόξ, *fire, lightning*, necessarily carry us to Jerusalem, where the eruption occasioned much human slaughter, whereas nothing suffered at Antioch but the temple of Apollo. And with these views the retortion on the Jewish writers will not appear so forced and unnatural. It was a Christian practice to apply the language of the Old Testament to the events of the gospel dispensation; and the disgrace of idols and idolaters being the constant subject of those writings, we may be sure, the Christians would not fail to apply every thing of this nature to the present occasion *. So that those *scriptures* being employed

* Theodoret tells the following story, very apposite to this subject: He says, that when Julian was at Antioch, one Publia, a venerable matron, and at the head of a community

Vol. IV. G g g

ployed as divine decisions to confirm their cause, naturally became the object of Julian's resentment.

3. This likewise well accounts for the title of Prophets, which he gives these Jewish writers or rulers; and for his abuse of them under that character. It was to prevent the reader's stopping at Apollo's temple, when it was the writer's purpose to lead him silently to that of Jerusalem: to which only the Jewish prophets and their *prophecies* had any relation. These things then we may consider as certain marks of his further meaning. And, indeed, if he had it not, what reason was there for being so shy in the mention of that idol temple? its destruction did not at all distress him; as he believed it to be set on fire by the Christians. But, in the other case, he had to do with the God of the Christians; and he was not yet in an humour, whatever he might be afterwards, to cry, *Vicisti, Galilæe*.

4. It being now seen, that Julian in this passage evidently refers to his defeat, the covert manner in which he owns himself overcome adds greatly to the weight of it. For no suspicion can lie against so oblique a reference to the fact, even in the opinion of those who could smell forgery in an open and direct confession. An impostor, *piously* disposed to procure Julian's testimony against

munity of virgins devoted to religion, took occasion, whenever the Emperor went that way, to chant louder than was the custom, in defiance of his impiety: they chose too to sing those psalms of David which ridicule the vanity and impuissance of idols, *ἡ τῶν εἰδωλῶν κομῆδι τὸν ἀσθεῖναι*, and particularly the following verses. *The Idols of the Heavens are but silver and gold, the work of men's hands: they that make them are like unto them, and so are all they that put their trust in them.* Julian (as he had reason) was offended with this insult, and, as often as he passed by, ordered them to be silent. Instead of obeying, Publia exhorted her virgins to strain their throats still higher, and especially when they came to this verse: *Let God arise, and let his enemies be scattered.* This provoked the Emperor to order one of his guards to bring out the old woman and box her ears, which (says the historian) Publia esteemed a great honour, and went on to torment the apostate with her psalm-singing, in the same manner as the author of the Psalms tormented the evil spirit in Saul. L. iii.

himself,

himself, would never think of doing it so obscurely, as that it should escape the notice of those whom he principally intended to impose upon.

Thus far concerning the APOSTATE's own testimony. But as there were three parties interested in this affair, the Pagans, the Jews, and the Christians; our evidence might be thought defective, if any one of them were wanting on so important an occasion.

We shall therefore, in the next place, produce the testimony of a famous RABBI; who, though late in time, yet composed the work, from whence the following passage is taken, on the traditions and records of the several ages he writes of. This is the celebrated R. Gedaliah ben Joseph Jechaja; he lived in the fifteenth century, and, in his history called Schalscheleth Hakkabbala, expresses himself to this effect: "In the days of R. Channan and his brethren, "about the year of the world 4349, our annals tell us, there was "a great earthquake *over all the earth*; by which the temple "which the Jews had raised at Jerusalem with vast expence, at "the command of Julian the apostate, was thrown down. The "day after the earthquake, a dreadful fire fell from heaven, which "melted all the iron tools and instruments employed about the "work; and destroyed many, nay incredible numbers of the "Jews *." I will make two remarks on this testimony. 1. The historian's calling it an *earthquake over all the earth*, is in the language of the Jews; and the same with that of the Evangelist, who tells us, that at the crucifixion, *there was darkness over all the earth* †. 2. This story of a rebuilt temple, shews he had his ma-

* In diebus R. Channan & sociorum ejus, anno circiter orbis conditi 4349, memorant libri annalium, magnum in orbe universo fuisse terræ motum, collapsumque esse templum quod struxerunt Judæi Hierosolymis, præcepto Cæsaris Juliani Apostatæ, impensis maximis. Postridie ejus diei [quo mota fuerat terra] de Cælo ignis multus cecidit, ita ut omnia ferra illius ædificii liquecerent & amburerentur Judæi multi atque adeo innumerabiles. Apud Wageniël, Tela ignea Satanæ.

† Luke xxiii. 44.

terials neither from Pagan nor Christian writers ; who are unanimous that no more than the foundations were prepared. And, as there is no visible purpose why he should invent it, we must conclude, he found it thus related in the annals of the rabbins ; the composers of which might possibly draw this conclusion from what they found recorded of the immense contributions of their people. 3. The historian says, it was at the *command of Julian* ; which, without bringing Christianity into the question, supplies his reader with a plausible account of this visible mark of the divine displeasure at the attempt * ; and consequently affords his brethren a principle on which they might believe the fact, consistently with their profession of Judaism.

C H A P. V.

HERE then, for the present, we shall rest our evidence ; ON THE CONFESSION OF OUR ADVERSARIES THEMSELVES : And, from the *nature of the TESTIMONY*, proceed to some considerations on the *nature of the FACT*, in order to the fuller establishment of this important truth.

One of the requisite qualities in a forged miracle, that pretends to live and do well, is, that the fact on which it rises be private, obscure, un concerning, and remote from general observation. And though these circumstances may sometimes attend a *true* one ; yet that is but accidental, and hurts not its credit, so long as it is accompanied (which it ever is) with others, that supply their defects. But for a forged miracle to affect the distinction of *public notoriety*, would be too impudent a reliance even on religious credulity. To feign a miracle on a civil fact, which must have passed in sight of a whole nation, would be rather an attempt to put out men's eyes, than to impose on their understandings. Hence it is

* Book II. c. iv. p. 225.

we find, the *lying wonders* of him, *whose coming was after the working of Satan* *, so well answer the description which He, who came with all the power of the Father, hath given us of every subtle Impostor in general, that *they love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil*.

Now the PROJECT to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem was a public transaction, the most notorious and interesting of that age.

The PROJECTOR was no other than the Emperor of the world himself: a circumstance alone sufficient to draw the attention of the world upon it.

His ATTEMPT produced other circumstances that would obtrude themselves even on the most incurious. The principal Jews were called together from all quarters †: Alypius, a man of the first figure, was put at the head of the undertaking: immense quantities of materials were laid in; vast numbers of workmen were assembled; and the impotent triumphs of the Jews gave an eclat to every movement which the restless though determined spirit of Julian was hourly pushing forward.

The PLACE contributed no less to its notoriety. It was in the centre of the empire; and in the head quarters of the two religious parties that then divided it.

The TIME likewise was critical. The religious world had just suffered a surprising revolution. It had been suddenly brought back from the *new* opinions to a profession of the *old*. Yet the disgraced religion, by courage and constancy in suffering, still kept its enemies anxious amidst all their success, and fearful, amidst all their power, for what might be the final issue.

The ACTION too was capitally interesting: The design of the project was to give the last blow to the credit of Christianity. And the honour of the new and old profession was staked on the event.

* 2 Thess. ii. 9.

† —τάτοι γὰρ ἱερεῖς [οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι] τῶν λόγων ἀπαξίας ἀνάγκης, ἔπειτα τὰς ἐργασίαις τοῖς κατὰ τὸν οἰκοδόμητον ὁμοφύλοις ἐθέλωσαν. Οἱ δὲ πλείονες συνήσαν καὶ χεῖρα δὲ καὶ ἀρεσκύματα εἰς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν οἰκοδόμου. Theodorct, Hist. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

We have shewn that every body understood Julian's purpose to be no other than to put a public affront upon Revelation. Paganism was big with expectation. The Church in general was alarmed; but the more knowing and pious amongst them, to the very last, mocked and defied the impiety of the attempt*.

Such were the various *passions and interests* which concurred with the *time and place*, to engage the attention, and excite the impatience of all men for the event.

But now, when full expectation on the one side, and continued alarms on the other, had set the world at gaze, the project suddenly disappeared. It was as it had never been; and the temple once more presented itself in its old ruins; but with a worse face, of horror and desolation. A surprising issue of so much determined power, and immense preparation!

A world, thus attentive and concerned, could not but be desirous of knowing the *cause* of so sudden a change of measures, if it were a change of measures, that influenced the event. Did the emperor relent? Did his agents fail in their obedience? or were the Jews, on better thoughts, become resigned to their visitation? Was the purpose diverted by a foreign invasion, or by domestic troubles? Did some hostile Barbarian, at that juncture, break in upon the empire; or some rebellious province suspend and weaken its authority? Or, lastly, did the Christians themselves defeat the insult, by opposing force to force? One or other of these *causes* must be given, to account for the defeat in a common way: and yet the astonished inquirer perceived that none of these had any thing to do in it. The emperor's hatred to our holy faith kept increasing to his death: Alypius's fidelity to his

* Cyrillus, post Maximum confessorum, Jerosolymis habebatur episcopus. Apertis igitur fundamentis, calces cæmentaue adhibita: nihil omnino decrat, quin die postera, veteribus deturbatis, nova jacerent fundamenta; cum tamen episcopus, diligenti consideratione habita, vel ex his quæ in Danielis prophetia de temporibus legerat, vel quod in evangelii dominus prædixerat, persisteret nullo genere fieri posse ut ibi a Judæis lapis super lapidem poneretur. *Res erat in expectatione.*—Rufini Hist. Eccl. l. x. c. 37, &c.

master,

master, and zeal for the old superstition, were without bounds; and the mad insolence of the Jews proved them ready to storm heaven itself to get into their old quarters. The empire, in all *other* parts, was at peace; and the only enemies it had, in *these*, were the Persians; who were too much alarmed by Julian's preparations, and too much taken up in putting their own frontiers in a condition of defence, to think of farther provoking him by new inroads into the empire.

What then would be the state of men's minds on this posture of affairs? Those who were at a distance would, in their loss for a natural cause, be attentive to what was told them of a miracle*. And those who were on the place would want no means of convincing them. For nothing was equivocal. The directors, the overseers, and the chief agents in this attempt, were all scattered and dispersed; and, surely, by no panic terror. An earthquake, that let loose a subterraneous fire, joined to a heaven all in flames, tore in sunder the foundations, destroyed the workmen, and burnt up and consumed the materials. Effects, which were all the objects of sense, and, what is more, remained so for a long time after. For many of those who survived their fellows, bore about them the lasting marks of their punishment: and, another religious revolution coming on, the site of the temple was suffered to retain that face of ravage and combustion, which the escape of pent-up fires always leave behind them †.

In this account then all parties must agree. And, by what remains of antiquity, it appears they did so: A consent, not procured in the way whereby *false* reports of the like kind have sometimes procured it. For this was no trifling event, laid in a remote corner, seen but by a few prejudiced relators, and accompanied only with ambiguous circumstances: In which case, partly from

* Φέρει ἐπὶ τοῖς τόποις ὅτι τὰς ἀγέμους διέγονται. Socrat Hist. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

† Καὶ οὐκ ἴσθης εἰς Ἱερουσόλυμα, γυνὴ ἐφει τὰ θυρίδια· καὶ τὸν αἰτίαν ζήτησις, ὁδὸν αὐτῆς ἢ ταύτης ἀέουσι. καὶ τὰτα μάστιγι· ἡμῶς παύσις ἐφ' ἡμῶς γὰρ, ὃ ἀπὸ πολλῶν ταῦτα γέγονε χρέου—Chryl. adver. Judæos, Orat. v.

contempt of a thing incredible, partly from neglect of a thing uninteresting, but principally from an indolence that shuns the trouble of examining, many a monkish tale hath made its fortune. But here, had the fact been *groundless*, or the event *different*, their falsehood must have been known to thousands: and what was so easy to be disproved, the interests of thousands would have exposed. Had the circumstances been *ambiguous*, they could not have passed uncontroverted: for This was not of the nature of the miracle said to be procured by the prayers of the *thundering legion*, which only gave testimony to the *power* of Christ, a matter about which Paganism was very indifferent: This went to the quick, and exposed the impotence and *falsehood* of their idols, a charge which always put the Gentiles out of temper. But if they were so cold in the cause of superstition as to need a spur to vindicate its honour, This they had likewise in the triumphs and exultations of the Christian ministers; who, in their sermons, their apologies, their histories, addressed both to friends and enemies, relate the event in all its circumstances; call upon the numerous eye-witnesses to attest the truth; appeal to the standing marks of the fact, the traces of a dreadful exterminating fire over *all* the place, and on *many* of the persons concerned; and, lastly, defy the advocates of idolatry to gainsay the exactness of their relation.

Such is the illustrious miracle we have here attempted to defend. We have examined it on the severest rules of rational assent. And we find it established on that full concurrence of happy circumstances which, we might expect, should attend a miracle so *singular* in its nature, and so important and *decisive* in its use.

But there is one circumstance almost peculiar to it, and, as it crowns all the rest, will deserve our most serious regard. It is this, that the *attempt* and the *issue* are so interwoven with one another, that they must stand or fall together. For whoever allows that Julian began to rebuild the temple, which he could not finish, must confess the obstruction came from above, because no human impediment

impediment interfered. And whoever denies the obstruction must deny the attempt, because if there were no obstruction of *that kind*, there was none at all : and if there were none at all, then there was nothing to be obstructed. That is, Julian never attempted to rebuild the Temple ; an inference so furiously sceptical, as would overturn the whole body of civil history.

A D I S C O U R S E
ON THE ATTEMPT OF THE
E M P E R O R J U L I A N
TO REBUILD THE
T E M P L E O F J E R U S A L E M.

B O O K I I.

HAVING now so well established the MIRACLE, we have little need to inquire into the objections that may be made to it, any further than as we may be led by our own curiosity, or inclined to gratify the curiosity of others, in seeing how far the capriciousness of wanton wit can go in its frolics towards perplexing the plainest and most evident of useful truths.

C H A P. I.

FIRST then it may be objected, “That the credit of the miracle rests entirely on the truth of this supposition, *That the holy oracles of God have declared, that the Jewish Temple should never be rebuilt* : For if this were not predicted, the restoration of it did
not

not impeach the divine veracity; nor, consequently, was its honour concerned in frustrating the attempt. Now the word of God no where says that the Jewish Temple *should never* be rebuilt; on the contrary, it insinuates that it *should*. It predicts, in general terms, the *total*, but not *final* destruction of the Temple; and, in express words, says, That *Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles UNTIL the times of it: Gentiles be fulfilled*. Which imply there was to be a period to the desolation, though the *time* be so obscurely marked as to make the fixing it uncertain."

The objection is plausible, and well deserves a solution. On which account (the method of the Discourse concurring) it was thought proper to obviate it in the very entrance on this argument: where it is shewn, from the nature of the Jewish and Christian religions, that the *total* destruction, mentioned in the Prophecies, necessarily implied a *final* one: For that, in the order of God's dispensations, the Jewish and the Christian Religions could never stand together: when *This* became established, *That* was to be done away. But while the temple remained, Judaism still existed: when *That* was overthrown, the religion fell with it; and consequently must rise again with the temple. But as this religion was *not* to rise while Christianity continued, the Temple was never to be restored. The consequence of all is, that, If it were restored, Christianity could no longer support its pretensions, nor the prophets nor Jesus the truth of their predictions.

C H A P. II.

SECONDLY, The testimony of Amm. Marcellinus, decisive as it is, hath been cavilled. It is suspected, "That He is no *original* Evidence; but hath taken the account, he gives us of what then passed at Jerusalem, from the Christian writers: the work in which we find it being composed near twenty years after the event, when the *fathers* had turned what there was of the natural fact

into a miracle ; and, by their declamatory eloquence, had made it famous throughout the now *believing* empire."

This objection abounds with absurdities : but it is not of my invention.

It supposes Marcellinus to have taken his account from the Christian writers, because there were no other to be had : for if there were other, then the Historian's authority does not rest on their testimony ; or, if it does, it rests on a good foundation, the evidence of Christian writers, supported by the Pagan. But is it likely that an unbeliever, a man of sense, and a lover of truth, should so confide in those of the new persuasion, speaking in their own cause, and unsupported by other evidence, as to deliver a fact, in terms of absolute certainty, which discredited a religion he revered, and a master he idolized ? Could we, under these circumstances, suppose him capable of preserving the memory of so unsupported a story, we should at least look to find it delivered in such terms of doubt and suspicion as he must needs think were justly due unto it.

But the Objector * seems to have attended as little to the *situation and circumstances*, as to the *character* of the Historian. When this event happened at Jerusalem, Ammianus was not in winter-quarters afar off in Gaul or Germany ; but near at hand, in the emperor's court at Antioch, and in an office of distinction. The objector, I suppose, will allow that Julian made the attempt. The attempt, I have shewn, was in its nature, such as must draw the attention of the whole empire upon it. Ammianus represents it as one of the most considerable enterprises of his master's reign ; and that it was projected to perpetuate his memory. It miscarried. And is it possible the cause of the miscarriage could, at that time, be more a secret to him than the undertaking ? Yet, if we believe the objector, the first news he heard of it was from the Christian Priests. Be it so. I ask no more, to shew the objection devoid of all com-

* Dr. S.

mon sense. A courtier of credit, a curious observer of what passed about him, hears nothing of what happened in his neighbourhood, at the time it did happen, though in an affair that engaged all men's attention. Many years after, in hunting for materials to compose his history, he starts this story. And where, I pray, does he find it ! Why truly skulking in the cover of a thorny and perplext inveſtive, or flaunting amongst the meretricious ornaments, and on the authority, of loose and prejudiced declaimers, records it, in his *Annals*, as a fact unquestionable. Not, as was said, to derive credit to his master or his religion, but to entail eternal dishonour upon both : and all this without giving either of them the least relief ; as was easy to be done by only telling from whom he had his story.

In a word, we see, the objection arises out of this circumstance, *The distance of time between the fact and the historian's account of it.* But such a circumstance can never support a conclusion of this nature, but in the case where a writer, who had an occasion to record a memorable fact at the time it happened, omits to do so ; and afterwards, at the distance of many years, sticks it into his history, without any reason given for his preceding silence. But this was not the case here : Amm. Marcellinus tells the story as soon as ever he had an opportunity of so doing ; which was when he retired from business to write history. And the distance between *that* and the event is so far from taking from the credit of his relation, that, as was observed, it adds greatly to it.

For we cannot but conclude, that as a soldier and man of business, he kept a journal of every thing that passed ; though we should not suppose, what is equally probable, that as a lover of letters he had very early formed his design of writing history. In what, therefore, concerned the transactions of those times, he had a sure and easy way of coming to the truth ; which was by comparing his own diary with the later, and better digested, accounts of others. But indeed the *nature* of the fact, and the *quality* of the

the writer, shew us, there was little danger of mistake. An authentic account of this whole matter was doubtless amongst the papers of state; to all which our historian had free access. And if we should suppose his relation to be no other than a faithful abstract of Alypius's letter to Julian, we should not, I believe, be a great way from the truth. It is certain, that a prudent historian, circumstanced as Marcellinus then was, could not have acted a wiser part than to relate so nice an adventure in the very words of the person, to whose conduct it was committed: for in so doing, he found himself in that rare situation of adherence strictly to truth, without offending either of the parties who then strove for the possession of it. We may further observe, that this supposition clears up another objection which has been made to his narrative. For,

Thirdly, we are told, "that the testimony of Marcellinus does but half our business: for though he gives a circumstantial relation of the fact, he speaks of it as a *natural*, not a *miraculous*, event."

The *former* objection, we see, supposes he had gone too far; *This*, that he hath not gone far enough. And yet I cannot understand how a professed Pagan could have said more, in conscience. This objector, sure, is not so unreasonable to expect, he should have recorded the triumphs of the Gospel over his own religion, in the words of the Christian writers, Because the other Objector had taken it into his head that he was beholden to them for his account of the story.

Thus far we may be certain: Had Ammianus thought it an artifice or imposture, he would have contrived to tell us so. For what should hinder him? Not any regard to the leaders of the Christian sect, upon whom the scandal would have fallen; for he is not backward, on every occasion, to expose their follies and perversities. On the other hand, the general character of Paganism made him very easy not to form any distinct judgement about the matter. Had he had any such inclination, he was fairly invited to it by what he found (and therefore honestly related) of the obstinacy

obstinacy of the eruption, *resolutely* bent to drive them to a distance*.

After all, a faithful historian, thus circumstanced, must be sufficiently distressed.

But Ammianus's skill was great, like his honesty; and he found a way to disengage himself with honour. Other considerations apart, the fact was too notorious to be smothered, and too important to be passed over: at the same time, the mention of it was nice and delicate; it was like walking over those burning ruins while yet *hot with the breath* of the avenger. Two things, in it, equally required management, the *motive to the attempt*; and the *nature of the defeat*: the one affected the glory of his master; the other, the interests of his religion. See, now, his address, and how artfully he has come off! Julian gave different reasons for his project, as best suited the views he had on those to whom he told it. To the Jews he affected compassion for their sufferings, and reverence for their holy rites: To his *Priests* and *Sophists*, we may be confident, he revealed his secret purpose to be the disgrace and ruin of revelation†: And to his *courtiers* and *military* men he pretended, what was most to their humour, the fame and glory of the enterprize. Though Ammianus was certainly no dupe to his professions, yet he found it convenient, and he thought it fair, to convey that motive to posterity, which Julian had given to his corps. The *defeat* was next to be considered. To own the miracle, would be condemning his *Religion*; explicitly to deny it, would be violating his *Honour*. He avoided this dilemma, by employing the words of the original Relator: and when we see, in his account, the very language of a narrative of State, we can no more doubt that he did employ them, than that Alypius himself sent his master a relation of the whole affair.

But if the necessity of saying so much distressed his *Principles*, the necessity of saying no more cramped his *Genius*; which was

* Hocque modo elemento *destinatus* repellente, cessavit inceptum.

† See the note in p. 419.

bold and swelling; and prompt, on these occasions, to pour along the torrent of his eloquence. Hear how pompously he describes an earthquake at Nicomedia. — “Eminuere Nicomediæ clades—” But the reader will find the rest below *.

He professes, we see, to tell his story *briefly* and *truly*: And I believe he did so. Yet his *brevity* does not hinder him from specifying the very day, nay even the hour when † this or that circumstance was remarked: nor his *truth* from giving us as minute a description of the various kinds of deaths as at a battle in Homer. How different is this from his relation of the event at Jerusalem! There he does not so much as inform us of the *month* in which it happened; we should even have been at a loss for the *year*, but that the Persian expedition directs us, to which the form of his annals hath connected it. And so far is he from dwelling upon the

* “—cujus ruinarum eventum *vere breviterque* absolvam. Primo lucis exortu *die nono kal. Septembrium*, concreti nubium globi nigrantium, lætam paulo antè cæli speciem confuderunt: et amandato solis splendore, nec contigua vel apposita cernebantur: ita oculorum obtutu præstrieto, humo involutus crassæ caliginis squalor infedit. *Dein, velut numine summo fatales contorquente manubias*, ventosque ab ipsis excitante cardinibus, magnitudo furentium incubuit procellarum, et elisi literis fragor; hæc quæ secuti *typhones atque præfæres*, cum horrifico tremore terrarum, civitatem et suburbana funditus everterunt.—Interim clamoribus variis excelsa culmina refultabant, *quaritantium conjugium liberosque*, et si quid necessitudinis arte constringit. *Post horam denique secundam, multo ante tertiam*, aër jam sudus et liquidus latentes retexit funereas strages. *Nonnulli enim superruentium rudерum vi nimia constipata sub ipsis interiere ponderibus. Quidam collo tenuis aggeribus obruti*, cum superesse possent si qui juvissent, auxiliorum inopiâ necabantur. *Alii lignorum extantium acuminibus fixi pendebant. Uno ictu cæsi complures paulo ante homines, tunc promiscuæ strages cadaverum cernebantur. Quosdam domorum inclinata fastigia intrinsecus ferebant intactos, angore et inediâ consumendos.—Alii subita ruinæ magnitudine oppressi iisdem adhuc mollibus continguntur. Collisius quidam capitibus, vel humeris præfectis aut cruribus, inter vitæ mortisque confinis, aliorum adjumenta paria perferentium implorantes cum obtestatione magna deserebantur—”*

† He is alike circumstantial in dating that other dreadful commotion which happened in the first consulate of Valentinian and his brother—“*diem duodecimum Kal. Augustas, Consule Valentiniano primum cum fratre, horrendi terrores,*” &c. l. xvi. c. 10.

slaughter

slaughter that followed, the too certain consequence of eruptions of this nature, that, had it not been for the Christian writers, we might have suspected his *horrible balls of fire* * had contained little more than a lambent flame, for any mischief that followed.

Again, he is not content to relate the Nicomedian earthquake, and expatiate only on its *effects*: he is as particular in describing both the *prognostics* that preceded it (such as the firmament overcast, and the day darkened with storms and tempests), and the *symptoms* that attended it (such as the lightning and whirlwind). While, on the other hand, his account of the disaster in Jerusalem is stripped of all these circumstances of terror; though they be the constant forerunners and attendants of fiery eruptions; and, if we may believe the Christian writers, did actually precede and accompany this: nor have we any reason to disbelieve them, because they speak (as we shall see) of certain phænomena, the natural effects of the disordered elements, which they erroneously ascribe to a different cause.

But this is not all: Ammianus, to give us the most fearful idea of this desolation at Nicomedia, says, the conflict of nature was such, as if the God of Nature himself, armed with all the stores of heaven, was hurling his lightning over a perishing world. But we find not a line of this imagery in the affair at Jerusalem. The Deity is there kept out of sight; though the repeated eruptions, which, he says, seemed *obstinately and resolutely bent* to drive the workmen to a distance, drove him to the confines of superior agency. But he was unwilling, and for a good reason, to call his readers after him.

What could occasion a conduct so different in a case so similar? Had he related the one as a noted fact, and the other but as an uncertain rumour, something might be pretended. But this makes the difficulty, he tells them both as facts, and facts of equal notoriety and truth. A difficulty nothing can solve but what we

* Metuendi globi flammarum.

have already shewn to be the case, the bashfulness of a backward evidence.

In this light we see, that his relating the eruption of Jerusalem as a natural event, takes nothing from the reality of the divine interposition. When a Pagan bears testimony to a fact of this importance, we may be as sure it is a *miracle* as, when a Papist bears testimony to a miracle of no importance at all, we are sure it is a *trick*.

But his *reserve* is so far from depriving us of the benefit of his testimony, that it is that which supports it. Had we found a Pagan speaking like a Christian Father on this occasion, his evidence had soon become as suspected as that of the Jewish historian, where he speaks of *Christ*; which one of the ablest and most candid of his critics has fairly condemned for an imposture; and another equally respectable, who would fain bolster up its credit, frankly owns, could never come from him in the condition it is brought down to us. This miracle, without question, embarrassed Marcellinus no less than the WORKER of miracles distressed the other Historian: whose case the excellent Writer, just now mentioned, has well described. But had posterity made equally free with both, I should have despaired of disengaging my Author with the address and abilities he has served Josephus*.

In a word, all we want of our adversaries is to have the fact acknowledged as Ammianus relates it. Its nature depends neither on his, nor on their, nor on our opinion of the matter, but on the nature of things. We think, indeed, that it speaks itself. But, for the sake of those who think otherwise, I propose, in the course of this examination, to shew, that it was an effect, which no power but that of the moral Governor of the universe was able to produce.

I proceed, then, in my subject; to which these cavils are only the prelude.

* See Mr. Forster's Discourse, intituled, "A Dissertation upon the account supposed to have been given of Jesus Christ by Josephus, &c. Oxon. M DCC XLIX."

C H A P. III.

THE next objection to the fact arises from what, one would have hoped, should have been the chief support of it, THE TESTIMONY OF THE FATHERS. But their credit amongst fashionable letters is now so low, that if they do not dishonour the cause they appear in, it is all we are to expect from them. For, as a late writer * graciously allows us to believe every strange thing except a MIRACLE, so, to say the truth, we are apt enough to credit every strange relator of antiquity, so he be not a FATHER. And yet, it is very certain, the *fathers* were, at worst, no more prejudiced in favour of Religion, than their Pagan neighbours were prejudiced against it. And whether these were philosophers, sophists, or statesmen, if we read their works, we shall find that very credulity, prejudice, false reasoning, and ill faith, which these objectors pretend has been discovered in some of the most celebrated of the *fathers*.

But what is it They have done, in the point in question, which proves so injurious to their own cause? "Why, it seems, they differ greatly from Ammianus, in their relation of this extraordinary fact; by adding many circumstances to his; some of which are utterly incredible."

Whether it were the *Fathers*, or their *Cause*, which render their accounts incredible, will be seen in due time. At present let me observe, it greatly eases their defence, that it cannot be fairly pretended, that the Christian writers contradict the relation of Ammianus, in any the least particular.

In the Second place, What I said before, of Marcellinus's substractions, I here repeat of the *Fathers' additions*; that they are so far from invalidating the fact, that they add greatly to its support. We have shewn Marcellinus to be an unwilling Evidence, who

* In a book, intituled, "Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding," printed 1748, p. 199.

hath cautiously avoided saying more than was just necessary to save harmless his character of a faithful historian. It was natural then to expect he had studiously omitted such circumstances as made most for the honour of that cause to which he was neither a friend nor favourer.

Thirdly, Admitting it was as is pretended, that incredible things are to be found in their relations : this circumstance will scarce be deemed sufficient to overthrow a well-attested fact, by any who consider that such as are best established have never been exempt from these injurious pollutions. The miracles of *Christ* and his apostles have not escaped the adulterations of heretics. And if this were sufficient to discredit truth, there is not a fact in civil history that would stand its ground. As to those who expect a certain innate virtue in Truth, of force to extrude all heterogeneous mixture, they expect a quality which was never yet found in it, nor, I fear, ever will. Nay, the more notorious a fact of this kind is, that is to say, the more eye-witnesses there are of it, the more subject it is to undesigned depravation ; as there must be, amongst a large cloud of evidence, some men of heated fancies : and the greater the communication, and the frequenter the collision, of these warm heads, the more active and inflamed will be the creative faculty of the mind ; which, in that state, we find, has always been the seminary of false circumstances of the prodigious kind.

But we should grant a great deal too much in allowing this to be the case here. Providence did not do its work by halves ; nor was penurious in the grace so seasonably bestowed upon the suffering church. For, what, we have shewn, was performed in the sight of all men, we shall see, was faithfully commemorated by the most celebrated preachers and apologists of *that* age ; and as soberly and carefully recorded by the best historians of the *following*. And if, travelling downwards in a blind and heavy road, it contracted some stains of the soil through which it passed, it was never so disfigured as to have those dirty features mistaken for its natural countenance, by any the least attentive observer.

The

The Christian Evidence for the fact are GREGORY NAZIANZEN, AMBROSE, and CHRYSOSTOM. These lived at the time it happened. The next age produced RUFINUS, SOCRATES, SOZOMEN, and THEODORET, whose testimony is perfectly consistent one with the other. In the last place are PHILOSTORGIUS, THEOPHANES, OROSIUS, NICEPHORUS, ZONARAS, and CEDRENIUS, who, although distant and different in age, are so near allied in judgement, that they are here put together; not to add credit to the cause they serve; but, by separating them from their several contemporaries of a better paste and compound, to bear alone the shame of their proper folly or prevarication.

The original evidence, as we said, are Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Gregory Nazianzen. Of these, Ambrose lived far in the West; and having, as may be supposed, received only a general relation of the fact, he delivers it as generally. *Have you not heard* (says he, writing to the emperor Theodosius) *how when Julian gave command to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem, the workmen were destroyed by a FIRE sent from God*?*

In

* This is an epistle to the Emperor, written on a very singular occasion—A certain bishop had excited his flock to burn a Jewish synagogue: which being complained of to Theodosius, he ordered the offenders to be punished; and that the bishop should rebuild it at his own expence. The impiety of this sentence was so offensive to Ambrose, that, having reminded the Emperor of the fate of the Jewish Temple, he asks him, whether he does not expect the same dishonours should attend his command, which followed the attempt of Julian. “Non audisti, Imperator, quia cum jussisset Julianus “reparari Templum Hierosolymis, quod divino qui faciebant repagulum igne flagrantur?” “Non caves ne etiam nunc faciat? Adeo a te non fuit jubendum ut Julianus hoc jussit.” Ep. xl. It was well this miracle was performed by God, to do honour to himself: Had it been to do honour to the bishops of his church, we see how little they deserved it! Here is one who violates the civil peace, and invades the religious rights of his neighbour; and another who supports him in so doing, on the authority of the miracle at Jerusalem. In which they either foully prevaricate; or grossly mistake the purpose of God’s interposition. They represent it as intended for an example to the magistrate to restrain the Jews from all exercise of their superstition; when it was evidently for no other purpose than to support the truth of the divine predictions concerning the

In which may be discerned the different fortune that naturally attends *truth* and *falsehood*. A fable, the further it goes, the more it gathers : for, like all untimely productions, coming out, at first, rude and unformed, it leaves room for charitable invention to give it shape ; which, by general contribution, soon raises it to a bulk that looks considerable. Whereas the circumstances of a true story drop off, one after another, as it advances in its progress, till it becomes stripped, and contracted to its essence : for there being precision in the testimony of the evidence, and conviction in the nature of the fact, men, on its first appearance, are less solicitous, as they have less need, to support it by its circumstances, than to convey it by its essentials.

Chrysostom, indeed, was in the neighbourhood of the place. But, speaking to an audience as well instructed in the affair as himself, though he had frequent occasion to put them in mind of so distinguishing a mercy, yet always dwells in generals ; just as he would have done in referring to the crucifixion, or to any other the most known incident in the Gospel. Thus, in his *Discourse against the Jews and Gentiles*, speaking of the desolate condition of the temple, he says—"For in our times that monarch, who exceeded all men in his malice to our holy faith, both lent the aid of the Imperial authority, and became an associate in the design. They began the work, but could make no progress ; for a FIRE, bursting from the foundations, drove away, and dispersed all concerned in the undertaking *."

the ruin of a certain temple. Theodosius was to expect the fate of Julian. And why ? Because he was *supporting* those very rights of nature which Julian then *violated* : For the attempt to rebuild the temple was but one of the many arts he employed to extirpate the Christian Faith by violence. But it has always been the trick, and has often proved the defeat, of Intolerance, to place their miserable Principle on such foundations as are found most of all to discredit it.

* —η γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ πάππας εἰς ἀσεβήσαντας βασιλεὺς, καὶ ἰδόντων ἱεροῖα τέτασθαι, καὶ τὴν ἑρῶν ἡφαιστὸς, καὶ ἄλλοι μὲν ἀποσπῶντες ἡδονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν θεμελίων καταστῆσαντας πάππας αὐτοῖς ἀπώλεσαν. *Adversus Judæos et Gentiles*, tom. i.

The

The only contemporary *father*, therefore, from whom we can expect a detailed history of the event, is Gregory Nazianzen. For he, not living at a distance, like Ambrose; nor preaching, like Chrysostome, to those who knew every circumstance, but residing in these quarters, and writing in defence of our holy faith, against Julian, in an appeal to the Roman Empire, was both qualified by his knowledge, and called upon by the nature of his performance, to be particular in his relation of the fact.

Now, as his account must undergo a severe scrutiny, it will be but fair to give it in his own words. Speaking then of Julian, he says,

“ After having run through a course of every other tyrannical
“ experiment against the Faith, and, upon trial, despising all of
“ them as trifling and contemptible, he, at last, brought down the
“ whole body of the Jews upon us; whom, for their ancient turn
“ to seditious novelties, and an inveterate hatred of the Christian
“ name, he chose as the fittest instruments of his machinations.
“ These, under a shew of great good will, which hid his secret pur-
“ pose, he endeavoured to convince, from their sacred books and
“ traditions, which he took upon him to interpret *, that now was
“ come the time foretold, when they should return to their own
“ *Land*, rebuild their *temple*, and restore the *law* to its ancient
“ force and splendor. When these things had been thoroughly
“ insinuated, and heartily entertained (for deceit finds easy admit-
“ tance when it flatters our passions), the Jews set upon the work
“ of rebuilding with great attention, and pushed on the project
“ with the utmost labour and application. But when now driven
“ from their work by a violent whirlwind and a sudden earthquake,
“ they fled together for refuge to a certain neighbouring church
“ (some to deprecate the impending mischief; others, as is natural
“ in such cases, to catch at any help that presents itself; and others,

* I think Gregory uses the word *ἐκμαντεύειν* ironically, in the sense of pretending to interpret with a prophetic spirit.

“ again,

“ again, enveloped in the crowd, were carried along with the body
 “ of flyers): there are who say, the church refused them entrance ;
 “ and that when they came to the doors, which were wide open
 “ but a moment before, they found them, on a sudden, closed by
 “ a secret and invisible hand ; a hand accustomed to work these
 “ wonders for the terror and confusion of the impious, and for the
 “ security and comfort of godly men. This however is now invariably
 “ affirmed and believed by all, That as they strove to force their way
 “ in by violence, the FIRE, which burst from the foundations of the
 “ temple, met and stopt them, and one part it burnt and destroyed ;
 “ and another it desperately maimed, leaving them a living monu-
 “ ment of God’s commination and wrath against sinners. Thus
 “ the affair passed ; and let no man continue incredulous concern-
 “ ing this, or the other miraculous works of God. But still the
 “ thing most wonderful and illustrious was a light, which appeared
 “ in the heavens, of a Cross within a Circle. That name and
 “ figure, which impious men before esteemed so dishonourable upon
 “ earth, was now raised on high, and equally objected to the com-
 “ mon view of all men ; advanced, by God himself, as the trophy
 “ of his victory over unbelievers ; of all trophies the most exalted
 “ and sublime. Nay further, they who were present, and partak-
 “ ers of the miracle we are now about to speak of, shew, to this
 “ very day, the sign or figure of the cross which was then marked
 “ or impressed upon their garments. For, at that time, as these
 “ men (whether such as were of us, or strangers) were shewing
 “ these marks, or attending to others who shewed them, each
 “ presently observed the wonder, either on himself or his neigh-
 “ bour : having a radiant mark on his body or on his garment :
 “ in which there was something that, in art and elegance, exceed-
 “ ed all painting or embroidery *.”

This

* — ἰστέ μὲν αὖτε διὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τῶν κατ’ ἡμῶν τυραννίδων, οὐ μόνον τι καὶ ὡς ἐν τῇ
 ἀτιμωσίᾳ—τὸ αὖτε ἐκ τῶν κατ’ ἡμῶν φῶνεν ἡμῶν, τὸν παλαιόν τι αἰῶνα κατ’ ἡμῶν
 αἰῶνα

This is the only contemporary writer amongst the Christians who delivers the account of the miracle *differently* from Ammianus Marcellinus, that is, with *additional* circumstances. Let us see then what handle *he* hath given to the objector.

But before we come to examine what he *really* affirms, and takes upon his credit to support; it will be proper to set in a true light what he is only *supposed* to affirm, and what he does not undertake to warrant.

He tells us, it was reported, that *those who fled for refuge to an adjoining church, whose doors were wide open but a moment before, found them suddenly closed by an invisible power*.—And, without question, They who could not then get in, did believe the impediment to be miraculous. They did not consider, that a frightened croud, all pressing to be foremost, would soon choak up a wider passage than the door of a little oratory, like this where they sought for refuge, had the doors been still *open*. But he tells us they were suddenly *closed*: and, if they opened outward, the *power* that shut them could be only *invisible* to a blind croud, half frightened

ἀνδρῶν ἐπισκευάμενοι ἐν αὐτοῖς μῶτον. Συνεργῶν λαβὼν τῷ τιχαάσματι, ἐπιθάζει τι δῆμι ἐν τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς βίβλων, καὶ ἀποφύττει, ὡς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίμενοι εἰς καλεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰν πόλιν ἀναδιδάσθαι, καὶ τῶν παλίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀνακλῶσθαι, καὶ ἀποκρυφίμενοι ἐν αὐτοῖς, πλάσσει τὴν ἐπίστασιν, ἵνα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ διηγήσῃ, καὶ ἱστοῖεν. ἱστοῖεν γὰρ εἰς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἔσται, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀναγνώστους διηγήσῃ τὸ ἱερὸν, καὶ χοροὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ ποιοῦντες περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἱταλαιπύρην—ὡς δὲ ὑπὸ ἀβύσσου λαλαῶν, καὶ βραχυῶς γὰρ ἄφω Συλαβίῃς ἐπὶ τι τῶν παλαιῶν ἱερῶν, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐκκλησίαν ὕμνησαν. οἱ δὲ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς τοῦτοις φῶνι Συμβαίνουσιν, τῇ παρὰ τὴν χροίαν πρὸς βοήθειαν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι παραχρῆν Συμφερόμενοι, καὶ τοῖς δίδουσι Συνεπιστήμιος· εἰσὶ μὲν οἱ λίγους, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἱερὸν αὐτὸς προσεδίδωκε, ἀλλ' ἀναπτύττειται προσελθόντες ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, ἱστοῦντες· εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀναγίνωσκον καὶ ἀφανῶς ἀναγίνωσκον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τιχαάσμιον πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀσθενῶν καλῶς ἐκτελεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. καὶ δὲ ἀπαλῶς ἔσται καὶ λίγους ποιοῦντες, ὅτι βασιλεύουσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλοπονησάντες περὶ τὴν ἰσοδοίαν, οὐδὲν ἱστοῖεν ἀπαλῶς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ καὶ τὸν μὲν καλῶς ἐκτελεῖ καὶ ἀναγίνωσκον—ὡς δὲ τῶν καίμων ἀποκρυφάσας, γένοιτο ἀφανῶς ἐμφανῶς τῶν τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸν ἀμειψόμενον ἀπαλῶς καὶ καλῶς. τὸτο μὲν δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς μὲν, ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τῷ θεῷ ἀναγίνωσκον. Ὁ δὲ ἐν τῇ παρὰ τὴν ἰστοῖαν καὶ ποιοῦντες, ἵνα φῶς ἐν τῇ ὕμνῳ τὸν Σταυρὸν ποιοῦντες. καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀναγίνωσκον τοῖς ἀβύσσου, καὶ σχῆμα τῶν ἐκκλησίαν ἱστοῖεν ἐκκλησίαν ποιοῦντες. καὶ γίνονται τρέσαντες τῇ θεῷ τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀσθενῶν ἰστοῖαν, τρέσαντες ποιοῦντες ἐκκλησίαν—ἐκκλησίαν ἵνα ἐν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν, οἱ δὲ θεῷ ἀναγίνωσκον ἐκκλησίαν καὶ μύσας, τὰς τότε καλῶς ἀναγίνωσκον τοῖς τῷ γαυρῷ γίμνῳ. ἐμὲ γὰρ τὰς ταῦτα διηγήσῃ τις [εἰτ' ὅν τὸν ἱστοῖαν, εἰτ' ὅν τὸν ἱστοῖαν] καὶ διηγήσῃ ἵνα καὶ τὸ θεῷ ἱστοῖαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν, καὶ τῇ παλαιῶν γινόμενοι καλῶς ἐκτελεῖν, καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ἱστοῖαν τῶν τοῖς ἰσχυρῶν, ἀνάσσει ἱστοῖαν ψαλμῶν, καὶ ποιοῦντες Συμφερίαν ποιοῦντες ἐν τῷ τῇ γίνονται. Orat. iv. adv. Jul.

out of their wits. And, indeed, Gregory himself intimates, in the following words (where he speaks of the fiery eruption) that this was not the general opinion; and particularly not his own; for he insinuates what he deemed to be the true cause of the impediment, in telling us *they strove to force their way in by violence*. But (adds he) that which followed, namely, the eruption, *is now invariably affirmed and believed by all*. As much as to say, time and cool examination, which corrected the first reports, have left the miraculous circumstance of the *impediment* doubtful; but have put that of the *eruption* out of all question.

This being premised, we come to the circumstances additional to the account of Marcellinus. Gregory mentions three: 1. *a whirlwind and earthquake*. 2. *The light which appeared in the heavens of a cross within a circle*; and, 3. *The figure of a cross on the bodies and garments of the workmen and assistants*. These, indeed, Gregory delivers as unquestioned facts, doubted or contradicted by none: and of so trite and frequent mention in the divines and historians of this time, that it is observable he tells the main fact, the *fiery eruption*, not directly or absolutely, but only obliquely and occasionally, for the sake of a circumstance not so generally known. Of all these, therefore, it will be incumbent on us to give some good account. I shall try them on the test of Ammianus's relation, as that is made (though only for this purpose) the standard of the truth; and doubt not but they will be *all* found very credible, notwithstanding their different degrees of evidence; the first, the whirlwind and earthquake, being *necessarily* connected with the eruption recorded by Ammianus; the second, the cross in the heavens, a *likely* attendant on the then unquiet state of the elements: and the third, the cross on the garments, very *consonant* to what we know of meteorology.

1. First then, as to the *earthquake*. Natural history informs us, that fiery eruptions, of which it makes frequent mention, are always preceded by an *earthquake*. And, indeed, the obvious nature
of

of the thing instructs us, it can hardly be otherwise; the force of fire making its way through a heavy load, opposed to its explosion, cannot but throw the incumbent earth into convulsive struggles, during the agitation. And this tumult in the *inferior* elements must needs communicate itself to the adjoining parts of the *superior*. Hence it hath so generally happened, that the disorder below has been accompanied with the like above; such as fierce *whirlwinds* and a troubled sky: this was the first signal of the like dreadful conflict in the desolation at Nicomedia, as Ammianus himself relates it.—“Concreti nubium globi nigrantium, lætam paullo ante
“coeli speciem confuderunt, ventosque ab ipsis excitante cardini-
“bus,” &c. Thus far, therefore, Gregory’s account is not only agreeable to the usual course of things, in their unquiet state, but the appearances are told in their order; the *whirlwind*, the *earthquake*, and the *fire*.

2. *The light which was seen in the heavens of a cross within a circle*, is the second thing we are to speak to. Of this kind of phenomenon, the *ecclesiastical*, the *civil*, and the *natural* history, both of ancient and modern ages, affords us so many instances, that it will give us very little trouble. Not to keep the Reader in suspense, it was neither more nor less than one of those meteoric lights, in a still and clouded sky, which are not unfrequently seen in solar or lunar halos: And when the parhelia, and paraselenes, which sometimes attend them, are added to that appearance, we can easily conceive how greatly the pomp of them must be increased. To support this account, we may observe, that this celestial cross was not seen till the conflict in the sky was over: it being the night after the storm, and the night after that, as Theodoret* informs us; where, by the way, we may observe, this was a lunar halo.

* —κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ὥραν καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν τῇ ὑμετέρῃ, ὅφρα ἐν τῇ ἑσπέρῃ τὸ σελήριον φαίνοι τὸ σχῆμα σταυροειδές. Eccl. Hist. l. iii. c. 20.

It was the same appearance, from whence (as Eusebius and others tell us) Constantine the Great drew the happy presage of an approaching victory : it was the same which Cyril of Jerusalem saw over that city, in the time of his son Constantius ; to whom the good bishop sent the news, and, indeed, endeavoured to make the most of it. The historians of the middle ages have, at different times, occasionally mentioned the like appearances ; and, generally, mentioned them as miraculous. Since the revival of learning, the Naturalists and astronomers have taken notice of such as happened in their times ; and have attempted to explain their physical causes.

But here I find what I had farther to say, on this subject, already done to my hands, in a very ingenious and learned discourse * of the excellent J. A. Fabricius : to which, with much satisfaction, I refer the Reader : For it is not my way to repeat what others have proved before me ; or to defraud them of the praises due to their discoveries.

I will only make one observation. All these meteoric crosses are represented as being encompassed by a luminous circle. A circumstance, which, if but commonly attended to, would have betrayed their original. But so far from that, the *circle* was brought as a convincing argument of their being miraculous. With this, Gregory triumphs † over the mathematicians or astrologers ; and defies them to account for it by their rules of art. Would the reader know the ground of so gross a delusion ? It was no more than this, the *circle* was so established an emblem of victory, that, like one of Epicurus's *Simulacra* (the exuviae of *bodies*, as these of *minds*), they regarded it as the *moral phantom* that proclaimed Julian's defeat.

* Intit. " Exercitatio critica, qua disputatur, Crucem, quam in cœlis vidisse se " juravit Constantinus imp. fuisse phænomenon naturale in balone solari." Vid. Bib. Græc. vol. vi.

† Πῶς οὐ τῶτον ἔχοντες τὸ ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς μαθήμενοι ; Οὐτὸν τῶν Χριστῶν ΝΙΚΗΣ ἢ ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣ, Orat. iv.

For figure and rhetoric had, in most times, but especially in those, been an overmatch for reason and science.

3. But the last circumstance (say the objectors) so far exceeds all the common length of credulity, that its invention must have put fancy to the stretch, and even fraud itself to the blush: and this is, the *mark of the cross impressed upon the bodies, or garments, of the people present.*

As extraordinary as this may seem, I do not despair of regaining those whom it hath most revolted.

But first it will be necessary to call in a writer of the next class, and consider his words—"When therefore (says Socrates) a vast number were assembled on the place, another prodigy happened; for a FIRE FELL FROM HEAVEN, which consumed all the workmens tools*." As this historian is the only writer who explicitly + mentions *lightning*, and its effects; it will be proper to consider its credibility. Under the last head we have shewn, how a fiery eruption must occasion a previous earthquake; and this earthquake, a stormy sky. But air, put into a violent motion, always produces *lightning*, when it abounds with matter susceptible of inflammation. And those columns of air, which lie over places that labour with convulsive throws to cast out an inkindled matter from its entrails, must needs be impregnated with vast quantities of sulphureous particles, which the earth, in that condition, exsudes from its pores, and which the solar heat draws upwards. But the natural history of these eruptions supports this reasoning. And Ammianus, whose evidence we have so often appealed to, gives us an example of it in the before-cited case of the *earthquake* at Nicomedia, attended, as appears by his account, with a fiery eruption, like *that* at Jerusalem. Now this historian tells us, that

* Παρόντων ὡν σφόδρα πολλῶν, ἔτερον τεράστιον ἐπιγινώσκαι. αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐξ ὑψηλοῦ καίτισται πῦρ, πάντα τὰ τῶν οἰκοδόμων ἐργαλεῖα διαφθείρει. Soc. L. iii. c. 20.

† Philostorgius, by the mode of his expression and by the order in which he puts things, seems as if he meant this fire, in the following words; τὸ το μὲν γὰρ, αὐτῷ ἐπαίματι τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ μῦθου. τὸ δὲ, σισμὸς ἰχθύων. Ex. Lib. vii. c. 9.

there,

there, the earthquake was preceded by *lightning*, as well as storms.—
 “Concreti nubium globi nigrantium, lætam paullo ante cœli speciem confuderunt—Dein velut numine summo *fatales contorquente manubias* ventosque ab ipsis excitante cardinibus, &c. — hæcque secuti typhones atque presteres, cum horrifico *tremore terrarum*.”
 The same, he affirms of that more dreadful earthquake which happened in the first consulate of Valentinian and his brother.
 “Paulo post lucis exortum, densitate prævia fulgurum acrius vibratorum tremefacta concutitur omnis terreni stabilitas ponderis *.”—

Lightning therefore, we see, is one of the constant concomitants in this desolation.

Now lightning is formed by the ferment and explosion of sulphureous and bituminous exhalations from the earth, mixing with nitrous acids in the air. And as this mixture, or combination, is variously proportioned, according to the then casual concurrence of elementary particles, so its destructive effects are various. Sometimes it hath been known to scorch up the cloaths without penetrating the body; and, sometimes again, to break all the bones without discolouring the flesh or cloaths; nay, even to melt the sword without injuring the scabbard. In the *first* case we must conclude, the sulphur predominated; in the *latter*, the salts. And according to *this* proportion, the lightning in question seems to have been formed. For, they tell us, it melted the iron instruments, but hurt neither the cloaths nor flesh; on which it affixed a cross, without any sensible notice at the time of the impresson. For I make no scruple to affirm, that this mark was the natural effect of lightning, so constituted.

That lightning falls in regular figures, hath been frequently observed. The most unlikely, one should think, is the circular; and yet, in that, it hath been commonly known to fall: the most likely is the angular, (and a *cross* is but two straight lines

* L. xxvi. c. 10.

meeting at right angles); yet this, though not very rare, has been less common.

But, it will be said, “the fathers make it a matter of much more importance: and the fantastic things they tell of these *crosses* exclude both nature and sober miracle; and admit of no other cause but fraud or fanaticism; even though we should substract from the account the contradictions that arise from their joint testimony. Gregory * and Socrates † say these crosses were *shining* and *radiated*: but Theodoret ‡ tells us, they were not bright and shining, but shaded with a dark colour: again, Rufinus and Socrates affirm, they were by no means to be washed out §.”

All this, it must be owned, hath the rank air of inventive prodigy. Yet view it well, and you see nature breaking in upon you. In a word, the fathers could have said nothing more corroborative of our account; which reduces them to a natural phænomenon: for the qualities they give to these crosses, not only shew them to be *meteoric*, but inform us of their very *specific* nature; which was precisely that of the PHOSPHORUS.

They shone by night, and were dark, and smoky-coloured by day (for thus, the different accounts of their appearance, given us by Gregory and Theodoret, are plainly to be reconciled, by the testimony of Rufinus ||) the very property both of natural and artificial Phosphori. Of the *first* kind, are insects, rotten-wood, shell-fish, tainted flesh **, scales, feathers, of certain animals, &c.

Of

* Κατάγριος.

† Τῶ ἐρχομένῳ πατὶ, σφραγίδι τῶν ἀντιπιδῶ.

‡ Οὐκ ἔτι μέλει φαιδρῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν μελαίνῃ καὶ σκοτεινῇ χειρῶ. L. iii. c. 20.

§ Ut etiam qui diluere pro sui infidelitate voluisset, nullo genere valeret abolere. Ruf.—ἀποπλύνει καὶ ἀποσμήχειν θέλει, ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ δύναμις. Socr.

|| In sequenti nocte in vestimentis omnium signaculum crucis ita evidens apparuit. Hist. Eccl. l. x. c. 37.

** Hossien the son of Ali, and grandson of Mahomet, was killed in aspiring to the throne in the Califate of Yefid. His head was cut off and carried by a soldier to the governor

Of the *latter*, that solid body, in particular, made from urine (for almost all bodies will afford it) with which, if one writes, as with a pencil on paper, the letters, in the night, will appear like flame, and, in the day time, present only a dim, smokey suffusion.

The reader will be further confirmed in this opinion, if he considers of what the *artificial phosphorus* is composed; which is chiefly a fixed salt, obtained by a long process by fire; in the course of which much of this element seems to be imbibed: so as to give the minute parts of the phosphorus the proper motion and agitation to produce light. Now the salts were predominant in the lightning in question, as appears by its violent effects on metals, and its innocuous contact with softer bodies. And we can easily conceive how that high ferment, by which lightning is formed, may produce a *natural* phosphorus, in the same manner as a long process by fire makes the *artificial*.

This will account too for the difficulty in washing out the marks. Those on the bodies would sooner disappear; those on the habits more slowly. And it is observable, that, though Gregory tells us, the curious yet produced (when he wrote) the marks on the garments; he says nothing of those on the bodies.

And now, I presume, the candid reader may be disposed to abate his wonder, and inclined to give the *fathers* credit for the facts, how much soever they might be mistaken in the immediate cause of them: and the unbeliever, from the fate of so *promising an objection*, may be taught the use of modesty and diffidence, when he opposes his own reason to the truths that establish Revelation.

But to put the matter farther out of doubt, I shall produce a passage from the *Adversaria* of the famous ISAAC CASAUBON, written while in England, and, as his son Meric conjectures (to whom we are indebted for it) about the year 1610-11. It follows in

governor of Couffah; as it lay on a table in the night the wife of the soldier pretended that a lambent flame played about the head, which might very well be. But this by the Partisans of Ali was esteemed a great miracle.

these

these words: "This day the Lord Bishop of Ely *, a prelate of great piety and holiness, related to me a wonderful thing. He said he had received the account from many hands, but chiefly from the Lord Bishop of Wells, lately dead †, who was succeeded by Bishop Montague; that in the *city of Wells*, about fifteen years ago ‡, one summer's day, while the people were at divine service in the cathedral church, they heard, as it thundered, two or three claps above measure dreadful, so that the whole congregation, affected alike, threw themselves on their knees at this terrifying sound. It appeared, the lightning fell at the same time, but without harm to any one. So far, then, there was nothing but what is common in the like cases. The wonderful part was this, which afterwards was taken notice of by many, that the marks of a cross were found to have been imprinted on the bodies of those who were then at divine service in the cathedral. The Bishop of Wells told my Lord of Ely, that his wife (a woman of uncommon probity) came to him, and informed him, as of a great *miracle*, that she had then the mark of a *cross* impressed upon her body. Which tale when the Bishop treated as absurd, his wife exposed the part, and gave him ocular proof. He afterwards observed, that he had upon himself, on his arm (as I take it) the plainest mark of a ✕. Others had it on the shoulder, the breast, the back, or other parts. This account that great man, my Lord of Ely, gave me in such a manner, as forbade me even to doubt of its truth §."

Here,

* Doctor Lanc. Andrews, afterwards Bishop of Winchester.

† Dr. John Still.

‡ The following note was communicated by a learned friend. R. W.

"Hoc etiam anno [1596], in agro Somersettenſi, utbeculæ episcopalis, cui a fontibus Velles [Wells] nomen, templum—die dominico, magnâ plebis frequentiâ, fulmine concuſſum, & ardere, viſum; ingenti populi conſternatione, plinctu & lamentatione: flamma undique circumvolitans omnem multitudinem circumplexa eſt, majore formidine quàm damno, quippe veſtes & capilli ambuſti, intactis corporibus." Rob. Johnſon, Rerum Britannicarum Hiſtoria, L. vii. p. 223.

§ Rem miram mihi narrabat hodie Dom. Episcopus Eliensis, sanctæ pietatis Antistes.

Here, then, we have the very same event, happening from the same cause, the *burst of lightning*. The only difference is, that *here* the *cross* appeared upon the bodies only: *there* both on the cloaths and bodies. A difference which the more or less subtilty of the meteoric matter would occasion.

The fact, we find, is as well attested as a fact can possibly be. A bishop, of the greatest name in his time for virtue and knowledge, receives it from an eye-witness, and a party concerned, a bishop likewise of an irreproachable character, and tells it to a man whose candid honesty and well-digested learning had rendered him one of the greatest ornaments of the age in which he lived. This account his son, a man of learning likewise, and of approved integrity, finds under his father's own hand, in his *Adversaria*, and gives it to the world; with this additional information, that he, the son, who had been beneficed in Somersetshire, had never heard the fact disputed, but had frequently met with several who pretended to a perfect knowledge of it.

To this let me add, that religion was out of the question. Here was no church, or churchman, no sect or doctrine, to be confuted or established, by the attestation of a prodigy. The great critic

Dicebat se accepisse à multis, sed præcipue à Dom. Episcopo Vellenfi nuper mortuo, cui successit Dom. Montacutus: evenisse ante annos circiter xv, in urbe Wella, sive ea dicenda, Valla, die quadam æstiva, ut, dum in Ecclesiâ Cathedrali populus sacris vacabat, duo vel tria tonitrua inter plura audirentur, supra modum horrenda, ita ut populus universus in genua $\mu\psi\tau\epsilon\mu\sigma$ procumberet ad illum sonum terribilem. Constitit fulmen simul cecidisse, sine cujusquam damno tamen. Atque hæc vulgaria. Illud admirandum, quod postea est observatum à multis, repertas esse crucis imagines impressas corporibus eorum, qui in æde sacra tum fuerant. Dicebat Episcopus Vallenfis D. Eliensis, uxorem suam (honestissima ea femina fuit) venisse ad se, et ei narrasse pro grandi miraculo sibi in corpore impressa \times signa extare; quod cum risu exciperet Episcopus, uxor, nudato corpore, ei probavit verum esse quod dixerat. Deinde ipse observavit sibi quoque ejusdem \times manifestissimam imaginem impressam esse, in brachio, opinor: aliis in humero, in pectore, in dorso, aut alia corporis parte. Hoc vir maximus, Dom. Eliensis, ita mihi narrabat, ut vetaret de veritate historię ambigere. Ex *Advers.* M. Casaubon. apud Mer. Casaubon. in tract. intit. *Of credulity and incredulity*, p. 118.

speaks

speaks of it as a physical, though a wonderful event. The very bishops deliver it to one another, and to him, as only an escape of nature. The bishop's wife indeed, at first, seemed a little planet-struck with superstition; and while she thought herself only distinguished with this badge of sanctity, was very willing it should pass for a *miracle*. But the honest bishop laughed her out of this conceit: and when she found how small a part of the honour was likely to fall to her share, she seemed content to submit it to her husband's better judgment.

Now, as religion and religious purposes had nothing to do in this wonder, that extraordinary philosopher *, once before quoted, will permit us to give it credit.

It is indeed so well proved, as to bear much weightier observations than any I have to lay upon it: what I have to say being only this, 1. That the two or three dreadful explosions perfectly agree with what hath been observed of the componency of that lightning which produces such an effect; namely, that it abounded with nitrous and fixed salts. 2. The relation says, it was some time after that the crosses were found upon the bodies of the patients; and that the bishop observed one upon himself on talking with his wife about it. This may give light to a passage in Gregory, which has the air of mystery, and yet amounts to no more than what the simpler and less sublime pen of this modern critic explains. The words of Gregory are these: *As they were shewing these marks, or attending to others who shewed them, each presently observed the wonder, either on himself or his neighbour; a radiant mark on his body or his garment.*

But suppose it should be said, "That the circumstance of lightning, on which we pretend to explain this phænomenon, is not sufficiently established; as it is mentioned but by one historian; and only in two words; and by the general name of a *fire* from

* The author of Philosophical Essays, &c.

Heaven." Whoever says it, will gain little, if his design be to invalidate the circumstance; and yet less, if he thinks that the discredit of that circumstance will deprive us of the means of accounting for the *crosses*. For it appears, from the nature of things already explained, that a *fire* from *beneath* might produce this effect as naturally as a *fire* from *above*. And by a relation, as well attested and notorious as the fact preserved in Casaubon, we have a famous instance of its having actually produced it. The excellent Mr. BOYLE, in his *discourse of some unbedded causes of the insalubrity and salubrity of the air*, gives us the following history from Kircher and others.—“ And that the subterranean effluvia may produce effects, and therefore probably be of natures very uncommon, irregular, and, if I may so speak, extravagant, may appear in those prodigious crosses that were seen in our time, viz. in the year 1660, in the kingdom of Naples, after the eruption of the fiery mountain *Vesuvius*; of which prodigies the learned Kircherus has given an account in a particular Diatribe: for these crosses were seen on linen-garments, as shirt-sleeves, womens' aprons, that had lain open to the air, and upon the exposed parts of sheets; which is the less to be admired, because, as Kircher fairly guesses, the mineral vapours were, by the texture that belongs to linen (which consists of threads crossing one another, for the most part, at or near right angles) easily determined to run along in almost straight lines, crossing each other, and consequently to frame spots resembling some one, and some another kind of crosses. These were extremely numerous in the several parts of the kingdom of Naples; insomuch that the Jesuit, that sent the relation to Kircher, says, that he himself found thirty in one altar-cloth, that fifteen were found upon the smock-sleeve of a woman, and that he reckoned eight in a boy's band: also their colour and magnitude were very unequal, and their figures discrepant, as may appear by many pictures of them drawn by the relator; they would not wash out with simple water, but required soap; their
“ duration;

“*duration* was also unequal, some lasting ten or fifteen days, and “*others longer*, before they disappeared *.”

1. The first observation I shall make on this curious narrative, is, that these Vesuvian *crosses* appear to have been impressed only on the garments, and not on the bodies: just contrary to those occasioned by the lightning at Wells; which were on the bodies, and not on the garments: while the Julian crosses appeared on *both*. The reader, therefore, if he likes it, may suppose, without any absurdity, that in the case at Jerusalem, the crosses on the bodies were caused by the *lightning*; and the crosses on the garments, by the *eruption from the foundations*.

2. The Vesuvian crosses were *extremely numerous*; which agrees well with the relations of Sozomene and Theodoret, the last of whom says, their garments were *filled* with them.

3. These Vesuvian crosses were hardly to be washed out: which exactly agrees with what Socrates and Rufinus tell of the same remarkable quality in the crosses at Jerusalem.

4. Lastly, we understand, that the marks of some of these were of considerable duration; as were those mentioned by Gregory Nazianzene; which, he says, continued to the time he wrote.

So much then for the contemporary evidence; which, though *fathers of the church*, are come off, we see, with honour and most so in a circumstance of a very delicate nature.

In the next class are Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomene and Theodoret. And all they add to the miraculous of Gregory's relation, are these two particulars, 1. The *lightning*, or a fire from Heaven, mentioned by Socrates. And, 2. this other circumstance, told us by Theodoret, that *when they began to dig the foundations, and carry out the earth, an incredible number of people was employed all day long upon the work. But in the night, the earth, thus taken out,*

* Works of Mr. Boyle, in folio, vol. IV. p. 293.

returned,

returned, of its own accord, from the valley into which it had been thrown *.

The case of the lightning hath been considered already, where it was brought in to explain the nature of the crosses. And, on that occasion, its close connexion with the rest of the phænomena was examined and explained.

What rests to be accounted for is only the *filling again of the foundations* with the earth that had been thrown out. And this appears to be one of those natural events, which, when mens minds are possessed with miracles (whether real or imaginary) they are wont to explain into prodigies: of the same nature and origin, doubtless, with that imagination in Gregory, that when the croud, which were tumultuously breaking into the church, had stopped up the passage, they were kept back by an invisible hand. For admit the fact as Theodoret relates it, that the *foundations* were filled again, and the *valley*, into which the earth had been thrown, was emptied; nothing was more natural than for an *earthquake* to do both, if it did any thing at all. The usual effect it is observed to produce, being an entire alteration in the face of things; such as the filling what is empty, and the emptying what is full. Cassiodorus, called *the Senator* (who abridged the *Tripartite History* which Epiphanius Scholasticus composed out of those of Socrates, Sozomene, and Theodoret), smooths what looked too rugged in this miracle, by the lightness and currency of his expression, *nocte vero spontanea terra de valle crescebat* †; suffering the reader to go at his pleasure into the solution here given: In support of which it will be proper to observe, that the shocks of the *earthquake* were repeated at different times. Gregory, we see, tells us of one which happened by *day*, when the labourers were driven for refuge to a neighbouring church. On the other hand, Socrates as expressly

* 'Επει δὲ ἰδόντων ἡρώδης καὶ τὸν χῶρον ἐνδοχόν, παραμένον μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδεικεν μετὰ δὲ περὶ λαοὶ, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ αὐτομάτως ἀπὸ τοῦ θάλασσης μὴδὲν ἦν. Eccl. Hist. L. iii. c. 20.

† L. vi. c. 43.

mentions one by night * : the very same (as appears from the similarity of the effects) which Socrates speaks of, in these words: *On the coming day, when they were to begin with the foundation, a great earthquake happened†: Sozomene's cast out stones from the foundation; so did that of Socrates ‡. It overturned a portico, and crushed to death several who were then abiding in it §: And this Theodoret expressly says happened by night, and to men asleep ||.*

The *order*, or, to speak more properly, *casual* disposition of Theodoret's relation, is this:—The miraculous filling again of the foundations—The dispersion of the lime and sand by tempests—The earthquake—After that the eruption, and then, for a close, the fall of the portico.

From hence I would observe, 1. That, though Theodoret, by the turn of his expression, would seem to insinuate, that the eruption followed the earthquake very speedily ** ; yet we see, by Sozomene, there was a considerable space between ; sufficient to clear again the foundations from the ruin they had suffered ††. But lest it should be said (as it hath been observed there were shocks of an earthquake at *different* times) this might be what immediately preceded that eruption, it will be proper to take notice, that the reflection Theodoret makes upon it is the very same with, and, indeed, appears to be borrowed from, what Socrates makes on the

* Διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς σεισμὸς μέγας ἐπυγνώμην. L. iii. cap. 20.

† Λίγηναι τῆς ἐκείνης, καθ' ἣν περὶ τοὺς θεμέλιους ἤμμελλον ἐποικισθῆναι, σεισμὸν γαίης αἱ μέγαν. L. v. c. 22.

‡ Ἀνίσταται τὸς λίθους τῶν πάλαι θεμέλιων τῷ καὶ. Socrat.

§ Τὸ δὲ κλίσεως τῆς γῆς ἐκ βάθρων ἀναδεδῆναι τὸς λίθους. Sozom.

§ Καὶ θηρόσιναι ἑαυτοὺς ἐν αἷς κατέλυσαν ἄλλως καὶ ἥρυσαν καὶ οἱ πλείους ἐγκαταλελειβέναι, οἱ μὲν αὐτίκῃ ἀπώλοντο, &c. Sozom.

|| Καὶ Νύκτωρ δὲ παραπύλλων ἦν τινι σιλαζύσῃ κατευδύνειν Στοιᾶ, κατὰ ἴχνη μὲν ἄλλως ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῃ τὸ οἰκοδόμημα· τὰς δὲ καθιέδους συνέχυσεν ἑπαιτίας. Theodor.

** Περὶ τοὺς μὲν σεισμὸς ἐγγίση μέγας—ἰσοδὴ δὲ ἐκ ἰδυσαν, οὗς ἐν τῶν ἰσοσσομένων θεμελίων ἀναδεδῆναι, &c. Theodor.

†† Ὡς δὲ σείσῃ θάλασσα ὁ Θεός, αὐτῇς ἰσορῶν τῷ ἔργῳ αἱ περιλαμβένει—πάλαι αἰνέοντα ἰσοδάξον· λέγει· ὅτι ἄμα τι τὸ δύνειον ἐκείνων τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ οὗ, &c. Sozom.

earthquake,

earthquake, which he expressly says happened by *night* *. Now, between this, and the eruption, he tells us, there was time sufficient for many to come out of the country to Jerusalem, whither the fame of the earthquake had brought them †. But Theodoret's own expression helps us to ascertain the thing. He says the fire broke out, ἐκ τῶν ὀρυσσομένων θεμελίων, *from the foundations which were ready dug*, in order to be built upon, which supposes what Sozomene says, to be true, that there was time to repair the disorders which *that* shock of the earthquake had occasioned.

And thus Cassiodorus understood him : For, speaking, as we observed above, of this miraculous return of the earth, he says, *every thing was prepared anew* ‡.

By this time the Reader begins to see day, through the thick confusion of Theodoret's cloud of circumstances : in which, his addition of the wonderful, in filling again the works, amounts only to this, that an earthquake, in the night, tumbled some rubbish into the *foundations* ; and forced some out from a *valley* into which it had been thrown.

The disjointed parts in Gregory, Socrates, and Sozomene, and which are still further distorted by Theodoret, the Latin Historian Rufinus fairly reduces to their place. “ Behold (says he) in the “ *night*, the last that preceded the day for laying the foundation, a “ prodigious earthquake arises, by which, not only the stones of “ the foundations are cast abroad and dispersed, but almost all the “ edifices, that were about the place, are thrown down and levelled. “ Public porticos also, in which a great multitude of Jews, who “ were observed to push on the work with most vigour, had their “ abode, being thrown down, bury all that are found under them

* Δίϑ· ἔ· ἐ· τῷ γινομένῳ Ἰουδαίῳ κατέλαβ·. Socrat.

Καὶ τὰς παλαιὰς ἀμύτους τῶν θείων ἱερῶν κατέλαβ·. Theodor.

† Καὶ φάμεν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ἔγε ἡ τὸς αὐτοῖς διάγουσας, παρῶν ἐν σφύρῃ πολλῶν ἱερῶν τεράτων ἐργασίας. πῶς γὰρ, &c. Socrat.

‡ Noctē vero spontanea terra de valle crescebat. Solutis itaque prioris etiam fundamenti reliquiis, nova omnia præparabant. L. vi. c. 43.

“ in their ruins *.” Thus Rufinus, by *fairly putting together* the several parts of one event, hath shewn, that levelling the ground, and overthrowing the porticos, were the simple consequences of the earthquake : while Theodoret, by *disjointing* them, and delivering the effects separately, and without their common cause, hath made two miracles out of one natural event.

The Reader now sees what the FATHERS have to say on the occasion. He has had their testimony laid at large before him. Let us stop a moment then, and cast a general eye upon the whole. I persuade myself we shall see such a concurrence and consistency in the accounts of the TWO PARTIES ; so perfect an agreement between the Pagan testimony, and the *first* class of Christian writers ; so close a dependency between *these* and the *second* class ; and such a connection and enchainment of one fact to another, throughout the whole, as will force the most backward to confess, that the hand of God was of a truth in this wonderful defeat.

Ammianus Marcellinus, Julian, and Ambrose, speak simply of the firey eruption ; Chrysostome goes one step further, and tells us of its fatal effects. Gregory enters more minutely into the affair : he ushers it in with what is always found to be the precursors of this dreadful judgement, *storms* and *earthquakes* : and closes the scene with two meteoric phænomena, likely enough to succeed it, though, indeed, not so much in the way of common observation.

The following writers, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomene, and Theodoret, add little to these relations. But the manner in which they tell their story (at the same time that it confirms, and explains the accounts of those who went before) proves they are not mere transcribers from their predecessors ; at least not from such of them as

* Ecce, Nocte, quæ ad incipiendum opus jam sola restabat, Terræ motus ingens oboritur, et non solum fundamentorum saxa longeque lateque jactantur, verum etiam totius pene loci ædificia complanantur. Porticus quoque publicæ, in quibus Judæorum multitudo, quæ operi videbatur insistere, commanebat, ad solum deductæ, omnes Judæos, qui reperti sunt, oppressere. L. x. c. 37, &c.

now remain ; which amounts to the same as if they themselves were original.

Thus, for instance, Gregory, indeed, mentions the *cross* upon the garments ; but it is to Socrates only, who speaks of the *lightning*, that we owe the knowledge of the *cause*.

So again, Gregory calls them *lucid* crosses ; but we are indebted to Rufinus, Socrates, and Theodoret, for the discovery of their specific nature ; who tell us, that they shone by night, were dark-coloured by day, and could not easily be washed out.

This will lead us to observe another mark of truth in these relations ; That the most wonderful circumstances, such as the *qualities* of these crosses, and the lucid circle round the *aerial* cross (circumstances which might seem to be made at pleasure for the sake of the marvellous) prove to be the *very qualities* which belong physically to their respective natures.

Nay, where their prepossessions had led them to find prodigies in accidents the most common ; as where Gregory ascribes the impediment to enter the church-doors to an invisible hand ; and Theodoret, the filling up the foundations, to be the return of the same earth back to its post ; they have themselves honestly recorded those very *facts* which enable us to rectify their mistakes : Thus the *confusion* of the crowd, which Gregory mentions, when they were endeavouring tumultuously to force their way, very naturally accounts for the impediment : and the *earthquake*, Theodoret speaks of, could not but produce that new face in the foundations, which he took to be miraculous.

Once more. The *saibers* indeed record many dreadful circumstances : but then none of them prove false terrors. If there were *storms* and *tempests*, they do their work ; the sand and lime are dispersed : When the *lightning* falls, the tools and instruments of building are consumed and melted : the *earthquake* overthrows porticos : The *firey eruption* tears in pieces the foundations : and not one of these attacks upon impiety, but what disperses, maims, or destroys the assembled workmen, and their abettors.

After-

After this too we are told, the various effects it had upon the minds of all, how differently soever interested. This is of more importance than appears at first sight. Invention and fable is not wont to go thus far. It may tell us of *appearances*; but it will never venture to speak of *effects*, which the hearer could immediately disprove. That which has a fairy entrance, has a fairy exit. Here the effects are mentioned that the truth may be examined. Chrysostome actually appeals, for the reality of the *eruption*, to the sight of the burnt and shattered foundations, and to the maimed and scorched survivors amongst the workmen. And All of them might have appealed, for the reality of the *storms* and *lightning* (which dispersed the lighter materials, and consumed the heavier, together with the tools and instruments of work) to the conduct of Julian and Alypius: For what other reason can be assigned, I do not say, for their *deferring*, but for their *giving up*, the whole enterprize * ?

Having now discoursed so largely on the several circumstances of this event, and yet (by reason of the *occasional* mention of them) not having been able to preserve the order in which they happened; it may tend to support, or at least to illustrate, what hath been already said, if we give a general view of them in one continued and connected relation.

And here our principal Guide will be the *nature of the phenomena*: for though the Christian Writers will not be useless, yet their perpetual violation of the order of time makes it necessary to regulate their accounts on the reason of things.

In excuse of their conduct, something is to be ascribed to the literary genius of those times, which was inaccurate and immethodical; something to the nature of their evidence, collected from discourses, where the mention of this illustrious event is only brought in to support some particular point of doctrine or morality

* Περιέγραψεν δὲ καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Ἕλληες, ἐκείνους τὸ ἔργον καὶ αἰσχύνην. Soz. L. v. c. 22. Καὶ αὐτὸν [Ἰουδαῖον] καὶ τοὺς Ἰουδαίους οἱ ἐσχάτων ἀμνημονίαι καὶ αἰσχύνην κατεγράφουσιν. Philost. Hist. Eccl. l. vii. c. 9.

then in question ; but the principal source of their neglect of order, was a false persuasion that every circumstance was miraculous and out of nature. This hindered them from inquiring into the order of time, and would have prevented them from finding it, had they been disposed to inquire. Besides, the *confusion* of time supported their *system* of the miraculous, by separating the *causes* from the *effects* : and the *regulation* of it would have looked like an impiety, as seeking for that in nature whose source was only in God. This too will account why the fault was not reformed by the Historians who followed the original evidence ; and whose business it was to reduce to order the confusion in the occasional works of their predecessors. However, whether the miracles became *casually* multiplied by a neglect of chronology, or that they *purposely* neglected it, in order to multiply them ; yet multiplied they were ; as we have shewn, in our inquiry into the *nature* of the circumstances. And nothing can better support the *truth of the deduction* arising from this enquiry, than the placing each circumstance in the order in which it happened. This we shall now endeavour to do.

1. The first signs the Almighty gave of his approaching judgement, were the *storms*, *tempests*, and *whirlwinds*. For the incumbent air could not but be affected with the ferment, at that time working in the earth, and exuding through its pores. These instruments of vengeance performed their office, in the dispersion of the loose materials *.

2. After these followed the *lightning*, the usual consequence of the clash and collision of clouds, driven forcibly together by storms and tempests. The effects this produced were, *first*, destroying the more solid materials, and melting down the iron instruments† : and *secondly*, impressing that prodigious mark on the bodies and

* Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῆ γῆς καὶ τῶν πολλὰς μεθυσθῶσαν μετὰ τὰς, ἐκείνης αἰμαὶ βίαιαι ποτίσθαι, αἰσας ἀνθρώπων ἐκείνων. Theod. Hist. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

† Πῶς γὰρ ἐξ ὈΥΡΑΝΟΥ κατεσπένθη, πάντα τὰ τῶν οἰκοδόμων ἐργαλῆα δάκρυαι. ὅτι γὰρ ἐκείναι ἐπὶ τοῖς φλογὸς ἀπολυμνίσαι τὰς σφύρας, τὰς γλαυκὰς, τὰς κροτάλιας, τὰς αἰλίας, τὰ σκίπαρα, πάντα ἀπλῶς ἔτα πρὶς τὸ ἔργον ἐπληρώθησαν εἶχον οἱ ἐργαζόμενοι. Socrat. l. iii. c. 20.

garments of the assistants. For what *Socrates* says is remarkable, that the *night after* (for this *lightning*, by his account, was in the *day*) the shining crosses appeared upon their garments *: which was as soon as they could appear, with that eclat. But it may not be improper to observe, that *Rufinus* seems to have mixed together the fire from heaven and the fire from the earth; for he gives all the effects of *both* fires, mentioned by others, to the single *one* he himself speaks of †.

3. The *earthquake* came next: which, *Socrates* says, happened in the *night* ‡; that night, in which the marks upon the garments were first observed. Its effects were these. It cast out the stones of the old foundations (which gave occasion to a remark, that the prophecy of *Jesus* was now *literally* fulfilled); it shook the earth into the new-dug foundation (of which *Theodoret*, we see, made a miracle), and it overthrew the adjoining buildings and porticos.

4. Then followed the *fiery eruption* §, which destroyed and maimed so many of the workmen and assistants; and at length forced the undertakers to give over the attempt as desperate ||. But it is to be observed, that this eruption was attended both with *storms*

* Καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἑρχομένῃ νυκτὶ, (φωταγίδες γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις, τοῖς ἰματίοις αὐτῶν ἐκείνοις ἐφάνησαν. L. iii. c. 20.

† *Ædes erat quædam—in qua ferramenta aliaque operi necessaria servabantur; e qua subito globus quidam ignis emicuit, et per medium plateæ percurrrens, adustis et exterminatis qui aderant Judæis, ultra citraque ferebatur. Hoc iterum sæpiusque et frequentissime per totum illum diem repetens, pertinacis populi temeritatem flammis ultricibus coercebat—insequenti nocte in vestimentis omnium signaculum crucis, &c. L. x. c. 37.*

‡ Καὶ δὲ τῇ Νυκτὶ (πρὸς μίαν ἐπεγεγμένον, ἀπέβησαν τὰς λίθους τῶν παλαιῶν θεμελίων, &c. L. iii. c. 20.

§ Λόγος ὅτι ἄμα τὸ δ' ὅτις ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ πῶς ἐξείσθησαν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τῶν ἐκείνῃ ἀνίστηναι, καὶ πολλὰς ἀνίστηναι. καὶ τὸτο πρὸς πάλιν ἀδύ; δύναι τε καὶ πρὸς ἀνίστηναι, καὶ πρὸς ὅτις ἀμφὸς ἀνίστηναι. Sozom. L. v. c. 22.

|| Ταῦτα οἱ ἀνίστηναι διασώμναι, καὶ τὰς διασώμναις μάστιγας; ὅτις ἀνίστηναι, ἀνίστηναι τε καὶ τὰ ἀνίστηναι καὶ ἀνίστηναι. Theodor. l. iii. c. 20.

and tempests above, and with an *earthquake* below *. This, Gregory, an original evidence, directly affirms; and it is altogether consonant to the nature of things. An earthquake could not but immediately precede so violent an eruption; and it is highly probable, that this tumult communicated itself to the neighbouring air. I mention this, because it contributed to the embarrass we find in the accounts of the evidence; some of whom have confounded this *latter* storm and earthquake with the *former*. Another observation I would make is, that, according to Ammianus Marcellinus, the fits of the firey eruption continued longer than the Christian writers represent the matter. Those of them who say the most, seeming to confine the eruptions to one day †, if we except the abridged account of Philostorgius, which intimates, they continued as long as any one attempted to go on with the enterprize ‡: and they would hardly desist for the impediment of a single day. It is absurd to suppose they did: and Ammianus's words clearly imply they did not §: consequently the eruption lasted much longer; and continued to be repeated as often as the projectors began to renew the attempt, till it had fairly tired them out. This, the reader will find, is of importance to establish the divine interposition. Yet the *Fathers* are so impatient to be at their favourite miracles, the *crosses* in the *sky*, and on the *garments*, that they slip negligently over what ought principally to have been insisted on, the **FIREY ERUPTION**; and leave what was truly miraculous, to run after an imaginary prodigy. The great St. Chrysostome, indeed, must be

* 'Οτι δὲ ἐπὶ ἀγρίας λαίλαπτος, καὶ βρασμῷ γὰρ ἄφρον' συνλαβόντες ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πλεονέκτων ἱερῶν—ὅτι βλαζονεύουσιν αὐτῶν καὶ φιλονεικῶντες περὶ τῶν εἰρηδον, πῶς ἔγνων, &c. Greg. Naz. Orat. ix.

† Ἐπιτίμω μὲν ἦν ταῦτα τὸ σῶν, δὲ διὰ τῆς ἡμέρας. Socrat. L. iii. c. 20. Hoc iterum saepiusque et frequentissime per totam illam diem repetens, *perstinacis* populi temeritatem flammis ultricibus coercebat.

‡ Τῷ το μὲν γὰρ, πῶς ἐπιτίμω τὰς ἐπὶ ἐξουσίας τοῦ μὲν τῶν δὲ, *Chrysostomus* ἰούστιν. Philost. Hist. Eccl. l. vii. c. 9.

§ Metuendi globi flammarum prope fundamenta crebris assultibus erumpentes, fecere locum exustis *aliquoties* operantibus inaccessum: hocque modo elemento *destinatus* repellente, *cessavit* inceptum. L. xxiii. c. 1.

excepted out of this censure. He would not suffer the change to be put upon him; but judiciously lays the stress upon that which would bear it.

5. The last appearance was *a lucid cross in the heavens, circumscribed within a luminous circle*. Nature, put so suddenly into commotion by its Creator, was, on the despair and dispersion of his enemies, as suddenly calmed and composed. And then appeared, in the yet clouded firmament, this noble phænomenon, in a lunar halo. And what could be conceived so proper to close this tremendous scene, or to celebrate this decisive victory, as the cross triumphant, incircled with the HEROIC symbol of conquest?

The order here given to the several *parts* of this event, is further supported by Marcellinus's narrative of that parallel disaster at Nicomedia; which we have already employed, and more than once, though for different purposes, to illustrate the fact in question. And it is remarkable, the Roman historian not only records the same circumstances, but assigns, to each of them the same order of time. 1. It began with *storms and tempests*. "Concreti nubium globi nigrantium," &c. 2. Then followed the *lightning*, "Dein velut numine summo fatales torquente manubias," &c. 3. Then the *earthquake*. "Horrifico tremore terrarum, civitatem et suburbana funditus everterunt." 4. And lastly the *fiery eruption*. "Palantes abrupte flammarum ardores," &c.

The order, so carefully preserved by Marcellinus, at Nicomedia, is, we see, totally neglected by the Christian historians, at Jerusalem. And what but this could suggest so different a conduct? He related what he rightly understood to be, *in the whole*, a natural event; They, what they falsely conceived to be, *in every part*, miraculous.

To conclude this head, let me observe, That, in an aggregate concurrent evidence, a minute *uniformity* on the one hand, or a real *inconsistency* on the other, equally tend to the discredit of the fact in question. In the first case, we justly suspect the *evidence* to be

be concerted ; in the latter, the *fact* to be ill founded. Because, where men relate what they receive from one common object, their accounts must be as various as the variety of the several recipients ; which is just so much as to give a *different colouring* to the same things, not to *alter* the things themselves. When we see, therefore, the minutest uniformity in the colouring, we conclude them not to be originals, who fairly represent from nature, but copyists, in concert from one another. And where, again, that common object, from which men receive their intelligence, is *real*, there, their accounts can admit of no inconsistency, because the nature of things is invariable. But if this object be the *creature of the imagination*, begot by the disordered passions, which are always changing, the testimony of the deluded observers will never be secure from contradiction.

Now the *Christian testimony* which we have examined, on this occasion, appears to be entirely free from both these suspicious circumstances. They tell it, indeed, in the whole, variously ; but with a perfect consistence of all its parts. They shew, by this, they wrote neither in concert, nor at random ; but drew from one common object, and an object that was real.

Having explained the *general cause* of that variety, in concurrent evidence, which most establishes its credit ; it may be proper to consider, the *peculiar cause*, in the evidence in question.

Where a notorious fact consists of many circumstances, the observers, according to their different tempers and dispositions, will be differently affected. Some will be struck with *this* circumstance, some with *that*. Hence one man will speak of a cause without its effect : Another, of the effect without the cause. *This* relator will run two circumstances into one ; *That* will split one into two. And if, of these circumstances, there are some not rightly understood, the order of time will be neglected : and, from that neglect, another embarrass, in the evidence, will arise, a different order assigned by different writers to the same circumstance.

Lastly,

Lastly, let me observe, it is not *every appearance*, neither, of a *concerted agreement*, or *irreconciled contradiction*, that should make us lightly reject a testimony of (otherwise) established credit. A single circumstance, in the event before us, will shew how easily, in either case, we may be betrayed into a wrong judgement. Nazianzen, Rufinus, Socrates, Sozomene, Theodoret, are so exact, and in so perfect agreement, about the *cross upon the garments* (while each, in his turn, overlooks more material circumstances) that if we take it in the light they place it, of a great and amazing prodigy, we should be apt to suspect it only a studied ornament to their relation. Yet the finding, on examination, that the properties, they assign to these crosses, lead to the discovery of their real nature, this entirely acquits them of invention. Again, what on the other hand has a stronger appearance of *contradiction* than one of them affirming that these crosses were *shining* and *radiated*; and another, that they were *sombrous* and *dark-coloured*? Yet this apparent contradiction assists us in the discovery of one of their physical properties; and that discovery helps us to reconcile the contradiction; as we find they were black by day, and lucid by night.

I chose to let this single circumstance of the *crosses* supply me with these instances of the contrary qualities (of too great conformity, and too little consistency, in a concurrent evidence) which equally tend to render it suspicious; because, indeed, these contrary qualities frequently exist together, in the testimony of *false witnesses to the same fact*.

We come now, in the last place, to that refuse of evidence, which we threw together as of no account; Philostorgius, Theophanes, Orosius, Nicephorus, Zonaras, Cedrenus, and their fellows. These men, like impertinent players, have only the language of others, without any sense of their own; save, that they, sometimes, presume to add their own inventions to their author's conceits. Thus Philostorgius and Theophanes clap on a couple of senseless lies, to the well-composed relation of their predecessors;

which, like wens in a fair-proportioned body, stick out so unsightly as never to be mistaken for its natural members.

The first of them tells a story (which Nicephorus has repeated) of a certain cave laid open by the workmen, in which was found the Gospel of St. John, miraculously preserved *. As this was apparently invented in favour of the *religion of reliques*, I shall deliver it up to the inquisition of Dr. Middleton.

Theophanes tells his tale on better grounds. He affirms, that the marks of the cross were not only found at Jerusalem; but at Antioch, and other cities; and that they appeared on the coverings of the altars, on the church-books, and on the sacred vestments †. Well fare Theophanes, for a punctual relator. I fancy Philostorgius would have been at a loss to produce his miraculous *gospel*: But without doubt, Theophanes knew where to find enough of his own manufacture, to save him from blushing, had he been of so weak a complexion.

CHAP. IV.

THE Reader hath now the whole of the church-evidence laid before him. It hath been largely and minutely examined; and, I presume, so fully explained and vindicated, as to make it needless to take notice of any *particular* Writer, who hath objected to its credit.

Yet the remarks of M. JAMES BASNAGE, on this collective evidence, are so very extraordinary, and his authority in the learned world so high, that I might be reasonably accused of neglect, should I pass him over in silence, though a great part of his censure hath been already obviated.

* Καὶ δὲ τῶν θυμολίων ἐντεταγμένων, ὡς τῶν λίθων ὡς τὸν ἰσχυρὸν κρατῶν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, γάρναι αὐτοὺς τοὺς παρῶντας, ἰσογυρμένους τῇ σφύρᾳ, &c.—Ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ γὰρ τοῦ—τὸν χυρὸν ἐπαυλῶν ἐνίσταναι βελλῖον αὐτῷ ἐντεταγμένον. Hift. Eccl. vii. c. 14.

† —αὐτομάτως τὰς τῶν ἀπ' ἡμεῶν τῶν δυσσεβούντων καὶ βίβλων καὶ ἄλλων ἱερῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ ἁγίων Χριστιανῶν, ἅλλα καὶ ἱερῶν ἰσχυρῶν τὸ σημεῖον τῷ γυναικί, ὁ μόνος ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις ἅλλα καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναῖς καὶ ἄλλων πόλεσι. Chronog. p. 44.

This very learned man, whose candour, exactness, and strength of reasoning, have advanced him to the first rank in letters, hath, amongst his other excellent labours, enriched the public with a *history of the Jews*, from the beginning of the Christian *Æra*, down to the present times; composed in a judicious method, interspersed with many curious inquiries, and abounding in a vast variety of good learning.

In the sixth book of this work, he gives us, what he calls, an *Examination of those miracles which defeated Julian's attempt to rebuild the Temple*: where, to speak freely, I find not one of those qualities, which have rendered him so deservedly famous amongst the Protestants abroad.

After having told us what share Julian had in the attempt, and how easily he brought the Jews into his measures, he goes on in this manner.

* “ It is said, that God hindered the building of the temple, by
“ three succeeding miracles. Three ancient historians, SOCRATES,
“ SOZOMENE,

* On dit que Dieu l'empêcha par trois miracles consecutifs. Trois historiens anciens, Socrate, Sozomene, & Theodoret, rapportent unanimement ces faits. Sozomene même, qui, à peur que quelques incredules ne les regardent comme fabuleux, renvoie ces incredules à la deposition des temoins oculaires, qui vivoient encore lors qu'il écrivoit. Le premier de ces miracles fut un tremblement de terre, qui arriva lors qu'on nettoioit les fondemens de l'ancien temple pour en jetter des nouveaux : et ce tremblement de terre renversa les materiaux. Il y a deux variations sur ce premier miracle ; car Theodoret le fait precéder de je ne sai quelle vertu divine, qui raportoit la nuit les anciens materiaux & les ordures qu'on avoit ôtées, et ensuite d'un vent miraculeux, qui dissipa les pierres, quoi qu'on eût jetté dessus une prodigieuse quantité de chaux et de ciment pour les essermir. Secondement, Sozomene fait mourir par ce tremblement de terre un *grand nombre de personnes*, qui étoient venues là en qualité d'ouvriers, ou de spectateurs, et qui furent ecrasées sous les ruines des maisons voisines et des porches, sous lesquels ils s'étoient retirez. Le second miracle fut un feu, qui, sortant des fondemens qu'on venoit de poser, consuma une partie des ouvriers, et mit le reste en fuite : l'un fait descendre ce feu du ciel, et les deux autres le font sortir de terre. Socrate le fait durer un jour entier pour consumer les hoiaux, les peles, et tous les instrumens destinez à l'ouvrage. Sozomene rapporte avec quelque

N n n a

incer-

“SOZOMENE, and THEODORET, unanimously relate these facts.
 “And as to Sozomene, in particular, who is apprehensive, there
 “might

incertitude *la mort des ouvriers*. Il marque même qu'on varioit un peu ; les uns assurent que le feu les avoit consumez, lors qu'ils avoient voulu *entrer dans le temple* ; ce qui étoit impertinent ; puis que les fondemens étoient à peine achevez ; & les autres soutenoient que cela étoit arrivé, lors qu'on commença à remuer la terre, et à la transporter. Il y a une quatrième variation sur ce miracle ; car on ajoute que les Juifs reconurent malgré eux que J. CHRIST étoit Dieu, et qu'ils ne laisserent pas de perséverer dans leur entreprise ; ce qui est contradictoire. Mais il n'importe : leur fermeté donna lieu à un troisième prodige. Car ils s'aperçurent le matin qu'il y avoit un grand nombre d'étoiles raisonnantes semées sur leurs habits, qu'ils voulurent effacer sans pouvoir y réussir. Sozomene y ajoute des étoiles qui étoient faites avec autant d'art, que si elles y avoient été mises par la main de l'ouvrier. Theodoret s'écarte un peu ; car au lieu d'étoiles raisonnantes il en met de noires, ce qui representoit mieux le crime et le supplice des Juifs, et à même tems il en fait écraser plusieurs qui étoient endormis sous un porche. Mais la grande variation roule sur l'effet de ce troisième miracle ; car les uns assurent que les Juifs se retirèrent chez eux aussi endurcis que s'ils n'avoient rien vu. Mais les deux autres prétendent que la plupart se firent Chrétiens, et que le bruit de leur conversion alla jusqu'aux oreilles de l'Empereur Julien. Nous avons crû devoir remarquer ces différentes circonstances, à fin qu'on puisse mieux peser la vérité de ce récit. Les uns trouveront quelque plaisir à multiplier le nombre de ces miracles, comme Theodoret, et y ajouter même ce que les Ecrivains modernes en ont dit. Mais il est juste que les autres y trouvent aussi les raisons qu'on peut avoir de suspendre sa foi. J'ajouterai seulement deux choses. L'une, que la preuve que Sozomene allégué pour montrer la vérité de ce qu'il avance, est très foible. Il en appelle à *l'événement*, & soutient qu'on ne peut plus douter de cette longue suite de miracles, parce que le temple ne fut point achevé. Mais cet historien avoit-il oublié que la permission ne fut donnée aux Juifs, que lors que Julien partoît pour son expédition contre les Perses, dans laquelle il fut tué, & qu'ainsi on n'avoit pas besoin de tant de miracles pour empêcher la structure d'un edifice ? L'opposition des Chrétiens, qui profiterent de l'éloignement du prince, la mort, et l'elevation de Jovien, ennemi des Juifs, suffisoient pour arrêter tout court ce dessein. D'ailleurs il renvoie ses lectures en termes vagues à des temoins oculaires, sans nommer, ni indiquer personne. Enfin Cyrille de Jerusalem, qui étoit alors Evêque de cette ville, devoit être sur les lieux, puis que ce fut lui qui rassura le peuple par le moien d'un oracle de Daniel, qui avoit prédit, à ce qu'il croyoit, que l'ouvrage ne réussiroit pas. Cependant Cyrille n'a jamais parlé de tous ces miracles. Ce n'est pas qu'il ne les aimât. Il écrivit, dit-on, à Constantin le Jeune, pour lui apprendre qu'il étoit plus heureux que son pere, sous l'empire duquel on avoit trouvé en terre la croix
 du

“ might be certain unbelievers, who would give no credit to them,
 “ he sends such to the depositions of those who had been eye-wit-
 “ nesses, and were yet living when he wrote his history.

“ The *first* of these miracles was an EARTHQUAKE, which hap-
 “ pened at the time they were clearing the old foundations, in
 “ order to lay *new*: and this earthquake overthrew their magazines
 “ of materials.

“ There are two variations on the subject of this first miracle.
 “ For Theodoret makes it preceded, 1. by I can't tell what divine
 “ power; which, in the night, brought back the old materials and
 “ rubbish into the place from whence they had been taken: and
 “ 2dly, by a miraculous wind, which dispersed the stones, though
 “ they had been covered by a prodigious quantity of lime and
 “ mortar, to bind them into one solid mass. The second varia-
 “ tion is in Sozomene's making this earthquake destroy *a great*
 “ *number of people*, who were there in quality of workmen or
 “ lookers-on, and were buried under the ruins of the neigh-
 “ bouring houses and portico's, whither they had retired for shelter.

“ The *second* miracle was a FIRE, which burst from the foun-
 “ dations they were then preparing; and destroyed one part of
 “ the workmen, and put the rest to flight. 1. One of these his-

du fils de Dieu, puis que le ciel lui faisoit voir un prodige plus éclatant : c'étoit une croix plus lumineuse que le soleil, que toute la ville de Jerusalem avoit vue au firmament un long espace de tems. Pourquoi parler de cette croix, et se taire sur ces miracles ? Il apprend aux Juifs qu'ils verront le signe de la croix, lequel precedera la venue du fils de Dieu, & ne dit pas un seul mot de celles qui avoient été attachées miraculeusement à leurs habits. Ce silence d'un Evêque qui étoit sur les lieux, qui aimoit les miracles et la conversion des Juifs, est suspect, lors qu'il n'y a que des témoins éloignez qui parlent. Cependant il ne faut pas dissimuler, que si un des Chronologistes Juifs soutient, que le temple ne fut point bâti à cause de la mort imprévue de Julien, un autre assure que ce temple, rebâti à grands frais, tomba, et que le lendemain un grand feu, qui vint du ciel, fondit les ferremens qui restoient, & fit périr une multitude innombrable de Juifs. Cet aveu des Rabbins est d'autant plus considérable qu'il est injurieux à la nation, et que ces messieurs ne sont pas accoutumés à copier les Ouvrages des Chrétiens. Bainsage, Hist. des Juifs, Lib. vi. c. 18, 19.

“ torians

" torians makes this fire to descend from Heaven ; the *other two*
 " bring it from beneath. 2. Socrates says, it continued the whole
 " day, and consumed the pick-axes, shovels, and all the tools and
 " instruments destined to this service. 3. Sozomene relates the
 " *death of the workmen* with some uncertainty. Nay, he observes,
 " that here the evidence varied a little ; some affirming that the
 " fire destroyed them as they were striving *to enter the temple*
 " (which was certainly an idle story, since even the foundations
 " were hardly finished) ; while others say, it happened when they
 " first began to break ground, and carry off the rubbish. 4. There
 " is a fourth variation on the subject of this miracle ; for it is
 " added, the Jews confessed, though in spite of themselves, that
 " JESUS CHRIST was God ; and yet they did not cease to persevere
 " in their attempt : which is a manifest contradiction.

" But no matter for that : their obstinacy gave occasion to a
 " *third* miracle. For, in the morning, they perceived a great num-
 " ber of SHINING STARS scattered over their habits ; which they
 " tried to efface, but in vain. Sozomene adds, there were of these
 " stars so artfully formed, that the hand of a workman could not
 " have done them better : Theodoret deviates a little here ; For,
 " instead of the *shining stars*, he speaks of *black* ones. Such as in-
 " deed more properly marked the crime and punishment of the
 " Jews. And at the same time, he crushes to death a great number,
 " who were fast asleep under a portico.

" But the great variation of all turns upon the *effect* of the third
 " miracle. For one assures us, that the Jews returned home as
 " hardened as if they had seen nothing : whereas the other two
 " pretend, that the greater part embraced the Christian faith ; and
 " that the news of their conversion reached even to the ears of
 " Julian himself.

" We have conceived it to be the duty of a faithful historian to
 " take notice of these differences, in order to assist the reader, in
 " forming a right judgment of the truth of the whole relation.

" Some,

“ Some, doubtless, will find their pleasure in multiplying the
 “ number of these miracles, like Theodoret ; and even in adding
 “ every thing which modern writers have said to set them off.
 “ But it is no more than fitting that men of a different turn
 “ should be made acquainted with the reasons there are to *suspend*
 “ their belief.

“ I will only add these two observations to what has been already
 “ said. The *one* is, that the argument Sozomene brings to prove
 “ the truth of what he advances, is a very weak one. He appeals
 “ to the issue ; and maintains, we can no longer doubt of this long
 “ train of miracles, since the temple was never finished. But
 “ could this historian forget that the Jews did not obtain their
 “ permission to rebuild it till the time of Julian’s setting out for
 “ his Persian expedition, in which he perished ? As this was the
 “ case, there was little need of all these miracles to hinder the
 “ *erection of a single building* ; surely, a sufficient cause for cutting
 “ short an enterprize of this nature may be found in the opposition
 “ of the Christians, who might take advantage of the prince’s ab-
 “ sence in a remote region, of his death there, and the advance-
 “ ment of Jovian, who was an enemy to the Jews. Besides the
 “ historian refers his readers, in a vague, indefinite manner, to the
 “ eye-witnesses of the fact, without pointing out one single person
 “ by name.

“ But lastly, Cyrill of Jerusalem, who was, at that time, Bi-
 “ shop of the place, and must have been upon the spot. since it
 “ was he, who confiding in a prophecy of Daniel (which had
 “ foretold, as he thought, that the attempt would prove unsuc-
 “ cessful) encouraged and animated the people to repose their con-
 “ fidence in God. Notwithstanding, this same Cyrill has never
 “ taken the least notice of these many miracles : and yet it cer-
 “ tainly was not because he was no friend to miracles : We are
 “ told he wrote to Constantine the Younger, to inform him, that
 “ he was more happy than his father, under whose empire the
 “ cross of Christ had been found here on earth, since Heaven,
 “ to

“ to grace his reign, had displayed a more illustrious prodigy :
 “ which was, a cross much brighter than the sun, seen in the
 “ firmament for a long time together, by the whole city of Jeru-
 “ salem. Why, now, was that cross remembered, and all these
 “ miracles forgotten ? He assures the Jews, they shall see the sign
 “ of the cross ; and that it will precede the coming of the Son of
 “ God ; and yet he says not one single word of those which had
 “ been miraculously affixed to their habits. The silence of a
 “ Bishop, who was upon the place, who loved miracles, and la-
 “ boured for the conversion of the Jews, looks very suspicious ;
 “ while, at the same time, they, who do speak to it, lived at a
 “ distance. ”

“ However, it ought not to be dissembled, that, if *one* of the
 “ Jewish Chronologists maintains, that the sudden and unexpected
 “ death of Julian prevented the rebuilding the temple ; *another* of
 “ them assures us it was rebuilt, and that, when this was done at
 “ a vast expence, it tumbled down again, and *the next day, a*
 “ *dreadful fire, which fell from Heaven, melted all the iron instruments*
 “ *that remained, and destroyed an innumerable multitude of Jews.*
 “ This confession of the Rabbins is the more considerable, as it re-
 “ flects dishonour on the nation ; and these gentry are not wont to
 “ copy from the writings of the Christians.”

Before I proceed to a particular examination of this long passage
 I shall make these two general remarks upon it.

First, that the learned critic goes all the way upon a *false suppo-
 sition* ; namely, that it was the purpose of these three historians, in
 their accounts of this event, to place the several circumstances, at-
 tending it, in the order of time in which each of them was sup-
 posed to happen. I have shewn they had no such purpose, and
 have explained the cause of their neglecting the order of time *.
 This was fit to be taken notice of, because the main force in his
 objections arises from the contrary supposition.

* See p. 447, 448.

My *second* remark is, that the learned critic embarrasses both himself and his reader, by using, without explaining, the ambiguous term of *VARIATION*: which may either signify a *contradiction*; or, only a simple *diversity*. His *reasoning* requires you should apply it in the former sense; but his *facts* commonly go no higher than the latter. This was proper to observe, because a *contradiction* discredits a concurrent evidence: while a simple *diversity* never hurts, and often supports it *.

When a writer's purpose is not to confirm the fact in question; but to render it doubtful and suspected; it will lye upon him to give a good account of every part of the evidence by which it may be supported: because no conclusion can be drawn *against* a fact till the whole testimony *for* it hath been fairly invalidated. It is otherwise when a fact is to be established. In that case, it may be sufficient to select and urge only the most material. Now the learned critic begins his discourse in this manner, *It is said, that God hindered the building of the temple by three succeeding miracles. Three ancient historians, SOCRATES, SOZOMENE, and THEODORET, unanimously relate these facts.*

His process against the miracle is regular and in form. He first names his witnesses: but does he name them all? So one would be apt to conclude, both from the nature of the case, and the critic's turn of expression: at least one would never suspect that he had omitted any of the first and original evidence. Yet he has omitted all of them. Not only Ambrose, Gregory, Nazianzene, and St. Chrysostome: but even the testimony of Marcellinus himself. This is a proceeding, which bears as hard against the ingenuity of the writer, as against the strength of his conclusion: and, with regard to his argument, the utmost this method can effect is only to discredit the witnesses he does think fit to produce and examine; while the fact itself, supported by others, of greater and

* See p. 451, & seq.

unquestioned authority, remains entire. But let us view his confutation in the light he would have it seen.

His objection to the *earthquake*, which he calls the FIRST miracle, is, that there are two *variations* concerning it.

The *first* is, that Theodoret *makes it preceded, first, by I can't tell what divine power, which, in the night, brought back the old materials and rubbish into the place from whence they had been taken; and, 2dly, by a miraculous wind, which dispersed the stones, though they had been covered by a prodigious quantity of lime and mortar, to bind them into one solid mass.*

1. As M. Bafnage himself here states the case, we see this is of the nature of those *variations*, mentioned just before, that imply no *contradiction*, but only a *diversity*. A case almost essential to the truth of an accumulative evidence, not given in concert. One witness delivers a circumstance omitted by another; and omits a circumstance which the other hath delivered. Thus Theodoret is here said to relate two circumstances preceding the earthquake, of which Socrates and Sozomene are silent: and Sozomene to relate an *effect* of this earthquake, of which Socrates and Theodoret are silent. Now, not to repeat what hath been just observed of the real credit *these diversities* carry with them; what can more strongly support the truth of this earthquake, attested by three historians, than that, when *one* had only recorded the fact itself, the *other two* preserved the memory of those circumstances, which, we have shewn*, this fact was most likely to produce?

2. But on the learned critic's false supposition of an *order of time* observed in these accounts, he might have improved this *variation* into a *contradiction*. And, considering he had this imaginary advantage, one would wonder he did not use it. For, in the order of Theodoret's relation, the filling up the foundations *goes before* the earthquake; whereas from the accounts of Rufinus and Cassiodorus, explained on the reason of things, it appears to have been *after*,

* See p. 442, 443. and 430, 431.

and the effect of the earthquake. But, as it hath been shewn*, that the historians had it not in their purpose to observe the order of time, the objection, even when thus stated, is seen to have no weight. However, admit, the historians had it in their purpose to observe the order of time, and that they differed in placing some of the circumstances: what follows? Not that the facts were false: but that the witnesses were men of credit, who did not write in concert. Is not the whole body of civil history full of facts believed by all mankind; about the *order* of which, as they stand connected in time to one another, historians do, and will eternally differ? I have now accidentally lying before me Dr. Hody's learned account of those *illustrious Greeks* who brought the use of their language into the west of Europe; where, speaking of Emmanuel Chrysologus, it appears that a number of writers, contemporary with him, affirm, that he first taught at Venice, then at Florence: while as great a number, and of equal credit, affirm just the contrary, that it was *first* at Florence, and *afterwards* at Venice. In the mean while no body ever doubted that he taught in both places.— And here the distinction between a *natural* and *supernatural* fact (frequently, and indeed, properly urged in these disputes) hath no place. For M. Bafnage's objection stands on a *civil*, not a *physical*, reason.

3. Lastly, He tells us, Theodoret says, *a miraculous wind dispersed the stones, though they had been covered by a prodigious quantity of lime and mortar to bind them into one solid mass*. But the best is, Theodoret says no such thing. The candid Critic should not have made his miracles still more wonderful by a false exposition of them. The whole affair, indeed, we think, was one continued declaration of the divine displeasure: but where God employs natural instruments to execute his judgements, they usually work according to their capacities: and Theodoret's *wind* does no more. His words are these — “ When they had laid in, and disposed on heaps,

* See p. 447, 448.

“ many thousand measures of lime and plaster ; violent storms, whirlwinds, and tempests, unexpectedly arose, and dispersed them all about *.” Here we find nothing told, but what this elementary agency might well perform. So that one cannot conceive what it was that induced this learned man, first to lay so strong an embargo on his heavy weight of stones, and then to disperse them again so lightly ; unless, because, as he says, the *Fathers* loved to talk of miracles, so he loved to *laugh* at them. But he should have chosen a fitter subject for his mirth.

His *second variation* about the earthquake is, in Sozomene’s making it destroy a great number of people who were buried under the ruins of the neighbouring houses and porticos. Here the variation is still more imaginary. Sozomene is not alone in the fact. Theodoret likewise mentions it ; though, by placing the firey eruption between the earthquake and the fall of the porticos, he hath separated the *cause* from the *effect* †. We should therefore place this instance amongst the *supports*, not the *objections*, to this illustrious event.

The SECOND miracle, according to M. Bafnage’s representation of things, is *the fire from the foundations* : and concerning this, he assures us, there are no less than *four variations*.

The *first* is, that *one of the historians makes the fire to descend from heaven ; the other two bring it from beneath*.

The assertion is grounded on a mere mistake of the text. Socrates speaks of *one* fact, when he says, “ A fire came from Heaven, and consumed all the workmen’s tools ‡ ;” Sozomene and Theodoret, of *another*, when they say, “ A fire broke out of the foundations, and destroyed many of the workmen themselves §.” And no-

* Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν πολλὰς μετὰ τὴν συνθήκην μαρτύρων ἐκείνων αἱ μὲν βίαιαι ἀνίσταται καὶ γρόβιοι καὶ κατωγῆς καὶ λαίλαπες, πάσας ἀνθρώπων ἰσχύοντας. Hist. Eccl. l. iii. c. 20.

† See p. 443.

‡ Πῦρ γὰρ ἐκ οὐρανοῦ κατεσπῆναι, πάντα τὰ τῶν οἰκοδόμων ἐργαλεῖα διέφθικεν. L. iii. c. 20.

§ Πῦρ ἐκείσθης ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τῷ ἱερῷ αἰτίσθη καὶ πολλὰς ἀνέλαυσε—Sozom. L. v. c. 22.—αὐτὸ ἐκ τῶν ἱεροσπορέων θεμελίων ἀνέβηκεν, πολλοὺς τῶν ἐργασίων ἐπέτερε. Theod. l. iii. c. 20.

thing but much prejudice, or little attention, could have blended *two consistent*, into *one inconsistent* fact. The fire from *heaven*, and the fire from the *foundations*, were different events: and distant from each other in time as well as place. All the mystery is, that Socrates mentions the former, and omits the latter; and Sozomene and Theodoret mention the latter, and omit the former. The *nature of things* *, as well as the rules of interpretation, supports this distinction: and, physically speaking, it had been more to be wondered at, if the storms and tempests had not produced *lightning*, than if a *firey eruption* had not followed an earthquake.

The *second variation* is, that Socrates says, *the fire continued the whole day; and consumed the pick-axes, shovels, and all the tools and instruments destined to the service.*

This *variation* is as fanciful, as the supposition, on which it rises, is false; namely, that Socrates here speaks of the *same* fire mentioned by Sozomene and Theodoret. For if he meant a *different* (as he certainly did), then its continuance for a *whole day* is no *variation*, even in the lowest sense our critic uses it, of one writer's recording a circumstance of the same fact, which another hath omitted.

A *third variation* (says M. Basnage) is, that Sozomene relates the death of the workmen with some uncertainty. Nay, the historian observes, that here the evidence varied a little. Some affirming that the fire destroyed them as they were striving to enter the temple (which was certainly an idle story, since the foundations were hardly finished); while others say, it happened when they first began to break ground and carry off the rubbish.

That Sozomene relates the death of the workmen with some uncertainty is a strange misrepresentation: his words are these, *It is said, that a fire burst suddenly from the ruins, and destroyed many. And this thing is confidently reported and believed by all, no one man ever*

* See p. 443.

calling it in question *. Could a writer possibly express more confidence in a Fact related? Let the Reader judge.

Indeed, Sozomene does observe, that, though, in the fact itself, all were agreed; yet, in one circumstance attending it, the evidence varied a little. A passage of Gregory Nazianzene ill understood apparently betrayed him into this groundless remark. But if Sozomene mistook Gregory, M. Basnage has much more grossly mistaken Sozomene.

Gregory delivered his account of the eruption in these words—*They fled together for refuge to an adjoining church—As they strove violently to force their way in, the fire, which burst from the foundations of the temple, met and stopped them; and one part of them it burnt and destroyed* †. *Ec.* Sozomene, alluding to this passage (after he had told us, that the fact of the fire's breaking from the foundations was *believed by all, and contradicted by none*) says, *Indeed there is this small difference in the circumstances; some say the flame met them as they were forcing their way into the church, and produced the effect spoken of above; while others say, it happened when first they began to clear the foundations* ‡. Sozomene, we see, understood Gregory, as if he had meant, that the flame which met those who were striving to enter the church, happened at some time *different* from that which was said to destroy the men working at the foundations. But he certainly mistook Gregory; who supposes plainly enough, that this destruction happened at the very time they were digging the foundations. Gregory not only assures us that the fact, as he tells it, stood *unquestioned* by all (which he could not have said had it related to *another time*); but he expressly says, they fled to this church as to a refuge from the *whirlwind* and *earthquake*.

* Λόγος ὅτι ἅμα τι τὸ διώτερον ἐπυγίον τῷ ἱερῷ, καὶ οὗτος ἐκείνης ἐκ τῶν διμελίων τῷ ἱερῷ ἀνέθετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἀνέλαστο· καὶ τῷτο πρὸς πάλιν ἀδελφὸν λέγειναι τι καὶ πυρκαϊαί, καὶ πάλιν ὁμοίως ἀμφιβάλλεται. L. v. c. 22.

† See p. 427.

‡ —Πλὴν ὅτι μὲν φασιν ὅτι βιαζομένοις αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐφεύγαι, φησὶ ἀπατήσασθαι, τὸ εἰρημίων εἰργάσασθαι οἱ δὲ, ἅμα ἤρξαντο τὸν χῶρον ἐκφυγεῖν. L. v. c. 22.

Now

Now the evidence is unanimous, that the whirlwind and earthquake happened as they were preparing the foundations. In a word, what Sozomene mistook for a *variation*, properly so called, was two different relations of the different parts of the same event. Great numbers *fled* from the whirlwind and earthquake; and these the fire, which burst from the foundations, destroyed as they were striving to enter the church: others *flood* their ground; and these were destroyed on the spot. Unwarily, Sozomene mistook Gregory's narrative of the state, in which the same eruption seized some of the sufferers, for the narrative of a different eruption. But though the ancient relators of this fact had indeed spoken of *different* eruptions, and, in ascribing the same general effect to all, had yet represented the workmen as destroyed, while busied in different places, and in different occupations: What then? Would this have taken off from the credit of their relation? By no means. On the contrary, it must have added to it. For we have seen in part, and shall see more fully hereafter, that the *fits* of this fiery eruption were so obstinate as not to give over till it had brought the directors to despair of the undertaking.

But to return to Sozomene; an attentive writer might have fallen into *his* mistake: What drew M. Bainage aside is not so easily understood. To interpret Sozomene as saying, that it was the *new-built temple*, into which these unhappy sufferers strove to enter, when his whole history shews, the foundations were never finished, implies strange inattention to his subject; or confidence in the implicit faith of his readers. But let Sozomene speak for himself. He says, *the fire met them as they strove to enter εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, into the church, or temple*. And to know what place he meant by these words, we must have recourse to his author, Greg. Nazianzene: Who, in the relation already given at large *, says, that when the Jews had procured the countenance and assistance of Julian to rebuild the temple, they addressed themselves to the undertaking,

* Page 427.

with great alacrity and vigour ; but, being driven from their work by a whirlwind and earthquake, they fled for refuge to a certain neighbouring church, ἐπί τι τῶν πλῆσιον ἱερῶν, apparently a Christian Oratory, built amongst, or adjoining to, the ruins of those sacred places, formerly included within the walls of the temple. This particular, Sozomene takes from Gregory : And what the latter expresses by ἐπί τι τῶν πλῆσιον ἱερῶν, the other calls εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν, *into the church*. Yet M. Basnage supposes, he meant the *Jewish temple rebuilt*. But perhaps he might be betrayed into this absurd interpretation, from what followed in Gregory ; who says, that while they were striving to force their way into this church, a fire, ἐκ τῷ ἱερῷ, met and stopped them. The question is what he here meant by ἱερῷ ; doubtless the same with ἱερῶν, going before, *the Jewish Temple*, near which the Christian Church or Oratory stood. But what *temple* ? Not a new one rebuilt, but the old one in ruins : ἐκ τῷ ἱερῷ signifying the same as ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων τῷ ναῷ, and with elegance ; for ἱερὸν is the generic word, and signifies as well the site of a holy building as the building itself. It appears, at least, that Sozomene understood the word ἐκ τῷ ἱερῷ in this sense, from his making *all* the variation in Gregory's account from the rest, to consist in his assigning a *different time* for the destruction of the workmen ; and from his express affirmation, that the witnesses all agreed in attesting, that the fire came from the *foundations of the ruined temple*. And it appears, he understood Gregory rightly ; who, in his turn, affirms, that the evidence were *unanimous* in attesting the fire came ἐκ τῷ ἱερῷ, by which he could mean nothing but the *foundations* of the ruined temple ; because it was in that only they were unanimous. Nor, for the same reason, could Gregory mean, nor could Sozomene so understand him, that the fire came from the *church*, into which they were forcing an entrance. And Gregory seems to have well weighed what he says ; for, in this very place, he carefully distinguishes between uncertain rumour and established evidence.

But

But, indeed, in every view, the learned critic's interpretation is insupportable. The whole tenor of Gregory's relation (which is in perfect harmony with the rest) shews that the obstruction began *before* they had laid the foundations.

On the whole, then, we see, *this variation*, concerning the eruption, is as imaginary as the rest.

Mr. Bafnage proceeds; and tells us, there is a *fourth variation*, concerning this miracle of the Fire; which is, that *the Jews confessed, though in spite of themselves, that JESUS CHRIST was GOD; and yet they did not cease to persevere in their attempt; which* (says the Critic) *is a manifest contradiction.*

Though I would not call this a *contradiction*, yet I readily confess it to be a high improbability. However, be it what it will, the Critic alone is to answer for it. In a word, the charge is entirely groundless, not one of them affirming, or intimating, the least word of any such matter; but, on the contrary, plainly declaring that this *confession* of the Jews was not till they had *given up* the enterprize, as desperate.

The words of SOCRATES are these: "The Jews, seized with extreme affright, were forced, in spite of themselves, to confess that JESUS CHRIST was GOD; yet, for all that, they would not obey his will; but, as men fast bound in religious prejudices, still continued in their old superstition. Nor did a third miracle, which happened afterwards (the shining crosses) bring them to the true faith *." This historian speaks only of the Jews.

SOZOMENE speaks both of Jews and Gentiles; and in the order here named,—"Some (says he) on the instant, judged that CHRIST was GOD, and that the restoration of the temple was displeasing to him: while others, not long after, went over to the church, and were baptised †."

* Ἰουδαῖοι δὲ τὴν μεγίστην φόβον ὑπέμεινον, καὶ ἀκούσας ἀμολόγουν τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἰσχυροὶ δὲ αὐτῶν τὸ δόγμα, ἀλλ' ἔμεινον τῇ τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ παραμένειν κατελέγετο, ἀλλ' γὰρ τὸ τρίτον θαῦμα τὸ δοκεῖν ἐπιφανέμεναι, εἰς αἰτίαν τῆς ἀληθείας ἔργον αὐτοῦ· σφραγίδος ταυτοῦ ἀληθείας. L. iii. c. 30.

† —τοὺς μὲν αὐτίκα ἐκείνη Θεὸν εἶπαι τὸν Χριστόν, καὶ μὴ ἀρνοῦνται τῇ ἀποκαύσει τοῦ ναοῦ, οἱ δὲ, ἐκ αἰτίας καὶ χρόνου περισθίονος τῇ ἰαλλοσίᾳ καὶ ἐμύθησαν. L. v. c. 22.

THEODORET, again, speaks only of the Jews; for, after having related the whole series of miracles, the last of which (in the rank he places them) was the crosses on their garments, he goes on in this manner: "The enemies of God seeing these things, and fearing his hand, now advanced, might fall upon themselves, fled away, and returned every man to his place; confessing him to be God, whom their forefathers had affixed to the tree *."

Now let the impartial Reader but reflect, that this circumstance of the confession is related, by each of the historians, as happening *after* all the destructive interpositions, which hindered the work; and he must needs conclude, that M. Basnage has given a false representation of their accounts.

SOCRATES lets us know, in what their obstinacy lay: not in persisting in their project; but persevering in their superstition.

SOZOMENE mentions only their sudden *confession*; and had he not opposed it to the lasting *conversion* of the Gentiles, it must be owned that, from him, we could conclude nothing of their obstinacy: but, as he hath so opposed it, we find his account to be perfectly conformable to the relation of Socrates; and discover even a hint in the words, *καὶ μὴ ἀρεσθῆναι τῇ ἀναντεώσει τῷ ναῷ*, that they did *desist* on their *confession*.

THEODORET is fuller than either of them, and explains what might be, otherwise, thought doubtful in Both. He marks the *obstinacy* of those, who (Sozomene says) *on the instant, concluded that Christ was God*: and the *despair* of those who (Socrates says) *continued in their obstinacy*.

Nothing can be clearer, or more consistent than this whole account of their behaviour. Yet M. Basnage assures us, "They are represented as confessing CHRIST, and at the same time persisting in their attempt." It would be hard to think it a designed misrepresentation: and still harder to conceive how he could fall into an involuntary error, in a case so evident, unless we suppose he

* τὰυτὰ εἰ ἀντίδοι θεοσώμηναι, καὶ τὰς διαλάττας μέγας ὀφθαλμοῦς, ἀπιδρασαν τοὺς καὶ τὰ αἰτίαι καὶ ἀλλοῦς, θεὸν ὁμολογῆσαι τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῷ ξύλῳ προσκεκλιμένον. L. iii. c. 20.

mistook

mistook the sense of Socrates' expression, ἐκ ἐποίων δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον — *they did not obey his will* : as if it meant, they were not *obsequious to this declaration of his will in the prodigies* ; whereas θεῖον is here used in the common theologic sense, of the *whole will of Christ* : as appears from what follows, which, by necessary construction, is explanative of what went before — ἀλλ' ἔμενον τῇ τῷ ἸΟΥΔΑΙΣΜΟΥ προλήψει κρατούμενοι, ὅδὲ γὰρ τὸ τρίτον θαῦμα τὸ ὕψιστον ἐπιγενέμενον εἰς ΠΙΣΤΙΝ —

But here, perhaps, it may be objected, That even what we ourselves allow these ancient writers to have said, creates a difficulty, which will deserve some solution, “ The Jews are represented as confessing the divinity of *Jesus Christ*, and yet persisting in their old superstition : surely a state of mind made up of very discordant principles.” It is true, the objection will deserve to be considered : and the rather as it is not impossible but this might be all M. Basnage aimed at ; though he missed the mark by a careless expression. However, the objection is so obvious ; and the account has, at first sight, so much seeming incongruity, that, I conclude, these Historians were well assured of their fact, before they would venture to trust it to the public judgement. And, when it comes to be examined, I persuade myself, *the reason of things* will give us the same satisfaction in its truth, which *concurrent evidence* gave them.

If we admit these prodigies to have happened, in the manner they are related, we cannot but conclude, that those, against whom they were directed, how hardened and determined soever, must be seized with sudden astonishment and affright. Now, in this state, the mind, hurried from its basis, catches at any thing which promises protection. Nothing therefore was so natural as their applying to the object *offended* ; which, at that moment, could be thought no other than *Jesus of Nazareth*. His power, then, would, in spite of all old impressions, be instantaneously acknowledged. This is what Socrates means, and well expresses, by saying, that, *in their extreme fright, they were forced, in spite of themselves, to confess that Jesus Christ was God*

So far every thing was just as the working of human nature would be, when not hindered by any foreign impression.

But they must know nothing of its workings, who can imagine, that new and contrary directions, produced by such accidents, in minds warped by the strong attraction of inveterate prejudices, and hardened by a national obstinacy, could be regular or lasting. When the fright was over, the mind would return mechanically to its old station; and there it would rest, especially if it could find, or even invent, for its support, any solution of the phænomena consistent with their former sentiments concerning Jesus: and these, we shall see hereafter, they might, and did invent. So that now we are ready for the concluding part of the account, which Socrates hath given us of this matter.—*Yet for all that, they would not obey his will, but, as men fast bound in religious prejudices, still continued in their old superstition.* He talks, we see, like one who understood what he said;—That their hasty *confession* was owing to their sudden *fright*; and their fixed *impiety*, to their inveterate *habits*. All here is so much in order, that the contrary had been the unnatural thing. Had they told us, either that the Jews were not frightened into a *confession*; or that they *were* frightened into a *conversion*; the fact had been equally incredible; because, the first case implied the absence of *passions*; and the latter, a freedom from *prejudices*; neither of which agreed with them, as *men* or as *Jews*. But they relate, what was perfectly consistent with *both*, that their stubborn metal was softened in the flames, and grew hard again as these abated. And have we not many examples of the like behaviour in more modern reprobates, who are in the other extreme of believing nothing? What sentiments of religion did we not hear on a late occasion of terror, where they were never heard before? But what symptoms of sobriety remained, when the danger was supposed to be over! The offended Deity, which they then saw dressed in terrors, was afterwards laughed at, as the phantom of a frightened imagination: and that good prelate, who was then so much revered for his pastoral care in warning them of the danger
of

of falling under the justice of an offended God, was soon after pursued with a torrent of abuse, as an evil citizen, who maliciously projected to fright them out of their wits. Now, if *Free-thinking* can thus keep its hold, when it hath nothing to rely on but the mere vanity of its profession; what must we think of *superstition*, which hath a thousand fanciful resources to support men in an old habit?

We come now to what M. Bafnage calls the *third miracle*. And, concerning this, he reckons up as many *variations* as in that which went before. But it will be proper first to see how he represents the miracle itself. His words are these,—*their obstinacy gave occasion to a third miracle. For, in the morning, they perceived a great number of shining STARS scattered over their habits*. His authority for calling these marks, *stars*, is Sozomene: who, indeed, gives them that name: but, as I conceive, very erroneously; by mistaking the sense of Gregory Nazianzene, whom he here follows *. Gregory's words are, καλᾶςτεροι αὖν; which Billius translates, *stellatus nimirum ipse notisque distinctus*; following the interpretation of Sozomene, who calls them downright *stars*, καὶ τρόπον τινα ἈΣΤΡΑΣΙ πατισκιδμένα τὰ ἐοδημάτα εἶχει. But I apprehend, that Gregory meant no more by καλᾶςτεροι, than that the mark had a star-like radiance; not a star-like figure. And my reasons are, 1. Because he had just before affirmed, that these marks were *crosses*; and, proceeding in his relation, he acquaints us with their *quality*, that they were καλᾶςτεροι, or *shining*. A circumstance that would first catch the observation; though, as we have shewn †, it may be naturally accounted for. He uses the same term to express the shining feathers in a peacock's train — τὸ πλεον κυκλόεσας περιείσας τὸ χρυσαυγὴς καὶ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΕΡΟΝ ‡. — 2. Socrates, if he borrowed from Gregory, gives this sense to his words; or, if he did not borrow

* It appears he followed Nazianzene from what he further observes of their elegant forth: — αἱ δὲ τὸ ἱερηνικὸν περιποίησιν καλῶσι μὲν. Soz. — πάντες ἱερηνικῶν ψαλμοῦ, ἡ περιεργασίας καὶ ἡ ἐκείνων ἐν τῷ τῷ γένει. NAZ.

† See p. 435, & seq.

‡ Orat. xxiiv.

from

from him, at least he teaches us how to understand him. His expression is σφαιρίδες λαμπῆς ΑΚΤΙΝΟΕΙΔΕΙΣ, *shining impressions of the crosses*. They were like *stars* in radiance, but in *figure* they were *crosses*. Nor do Rufinus, Theodoret, or Cassiodorus, who all remember the *crosses*, speak one word of *stars*; no not even Theophanes, who studied them well; and seems to have had the manufacturing of a spurious sort, in imitation of them.

Thus much was proper to be said: For, though this difference of figure does not in the least affect our reasoning on its *physical* cause, yet it much impairs its *moral* meaning as a symbolic mark. Which, as Sozomene could not but see, it shews his honesty at least, in not concealing a mistaken circumstance, though it took off from the awful significancy of the impression.

With our Critic's leave, therefore, we will call them *CROSSES*. And now let us see what he hath to object to them.

He preludes his reflections with this oblique remark,—*these shining stars they tried to efface, but in vain*. This is said to insinuate discredit on the fact, by an accession of the wonderful. But we have shewn, that the difficulty of washing them out was a natural effect of their shining quality*; at least, a property they had in common with other the like appearances in later times†. So that this will stand no longer in our way.

He comes to his *variations*, by which, as we observed before, he sometimes means *additions*; sometimes *differences*; and sometimes, again, *contradictions*.

The *first* is the lowest species of a *variation*, that is to say, an *addition*.—Sozomene adds, *there were of these stars so artfully formed, that the hand of a workman could not have done them better*. Sozomene, as we observed, borrowed this particular from Gregory. And if Socrates and Theodoret omit it, it was not because they were ignorant of it; much less because they did not believe it. However, such who know that nature frequently casts the mixed sub-

* P. 436.

† P. 441.

stances, produced by fermentation, into regular figures, and often, with that elegance of design which art can but lamely imitate, will have no reason to doubt of the truth of this circumstance, after it hath been shewn *, that the marks were entirely *meteoric*.

The *second* variation is, that Theodoret *deviates a little here*; for, instead of the *shining stars*, he speaks of *black ones*. Such as indeed more properly marked the crime and punishment of the Jews. These last words are slyly added to recommend the ingenious turn of Theodoret's *addition*: and to shew his Reader, that the *Father* knew how to invent with judgement. But to leave his justification to the nature of the fact, which we are just coming to, when we have observed; that M. Basnage should here have changed his language, and used *crosses* instead of *stars*; for Theodoret does not intimate a syllable about *stars*. It is true, then, he does indeed say, that the crosses on the garments of the Jews were of a dark colour—*ἐν μελαίνῃς χροιᾷς*—We have seen, that the matter of these crosses was of the nature of the Phosphorus, whose property it is to shine by night, and to be dark-coloured by day†. Now if one Writer were to describe their appearance by night, and another their appearance by day, Must not This say, they were *radiant and shining*; and That, that they were *dark coloured*? And so much for his *second variation*.

The *third* is, that Theodoret, AT THE SAME TIME, *crushes to death a great number who were fast asleep under a portico*. The force of this objection, such as it hath, lies in the *time*. For as to the *fall* of the portico, Rufinus and Sozomene concur with Theodoret. But it is by no means true, that Theodoret says, it was at *the same time*. If we suppose that he observes order in this incident, we must conclude the *fall* happened *before*. For the series of his relation stands thus—a portico fell by night—on the same night, and on the following, a cross in the sky—then the crosses on the gar-

* P. 435.

† See p. 435, & seq.

ments *. The truth is, the fall of this portico had a very sufficient cause. Sozomene plainly intimates, and Rufinus expressly says, it was thrown down by the *first* earthquake which *preceded* the fiery eruption †.

We come now to what the learned Critic calls the *great variation of all*.

Which, he says, *turns upon the effect of the third miracle. For one assures us, that the Jews returned home as hardened as if they had seen nothing: whereas the other two pretend, that the greater part embraced the Christian faith. And that the news of their conversion reached even to the ears of the Emperor Julian himself.*

This, I confess, is to the purpose; and, were it true, would be a considerable objection to the credit of their evidence. But the contradiction charged upon them is groundless and imaginary. He who (our Critic says) *assures us, that the Jews returned home, as hardened as if they had seen nothing*, is Socrates; whose words are these: “The Jews, seized with a horrible consternation, were forced, in spite of themselves, to confess that JESUS CHRIST was GOD. Yet for all that, they would not obey his will. But, as men fast bound in religious prejudices, still continued in their old superstition: nor did a third miracle, which happened afterwards, bring them to the true faith—They were hardened, therefore, according to the saying of the apostle, and cast away the good which was then laid before them ‡.”

This, without doubt, is a plain assertion that the gross body of the Jews concerned in this attempt returned home religionless as they came; without either their *temple*, or any holier worship. So far, therefore, is allowed; and he hath it to make his best of;

* *ἡ ῥύσις ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ—καὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ πῶς πάλιν τῇ ὑπερείᾳ ὤφθη ἐν τῷ ἑσπέρῳ—καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἰδιόματα.* L. iii. c. 20.

† See p. 444. 445.

‡ Ἰουδαῖοι δὲ ἐν μεγάλῳ φόβῳ γινόμενοι, καὶ ἀκούεις ὑμολόγουν τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν λέγοντες. ὡς ἵπποι δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ δῖλμα, ἀλλ' ἔμεινον τῇ τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ περὶλήφει κρατούμενοι· ὅθι γὰρ τὸ τρίτον θαῦμα τὸ ὕψιστον ἐπιγινώσκοντες, οὐκ ὤρουν τῆς ἀληθείας ἔχειν αὐτούς.—πιστεύοντες ὅτι καὶ τὸν Ἀπόστολον, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν χριστῷ ἔχοντες ἔφευγον. SOCR. L. iii. c. 20.

which,

which, we see, he is willing enough to do; for he takes notice, that the other two historians, Sozomene and Theodoret, contradict Socrates, and *pretend, that the greater part embraced the Christian faith.*

This then is the point to be examined. But let me previously observe, 1. That both Jews and Gentiles joined in the attempt to rebuild the temple; and had both of them the stigma of the cross upon their garments, as Gregory Nazianzene and Rufinus inform us *. Nay, from Gregory we learn, it was impressed on the habits of such of the *believers*, likewise, as were present. And, indeed, but for this circumstance, the false miracle of Theophanes had never been invented, or at least had been differently fashioned: for he covers the very church-books and sacred vestments with crosses. And, what is chiefly worth observing is, that this falling of the crosses *indifferently* on all parties present, confirms the physical account we have given of their nature. 2. My second observation is, That as Socrates records the effect of this miracle on the Jews, so Gregory Nazianzene records the effect of it on the Gentiles: For this Father having insulted and triumphed over their Mathematicians and Astronomers on the subject of the aerial Cross; goes on to speak of *that* upon the habits of the persons present; and concludes his account in this manner: *So great was the astonishment of the spectators, that almost all of them, as at a common sign, with one voice invoked for mercy the God of the Christians, and strove to render him propitious with hymns and supplications. And many of them, without procrastinating, but, at the very time these things happened, addressing themselves to our priests with earnest prayers, were admitted into the bosom of the church* †, &c. Where we may observe

* ἐπισημαίνονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὰ ἱερώτα, οἱ τῷ θαύματι ἐκείνῳ διακρίναι καὶ μέγα—καὶ τὴν γὰρ ταῦτα ἀποδοῦναι, οἱ δὲ τὸν ἡμέτερον, οἱ δὲ τὸν ξένον—Naz. Orat. ix. — In sequenti nōte in v. sistentis omnia signaculum crucis. Ruf. L. x. c. 37.

† Τοσούτοι τῶν ἡμετέρων κατέπλεξε, ὡς μικρὸ μὲν ἀπαλίας ὕπερ ἐξ ἡμῶν (ἐνθαύμαστοι καὶ μὲν φωνῶν, τοὺς τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἀναπαύσασθαι θεῶν, ὑφεταίς τε πολλαῖς καὶ ἰουσίαις αὐτῶν ἐξελασσισθαι· πολλὰς δὲ οὐκ εἰς ἀναβολὰς, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτὰ τῶν (ἐνθαύμαστοι) προσευχαρίαις τοῖς ἱερεῶσιν ἡμῶν, καὶ πολλὰ κατεπιθετίνας τῇ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν γινώσκειν μέγα, &c. Orat. ix.

the different language of Nazianzene on this occasion speaking of the Gentiles, from that of Socrates, who spoke of the Jews. The first says, τὸν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἀνακαλεῖσθαι Θεὸν; the other, ἀκούεις ὡμολόβην τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν λέγοντες. The Gentiles implored the protection of the great *God of Heaven*, whom they had before *neglected*: the Jews were forced to own *that Christ* to be God, whom they had before *rejected*.

This being premised, we come now to Sozomene and Theodoret; who, our learned Critic affirms, have contradicted Socrates, in *pretending that the greater part embraced the Christian faith*.

I will give the passage of Sozomene entire. *After these things [namely the earthquake and fiery eruption], another miracle happened, more illustrious and wonderful than the foregoing: for, on a sudden, and without human agency, every man's habit was impressed with the sign of the Cross.—The consequence of this was, that some, on the instant, concluded Christ to be God, and that the restoration of the temple was displeasing to him. While others, not long after, went over to the Church and were baptized; and by hymns and supplications, in behalf of the guilty, endeavoured to appease the wrath of the Son of God *.*

As evident as it certainly is that Socrates spoke only of the Jews; and Gregory Nazianzene only of the Gentiles; so certain is it, that Sozomene, who took from both of them, speaks *both of Jews and Gentiles*.

He says, *every man's habit was marked with a Cross*. That is, as Greg. Naz. had said before, every man indifferently, whether Jew or Gentile. He then mentions the *consequence* of this prodigy, not on the Jews only, but on the Gentiles; ἐκ τούτου δὲ—And as it was reasonable to expect it would have a different effect on these different bigots; he *first* speaks of what it had upon the Jews, that,

* Ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἐτυμώθη, τὸ περιεῖν (αὐτίκῃ τι καὶ παραδοξότατον) αὐτομάτως γὰρ πάσι καὶ ἑθνεῖς τῷ (καὶ τῷ) τοῦ κατισμαίνοντος—ἐκ τούτου δὲ, τοῖς μὴ αὐτίκῃ ἐκείνῳ Θεῷ ὄντι τὸν Χριστὸν, καὶ μὴ ἀρνούμενοι τῇ ἀποστολῇ τῷ κατὰ εἰς μακρὰν προσιβίῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἰμνῶνται, καὶ ὑμνοῦσι καὶ πνεύματι ὑπὲρ τῶν τολμημάτων αὐτοῖς, τὸν Χριστὸν ὁμολογῶν. Eccl. Hist. l. v. c. 22.

on the instant, they confessed Christ to be God. This is no more than Socrates had said. They only differ in the manner of telling: For while Socrates goes on to inform us, in express words, that the confession was not *lasting*, and that they presently fell back into their old superstition; Sozomene contents himself to *lead* his reader to the same conclusion, by opposing this sudden flash of *conviction*, to the real and lasting *conversion* of the Pagans, as he found it recorded by Gregory. *Others* (says he) *not long after went over to the church, &c.* From hence it appears, that Sozomene is so far from contradicting Socrates, on this article, that he lends him all the support a concurrent testimony can afford.

THEODORET comes next. And him too the learned Critic hath involved in the same charge of contradiction; but with much less pretence. For he, like Socrates, speaks only of the Jews; and, in such a manner too, as if he had Socrates all the way in his eye. The whole of what he says is to this effect: *The very garments also of the Jews were filled with crosses—which these enemies of God seeing, and fearing that his hand, now exerted, might fall upon themselves, fled away, and returned every man to his place, confessing him to be God, whom their forefathers affixed to the tree*.*

And now, what is there that can countenance M. Basnage in saying, that *Theodoret pretends the greater part embraced the Christian faith?* Is not the *confession* he records the very same with that which, Socrates tells us, so soon passed away in their returning infidelity, insinuated in the very words, τὰ οἰκτεῖα κατέλαβον? We conclude, therefore, against the learned Critic's objection, that, in this article, there is a perfect harmony amongst the three historians.

But it will be said perhaps that, in clearing away this objection, I make room for another, that may prove more stubborn, and difficult to remove. “For it seems incredible that so illustrious a

* Καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐσθῆματα γενομένην ἐκτελέσασθαι, ταῦτα οἱ ἐχθροὶ διανοήσαντες, καὶ τὰς θανάτου μάστιγας ἐξοβήσαντες, ἀπέλθοντες ἐκ τῶν οἰκτιῶν κατέλαβον, διὸν ἐκλογίζοντες τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων τῷ ξύλῳ προσκεκολλημένον. Eccl. Hist. L. iii. cap. 20.

miracle should have made no impression on the Jews; and yet have had so considerable an effect upon the Gentiles. An objection, which seems to be redoubled upon one who hath affirmed *, that a Jew's conviction of the truth of Christianity must, on his own notions of the *unity*, be necessarily attended with a conversion: while that Polytheistic principle of *intercommunity* did not imply the necessity of a Gentile's conversion under the same conviction."

To this I answer, It is very true, that a miracle performed before a Pagan, and not directly addressed to him, made, for the most part, but a small impression on his religious notions; because that general principle of Paganism hindered him from seeing, that the evident truth of *another* religion necessarily implied the falshood of his *own*. It was different with the Jew; who, being a worshipper of the true God, must necessarily regard his attestation, by miracle, not simply as an evidence of the truth proposed, but as an obligation upon all men to embrace it. Hence the apostle Paul, who best knew the different geniuses of the two opposed Religions, says, *The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: Σοφίαν*, the religious principles of their philosophy: in the chief of which was the doctrine of *intercommunity*.

Had the Jews therefore considered this miracle at Jerusalem, as an *attestation to the truth of Christianity*, they must have embraced it. And to affirm they did so consider it, and yet not embrace it, would, it must be owned, be saying something strangely incredible. But this was not the case. In their fright they might call out upon *Christ as God*; but when that was over, their prejudice regained its hold, and drew them back to their ancient superstition; however it could not have kept them there, but that it enabled them to find a purpose, in this miracle, very well consistent with Judaism: and this was *God's anger* at their prophaning a work so holy, by consenting to put it under the direction of a Pagan emperor. This would be easily credited by those who had learnt from

* See Divine Legation, Book II. Sect. 6. See also Book V. Sect. 6.

their sacred Books that an Israelite was struck dead but for stretching out his hand to uphold the falling ARK. When, therefore, they saw and felt these severe marks of His displeasure, To what would they ascribe it, but to their accepting the impure assistance of an impious Gentile to rebuild the house of the Divine presence? For could it be expected (would their leaders now say) when God had denied this honour to the *Man after his own heart*, because his hands were defiled with blood, that he would confer it upon a Pagan, a Warrior, and a declared Enemy to that Dispensation; a zeal for which was David's great merit with the God of Israel? We see, by the passage quoted above * from R. Gedaliah ben Joseph Jechaiah, that some such reasoning as this, which a *Father* † of the church seemed to think did not want its weight, enabled them to own the miracle without blushing. But had they even wanted so plausible an evasion, yet their prejudices would not have suffered them to be nice in a case where the whole of their Religion lay at stake: In such cases, they were not used to be delicate; as appears by a parallel instance, in the bungling solutions they invented to evade the consequences arising from the miracles of Jesus himself. Sometimes they ascribed his power (as the Gospel tells us) to the assistance of the evil dæmon; and sometimes again (as the books of their traditions inform us) to certain spells or charms stolen from the temple of Solomon.

However, though the miracle at Jerusalem was too notorious to be questioned in that age; and so was to be accounted for in the manner we have seen; yet in aftertimes it was thought safer to deny it; though still by the *modest* way of an implication. Thus (as we have seen above ‡) R. David Gans pretends, that the miscarriage in the Persian war prevented the rebuilding their temple—

* P. 407.

† St. Chrysostome, speaking of the readiness of the Jews to accept Julian's assistance, says,—Καὶ ὡς προχέοντο οἱ μισροὶ ἐν ἀναισχυρίῳ παρὰ ἄλλοις ἰσχυροῦς, καὶ Ἕλλησι ταῦτα αἰτεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰς μισροὺς ἰσχυροὺς καλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἁγίων οἰκοδομῶν. Hom. v. adv. Jud.

‡ P. 305, note.

Nam Cæsar in bello Persico periit. Another of them invents a very different tale (for falshood is rarely constant), and pretends that a sly trick of the Samaritans made both the Jews and the Emperor, in their turns, weary of the project. But so foolish a story will hardly bear the telling. However the reader may find it below *. And in this manner too they treated the miracles of Jesus: for though, at first, they only tried to evade their force; they ventured at length to deny their reality.

On the whole, then, we see, That the inveterate *prejudices* of the Jews; their *obstinacy* in the wrong; and their *aversion* to the Christian name, would hinder a miracle from having its proper effect upon them, could they but contrive either to put it to the support of their own superstitions, or, at least, to turn it from the condemnation of them. We see, the miracle in question might be thus evaded. Who then can doubt but they would evade it? The consequence was, their continuance in error. The Christian writers tell us they did so continue. And we now find, They say nothing but what is very probable.

* In diebus R. Jehosuah Hananiz filii, mandavit Imperator ut *Templum reedificaretur*. Papus autem, & JULIANUS opiparas mensas præponunt Judæis à captivitate advenientibus (ad opus adjuvandum) ab Hako ad Antiochiam. Cutei vero seu Samaritani Imperatori asserunt, quod si Hierusalem restauretur, Judæos a contribuendis vectigalibus cessaturos, indeque ab illo defecturos; quibus Imperator: Quomodo inquit, licet mihi ab incepto recedere post mandati promulgationem? Ad quod Samaritani, Domine, iuquiunt, præcipe ergo, ut locum prioris Templi mutent, vel ut augeatur aut diminuat in longitudine vel latitudine circa quinq; cubitos, itaque, nullo cogente, opus destituent. Huic sententiæ acquievit Imperator; atque juxta eam, novum misit Judæis mandatum in valle *Bet Rimon* aggregatis, quo audito, in magnum prorumpunt fletum, indeque furore perciti de defectione loquuntur; sed Magnates defectionis consequentiis valde perterriti, implorant a prædicto R. Jehosuah, ut populum alloquatur, eumque ad pacem adducere conetur, quod fecit sequenti fabula. Leo a frustulo ossis in ejus gutture infixum admodum afflictus, magnam spondet mercedem cuicumque molestum os ab ejus gutture averruncaret. Accedit Grus, os averruncat, & mercedem petit. Cui Leo, Jacta te ipsum, inquit, quod ingressus es in Leonis os in pace, & egressus es in pace. Sic, fratres, sufficit ut ingressi simus sub hujus gentis potestate in pace, & egrediamur in pace. Hæc sunt Beresit-Raba verba fideliter translata, ex fine cap. 64. Hoc accidit anno ab orbe condito circa 4833, secundum R. David Ganz in ejus *Zemah David*.

The

The contrary effect of this miracle on *Paganism* is as easily understood. For though the principle of *intercommunity* supported a Gentile against the power of miracles at large ; yet when he found one of them levelled at himself, as its direct object, the case would be altered. He would then feel the point in question brought home to him ; and the circumstances of affright and desolation (if, as here, the miracle was attended with any such) would keep off prejudice till reason had passed a fair judgement. The Jews and Gentiles joined cordially in this project. The prime motive of the Jews was a *fond* desire to be restored to their country and religion ; but that of the Gentiles, a *malicious* purpose to give the lie to Revelation. And, without doubt, the moral *impression* on the defeat would be relative to the *motive* of the attempt. They thought to dishonour the holy faith ; and they added new credit to it. So that a *consciousness* of their intentions would add proportionable *facility* to their conversion. The Jewish evasion would not serve *their* purpose. At most, it could only make them waver between the *Church* and the *Synagogue* ; a state of no long continuance. Sozomene assures us it was soon over ; *In a little time* (says he) *ἐκ τῆς μαχαρᾶς, they went over to the Church, and were baptised.*

But, before we leave this subject, it may be proper to observe, That *general* expressions, relative to parties, and bodies of men, are not to be understood *universally*. Thus when the Historians tell us, *all* were marked with the cross, They do not mean *every individual* present ; but all indifferently, of every denomination. So again, when they say, the *Pagans* were converted, and the Jews remained hardened, They do not mean every particular man ; but the far greater number in either party. And thus St. Chrysostome directs us to understand it, where he says, *that the Jews, for the most part, remained hardened* *.

It is scarce worth while to take notice, that what M. Basnage affirms (of Sozomene and Theodoret's saying, *That the news of the*

* Tom. V. Orat. xlv.

Jews' conversion reached even the ears of the emperor Julian himself), is as mistaken as the rest. For Sozomene says nothing of the matter: and as to Theodoret, his words are as follows: *These things came to the ears of Julian, for they were cried up, and in the mouths of all men; but his heart was hardened like Pharaoh's**: where we see, by ταῦτα he means the miracles. For it was not the *conversion*, which was in the mouths of all men, but the *miracles*. And Julian's resisting these, was what made his case like Pharaoh's.

Our critic, having now well canvassed the *evidence*, tells us for what purpose he hath given himself this trouble; *It was to supply those sober persons, who do not believe the miracle, with arguments to fortify their doubts*. But as if something was still wanting to so good an end, he resumes his task, and says, he will add two *observations* more.

The first is, That the argument Sozomene brings, to prove the truth of what he advances, is a very weak one. He appeals to the issue; and maintains, we can no longer doubt of this long train of miracles since the temple was never finished. But (says the critic) has the historian forgot that the Jews did not obtain their permission till the time of Julian's setting out for his Persian expedition, in which he perished? There was then little need for all these miracles, to hinder the erection of a building. Surely a sufficient cause of cutting short an enterprise of this nature might be found in the opposition of the Christians, who might take advantage of the Prince's absence in a remote region, his death there, and the advancement of Jovian to the Empire, who had an aversion for the Jews. Besides, the historian refers his readers in a vague indefinite manner to the eye-witnesses of the fact, without pointing out one single person by name.

Here are many things asserted, that will deserve to be examined.

1. He misrepresents the matter, in saying that Sozomene gives the unbuilt temple as a proof of its being obstructed by a miracle.

* Ταῦτα ἤκουσε μὲν Ἰουλιανὸς, κατὰ πάντων γὰρ ἤδη. τῷ δὲ Φαραὼ παραπλησίως τὸν καρδίαν ἰσχυροῖτο. L. iii. c. 20.

To such reasoning, I own, M. Bafnage's observation of *Julian's absence and death*, &c. had been a good reply. But Sozomene's argument stands thus: "The yielding up the place, and leaving the work imperfect, *ἡμίτελος τὸ ἔργον καταλιπούσης*, is a proof of the miraculous interposition." Now, it is one thing to *see a work unfinished*; and another, to *know who* left it in that condition. From the first (which is as M. Bafnage represents it) Sozomene's conclusion would not hold; from the latter (which is as Sozomene himself puts it) his conclusion may be very fairly drawn. But to this it may be objected, "That, at the time Sozomene made this observation, the two different representations amounted to one and the same thing; because all that the reader could see, was a *work unfinished*; and, for the rest, he had only the historian's word." This, our adversaries will allow to be fairly put. But they are not aware, that when Sozomene wrote, the face of things, upon the place, was such as was sufficient to convince his readers that the Jews and Gentiles were forcibly driven from their work; namely the marks of a desolating earthquake, and a consuming fire. Chrysostome tells us, these existed when he wrote; and it would be absurd to think that such kind of marks could be obliterated so soon after.

Thus far in defence of the historian's argument, falsely represented by the critic. I proceed to consider the false fact, which the critic has advanced, in support of his false representation. He says, *that the Jews did not obtain their permission to rebuild the temple, till the time Julian set out for his Persian expedition*. This he grounds on the words of Socrates, *Κελεύει τάχῃ ἐκτίσθαι τὸν Σολομῶνι ναόν· ὃ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἤλαυνε*. which the Latin translator renders, *Solomonis templum protinus instaurari jubet. Ipse interim ad bellum contra Persas proficiscitur*. But *ἐπὶ Πέρσας ἤλαυνε* does not signify he forthwith began his march, as if it had been *ἐπὶ Πέρσας πορεύσθαι*; but that he began the war against them, by putting every thing in a hostile motion; which he might do while he stayed at Antioch. And Amm. Marcellinus, who was, at that

time, with Julian, and of his court, tells us, that the eruption which put an end to the project, happened before his master left Antioch.

But the critic's *inference* from this will deserve a more particular consideration—*so that there was little need of all these miracles to hinder the erection of a single building. Surely a sufficient cause for cutting short an enterprise of this nature may be found in the opposition of the Christians, who might take advantage of the prince's absence in a remote region, of his death there, and the advancement of Jovian, who was an enemy to the Jews.*

Here are two things reprehensible in this inference, 1. A *false state of the case*; 2. and a *groundless insinuation*.

1. He speaks as if these miracles were worked only to hinder the simple erection of a building for superstitious worship; the error of Ambrose, taken notice of above. Whereas there was much more in the affair. Its erection would have contradicted the prophecies, and opposed the declared nature of the gospel dispensation. In the first case, there seemed no sufficient reason to interfere; in the latter, an interposition was necessary.

2. He *insinuates*, that the real obstruction came from the Christians in Julian's absence;—from his unexpected death;—and from the succession of a Christian to the empire. This, we see, is only his opinion; I think differently: and had I nothing but my conjectures to oppose to *his*, here I would leave it: but, without betraying the cause I have undertaken, I cannot omit to remind the reader, that the critic's *insinuation* is utterly discredited by the concurrent testimony of two unexceptionable witnesses, Ammianus Marcellinus, and Julian himself: from both of whom * we learn, that the affair of the temple-project was all over before the Emperor removed from Antioch.

But there is still something behind the curtain: which, either prudence or modesty, made the critic backward to subject to the

* See p. 390, 391. 399, & seq.

abuse of every licentious reader. But I am always for letting truth be trusted with itself: therefore, to disguise nothing, I would observe, that one of the strongest objections to the miracle seems here to be obscurely insinuated. Whether he saw it in it's full force may be doubted. However, here it is: and the reader shall have no reason to complain that it does not come with it's best foot forward. I will suppose then M. Basnage to make the following objection:

“That, admitting the re-edification of the temple was both contrary to the words of the old prophecies, and to the nature of the new dispensation; yet, as the projector of this affront upon religion was suddenly cut off, and succeeded by a Christian Emperor, before any considerable progress could be made, there was no need of a miracle to defeat the attempt; and God is not wont to make a needless waste of miracles.”

The objection, we see, is specious, and, at first view, will be apt to impose upon us. But let us weigh it's real value.

The case is agreed to be this: the two inveterate enemies of the Christian name conspire together, though with different views, to blast its credit, and dishonour its pretensions; and this, in a point so essential, that the religion itself must stand or fall with the issue of the event.

They put their design in execution. The materials are collected, the workmen assembled, the foundations laid, and the superstructure now advances without stop or impediment. In a word, every thing succeeds to their wishes. When, on a sudden, one of the most common accidents in the world blasts the whole project; a giddy headstrong prince * perishes in a rash adventure against a fierce and subtle enemy.

* The temper and character of this prince was so well known, that, when he consulted the Gods about his fate, the priests were in no danger of discrediting their oracles by a mistaken conjecture. They told him he should die a violent death. This he himself informs us of in his last harangue to his friends.—*Nec fateri pudebit, interitum me ferro dudum didici fide fatidica præcinente.* Amm. Mar. l. xxv. c. 3.

In this case, what would the world have thought ; the world, which never thinks favourably of religious novelties ; and which this bold defiance of the power of Christ had set at gaze, and made impatient for the event * ? Would it not have said, that Christianity was beholden to a mere accident ; while the power, that should have supported it, was not at hand to vindicate its credit and reputation ? And it was well if they had said no more. For the popular story, which the malice of the Pagans, and the indiscretion of some Christians, had set a going, *that Julian was assassinated by a Christian soldier*, would, in that case, have been enough to raise suspicions that the *faith* had been propagated, at first, by as indirect means as it was now supported.

The Jews had twice before projected the restoration of their *temple-worship* : once under Hadrian ; and once again, under Constantine. At those junctures the attempt had none of this malice and formed impiety against the divinity of our holy faith. The Gentiles then gave the Jews no assistance or support : and it was in them a simple, natural desire of returning to their own land, and of re-establishing their country-rites. But still, it being contrary to God's religious œconomy, the design was defeated by the *policy* of Hadrian, and the *zeal* of Constantine ; and these *civil* impediments were sufficient to cover the honour of religion. For, in these two instances, God's transaction was only with his church. He promised to support it to the end of time, and he equally performs his promise whether that protection be conveyed by the mortal instruments with which he works in the course of his general providence, and whose blindness is guided by his all-seeing eye : or whether it be immediately afforded by the sudden arrest and new direction of nature, irresistibly impelled by his all-powerful hand.

But the case was different in the affair before us. Here God had a controversy with his enemies. His power was defied, his

* See p. 409.

protection scorned, and his Godhead dared and challenged to interpose between them and his servants. At this important juncture, to let a natural event decide the quarrel; and to urge *that* as a proof of his victory, would be taking for granted the thing in question. For the affair was not with his friends, who believed his superintendency; but with his enemies, who laughed at and despised it. Not to shew himself, on this occasion, in all the terror of offended majesty, must have exposed his religion to the same contempt as if the very pinnacles of the new-projected temple had been completed.

But this is not all. A PROPHECY, such as this, concerning the *final* destruction of the temple, is of the nature of a PROHIBITORY LAW. For God's *foretelling* a thing *should never be*, contains in it a *prohibition* to do it: because that information is founded in *his own* will, or command; not in the will or command of *another*: therefore that *will* binds all, to whose knowledge it arrives. This law came to the knowledge of our projectors, as appears from their very impiety in defying it*. But it is of the nature and essence of *Law*, to have penal sanctions. Without them, all laws are vain; especially *prohibitory laws*. Now these transgressors were as culpable in beginning the foundations, as they could have been had they lived to finish their work. Therefore to see them escape punishment, and safely and quietly go off when the change of times forbade them to proceed (a change, which had nothing in it more wonderful than the death of a rash adventurer in battle) must have argued, that God was no more concerned in the issue of this, than of all other natural events; and consequently, that these *brusht* prophecies, and this *pretended gospel*, were the inventions of men. I believe modern infidels would scarce have spared us, had they taken church-history at this advantage.

* Πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διότι καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, βασιλεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, καὶ πᾶσι Ἰουδαίοις οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι Ἰουδαίους συνῶναι, ἰουδαῖοι, αὐτοῖς τῆς σπουδῆς, ὑπολαβόντες, δύνασθαι καλεῖσθαι τὸ ἐκχρισμῶν, καὶ ψευδῶς ἀπειλῆσαι τὸ Χριστὸν τὰς προφητείας. εἰ δὲ, ἅμα τούτῳ διανοήσας, καὶ παρὲν ἔχειν τοῦ ἀναστῆναι τὸ ἱερόν.—τὸν δισπῶντα ὑπολαμβάνοντες ὁ Μάρτυρ· περιέφησιν διελύχον. Theod. l. iii. c. 20. Sozom. l. v. c. 22.

But

But now, by a timely interposition, the honour of religion was secured: And, an exemplary punishment being inflicted, the reverence of his laws, the credit of his messengers, and the regal dignity of his Son, were all amply vindicated.

While I am upon this subject, let me observe, what, perhaps, I might have found a better place for, that the forbearance of Jovian and Valentinian to revenge, on those forward creatures in power, the insults and injuries offered on this occasion to many peaceable and honest men, is no slight proof of the reality of a miraculous interposition. For it shewed the church fully satisfied that God had avenged his own cause. Gregory Nazianzene ends his *Discourse against Julian* with an excellent persuasive to forgiveness; wherein he exhorts the Christians to sacrifice their resentments, as a *Thank-offering*, to God: *ἰνοῦντες* (says he) *τῷ Θεῷ χαριστήριον*.

Thus having set this objection in the best light we were able, both for the honour of religion, and the credit of M. Basnage's criticism; and seen to what it amounts: we leave it to the reader to make his conclusions on the general question.

M. Basnage goes on in these words,—*Besides, the historian [Sozomene] refers his readers in a vague indefinite manner to the eye-witnesses of the fact, without pointing out one single person by name.*

Objectors are often too careless where their random reflections will light. This will fall upon the Apostle's narrative as well as our historian's. St Paul, arguing against some who denied the Resurrection from the dead, confutes them by the Resurrection of Jesus; who was *seen*, after he was risen, *of above five hundred brethren at once, of whom* (says he, without specifying any one by name) *the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep* *.

Sozomene writes a general history of the church, for the use of the whole Christian world: and speaking, in its place, of the

* 1 Cor. xv. 6.

event at Jerusalem, he concludes his account in this manner: *Should these things seem incredible to any one, those who have had their information from eye-witnesses, and are yet alive, will confirm it to him* *. Of which number, if he himself was not one; yet, at least, he had his account from one. In either case, this was proper satisfaction to a doubter. And it had been impertinent to add, that “amongst these were John, Thomas or Andrew of Jerusalem;” obscure names, which would have given his reader no more satisfaction, than what his general information had conveyed before. But it may be said, that St. Paul, besides his *vague* account of *five hundred*, adds the names of Cephas, James, and himself. And so, doubtless, would Sozomene have done, had he either seen it himself, or known any that had, with whose names his reader was as well acquainted, as the Corinthians were with Cephas, James, and the *rest of the Twelve*. What he hath done was what common sense dictated he should do. But M. Basnage seems to expect in a general history all the circumstance and precision of a *procès-verbal*.

However, thus much we learn from these *vague* words of Sozomene, that he was not a mere copier; but, to verify his story, went as nigh the fountain-head as he could get. And this being the practice of these three honest and judicious historians, we need not wonder that *one* should mention *this* incident, and *another, that*, just as they received their information from the most credible of the *first ear-witnesses* they could find then alive: which too, by the way, is sufficient to take off all M. Basnage urges on the head of *variations*. But had we taken his VARIATIONS from him, what were he then? An artist without the proper tool of his trade; for a *professed objector* never borrowed more than this from the magazine of Quintilian—*ARTIFICIS est invenire in actione adverjarii quæ inter semetipsa pugnent, aut PUGNARE VIDEANTUR*.

* Ταῦτα εἴη κατὰ τὴν ἀληθείαν, πιστεύουσιν οἱ κατὰ τὸν διασημοῦς ἀκούοντες ἐν τῇ βίῃ πιστοῦντες. L. V. C. 22.

We are now come to the end of this long piece of criticism, which concludes in these words: *But lastly, Cyril of Jerusalem, who was, at that time, Bishop of the place, and must have been upon the spot, since it was he, who, confiding in a prophecy of Daniel (which had foretold, as he thought, that the attempt would prove unsuccessful) encouraged and animated the people to repose their confidence in God. Notwithstanding, this same Cyril hath never taken the least notice of these many miracles: and yet it certainly was not, because he was no friend to miracles: we are told he wrote to Constantine the Younger, to inform him, that he was more happy than his father, under whose empire the Cross of Christ had been found here on earth; since Heaven, to grace his reign, had displayed a more illustrious prodigy: which was a cross much brighter than the Sun, seen in the firmament, for a long time together, by the whole city of Jerusalem. Why now was that cross remembered, and all these miracles forgotten? He assures the Jews they shall see the sign of the cross; and that it will precede the coming of the Son of God; and yet he says not one word of those which had been miraculously affixed on their habits. The silence of a Bishop, who was upon the place, who loved miracles, and laboured for the conversion of the Jews, looks very suspicious; while, at the same time, those who do speak to it lived at a distance.*

The supposed fact, as here stated, concerning Cyril's testimony, is indeed a material objection to the miracle. What shall we say then? Would not any one conclude that this learned man, a real friend to Revelation, and faithful historian, had weighed it well before he ventured to pronounce upon its consequences, in so public a manner? Who would suspect that he has taken for granted *one* thing, which every body knows to be false; and *another*, which nobody can know to be true?

He takes it for granted, that the works which now remain of Cyril were written *after* the event; whereas they were all written *before*. These are the *Catecheses ad competentes*, the *Catecheses mystagogicæ*, and the *Epistle to Constantius*: the two first bear date about

about 347, and the latter in 351 ; those, sixteen ; this, twelve years *before* the miracle in question. And the worst is, the learned critic could not but know it.

If he had no intention to deceive by this captious insinuation, we must lay the blame on his careless expression ; and that his argument from Cyril's silence, when set in the best light, stands thus :

“ The pretended miracle at the temple of Jerusalem happened in the year 363. Cyril lived to the year 386, so that we cannot but conclude, he wrote and preached much within that period. He appears to be fond of recording miracles : but he had peculiar reasons to celebrate, and expatiate upon, *this*. It favoured his charitable zeal for the conversion of the Jews ; but, above all, the glory of it reflected much lustre upon himself, as he had predicted the defeat. Had he therefore known it to be true, he must have recorded it. But the silence of antiquity concerning his testimony shews he did not record it. For to whom but to Cyril, the Bishop of the place, and then upon the spot, should the ancient relators of the fact have appealed ? Yet he was not forgotten in the crowd : for they tell us of his faith in the *prophecy of Daniel*. We must, therefore, conclude, that the event, whatever it was, had struck the good bishop dumb ; and that his silence proceeded from that sort of confusion, which we now-a-days see in the *modest part* of our *Revelation-Prophets*, when some unexpected event between the Turk and the Emperor has disconcerted the scheme they had chalked out for the direction of Divine Providence.

It will hardly be thought, I have not done the argument justice. Let us see then what can be said to it.

1. Whether Cyril left any thing behind him (except what he wrote before the event) is not any where said. Some perhaps may conclude from Jerom, that he wrote nothing after this time : For, in Jerom's catalogue of ecclesiastical writers, the works mentioned above are given as a complete list of what Cyril wrote : and it

is scarce to be supposed that any of his writings should have perished between his time and that of Jerom.

2. Cyril might write many things, and yet none relative to this affair ; or in which he could properly introduce it.

3. He might have given the history of it in all its circumstances, and yet these three historians (to whom M. Basnage's observation is confined) not been guilty of any neglect in not mentioning his testimony *by name*. Or if it were a neglect, it was the same they committed in passing over two other contemporary writers, Gregory Nazianzene and John Chrysostome ; one of whom has spoken fully, and the other frequently to the miracle in question. But to this, perhaps, it may be replied, " That though they have not quoted them, yet they have referred to, and borrowed from them." How does the objector know that ?—From the *bo-milies* of the one, and the *invektives* of the other, now remaining.—Very well : and for aught he knows to the contrary, had any of Cyril's supposed works been remaining, we should have found them quoting from, and referring to him ; especially, as they relate several circumstances, mentioned neither by Gregory nor Chrysostome. Had Gregory's works been lost, we had been as unable to know that they borrowed from *him*, as we now are that they borrowed from Cyril.

4. As to their recording the good bishop's prophetic *confidence* in the divine interposition, and at the same time overlooking his testimony to the miracle that followed, a very good reason may be given ; and such a one as does honour to their judgment. Cyril was *singular* in the first case ; and but *one of many* in the other. They took, therefore, from him what no other could supply : and what was to be found every where (the testimony to the miracle) they left in common to the church.

5. As to the objection, from the circumstance of Cyril's *loving miracles*, let me observe, that if it could be proved, from a work of his written after 363, that he had neglected any fair occasion to record

cord the defeat of Julian, the objection would have some weight. But in the total uncertainty whether he did record the story or no, it turns against the objector, as the circumstance of Cyril's *loving miracles* adds probability to the affirmative, that, if he did write at all, he would find room for a subject he loved to write upon.

6. But since the learned critic hath been pleased to speak slightly of this excellent prelate, as if he were both fanatical in interpreting prophecies, and bigotted in believing miracles; so much will be due to the virtues of a worthy man (how far soever removed in time and place), as to vindicate him from unfair aspersions; due especially from us, as this justice to his character will be seen to reflect credit on the share he took in opposing Julian's attempt. There is a story recorded of him, for which every good man will reverence his memory. He had an ecclesiastical squabble with Acacius Bishop of Cæsarea, about Metropolitcal jurisdiction. Cyril despised so frivolous a contest; and refused to appear before the Palestine Synod, to which his factious adversary had delated him. Whereon, the Synod agreed to depose Cyril, for contempt. But to give their sentence a shew of credit against so distinguished a personage, they added this crime to the other, that once, in a desolating famine, he disposed of the treasures of his church to feed the poor. This action, so becoming a faithful minister of Jesus Christ, fully shews, that, whether he had a right to metropolitcal jurisdiction or no, he well deserved it. But the crying part of this sacrilege is yet behind: it seems, that in the sale of his sacred wardrobe, a reverend Stole, interwoven with gold, and made yet more illustrious by the *sanctity* of its giver, Constantine the Great, came at length, in the ceaseless round of property, into the possession of a notorious prostitute, who flourished with it on the public stage.

. M. Bagnage concludes his remark on Cyril in this manner: *The silence of a bishop, who was upon the place, looks very suspicious; while, at the same time, those who do speak to it lived at a distance.*

Admitting the bishop was indeed silent, How could this learned man, who forms his charge on the information of the three Historians, say, that *those who speak to the miracle lived at a distance*; when Sozomene plainly tells us, that, at the time he wrote, there were several still living, who had it from the eye-witnesses of the fact? Here then, for the silence of *one* man, we have the testimony of *many*.—But Sozomene speaks of none by *name*—Who knows, then, but the bishop might be amongst the *nameless*? It hath been many a bishop's fate. However, *the testimony of the people on the place* is directly *asserted* by the historian; and the *silence* of Cyril only *inferred* by the Critic, from his not finding him amongst the witnesses.

And, with these reflections on the good prelate, so unworthy the learning, the sense, and the ingenuity of M. Basnage, he concludes his *OBJECTIONS against the miracle*.

What follows is to shew his impartiality. “However (says he) “it ought not to be dissembled, that if one of the Jewish Chronologists maintains, that the sudden and unexpected death of Julian “prevented the rebuilding the temple; another of them assures “us, it was rebuilt; and that when this was done at a vast expence, it tumbled down again; and, the next day, a dreadful “fire from heaven melted all the iron instruments which remained, and destroyed an innumerable multitude of the Jews. This “confession of the Rabbins is the more considerable, as it reflects “dishonour on the nation; and these gentry are not wont to copy “from the writings of the Christians.”

Here, it must be owned, he hath approved himself *indifferent*: and if his arguments *against* the miracle be more in *number*, than those *for* it; the *weight*, at least, on both sides is equal.

Not that I would insinuate, as if this Rabbinical testimony was, altogether impertinent. I have myself produced it in support of the evidence*: and, principally for the sake of that circumstance,

* P. 407.

which

which M. Basnage so ingenuously acknowledges—*That the Rabbins are not wont to copy from Christian writers.*

Nor will I deny, that this testimony hath *its proper place* in a religious *History of the Jews*. What I cannot reconcile to this great man's general character, nor even to that air of impartiality which he here professes to preserve, is, that when he hath brought out all he could invent to the discredit of the miracle, he should content himself with producing only one single circumstance, and that, the least considerable, in its favour. Inasmuch that if ever the conclusive testimonies of Ammianus Marcellinus, Gregory Nazianzene, and John Chrysostome, should be lost, and this piece of criticism remain, the silence of so candid and knowing a writer as M. Basnage will be infinitely a better proof that no such evidence had ever been, than what he himself urges, from the silence of antiquity, against the testimony of Cyril.

But, to end with this learned Critic. There is, I must confess, something so very odd in his conduct on this occasion, as cannot but give offence to every sober Reader. Yet I would by no means be thought to approve of Mr. Lowth's uncharitable reflections: which stand (as they often do amongst worse writers) in the place of a confutation. One may allow M. Basnage to have thought perversely; because this is an infirmity common to believers and unbelievers: But one would never suspect a *Minister of the Gospel* of a formed design to undermine a Religion into whose service he had solemnly entered; nor, a *man, truly learned*, of a bias to infidelity: such dispositions imply gross *knavery* and *ignorance*; and M. Basnage approved himself, on all other occasions, a man of uncommon talents and integrity.

A strong prejudice against the character of the *Fathers* was what, apparently, betrayed him into this unwarrantable conclusion: for, injuriously suspecting them of imposture whenever they speak of miracles, he began with them where he should have ended; and read their accounts, not to examine facts yet in question, but to condemn

condemn frauds as already detected. Hence every *variation*, nay, every *variety* in their relations, appeared to him a *contradiction*. And that which indeed supports their joint testimony, was by this learned man imagined to be the very thing that overthrew it. But their best vindication is a strict scrutiny into their evidence *. This we have attempted; not as an advocate for the *Fathers*, but an Inquirer after *Truth*. What hath been the issue must be left to the judgement of the Public.

C H A P. V.

WE go on with the remaining objections to this miracle, in which we shall be more brief.

V. In the next place it is pretended, "That this firey eruption was an ARTIFICIAL contrivance of the Christians to keep their enemies at a distance. It is said, the Egyptians, from the earliest times, had the secret of mixing combustible materials in such a manner as to produce the effects of exploded Gunpowder: That Sir William Temple, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and, an abler man than either of them, Sir Thomas Browne of Norwich, have dropt hints as if some of the greatest wonders, both in sacred and prophane antiquity, were the effects of this destructive composition; such as the thunders and lightning at the giving the *law* from mount Sinai; the deaths of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, in their contest with Aaron; and the defeat of Brennus and his army of Gauls when they assaulted the temple of Apollo at Delphi. This too, they say, will account for a strong mark of resemblance, between the latter, and the defeat of Julian; in both which the

* Whoever will take the pains of examining what the Fathers, and particularly Gregory Nazianzene, say of this miracle, and will compare it with their sentiments of the extraordinary reports that went about, concerning Julian's death, will see cause to confess, that they were not so *credulous* or so *deifying* as they have been represented.

impending

impending destruction was predicted; in the one by Cyril; in the other, by the priests of Apollo*."

The objection, we see, supposes full *power* and *opportunity*, as well as profound address in these Christian engineers: for let them be as knowing as you will, in all the hidden arts of Egypt, yet, if they had, not elbow-room for their work, all their skill would come to nothing.

We will examine how they were bested in each of these particulars. At this important juncture the Christians were unarmed, and defenceless. They were forbidden by law to bear office; and they every where submitted to the imperial decrees. But This, to rebuild the temple, was enforced by all the power and authority of the empire. And the project was no sooner on foot, than the place was possessed and crowded with vast numbers of Jews and Gentiles. Nor was this all. The Christians were driven from the neighbourhood of the holy place, by their just fears and apprehensions. They had every thing to expect from this impious combination. For their enemies of both parties came in crowds to share and enjoy the approaching triumph; while each strove which should exceed the other in violence and outrage. Insomuch that *some*, as Chrysostome assures us, *absconded, and shut themselves up in their houses; others fled into deserts and solitudes, and avoided all places of public resort* †. So that whatever the priests of Apollo at Delphi (who had their town and temple in possession, and a good garrison to keep off the enemy, till they were ready for their reception) might find themselves capable of performing; it is plain the poor Christian Pastors (their Flocks dispersed, and themselves absconding), were utterly deprived of all arms but those of Faith and Prayer. This, I think, may stand for an answer to that resemblance between the *predictions* of Cyril, and the priests of Apollo, from which the objection would deduce such consequences of suspicion.

* —In hoc partium certamine repente antistites advenisse Deum clamant, Ὡς. Just. l. xxiv. c. 8.

† οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις κρυπόμενοι, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐρημίας μετὰκίβητο, καὶ τὰς ἀγροὺς ἔφυγον. Adv. Jud. Orat. v.

But,

But, let us allow them both will and opportunity to do the feat: yet still, I apprehend, every likely *means* would be wanting. Chemical writers, indeed, in their romantic claims to antiquity, have boasted much of the profound knowledge of the old Egyptians in the Spagiric Art: but this without the least proof, or warrant from history. The first authentic account we have of *artificial fire* was an invention or discovery of the seventh century. One Callinicus, an Egyptian of Heliopolis, fled from the Saracens (who then possessed that country) to Constantinople*; and taught the Greeks a military mischief, called by them *ὕγρον πῦρ* [a liquid fire], but by the Franks *feu Gregois*. It was composed, they tell us, of naphtha and bitumen; and was blown out of iron and brass tubes; or shot from a kind of crossbow. Wherever it fell, it stuck, and burnt obstinately; and was with great difficulty extinguished. Some, indeed, say it was accompanied with a sound like thunder. But this is certain, the execution was not by the force of the explosion, but by a strong and continued burning. After this we hear of no other artificial fires till the thirteenth century; when our famous countryman, Roger Bacon, invented that very composition we call *Gunpowder*. He specifies all the ingredients; and speaks of it as a discovery of his own. It was not long ere it was put in practice: For, in the next century, Froissart, and other French historians, mention the use of *cannon*; and, as an invention of their own times.

It is true, that when the missionaries had opened themselves a way into China, and were enabled to give us a more perfect account of that great empire than we had received from the straggling adventurers, who at several times had penetrated thither before them; we are told, amongst the other wonders of these remote regions, of fire-arms, both great and small; which had been in use for sixteen hundred years; nay, these missionaries go so far as to say, that they themselves had seen cannon which had been cast six or eight centuries before. But there are other, and more early accounts, which

* See Nicetas, Theophanes, Cedrenus, Constantius Porphyrogenetus.

shew we are not to depend entirely upon these. M. Renaudot hath given the public a translation of two Mahometan Voyagers, who visited the south part of China, in the ninth century. These Arabians are curious in describing every thing rare and uncommon, or in the least differing from their own customs and manners : And yet they give us no hint of their meeting with this prodigious machine ; and such must cannon needs be deemed by men unacquainted with the use of gunpowder. Four centuries afterwards, Marco Polo the Venetian, a curious and intelligent traveller, penetrated into China by the north : and he too is silent on this head. In the next century our famous countryman Mandeville rambled thither. His genius was towards natural knowledge, having studied and professed medicine ; he was skilled likewise in most of the languages of the East and West. This man sojourned a considerable time in China : he served in their armies, and commanded in their strong places : yet he takes not the least notice of cannon, which he must have used, had there been any ; and the use of so interesting a novelty he would hardly have omitted to describe. For he set out on his travels in the year 1332 ; and Larry says that the first piece of cannon, that had been seen in France, was in 1346. Though Du Cange * observes, that the Registers of the chamber of accounts † at Paris make mention of gunpowder so early as the year 1338. And Froissart under the year 1340 records, that the town of Quesnoy discharged their cannon against the French who made their courses to the gates of that city.

All this, when laid together, seems to furnish out a very strong proof that the Chinese had never seen cannon till after this visit of Sir John Mandeville : which agrees well with a known fact, That, about two centuries ago, the Chinese, in their wars with the Tartars, were forced to take in the assistance of the Europeans to manage their artillery.

* In Gloss. v. BOMBARDA.

† One article of which stands thus — à Henri de Faumechon pour avoir poudres, & autres choses nécessaires aux canons qui estoient devant Puy-Guillaume.

But this fable of the antient use of cannon in China is not to be charged on the missionaries, but on the Chinese themselves, the proudest and vainest people upon earth; arrogating to themselves the invention and improvement of every kind of art and science. They boasted, in the same manner, of the antiquity and perfection of their astronomy and mathematics. But here their performances soon betrayed the folly and impudence of their pretences. It was not so easy to detect them in the subject in question. The missionaries, on their arrival, saw cannon, which doubtless had lain there for two or three ages. And of these, the Chinese were at liberty to fable what they pleased. But it appears plain enough, they were indebted for them to their commerce with the Mahometans (the only people on the Western side of India, with whom they had then any commerce), some time between the voyage of Mandeville and the arrival of the missionaries: very likely, soon after their invention in Europe; for Peter Mexia speaks of the Moors as having the use of cannon about the year 1343. A probability very much supported by the confession of the Chinese themselves, in a modest humour, That though they had cannon from the most early times of their empire, yet, till the Tartar war, spoken of above, they were totally unacquainted with the management of artillery.

Let this suffice, in answer to this wild objection, or suspicion rather; the wildest sure that ever infidelity advanced to elude the force of sober evidence. An objection not only unsupported by antiquity, but discredited by itself. Inventions, which promote the health and happiness of our species, have been often, indeed, kept concealed; and when at last communicated have soon passed again into oblivion. But the natural malignity of our nature would never suffer so destructive and pernicious an invention to remain long a secret; or, when it was once known, ever to be refused or forgotten. So that if this kind of artificial fire was an early discovery of the Egyptian sages, it had a fortune which can never be accounted for on the common principles of human conduct.

C H A P. VI.

THE last objection, which is a little more plausible, is to be received with a great deal more ceremony and distinction; as coming from the great Intimados of NATURE, the secretaries and confidants of her intrigues. These men tell us, "That the fire, which burst from the foundations of the *temple*, was a mere *natural eruption*. The regions in and about the Lesser Asia were (they say) in all ages subject to earthquakes, proceeding from subterraneous fires: and the present face of the country about Sodom and Gomorrah shews, that the land of Judæa, in particular, had its entrails full of these destructive principles. The fire from the mountain of the *temple* had, they say, all the marks of a *natural eruption*; the same circumstances attending it which attend all natural eruptions, and especially that at Nicomedia. Nor is the *time*, in which it happened, sufficient to oppose to this conclusion. For these *commotions of nature* being frequent in every age, it is no wonder they should sometimes fall in with those *moral disorders*, occasioned by religious contests, which are as frequent; or that, at such a juncture, frightened superstition should catch at these accidents of terror to support a labouring cause. Hence it was (say they) that Jupiter Ammon was made to destroy the army of Cambyfes, when sent to burn his temple, and lay waste the country of his worshippers; and Apollo, to fall upon the army of Brennus, when he led it to plunder the treasury at Delphi."

This is the objection: and I have not scrupled my help to set it off. For, besides the distinction due to the character of the objectors, I had other reasons why I would willingly have it seen in the best light.

Several of the circumstances attending the event in question, and *some*, which have been generally held the most *miraculous*, I have myself delivered as the effects of *natural causes*; induced thereto

by the love of truth, and a fond desire of reconciling the fact itself, and the Christian *Fathers*, who relate it, to the more favourable opinion of modern *Freetinkers*. It will be fit, therefore, I should explain and justify my own conduct before I object to that of my adversaries.

The agency of a superior Being on any portion of the visible creation lying within the reach of our senses, whereby it acquires properties and directions different from what we hold it capable of receiving from the established laws of matter and motion, we call a MIRACLE.

To ask, whether God's *immediate* agency makes a necessary part of the definition ; or whether, to give a miracle its name, it be sufficient that another Being, superior to man, performed the operation, appears to me a very impertinent enquiry. Because there are but two sorts of men who concern themselves about the matter ; Those who hold God's *moral government* ; and Those who allow only his *natural*.

The first sort, the *Religionists*, must on their proper principles allow, that a work performed by superior agency, in confirmation of a doctrine worthy of God, and remaining uncontrouled by a greater, can be no other than the attestation of Heaven, to which God hath set his hand and seal. Because the permitting an *evil Being* to perform these wonders, would be deceiving his creatures, who know little or nothing of the world of spirits. It would be drawing them unavoidably into an error, where they would be fixed ; which is contrary to what the Religionist conceives of God's moral attributes, and, consequently, of his government. As to the Sectators of *Naturalism*, the specific qualities of a miracle never come within the range of their enquiries ; for, holding only the *natural* government of God, they deny, of course, the very existence of every thing that implies a *moral* regimen.

Miracles, then, we may be allowed to say, are of two sorts. Those where the laws of nature are *suspended* or *reversed* (such as the budding of *Aaron's rod*, and the raising of *Lazarus from the dead*).

And

And those which only *give a new direction* to its Laws (such as bringing *water from the rock*, and *stopping the issue of blood*). For miracles being an useful, not an ostentatious display of God's power, we cannot but conclude, He would employ the one or other fort indifferently, as best served the purpose of his interposition.

Now, as it would be *impious* to bring in NATURAL CAUSES to explain the *first* fort; so, totally to exclude those causes in the latter, would be *superstitious*: and both, infinitely *absurd*. Who, for instance, would venture to affirm that the prolific virtue in the stock of *Aaron's rod* contributed to the blossoming of its branch? Or, on the other hand, that the water which came from the *rock* at the command of *Moses*, was just then created to do honour to his ministry? In this last case, what more would a rational Believer conclude, than that GOD, by making, at the instant, a fissure in the rock, gave room for the water to burst out, which had been before lodged there by *nature*, as in its proper reservoir? And the sober Critic, who proceeds in this manner, does no more than follow that method of *interpreting*, which God himself useth in *working* the miracle; which is, to give to Nature all that Nature could easily perform.

We are further encouraged in thus explaining the mode of God's interposition, by one of the most awful exertions of Divine Power, recorded in holy Writ. But, previous to the story, the Reader should be reminded of what hath been observed of the *order* of the appearances both in the *natural* eruption at *Nicomedia*, and in that, we call, *miraculous*, at Jerusalem; where, in each case, the desolation began with *winds* and tempest; was continued by an *earthquake*; and concluded in a *firey* eruption. The story is this, The Prophet *Elijah*, oppressed with the corruptions of the house of Israel, is commanded to wait God's presence, and attend his word. "And he said, Go forth, and stand upon the mount before the
" Lord. And behold the Lord passed by, and a great and strong
" WIND rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before
" the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the
" wind

“wind an EARTHQUAKE; but the Lord was not in the earthquake: and after the earthquake a FIRE; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a SMALL STILL VOICE*.” His coming to *shake terribly the earth* is here, we see, described, in all the pomp of incensed Majesty. Yet it is remarkable, that the precursors of his presence follow each other in the same order of physical progression, in which nature ranged the several phænomena at Nicomedia and Jerusalem; the *tempests*, the *earthquake*, and the *fire*: an order, the sacred Historian plainly points out to us, where he says, that *God was not in any of these*; intimating, that they were pure physical appearances, the parade of nature, thus far suffered to do its office without stop or impediment: but that *He was in the small still voice*, which closed this dreadful procession; intimating, that these natural appearances were *ministerial* to the *interposition* of the Author and Lord of Nature.

Let us apply all this to our argument; and consider, how a sober believer, convinced by the force of evidence, would interpret the *miracle in question*. He would, without doubt, conclude, that the mineral and metallic substances (which, by their accidental fermentation, are wont to take fire and burst out in flames) were the native contents of the place from which they issued; but that, in all likelihood, they would there have slept, and still continued in the quiet innoxious state in which they had so long remained, had not the *breath of the Lord awoke and kindled them*.

But when the Divine Power had thus *miraculously* interposed to *stir up* the rage of these fiery elements, and yet to *restrain* their fury to the objects of his vengeance, he then again suffered them to do their ordinary office: because *Nature* thus directed would, by the exertion of its own laws, answer all the ends of the *moral designation*.

The consequence of which would be, that its effects, whether *destructive* or only *terrific*, would be the same with those attending mere natural eruptions.

* 1 Kings xix. 11, 12.

So far, indeed, one cannot but suspect, That the *specific* qualities in the fermented elements, which occasioned the *frightful appearances*, though they were natural to enflamed matter under certain circumstances, were yet, by the peculiar pleasure of Providence, *given* on this occasion ; and not left merely to the conjunction of mechanic causes, or the fortuitous concurrence of matter and motion, to *produce*. And my reason is, because these *frightful* appearances, namely the *cross* in the heavens, and on the garments, were admirably fitted, as MORAL EMBLEMS, to proclaim the triumph of CHRIST over Julian. For the apostate having, in a public and contemptuous manner, taken the *monogramme* and *cross* out of the military ensigns *, which Constantine had put there, in memory of the aerial vision that presaged his victories ; the same kind of triumphant cross was again erected in the heavens, to confound the vanity of that impotent bravade : and having forbidden the followers of Jesus, by public edict, to use the very *name* of Christians ; a *stigmatic cross* was now imprinted upon the garments of those who were seconding his impieties, or were witnesses to the defeat of his attempt.

And, in these shining marks of vengeance, there was nothing low, fantastical, or superstitious. The impress was great and solemn, and corresponded to the dignity of the occasion.

Another *use* of these *terrific appearances* (now first beginning to manifest itself, as in many other circumstances of religious dispensation, produced in one age for the service of another, most remote) will further confirm our opinion of their *final cause*. The *use*, I mean, is their supporting the testimony of the *fathers*. The *crosses on the garments*, to the men of that time, not apprized of their being meteoric marks, must appear a very incredulous circumstance : on which too (whatever the nature of the crosses was), the evidence of the divine interposition was seen not to depend. Yet the *fathers*, with the utmost confidence, and most perfect agreement, relate this circumstance at large ; dwell more upon it, and glory

* Greg. Naz. Or. iii. Sozom. l. v. c. 17.

more in it, than on all the rest. Hence I infer, that nothing but the notoriety of the fact induced them to load the miracle with a circumstance, which, they could not but see, was so far from adding credit to the evidence, that it would render the whole transaction suspicious.

Thus much concerning these *two sorts of miracles*, and the different manner of treating them. But it is to be observed, There is yet a *third*, compounded of the other *two*, where the laws of nature are in part *arrested* and *suspended*; and, in part only, *differently directed*. Of this kind was the punishment of the old world by a *deluge* of waters. Now, if, to such as these, we should apply the way of interpretation proper to the *second* sort, where only a new direction is given to the laws of nature; the absurdities, arising from this abusive application, would go near to disgrace the method itself: as That Divine hath helped to shew us, who ingeniously contrived to bring on the deluge of waters by the aid of an approaching *comet*, but was never after, by any physical address, able to draw it off again. And such disgraces are hardly to be avoided: for, in the *second* and simpler kind, the physical interpretation hath *experience* to support it: whereas, in the *third* and more complicated, the artist must be content with an *hypothesis*.

This was proper to be said before we came to try the force of the objection.

1. It begins with observing, "That the regions in and about the Lesser Asia were, in all ages, subject to earthquakes, caused by subterraneous fires; and that Judæa in particular had its entrails full of these destructive principles; as appears even from the present face of the country about Sodom and Gomorrah."

If this account be true, as I believe it is, then Judæa was a proper theatre (as occasion required) for this *specific* display of the divine vengeance. And we see why *fire* was the scourge employed: as *water* doubtless would have been, were the region of Judæa naturally subject to inundations. For miracles not being an ostentatious but a necessary instrument of God's moral government, we cannot

cannot conceive it probable that he would *create* the elements for this purpose ; but *use* those which lay ready stored up against the *day of visitation*. By this means, his *wisdom* would appear as conspicuous as his *power*, when it should be seen, that the provisions layed in, at the formation of the world, for the use and solace of his creatures while they continued in obedience, could, at his word, be turned into scourges when they became faithless and rebellious. The force of this reasoning is so obvious, that, had Providence been pleased to use the contrary method, unbelievers, I am persuaded, would have made that very method an objection to the credibility of the fact. However, though it seemeth most agreeable to what we conceive of divine wisdom, that it should often use the instrumentality of nature in its miraculous interpositions, yet, let it be observed, the same wisdom always provides, that the *Author of Nature* be not lost or obscured under the glare and noise of his *instruments*.

It is said, the region of Judæa was, from the quality of its contents, much subject to earthquakes and firey eruptions. If so, how happened it, that, from the most early times to the period in question, there never was any unusual disorder in its entrails (if you except an earthquake which Josephus mentions as happening in the time of Herod) but at the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah ; at the destruction of Korah and his company ; in the days of Uzziah * ; at the Crucifixion ; and on this attempt of Julian ? How happened it, that this destructive element lay quiet in the midst of so much fuel, and for so many ages ; and only then, and at those critical junctures, shewed itself, when God had a contest with his enemies ? Can any reasonable account be given of such a disposition but this, that, whenever God decrees to punish, it is his purpose the divine agency should be fully manifested ? To pretend, they were all natural events, and the several coincidences merely casual, is supposing something vastly more incredible

* See Amos i. 1. and Zech. xiv. 5.

than what unbelievers would persuade us is implied in the notion of a *miracle*.

2. But it is said, "This eruption from the foundations of the temple had all the *marks* of a natural event, being attended with the same circumstances which, Amm. Marcellinus tells us, accompanied the earthquake at Nicomedia."

It is very certain, the eruption from the foundations of the temple had all these *marks*; and if our explanation of the miracle, as it seems the most *rational*, be indeed the *true*, it could not but have them. When God had kindled the fiery matter in this storehouse of his wrath, all the effects that succeeded, must needs be the same with those which attend the explosion of any other subterraneous fire. What would follow, had they not been the same, but rejection of the whole story? which, in times so squeamish as ours, and so difficult of credit, would have passed for a fairy-tale. This consideration induced me to shew, at large, the exact conformity, throughout the process of the event, between the visitation at Jerusalem and the disaster at Nicomedia. Not but I foresaw the consequence. It is the least of an unbeliever's care to reconcile his objections to one another. I knew his first cavil to the credit of the fact would be the *wonderful* attending the eruption. I therefore provided against it, by shewing this fact to be similar in its main circumstances to the best attested relations of natural events. But I knew too, that, in case of a defeat here, he would not be ashamed to point his cavil the other way, and turn this very *resemblance* to an argument against a supernatural interposition.—What pity is it that Ammianus, who best knew the full extent of this *resemblance*, was not more quick-sighted? He too was an enemy of the Christian name (indeed, to do him justice, more fair and candid than any I know of the same denomination amongst ourselves), but so little sensible of its force, and so much confounded with the event, That, instead of telling the affair at large, which fell in so exactly with his detailed account of the disaster at Nicomedia,
he

he hurries it over with the rapidity of one of the frightened workmen, who had just escaped the common desolation.

After all, a general *resemblance* in the *effects* is allowed. What we insist on is, the *difference* in their *cause* or original. And this difference is supported even by the very nature of things from whence that general resemblance arose.

Nicomedia, a city of Bithynia, was placed on an eminence, at the bottom of a Gulph of that name, in the *Propontis*. Now mountains thus situated, into whose cavernous entrails the sea may find its way, must, if other natural causes favour, be, sometimes, subject to firey eruptions; of which we need no other example than the mountain Vesuviús. But the temple-hill at Jerusalem was neither large nor cavernous; nor was it in the neighbourhood of the sea: circumstances, which, all the world over, are wont to produce this effect. Neither were any *new openings* made, at this time, into the bowels of the mountain; which, by letting in *air* or *water*, might be supposed to ferment and inflame their combustible contents. The historians who relate this *attempt* inform us, that even some parts of the old foundations were left standing to erect the new edifice upon; and in others, where the old works were little better than a heap of rubbish, or at least judged too infirm, that incumbrance only was removed. This appears from the relations of Socrates and Sozomene compared with one another. Socrates assures us*, that the earthquake threw out stones from the old foundations: which he mentions to shew the *literal* accomplishment of the prophecy of *Jesus*, that there *should not be left one stone upon another*. Sozomene indeed affirms†, that the foundations were cleared; but then he goes on and says, the earthquake threw out stones. Now, as no new foundations were ever laid, he must mean with Socrates, the stones of the old. And thus the seeming difference in their accounts will be reconciled. Let me

* L. iii. c. 20.

† L. v. c. 22.

add, that more than once before, and at distant times, they had dug deep into this hill, to lay the foundations of Solomon's and Herod's temples: and then every thing continued quiet. Yet, now, when no new openings were made, the effort to build a *third* was followed by a firey eruption.

Again, in natural ferments of this kind, the commotion is generally very *extensive*, and runs through large tracts of country. Thus the earthquake mentioned by Josephus shook the whole land of Judæa; and the disaster at Nicomedia, as Marcellinus informs us, was occasioned by a tremor which went over Macedonia, Asia, and Pontus; and did infinite mischief throughout its course*. The same historian tells us of another which shook the whole globe of the earth†; and described by Jerom‡ in these words, “Ea tempestate terræ motu totius orbis qui post Juliani mortem accidit maria egressa sunt terminos suos, &c.” On the contrary, the eruption at Jerusalem was confined to the very spot on which the temple had stood; and continued only to deny access to such who, not taking warning by those whom it had destroyed, would still persevere in their impiety§. A circumstance very different from common earthquakes and firey eruptions; and of which we have no examples, save in the eruption that destroyed Korah and his company; and in the earthquake at the Crucifixion of our Lord; and perhaps in that in the days of Uzziah; all of them supernatural events.

Thirdly, in natural eruptions the fire continues burning till the fuel which supplies it be consumed. But the witnesses to *this* assign a very different period to its fury. It continued just as long as the builders persisted in their attempt, and no longer. At every new effort to proceed, the rising fire drove them back; but at the

* *lisdem diebus terræmotus horrendi per Macedoniam, Asiamque, & Pontum assiduè pulsibus oppida multa concusserunt & montes. Inter monumenta tamen multiformium ærumnarum eminere Nicomediæ clades, &c. Marcell. l. xvii. c. 7.*

† *L. xxvi. c. 10.*

‡ *Vit. Hilar.*

§ — *fecere locum exulis aliquoties operantibus inaccessum. L. xxiii. c. 1.*

instant they gave out, it totally subsided. This so terrified Julian, that Chrysostome tells us *, he relinquished the enterprize for fear the fire should turn upon his own head. And this made Marcellinus say, — “elemento DESTINATIVUS repellente”—an expression of great elegance to imply the direction of an intelligent agent.

3. In the last place we are told, “That even so critical a juncture is not to be accounted of: for that *religious squabbles* and *natural prodigies* are equally common; and church-artists never wanting to fit them to one another. Hence, they say, are derived those two notable judgments of Jupiter Ammon and Apollo, upon the armies of Cambyfes and Brennus.”

The observation is plausible. It pleases the imagination: and wants nothing but truth to reconcile it to the judgment.

In miracles performed by the *ministry* of God’s messengers, where the laws of nature are *suspended* or *reversed*, it is sufficient if he who works them shall, at any time, declare their purpose and intention. But, in a miracle performed by the *immediate power* of God, without the intervention of his servants, in which only a *new direction* is given to the laws of nature, one of these two conditions is required to give it credit: either that an inspired servant of God predicted it, and declared its purpose beforehand, as Samuel did the *storm of thunder and rain*, the declaration of God’s displeasure, for the people’s demand of a king: or that it be seen to interpose so seasonably and critically as to cover and secure God’s moral government from inevitable dishonour, as in the case before us. Without one or other of these conditions, superstition would break loose at once, and soon over-run the world: for bigotry (always in close conjunction with our natural malignity) would convert every unusual appearance of natural evil into a prodigy, and a punishment: but why do I say it *would*? It hath in fact done so: and

* ταῦτα λέγουσι ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰουλιανὸς καίτοι τοσαῦτον μακάρι ἔχοντι περὶ τὴν σωτὴν τοῦτον, δίσκας μὴ πικραιτέρω περιελθόν, ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κεφαλὴν καλίστη τὸ σῆς, ἀπίστῳ ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ τῷ Ἰησοῦ σωτῆρι. Adver. Judæos, Orat. ii.

every age and religion hath abounded with these spurious judgments, by which human charity and God's moral government hath been incessantly violated and dishonoured. And yet an ordinary attention to the obvious and rational conditions, here pointed out, would have prevented this mischief: for I know but of one instance in all antiquity which could embarrass the decision: and that is,—not the expedition of Cambyfes; for it would have been a greater wonder that an army should get safe through the sands of those deserts, than that it perished in them. The case I mean is the destruction of Brennus's army before Delphi. Here, neither of the conditions seemed wanting. The priests of Apollo, we are told, *predicted* the approaching desolation: and the *cause* (which was the punishment of impiety and irreligion) appeared not altogether unworthy the divine interposition. These, together with the faith due to the best human testimony, which strangely concurred to support the fact, were, I presume, the reasons that inclined the excellent Dean Prideaux to esteem the accident *miraculous*; not so weakly as hath been represented by some; nor yet with that maturity of judgment, which one would expect from so great a master of ancient history. His words are these—"Brennus marched on
 " with the gross of his army towards Delphos, to plunder the temple—But he there met a wonderful defeat. For on his approaching the place, there happened a terrible storm of thunder, lightning, and hail, which destroyed great numbers of his men, and, at the same time, there was as terrible an earthquake, which rending the mountains in pieces, threw down whole rocks upon them, which overwhelmed them by hundreds at a time.—Thus
 " was God pleased, in a very extraordinary manner, to execute his vengeance upon those sacrilegious wretches for the sake of religion in general, how false and idolatrous soever that religion was, for which that temple at Delphos was erected*." The learned historian, we see, takes it for granted, and he is not mis-

* Connest. Vol. II. p. 20, 21. Fol. Ed.

taken,

taken, that Brennus and his Gauls acknowledged the divinity of Apollo. Julius Cæsar informs us, that the Gauls had very near the same sentiments of the greater deities (as they were called) with the Greeks and Romans*, and the rest of the politer Pagan nations. And, distinct from his authority, we know, that their principle of *intercommunity* made their national Gods free of all countries. Brennus, therefore, was a sacrilege in form. But notwithstanding this, there are many strong objections to the Dean's notion concerning the *quality* of the disaster.

This sacred place, the repository of immense riches, had, at other times, been attempted with impunity; nay with success; for it had been so often plundered, that, when Strabo wrote, the temple was become exceeding poor†. And if, amongst these several insults, there were any more worthy the divine interposition, *for the sake of religion in general*, than the rest, it was when the Phœnicians, the natural and civil protectors of the temple, plundered it of all its wealth, to raise an army of mercenary soldiers. And yet, at that time, the offended deity gave no marks of his displeasure. Now to suppose, when several attempts of this kind had succeeded, that the failure of one, though attended with some uncommon circumstances, was a divine interposition, is going very far in favour of an hypothesis. If it should be said, that the God of Israel suffered his own temple to be several times prophaned (which Julian himself takes care to remember‡) and yet at last vindicated the glory of his name; I reply, there was this essential difference in the case, that whenever the temple of the Jews was violated, the evil was foretold as due to their crimes, and the people made acquainted with the impending punishment: and that now, when its sanctity was insulted by a Gentile's attempt to restore its ho-

* —Post hunc [Mercurium] Apollinem, Martem & Jovem & Minervam. De his eandem fere, quam reliquæ gentes, habent opinionem. De Bell. Gall. L. vi.

† καὶ γὰρ τοὶ φοινικῆς ἐν τῷ ἐν Δαφνῶν ἱερῷ. Lib. xi.

‡ See p. 399, 400.

nours, it was in defiance of a prophecy which had doomed it to a final desolation.

There is yet a stronger objection to the learned Dean's solution ; which is, that, had the defeat been miraculous, the interposition would have lost its end. For it could never have been deemed as effectuated *to vindicate religion in general* ; but *as done for the sake of their false Gods only* ; the story informing us, that the *priests* of the temple denounced the coming vengeance ; and ascribed it to the wrath and power of Apollo* and his two sisters. So that this intervention would have been the means of fixing idolatry, and rivetting down polytheism upon the Gentile world.

But what is still more, the circumstances of the times did not at all favour a miracle for the purpose assigned, namely *for the sake of religion in general, against impiety*. The popular folly, in the Pagan world, ran all the other way. It was not *irreligion*, but *superstition*, that then infected mankind. They had no need of a real miracle to remind them of the superintendency of Providence ; they were but too apt to ascribe every unusual appearance of nature to moral agency. So that, had Heaven *now* thought fit to interfere ; we cannot but conclude, it had been rather in *discredit of idolatry in particular*, than in *behalf of religion in general*.—There is hardly any need to observe, that the reasons, which make against God's own intervention, hold equally against his permitting evil spirits to co-operate with the delusions of their priests.

Having, therefore, excluded all superior agency from this affair ; it will be incumbent on us to shew, by what human contrivance it might have been effected. For it must be owned, its arrival at

* In hoc partium certamine repente universonum templorum antistes, simul & ipsæ vates, sparsis crinibus, cum insignibus atque infulis, pavidi vecordesque in primam pugnantium aciem procurrunr : advenisse Deum clamant ; eumque se vidisse disilientem in templum—Juvenem supra humanum modum insignis pulchritudinis, comitesque ei duas armatas virgines ex propinquis duabus *Diana Minervæque* ædibus occurriffe : nec oculis tantum hæc se perpexisse ; audisse etiam stridorem arcûs ac strepitum armorum.—Juft. lib. xxiv. c. 8.

so critical a juncture will not easily suffer us to suppose it a mere *natural* event.

The inclination of a Pagan Priest to assist his God in extremity will hardly be called in question. We see, by the round story of *those* at *Delphi*, that they were not embarrassed by vulgar scruples. They told their townsmen, they saw the God, at his first alighting, in the person of a young man of exquisite beauty, and his two virgin associates, Diana and Minerva, with each her proper arms of bow and spear: But they did not expect the people should trust to their *eye-sight* only; they assured them, they *heard*, besides, the clang of their arms.

So much for a good disposition: which was not ill seconded by their public management and address. On the first rumour of Brennus's march against them, they issued out orders as from the oracle, to all the region round, forbidding the country people to secrete or bear away their wine and provisions. The effects of this order succeeded to their expectation. The half-starved Barbarians finding, on their arrival in Phocis, so great a plenty of all things, made short marches, dispersed themselves over the country, and revelled in the abundance that was provided for them. This respite gave time to the friends and allies of the God to come to his assistance: so that by such time as Brennus was sat down at the foot of the rocks, there was a numerous garrison within to dispute his ascent*.

Their advantages of situation likewise supported the measures they had taken for a vigorous defence. The town and temple of Delphi were seated on a bare and cavernous rock; defended, on all sides, with precipices, instead of walls. The large recess within

* Gallorum vulgus, ex longâ inopiâ, ubi primum vino cæterisque comœditiis referta rura invenit, non minus abundantia quàm victoriâ lætum, per agros se sparserat; desertisque signis, ad occupanda omnia pro victoribus vagabantur. Quæ res dilationem Delphis dedit. Prima namque opinione adventûs Gallorum prohibiti agrestes oraculis, feruntur messes, vinaque villis efferre.—Salutare præceptum—velut morâ Gallis objectâ auxilia finitimorum convenere. Justin. lib. xxiv. c. 7.

assumed the form of a theatre: so that the shouts of soldiers, and the sounds of military instruments, re-echoing from rock to rock, and from cavern to cavern, increased the clamour to an immense degree. Which, as the historian observes, could not but have great effects on ignorant and barbarous minds*.

The playing off these panic terrors was not indeed sufficient of itself to repel and dissipate a host of fierce and hungry invaders; but it enabled the defenders of the place to keep them at bay, till a more solid entertainment was provided for them. I mean the *explosion*, and fall of that portion of the rock, at the foot of which the greater part of the army lay encamped.

For, the town and temple, as we observed, were seated on a bare and hollow rock; which would here and there afford vent-holes for such fumes as generated within to transpire. One of these, from an intoxicating quality, discovered in the steam which issued at it, was rendered very famous, by being fitted to the recipient of the priests of Apollo †. Now if we only suppose this, or any other of the vapours, emitted from the fissures, in so large and cavernous a rock, to be endowed with that unctuous or otherwise inflammable quality which modern experience shews us to be common in mines and subterraneous places, we can easily conceive how the priests of the temple might, without a miracle, be able to work

* Templum & Civitatem non muri, sed præcipitia; non manu facta, sed naturalia præsidia defendunt; prorsus ut incertum sit, utrum munimentum loci, an majestas Dei plus hic admirationis habeat. Media saxi rupes in formam theatri recessit. Quamobrem & hominum clamor, & si quando accedit tubarum sonus, personantibus & respondentibus inter se rupibus, multiplex audiri, ampliorque quàm editur, resonare solet. Quæ res majorem majestatis terrorem ignavis rei, & admirationem stupentibus plerumque affert. Just. l. xxiv. c. 6.

† "Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ὡς ἀνδρες ποιμενιστῆς, ἐκτελέσωμεν τῇ μαλίστῃ, καὶ εἰσὶν τι ἐγγύς τοῦ ἁγίου, καὶ ἡμετέρας ἐκ Ἀπὸλλωνος. Pausan. Phoc. c. v.—Φασὶ δ' εἶναι τὸ μαλίστον, αἴθρον καὶ ὡς κατὰ βάθος, καὶ μάλα ἐγγύς τοῦ ἀναξίσεως δ' ἐκ αὐτῶν ποῦμα ἰνθυσιαιάν. Strabo, Geogr. l. ix. In hoc rupis anfractu, media ferme montis altitudine, planities exigua est, atque in ea profundum terræ foramen, quod in oracula patet: ex quo frigidus spiritus, vi quadam velut vento in sublime expulsus, mentes Vatum in vecordiam vertit, impletasque Deo, responsa consulentibus dare cogit. Just. lib. xxiv. c. 6.

the

the wonders which history speaks of as effected in this transaction. For the throwing down a lighted torch or two into a chasm, from whence such a vapour issued, would set the whole into a flame ; which, by rarifying and dilating the inclosed air, would, like fired gunpowder, blow up all before it. These effects are so known and dreaded in coal-mines, subject to inflammable vapours, that, in some of them, in the north of this kingdom, instead of lamps or candles, which would be fatal, the workmen are obliged to have recourse to a very extraordinary contrivance to give them light, which is the application of a flint to a steel cylinder in motion. And we cannot suppose the priests, the guardians of the rock, could be long ignorant of such a quality ; which either chance or designed experiments might bring to their acquaintance : or that they would divulge it when they had discovered it. I am even inclined to think, they had the art of managing this quality at pleasure ; so as to produce a greater or less effect, as their occasions required. It is certain, Strabo relates *, that one Onomarchus with his companions, as they were attempting by night to dig their way through to rob the holy treasury, were frightened from their work by the violent shaking of the rock : and he adds, that the same phænomenon had defeated many other attempts of the like nature. Now whether the tapers which Onomarchus and his companions were obliged to use while they were at work, inflamed the vapour, or whether the priests of Apollo heard them at it, and set fire to a countermine, it is certain, a *quality* of this kind would always stand them in stead.

Such, then, I presume, was the expedient they employed to dislodge this nest of hornets, which had settled at the foot of their sacred rock.

It is further remarkable that this explosion was followed (as it was likely it should) by an event of as much terror and affright,

* τὸς περὶ τοῦ Ὀνόμαρχου ἐπιχειρήσεως ἀποκατεῖναι τοῦτον τοῦτον γενόμενον μεγάλῳ, ἔξω τῶ καὶ πείσθαι καὶ παύσεσθαι τῆς ἀποσπασθῆς· ἐμβαλεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φόβος τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιχειρήσεως. Strab. Geogr. lib. ix.

a storm of thunder, lightning, and hail; which these violent concussions of the air physically generate. For Justin assures us *, the tempest did not happen till *after* the fall of the rock; though the Dean, we see, makes them operate *together*.

But what, after all, if these Barbarians were something less unfortunate than the Priests of Apollo would have us think them; and had got a considerable booty before they fell into this disgrace? Strabo tells an odd story † of the Roman general Cæpio's finding a vast treasure at Tolose, supposed to be part of the riches which its inhabitants, the Tectosages, had brought home from this very expedition against the Delphic God. It would almost make one suspect, that the priests, before they came to extremities with the sacred rock, had entered into treaty with these Barbarians, and paid them a large tribute to decamp and quit the country; which possibly they might receive with the same good faith that their countrymen, in a like expedition, weighed out the *Roman gold*, before the capitol; and so necessitate the Delphians to send down the rock upon them to clear accounts; just as, in the other instance, Camillus revenged their extortion in Italy. What seems to strengthen our conjecture is, that the Tectosages, in order to appease the offended Deity, had consecrated this treasure to holy uses, with an addition of their own. Nor does it take from the credit of the story, that all which the penetrating Strabo hath to oppose is the ill success of Brennus and his followers, as we find it related in the common histories of the expedition. If this were the case, the pretended miracle shrinks into a very slender kind of prodigy.

However, the account given above seems, on the whole, to be the true solution of this extraordinary event. It is easy and natural;

* *Insecuta deinde tempestas est, quæ grandine & frigore saucios ex vulneribus absumpsit.* l. xxiv. c. 8.

† —ἡ τῶν Τεικτοάγων ἢ φασὶ μίσσασθαι τῆς ἐπὶ Δελφὸς γαλήνης, καὶ τὰς τε θουραὶς τὰς ἐπιβίβας παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὑπὸ Καίπιου τῷ γαλήνῳ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν πόλει Τολώσῃ, τῶν ἐκείνῳ χρημάτων μίσηται φασὶ σκευάσθαι ἢ τὰς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ οἴκῳ ἀποτίλλας καὶ ἐξυλασσεύειν; τὸν Θιόνε L. iv.

and the cause fully equal to the effect. But my chief reason for being so explicit, was, to add still further support to our general conclusion; as the detail would shew, that all the main circumstances in the destruction at Delphi, and in that at Jerusalem, were essentially different.

The *rock* on which Delphi stood, was exactly fitted for such a contrivance: The *mountain* at Jerusalem, by its compactness and continuity, altogether improper. The easy *object* of Apollo's resentment was a rabble of half-starved and half-intoxicated Barbarians: The *object* of the resentment of the God of Israel was a select number of the politest, joined to the craftiest, people upon earth, detached to support a project, which the ablest artists of all kinds were assembled to put in execution. The *priests* of Apollo were masters of the town and temple, and supported by a powerful garrison: Both the *priests* and *people* of the God of Israel were dispersed, and had left the place free and open to their enemies.

But the principal difference lay in the grounds and reasons of the thing. By which I do not mean, that one event was supposed to be the agency of a *God of the Greeks*, and the other of *the God of the Jews*: For, who was the *true*, and who the *false* God, the Gentlemen, with whom we are concerned, seem willing should remain undetermined. The difference lay in this, That the interposition of the *Delphic God* was to save the treasures of his priests; which he had, at other times, and on more flagitious terms, suffered to be violated. But the interposition of the *Lord of Hosts* was to save the honour of his name, which he hath never since suffered to be impeached by malice or impiety, throughout a course of fourteen hundred years. Or, in other words, to defend the general system of revelation from being forcibly borne down by the whole power of the *Roman* empire. For the attempt to re-establish the Jewish worship was professedly and publicly to give the lie to the *prophecies* on which Christianity was founded, that is, to the *God of Heaven* himself: the *most important occasion* we can conceive of exerting his power, as including in it a NECESSITY to exert it. But more of this,

this, when I come, hereafter, to speak *of the nature of that evidence which demands the assent of every reasonable man to a miraculous fact.*

However, it may not be amiss at present, so far to forestall that inquiry, as, by way of specimen, to say one word of a particular hitherto untouched, the *specific nature* of this supernatural event. A circumstance which seems greatly to confirm and illustrate all that hath been said. I have observed, that the *end* or *purpose* of it was twofold: 1. To *support* the œconomy of God's dispensation *. And, 2. To *punish* the impiety of those who attempted to disturb it †. As in order to evince the *first* end or purpose, I have shewn ‡, that the attempt aimed to falsify the prophecy, which had foretold the final destruction of the temple; so, in order to evince the *second*, I shall now shew, that this disaster was the very specific punishment, which, the prophet Isaiah informs the Jews, was reserved and kept in store, to be the scourge for impiety and rebellion. This seems to be considerable, and of moment. For where, as in the *extraordinary* dispensations to this people, the specific punishments, which, from time to time, were reserved, by God's decree, for their chastisement, had been marked out, and set before them; it is reasonable to expect, that, when a supernatural punishment was so inflicted, it would be by the agency of such a specific disaster as was foretold would be attendant on the crime. Now this, we say, was exactly the case in the affair before us. The prophet describes the punishment, reserved for the obstinacy and impiety of the Jewish people, in these words, *Thou shalt be visited of the Lord of Hosts with THUNDER, and with EARTHQUAKE, and great noise, with STORM AND TEMPEST, and the FLAME OF DEVOURING FIRE* §.

Here we see the denunciation and execution are so wonderfully coincident, that one might be well excused in going a little further,

* See l. i. c. 1.

† See p. 489.

‡ See l. i. c. 3.

§ § Isa. chap. xxix. ver. 6.

and even supposing the words here quoted to be a particular prophecy of the disaster in question. And our conjecture would receive further countenance from this important circumstance, that the immediate preceding verses are an undoubted prophecy of the total destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. *Woe to Ariel, to Ariel the city where David dwelt—I will camp against thee round about, and will lay siege against thee with a mount, and will raise forts against thee. And thou shalt be brought down, and shalt speak out of the ground, and thy speech shall be low out of the dust—yea, it shall be at an instant, suddenly**. However this be; so much, at least, is certain, That had a writer described this disaster after the event, and copied from it, he could not have given a more exact and faithful picture of it than the prophet Isaiah hath here done.

But it is now time to turn to our *mathematician*; and request him to prepare his tables of calculation; if for no other purpose than to gratify our curiosity in the *doctrine of chances*. When he is ready, let us know, how many millions to one are the odds against a *natural eruption's* securing the honour of the Christian Religion, at that very important juncture when God's omnipotence was thus openly defied; and not by this or that crack-brained atheist, but by all the powers of the world combined against it. Let him add these other circumstances, that the mountain of the temple was, both from its frame and situation, most unlikely to be the scene of a *physical eruption*: and that this eruption was confined, contrary to its usual nature, to that very spot of ground: and then see how these will increase the odds. But his task is but begun; he must reckon another circumstance, the fire's obstinately breaking out by fits, as often as they attempted to proceed; and its total extinction on their giving up the enterprize: let him, I say, add this to the account, and see how it will then stand. To these, too, he must join the phænomena of the cross in the air, and on the garments; which will open a new career to his calculations. And further, to

* Ver. 3, 4, 5. confer this with Matt. xxiv. 17, 18.

in flame the reckoning, he may take notice, that history speaks but of *one* other commotion confined to the intrails of this hill, which likewise happened at a very critical juncture, the *crucifixion* of our Lord, when the *vail of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom, and the earth did quake, and the rocks rent* *. Lastly, he may reflect, if he pleases, that all these odds lie on the side of a divine interposition to hinder an *attempt*, which a space of fourteen hundred years hath never seen revived; though the project itself (the restoration of one of the most celebrated temples in the world) is in its nature most alluring to superstition: and though the long imbecillities of religion and government, in the various revolutions there undergone, have afforded ample opportunity to a rich and crafty people to effect what was the only means of wiping out their opprobrium, and redeeming them] from universal contempt. He must, I say, take in all this before he sums up the account. And then, if he be ingenuous, without doubt he will confess, that to compute the immensity of these odds will exceed all the powers of number.

To speak freely, The attempt to account for it by a *natural cause* is a wretched evasion. Let us consider in how different a manner unbelievers are wont to treat those parallel miracles, *The bursting of water from the rock at the command of Moses*; and, *of fire from the earth to punish the rebellion of Korah*. No man was ever so wild to charge these facts to the account of *natural causes*. And yet, the sudden gushing out of water from a rock is certainly a commoner thing than a burning mountain. But the reason of their reserve, in these instances, is plain; they had other causes at hand, besides natural events, to exclude a miracle; such as human artifice and contrivance; the uncertainty of very early history, &c. But, in the eruption from the foundations of the temple, the fact was so well circumstanced, that an objector found nothing else left to trade with but this last miserable shift: which, when all other means

* Matt. chap: xxvii. ver. 51.

fail, is still at hand to keep back that bugbear to impiety, GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT, which government, together with REVEALED RELIGION founded on it, are (to observe it by the way) as compleatly exhibited by *one* miraculous interposition, fully proved, as by *one hundred*.

In support of all that hath been said, give me leave to observe, That the contemporary evidence, who, from their more intimate knowledge of the fact, must needs be allowed the best judges of its nature in general, give no intimation that they themselves thought, or that others suspected it to be a *natural event*. Julian, indeed, to hide his confusion, insinuates * something like it, but under cover of the destruction of the temple at Daphne †; and otherwise, in so oblique and obscure a manner as shews him to be ashamed of so foolish a pretence. But then his honest and well-instructed advocate, Amm. Marcellinus, is far from giving into this suspicion; the different manner in which he relates the two events at Nicomedia and Jerusalem evidently imply the contrary. In his account of the *former*, out of a pure parade of science, he digresses, on the physical causes of *earthquakes*. In the *latter* (would the fact have borne him out) he had better reasons than an affectation to shew his learning, to tell us what the philosophers had said most plausible, in favour of a natural event; for had that been the fact, the true *cause*, he knew, was universally mistaken; and Paganism was essentially concerned to have that mistake rectified. On the contrary, Ammianus hath contributed to support the general opinion, by expressions which evidently imply *superior agency*. Yet was this candid Historian nothing shy in speaking his mind, when he conceived either fraud or superstition had too large a share in common reports. For, mentioning the conflagration of Apollo's temple at Daphne, which the Christians boasted to be miraculously consumed

* See p. 400, 401. and 403.

† Which, it is not unlikely, was burnt by common lightning, though Julian, in his Misopogon, directly charges it on the Christians.

by lightning, he frankly declares it was suspected to have been set on fire by themselves*. But why should I insist on the conduct of so fair an adversary as Marcellinus, when Libanius, and the rest of Julian's sophists, those bigots to Paganism, and inflamers of their master's follies, dared not so much as mutter the least suspicion of this nature, though the first of them, as we have seen, hath mentioned this disaster in such a manner as shews he well understood the necessity of throwing into shade, what he could give no good account of, if placed in a fair light. Nor was their silence the effect of fear, or want of good-will. In more dangerous and offensive matters they spoke freely; and with insolence enough; For when the Christians every where gave out that the death of Julian was miraculous, these friends of his publicly maintained that he was basely assassinated by a Christian soldier; and undertook to make good the charge, at their own peril †, if the emperor would appoint commissaries to examine

* Suspiciabatur id Christianos egisse stimulos invidia, quod idem templum inviti videbatur ambitioso circumdari peristyllo. L. xxii. c. 13.

† See Libanius ἐπὶ τῆς ἰουλιανῆς τιμωρίας. Fabr. Bibl. Græc. vol. vii. and the oblique reflections of the noble author of the *Characteristics* upon it, vol. iii. Mis. ii. c. 3.—But, — by what I can gather from antiquity, it seems to have been a frank calumny. Eutropius, who was in the action, and Marcellinus, who served there in the body-guards, seem, neither of them, to have entertained the least suspicion of this kind. Besides, Julian was wounded at that very instant when the darts of the Persians were known to do most execution; that is to say, in one of their *dissembled sights*; and when his own guards forewarned him of the danger, in pressing upon their rear—"Clamabant hinc inde can-
" didati (says Ammianus) ut fugientium molem tamquam ruinam malè compositi cul-
" minis declinaret: et incertum subita *equestris* hasta cute brachii ejus præstricla, costis
" perfoßis hæsit in ima jecoris fibra." Lib. xxv. c. iii. But what shall we say to the emperor's own testimony; who, in his dying harangue, returns thanks to God for not suffering him to fall by *secret conspiracy*?—"Ideoque sempiternum veneror numen quod
" non clandestinis insidiis, nec longa morborum asperitate, vel damnatorum sine decedo:
" sed in medio cursu florentium gloriarum hunc merui *clarum* e mundo *digressum*." Id. ib. And this testimony will be seen to have the more weight, if we consider, that Julian having (as in this place he tells us) consulted the oracle about his fate, was answered, that he should *fall by the sword*—"interitum me ferro dudum didici fide fatidica
" præcimente." Id. ib. The ambiguity of which answer would naturally make him as
vigilans

amine into the fact. Lastly, the *Fathers* and *Church Historians*, who are so large in establishing the credit of God's interposition at Jerusalem,

vigilant against his personal enemies, as against the enemies of the state. So that when he calls his death *clarum digressum*, we may take his word for it, that he knew it to be by the darts of the Persians.

Yet Libanius, we see, brings a formal charge against the Christians, of a pretended assassinate; and offered himself as the prosecutor, to make it good. What evidence he had in reserve is hard to say: But, in his *Oration to revenge the death* of his master, having related that Sapor, willing to recompense the hand which had worked his deliverance, had published a reward which nobody came in to receive, and from thence had concluded, that Julian must have fallen by one of his own soldiers; Libanius, I say, calls this the strongest proof of all, *ὅτι δὲ μὴ τις ἀπαύνην*. And it was no wonder he rated it so high: for when he composed his *funeral oration on the death of Julian*, he was so unfurnished on this head, that he takes it for granted his master was slain by a *Persian horseman*, *ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαιμενίδου τοῦδε κατορένους*.—At that time, he seemed to think with Eutropius, Marcellinus, and every other reasonable man, that the circumstance of the reward's being unclaimed was so far from being extraordinary, that it was not to be expected a particular stroke should be distinguished amidst a general flight of darts and arrows. A great poet, long before, in the description of a battle, had feigned the same accident: but he had too much good sense to suppose so unlikely a circumstance attending it, as that the author of the stroke was either distinguished by others, or conscious of it himself:

“ Ecce, viro stridens alis allepsa sagitta est,
 “ Incertum qua pulsa manu, quo turbine adacta;
 “ Quis tantam Rutilis laudem, casusne deusne,
 “ Attulerit pressa est insignis gloria facti;
 “ NEC SESE ÆNEÆ JACTAVIT VOLNERE QVISQUAM.”

But, you will say, Libanius was better informed when he wrote the *Oration to revenge his death*. Be it so. It is certain, however, he does no honour to his information; neither in the matter, nor in the composition of that piece; it being indeed one of the meanest and most disingenuous discourses of all antiquity: and, in every respect, so pitiful, that, had the reasoning and rhetoric belonged to a *Faster*, our anti-ecclesiastics could not have desired a better fund for their mirth and raillery.

On the whole, this calumny seems to have had its birth from a stratagem of Sapor to throw the Roman army into discord and confusion, when, on the death of Julian, he found it was not like to become so easy a prey to him, as he expected. It is probable he published the reward, spoken of above, without affectation or design: but no one

Jerusalem, afford us not the least hint that their adversaries ever thought of evading it by the pretence of a *natural event*.

coming to lay in his claim, he found a good use might be made of it ; and so gave out, That Julian must needs be slain by a Roman soldier, since, after the most diligent search amongst his own troops, there was no one that pretended to the merit of his death. That this report might make its due impression, he ordered the Persians (who were then harassing the Romans) whenever they came up within hearing of the enemy, to reproach them with the murder of their master : It was in prosecution of the same scheme, that when the ambassadors, whom Jovian sent to treat of peace, came to their audience, The first question he asked them was, Whether Julian's death had been yet revenged. But why so much solicitude in a matter he had no concern in : and so much repentment of an action he had reaped such advantages from, if he did not expect, by this affected generosity, to reap greater ? Every man of sense in the army treated this artifice as it deserved : and hence, without doubt, the neglect shewn to it by Eutropius and Marcellinus. Nor is this a stratagem unusual in war. Our Henry V. employed it with success after the battle of Azincourt, to appease the duke of Burgundy, when he sent the king his gantlet by an herald (the declaration of war in those times) to revenge the death of his two brothers, who fell in that action fighting on the side of Charles VI. For, unwilling to bring down upon himself so powerful an enemy, but principally desirous of inflaming the distracted councils of France, he took advantage of the quarrels between the houses of Burgundy and Orleans, to assure the herald that the duke's brothers were not killed by the English troops, but by those of their own party, in the faction of Orleans : of which, he said, he would produce evidence, and make good his allegation to the full. But he performed his word just as Sapor did his, of the assassinate of Julian : where (to return to our subject) the pretence was so gross and ridiculous, that it is probable we had heard no more of it, had it not been for the delusion of some Christians, who, being on the hunt after miracles, caught at the circumstance of the dart's coming from an unknown hand, to make a miracle of the apostate's death. Henceforward the fable received new vigour ; and soon after, a kind of establishment, from the strange indiscretion of Sozomene, who would needs venture to defend the *morality* of this pretended assassinate : a rashness which did the faithful more dishonour than all the contrivances of Julian against them. And yet, to do justice to every one, the folly, to speak no worse of it, is not to be charged on the Christian principles, but on the Pagan ; which Sozomene would not suffer his Christianity to correct ; for the cutting off a tyrant was one of the most illustrious of the Pagan virtues ; and unhappily our church-historian seems to have been struck with the glory attending that achievement.

CONCLUSION.

WE shall conclude with a short recapitulation of the whole argument.

First, It hath been shewn, That the *occasion* was most important ; and that the credit and honour of Revelation required God's interposition at this juncture.

That Julian aggravated the impiety of his attempt, by all the insulting circumstances most likely to bring upon him the vengeance of heaven.

That the *event* is established by all the power of human testimony : That the church hath borne witness to it by a full, consistent, and contemporary evidence.

That the adversaries of our holy Faith, who were in the neighbourhood of the scene, the followers of Julian, and most partial to his views, have confirmed their report. Nay, that the emperor himself hath confessed the hand which overcame him, though with that dissingenuity which characterises the *sephist* and the *bigot*, in what party soever they are found.

And lastly, That the *fact* was, in its nature, such as least admitted of unfaithful accounts concerning it.

Then the *objections* to the miracle have been considered.

It hath been shewn, that, from the word of *PROPHECY*, and the course of God's dispensations, his interposition was even *necessary* to support the honour of Religion.

That the evidence of the historian, *AMM. MARCELLINUS*, is so full and perfect in all its parts, that there is not one circumstance in his character or testimony, which an unbeliever could abuse, to keep back his assent ; nor any wanting, which a Believer would desire, to prevent a cavil.

That the several accounts of the *FATHERS of the Church* and the *Ecclesiastical Historians* are not only consistent with, but highly corroborative of, one another ; and, that such parts of their relations.

tions as appear at first sight most prodigious, are indeed, when maturely examined, the parts which most deserve credit,

That it is very unlikely, nay almost impossible, that the eruption should be the effect of *human ART and contrivance*.

And lastly, that it is no less absurd to suppose it a *NATURAL event*.

Thus new light continually springing up from each circumstance as it passed in review; by such time as the whole was considered, this illustrious *MIRACLE* hath come out in one full blaze of evidence. Infomuch, that I will venture to affirm, there is nothing to be opposed to its force, but what must at the same time destroy the credit of all human testimony whatsoever.

When, therefore, the Reader reflects, how little this invincible demonstration for our holy Faith hath been hitherto insisted on; how slightly it hath been handled; and how hastily and slovenly hurried over; he will possibly find cause to wonder as much, on the one hand, at this strange inattention, as on the other, at the unreasonable credulity of the blind adorers of antiquity. For though it hath ever affected the learned and impartial observer with the superiority of its evidence, yet no one before, that I know of, hath attempted to set that superiority in a just light, though provoked to it by the insolence of our enemies, and, what is still more provoking, the indiscretion of our *FRIENDS*: some of whom have hinted their suspicions in private; and others given more open intimations of its falshood.

This, in part, may be owing to those ticklish circumstances in the evidence of the *Fathers*, which, on examination, we have shewn to be its principal support. But what hath chiefly occasioned this neglect, I am persuaded, is the state and condition of the *Ecclesiastical History* of that time; when the light of miracles was surrounded with such a swarm of monkish fables, as was enough to darken the brightest of its rays; and, indeed, nothing, but the force of its divine extraction, could ever have broke through them:
for,

for, as if these unhappy artificers *designed* what they brought to pass, they were not content to counterfeit the hand of God on other common occasions : they would try their skill on *this*, where it had been so eminently displayed ; and actually contrived to mimic its most essential and triumphant circumstances. Accordingly, *Church History* informs us, that when Julian and his brother Gallus projected to build a *temple* over the sepulchre of one St. Mamas ; that part which Julian undertook *fell down again* as soon as built ; the saint, it seems, disdaining the service of the future apostate. The cloudy monk, who invented this fable, had, we see, two conceits in his head : he would make Julian's offering as unacceptable as Cain's ; and resolving likewise, he should be an unlucky builder through life, would not give him the skill or privilege of that primitive out-law. The same *History* again informs us *, That once, when Julian sacrificed, there was found impressed upon the entrails of the victim, *a cross within a crown or circle* : for when the monks had once got the apostate into their hands, they treated him as a true Demoniac ; and so plied him with crosses, that sovereign Panacea of the Exorcists.

Thus they dressed up their impostures as like as they could, in garb and fashion, to the miracles of heavenly extraction ; with the spirit, or, must we say, in *imitation* of those Pagan priests, who forged their *Ancilia* to secure the SACRED SHIELD which fell from heaven : as if they had taken it into their heads, that true miracles, unattended with these delusions, were in the same danger from the enemies of the Faith, that the *Palladium* of Rome was from robbers, without a numerous guard of brazen counterfeits.

* Greg. Naz. Orat. iii. Soz. l. v. c. 3.

THE
DOCTRINE OF GRACE:
OR, THE
OFFICE AND OPERATIONS
OF THE
H O L Y S P I R I T'
VINDICATED FROM
THE INSULTS OF INFIDELITY,
AND
THE ABUSES OF FANATICISM:
WITH SOME THOUGHTS
(Humbly offered to the Consideration of the ESTABLISHED CLERGY)
REGARDING
The right Method of defending Religion against the Attacks of
either Party.
I N T H R E E B O O K S.

VOL. IV.

Z z z



A D V E R T I S E M E N T

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

WHILE I was composing these sheets to vindicate the honour of Religion, it was given out that I was writing in defence of a late Minister of State.

I have a Master above, and I have one below ; I mean GOD and the KING. To them my services are bound.

The most sacred of all private ties are *Friendship* and *Gratitude*. The duties arising from these, though not altogether so extensive as the other, are subservient only to them.

With respect to the great Minister here understood, His vindication, had he wanted any, could come, with proper dignity, only from himself. And He, though for the first time, would be here but a Copier : I mean, of the example of that First of Romans * ; who being calumniated before the people by one Nævius, an obscure Plebeian, when he came to make his defence, which happened to be on the anniversary of the battle of Zama, addressed the assembly in this manner : “ It was on this day, “ Romans, that I subdued your mighty Rival for Empire, the “ Carthaginian. Ill would it become the friends of Rome to “ waste such a day in wrangling and contention. We should “ now be returning thanks to the immortal Gods for the signal “ protection they afforded us in that glorious conflict. Let

* Scipio Africanus ; who restored his country by carrying the war from Rome to Carthage.

“ us leave then this fellow with himself, and ascend together to
“ the capitol, to offer to Jupiter the Deliverer ; who, on all occa-
“ sions as well as this, hath, from my early youth, vouchsafed to
“ bestow upon me the growing power and the constant disposition
“ to support the honour of my country. And let no God, auspi-
“ cious to Rome, be left uninvoked, that the State, in its distresses,
“ may never want such servants as I have still endeavoured to ap-
“ prove myself.” When he had said this, he stepped from the rostrum and left the forum empty ; all the people following him to the capitol.

That *the people followed him* is not surely the marvellous part of the story. The thing to be admired is, that a Statesman should lead the people to prayers.

This indeed is the last service a Patriot-minister can render to his country. And I am well persuaded (so exactly does the example fit the occasion) that our illustrious Modern would have deemed it the crown of his labours to have animated his Fellow-citizens with a spirit of true piety towards God, as successfully as he inflamed them with a spirit of zeal and fortitude for the King and Constitution.

P R E F A C E.

THE CONTEMPT of *Religion* soon followed the ABUSE ; and both of them have existed almost ever since the first institution of the thing itself. For, that corruption of heart, whose disorder *Religion* was ordained to cure, has been ever struggling against its Remedy.

I. In the days of Solomon, when *Wisdom* was at its height, *Folly*, as we learn from many passages in the writings of that sacred sage, kept equal paces with it. Hence it is that, after he has given many lively paintings of the deformed features of Irreligion and Bigotry, he subjoins directions to the sober advocate of Piety and Virtue how best to repress their insolence and vanity. ANSWER NOT a Fool (says he) according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him. ANSWER a Fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit*.

Short, isolated sentences were the mode in which ancient wisdom delighted to convey its precepts for the regulation of human conduct. But when this natural method had lost the grace of novelty, and a growing refinement had new coloured the candid simplicity of ancient manners, these instructive sages found a necessity of giving to their moral maxims the seasoning and poignancy of *paradoxes*. In these lively and useful sports of fancy, the son of David,

* Prov. xxvi. ver. 4, 5.

we are told, most excelled. We find them to abound in the writings which bear his name; and we meet with frequent allusions to them in all the parts of sacred Writ, under the names of *Riddles*, *Parables*, and *Dark-sayings*.

Now of all the examples of this species of instruction, there is none more illustrious, or fuller of moral wisdom, than the *paradox* just now quoted; or which, in the happiness of the expression, has so artfully conveyed the key for opening the treasures of it. But as a *dark* conceit and a *dull* one have a great proximity in modern wit; and a nice *difference* is not distinguished from a *contradiction* in modern reasoning; this paradox of the Sage has been mistaken by his critics for an absurdity of some of his transcribers, who forgot the negative in the latter member of the sentence: and so, to be set right at an easier expence than unfolding *dark sentences of old*; that is to say, by exchanging them for *clearer*, of a *modern* date: which *time* can make ANCIENT READINGS; and which a careful collation of its blunders may hereafter make the TRUE.

II. But they who chuse to receive antiquity in its antique garb, will, perhaps, venture with me to try, if the apparent contradiction in the received text cannot be fairly unriddled without any other aid than of the words themselves, in which the *dark saying* is conveyed.

Had the *folly* of these *fools* been only of one condition or denomination, then the advice *to answer*, and *not to answer*, had been repugnant to itself. But as their *folly* was of various kinds, in some of which, *to answer* might offend the dignity, and in others, *not to answer* might hurt the interests of Truth; *To answer*, and *not to answer*, is a consistent, and may, for aught these critics know, be a very wise direction.

Had the advice been given simply and without circumstance, *to answer the fool*, and *not to answer him*, a critic, who had a reverence for the text, would satisfy himself in supposing, that the different directions referred to the doing a thing *in and out of season*. But
when,

when, to the general advice about *answering*, this circumstance is added—*according to his folly*, that interpretation is excluded; and a difficulty indeed arises; a difficulty, which has made those who have no reverence for the TEXT, to accuse it of absurdity and contradiction.

But now, to each direction, reasons are subjoined, *Why a Fool should*, and *why he should not, be answered*: reasons, which, when set together and compared, are, at first sight, sufficient to make the critic suspect, that all the contradiction lies in his own incumbered ideas.

1. The reason given, *why a Fool should not be answered according to his folly*, is, *lest he [the Answerer] be like unto him*:

2. The reason given, *why he should be answered according to his folly*, is, *lest he [the Fool] be wise in his own conceit*.

The cause assigned, of *forbidding to answer*, therefore, plainly insinuates, that the Defender of Religion should not imitate the insulter of it in his *modes of disputation*; which may be comprised in *sophistry*, *buffoonry*, and *scurrility*. For what could so much *liken* the answerer to his idiot-adversary, as the putting on his fool's-coat in order to captivate and confound the rabble?

The cause assigned, of *directing to answer*, as plainly intimates, that the Sage should address himself to confute the fool upon *the fool's own false principles*, by shewing that they lead to conclusions very wide from the impieties he would deduce from them. And if any thing will prevent the *fool* from being *wise in his own conceit*, it must be the dishonour and the ridicule of having his own principles turned against him; while they are shewn to make for the very contrary purpose to that for which he had employed them.

The supreme wisdom, conveyed in the two precepts of this unravelled *paradox*, will be best understood by explaining the advantages arising from the observance of each of them.

III. We are *not to answer a fool according to his folly, lest we also be like unto him*—This is the reason given; and a good one it is; sufficient to make any sober man decline a combat, where even victory would bring dishonour with it. Now, if our *answer* be of such

such a nature that we also (though with contrary intentions) do injury to truth, we become *like unto him* in the essential part of his character. And surely Truth is never more grossly abused, nor its advocates more dishonoured, than when they employ the foolish arts of *sophistry*, *buffoonry*, and *scurrility*, in its defence.

1. To use *fallacious* and inconclusive arguments in support of Truth, is doing it infinite discredit. The practice tends to make men suspect that the questioned Truth is indeed an imposture, when it finds support in the common tricks of impostors: the least unfavourable inference will be, that the Truth is defended not for its own sake, but for the sake of the Defender: this will make the serious enquirer less attentive to the issue, and more jealous of the good faith of the advocate; which cannot but lessen our reverence to the one, and increase unfavourable prejudices towards the other. It tends to reduce the two parties of *Wisdom* and *Folly* to a level; when they stand on the same barren and deceitful ground. It tends to confound the distinction between *true* and *false*, and to make all terminate in that most malignant species of *folly*, Pyrronic doubt and uncertainty.

2. To employ *Buffoonry* in this service, is to violate the majesty of Truth, which can enforce its influence amongst men no longer than while its sanctity of character is kept safe from insult.

Buffoonry deprives Truth of the only thing she wants, in order to come off victorious; I mean, a *fair bearing*. To *examine*, Men must be serious; and to *judge*, they must be attentive to the argument. *Buffoonry* gives a levity to the mind, which makes it seek entertainment rather than instruction, in all that is offered to its inspection. But let this poor talent be taken at its utmost worth, the use of it will still raise a suspicion, that the advocate has his cause little at heart, while, in the very heat of an important controversy, he can allow himself to be amused and diverted by the levity of false wit; since, in matters that are understood to concern us most, we are wont to appear, as well as to be, most in earnest: and this scandal given by the advocate, will always do prejudice to the cause.

3. Again,

3. Again, *personal abuse*, that favourite *colour* which glares most in the fool's *rhetoric*, is carefully to be avoided. For nothing can so assimilate the answerer to the fool he is confuting as a want of *charity*, which this mode of defence so openly betrays. To *charity*, the fool makes no pretensions. His very attempt is an avowed violation of it. He would deprive the world of what he himself confesses to be most useful to society, and most pleasing to the natural sentiments of man; that is to say, *religion*. He would break down this barrier against evil, he would rob us of this consolation of humanity; and in such a service he follows but his nature and his office, when he vilifies and calumniates all who set themselves to oppose his impious projects. But the *end of the Commandment is charity*.

These are the various modes of *answering* which are to be avoided, lest the advocate of religion become *like* the impious caviller whom he addresses himself to confute.

IV. But then, *lest the fool should be wise in his own conceit*, we are, at the same time, bid, *to give him an answer*. But how can this be done, in the manner here directed, namely, *according to his folly*, and yet the answerer not become *like unto him*, but, on the contrary, be able to produce the effect here intimated? The cure of the fool's vain conceit of his superior wisdom, is a difficulty indeed; a difficulty worthy the advocate of truth to undertake: and which a master of his subject may hope to overcome, in contriving to confute the fool on his own *false principles*, by shewing that they lead to a conclusion very opposite to those free consequences he has laboured to deduce from them. And if any thing will allay the *fool's* vain conceit of himself, it must be the sense of such a dishonour. For what can be more shameful than to have his own principles shewn to be destructive of his own conclusions? What more mortifying, than to have those principles, in whose invention he so much gloried, or in whose use he so much confided, fairly turned, by all the rules of good logic, to his own confusion? Nor is the partisan of falsehood more

humbled than the cause of truth advanced, by thus answering a fool *according to his folly*. For that victory where the adversary is thus made to contribute to his own overthrow is, in common estimation, always held to be most compleat: that system being naturally deemed contemptible, whose most plausible support draws after it the ruin of what it was raised to uphold.

And thus, as the *wise man* directs, is this forward fool to be treated; whether it be by *silence* or *confutation*.

V. That, in general, his folly is to be repressed, *according to the dictates of true wisdom*, the nature of the thing sufficiently informs us: there was no need of a particular direction to enforce the expediency and necessity of such a conduct. But then, besides, it may sometimes happen, that the interests of truth require his being *answered even according to his folly*: and, as our duty here is very liable to *abuse*, it was expedient to obviate the danger. This, we may observe, the sacred writer hath done; and with much art and elegance of address.

It may indeed be said, why this practised obliquity in defence of truth? Is not the purity of her nature rather defiled, than her real interests advanced by this indirection? And does not wisdom seem to tell us, that it becomes her dignity to repress folly by those arms only which wisdom herself hath edged and tempered; that truth, by the information of her own light, points out the straight road to her abode; and forbids us to riggle into her sacred presence through by-paths, and the cloudy medium of falshood?

But they who talk thus do not sufficiently reflect on the condition of our weak and purblind nature, which can ill bear the bright and unshaded light of truth. On which account, it is so contrived, in the beautiful order of things, that *folly*, by thus administering to her own defeat, should bring us back again into the ways of wisdom, from which she hath seduced us.

The REDEEMER of mankind, in condescension to the infirmities of those he came to save, hath taken this very advantage of that
that

that established order: for, more effectually to silence those *fools* who questioned his mission and his office, he *answers them according to their folly*; that is, he demonstrates to them, on their own erroneous ideas of the nature and end of the LAW (formed on rabbinical traditions and the reveries of Greek philosophers), he demonstrates to them, I say, the truth and reasonableness of the GOSPEL. The pure and unabated splendor of truth, ushered in by wisdom, would have only added to their judicial blindness: for to bear it undazzled, they had need of the presence of that SPIRIT OF TRUTH, which was not yet come, but only promised to be sent. Indeed, when this sacred guide was come, and while he continued in an *extraordinary* manner, to enlighten the understandings of the faithful, there was no occasion for this enforced ministry of *folly*, to contribute to her own destruction. And therefore the *first* propagators of the gospel proceeded more directly to the establishment of the truth, and on the solid principles of *wisdom* only. Yet now again, in the *ordinary* communications of GRACE, this direction of the *wise man* will be as useful as ever, to the interests of virtue and religion, ANSWER A FOOL ACCORDING TO HIS FOLLY, LEST HE BE WISE IN HIS OWN CONCEIT.

A
D I S C O U R S E
O N T H E
O F F I C E A N D O P E R A T I O N S
O F T H E
H O L Y S P I R I T.
B O O K I.

C H A P. I.

THE blessed Jesus came into the world ON THE PART OF God, to declare pardon and salvation to the forfeited posterity of Adam. He testified the truth of his Mission by amazing miracles, and sealed man's Redemption, in his Blood, by the more amazing sacrifice of himself upon the cross.

But as the REDEMPTION, so procured, could only operate on each individual, under certain conditions of FAITH and OBEDIENCE, very repugnant to our corrupt nature, the blessed Redeemer, on leaving the world, promised to his followers his intercession with the Father, to send amongst them another divine Person ON THE PART OF MAN, namely the HOLY GHOST, called the *Spirit of Truth*.

Truth, and the *Comforter*; who, agreeably to the import of these attributes, should co-operate with man in establishing his FAITH, and in perfecting his OBEDIENCE; or, in other words, should *sanctify him to Redemption*.

This is a succinct account of the œconomy of grace; entirely consonant to our most approved conceptions of the Divine nature and of the human condition. For if man was to be reinstated in a FREE-GIFT, which had been justly forfeited, we cannot but confess, that as, on the one hand, the restoration might be made on what conditions best pleased the giver; so, on the other, that God would graciously provide that it should not be made in vain.

An atonement, therefore, for the offended Majesty of the FATHER, was first to be procured; and this was the work of the SON: and then, a remedy was to be provided for that helpless condition of man, which hindered the atonement from producing its effect; and this was the office of the HOLY GHOST: so that both were joint-workers in the great business of reconciling God to man.

What at present I propose to consider is, the *Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit*, as they are delivered to us in sacred Scripture.

His office in general is, as hath been observed, to establish our *faith*, and to perfect our *obedience*, both of which he doth by ENLIGHTENING THE UNDERSTANDING, and by RECTIFYING THE WILL. All this is necessarily collected from the words of Jesus, which contain this important PROMISE. *I will pray the Father (says he) and he shall give you another COMFORTER, that he may abide with you for ever; even the SPIRIT OF TRUTH—He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you—which is the HOLY GHOST, whom the Father shall send in my name. He shall TEACH YOU ALL THINGS* *.

* John xiv. 16, & seq.

By *teaching us all things* under the joint characters of the *Spirit of Truth* and of the *Comforter*, we are necessarily to understand *all things* which concern FAITH and OBEDIENCE.

These two distinct branches of his office I shall consider in their order.

CHAP. II.

FIRST of all, let us observe the method employed by divine wisdom in manifesting the operations of the HOLY GHOST, as the SPIRIT AND GUIDE OF TRUTH*.

The first extraordinary attestation of his descent was at the day of Pentecost, in the GIFT OF TONGUES.

Besides the great and almost indispensable use of this endowment on the first disciples of Christ, who were to convey the glad tidings of the gospel throughout the whole earth; the elegance and propriety in the choice of this miracle, to attest the real descent of that *Spirit* who was to *teach us all things*, can never be enough admired: for WORDS being the human vehicle of our knowledge, this gift was the fittest precursor of the *Spirit of Truth*.

But this first opening scene of wonders, which was to prepare and influence all their subsequent labours, a late eminent writer would, from a SIGN, reduce to a *shadow*; in which he seems to think, fancy set itself on work, to produce a prodigy. “The gift of tongues upon the day of Pentecost (says the learned person) *was not lasting, but instantaneous and transitory*; not bestowed upon them for the constant work of the ministry, but as an *occasional sign only*, that the person endowed with it was a chosen minister of the gospel: which sign, as soon as it had served that particular purpose, seems to have ceased, and totally to have vanished †.”

* John xvi. 13.

† Dr. Middleton's Essay on the Gift of Tongues, vol. II. of his works, p. 79.

Let us examine now the grounds of this new interpretation, so apparently derogatory to the operation of the Holy Spirit.

The learned writer proceeds in order; first, to *reduce* the type or visible sign of the gift, the FIERY TONGUES: for having declared the gift itself to be instantaneous and transitory, he has, very consistently, endeavoured to shew that the *sign* of it was merely fanciful. He explains it to be no more than a sudden flash of lightning, “which, he says, like all other phænomena. of that sort, no sooner appeared, than vanished *.”

His reason for this opinion is, “because when the Disciples spoke in strange tongues to the multitude, the conclusion they drew from that circumstance seems to shew, that the celestial fire did not, at that time, sit upon their heads †.”

But the learned person has omitted to bring this other circumstance into his account, that when the *cloven tongues appeared upon each of them*, they were assembled together in a private room, sequestered and apart: and that it was not till the thing was *noised abroad*, and the *multitude come together*, to inquire into the truth of it, that the apostles *spoke with tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance*. Now between this visible descent of the Holy Spirit, and their speaking to the multitude, a considerable time must have intervened; sufficient to convince the apostles, from the steady duration of the appearance, that it was not natural but miraculous. And this the original words well express: *ἐκάθισεν ἑφ’ ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν*, properly rendered by the phrase of *SITTING upon each of them*: words so inconsistent with a momentary appearance, that it would be trifling with common sense to deduce such an interpretation from oblique circumstances and collateral reasoning. It is true the learned writer concedes, even from the sign’s being only *a sudden flash, which vanished almost as soon as it appeared*, that “it indicated something miraculous and supernatural ‡.” But I am afraid, that those who are the readiest to embrace his

* P. 81.

† P. 82.

‡ P. 82.

physiology, will not be the first to admire his theology; especially as it is so gratuitously deduced. It may therefore not be improper to consider the evangelical account of this visible descent, with a little more exactness. In this place (we see) the *fire tongues* are said, *to sit upon each of them*: and other places of scripture, which mention the like descent of the Holy Spirit in visible form, describe it in such terms as denote a very different appearance from a sudden *flash of lightning*. St. Matthew tells us, that *the Spirit of God descended like a dove, ὡς δὲ περιστερὰν*; that is, with a dove-like motion; as birds, when about to settle upon any thing, first hover over it with quivering wings: it then *lighted upon Jesus, ἐρχόμενον ἐπ' αὐτόν*. So, in the place in question, the same Spirit is said to descend under the appearance of *cloven tongues, like as of fire, ὡς δὲ πυρὸς*. In the former instance, only the *motion* of the descent is described: in this, both the *motion*, *figure*, and *colour*. And the term of *cloven tongues*, which the sacred historian employs to describe the *motion*, and which the learned writer takes up, to prove his hypothesis of a momentary existence of the phænomenon, proves it, in truth, to be of some continuance. “We cannot (says he) “think it strange that fire flashing from Heaven, and suddenly vanishing, should yield some resemblance of *tongues* to the eyes “of the MULTITUDE; for this is no more than what is *natural*, and what we may observe, in some measure, from “every flame that flashes from the clouds, and breaks itself, of “course, in a number of small pointed particles not remote from “that shape*.”

To this, let us, in the first place, observe, that the thing seen, ὡς δὲ πυρὸς, on the heads of the apostles, was no more an elementary *fire*, than the thing seen, ὡς δὲ περιστερὰν, on the head of Jesus, was a real *dove*: for, as only a *dove-like motion* is intimated in this latter expression, so only a *flame-like motion* is intimated in the former; and what this was, the historian tells us in its effect, the

* P. 82.

appearance of cloven tongues. The learned person is certainly mistaken in supposing a *sudden flash of lightning* has *naturally* the appearance of cloven tongues. Such a phænomenon exhibits to the eye of the beholder only a line of light angularly broken into several directions; very different from the form of *tongues*, whether whole or *cloven*. Whenever a flame assumes this appearance, it is become *stationary*, as this was, which, the historian says, *sat upon each of them, ἐκάθ.σε*: and then its *natural* motion being upwards, it represents, when divided lengthwise, a pyramidal or *tongue-like* figure, *cloven*. A demonstration that the appearance in question was not *momentary*, but of some continuance.

The learned writer having thus accounted for the precursor of the gift, comes to consider the gift itself; and attempts to shew that “the chief or **SOLE END RATHER** of the *gift of tongues* was “to serve as a sensible sign in that *infirm state* of the first Christians, that those to whom it was vouchsafed were under a divine influence, and acted by a divine commission.—So that it is “not reasonable to think that this *diversity of tongues* was given to “the apostles for the sake of converting those people before whom “they then spoke *.” Hence (says he) “it appears that the gift “was not of a stable or permanent nature †.”—That is, it was no lasting endowment, to enable the apostles to perform their ministry amongst those whose language they had never learnt; but, a momentary power which served that day for a *sign* to the multitude: and consequently, they had these languages to learn anew when they wanted the use of them. This, I say, appears to be his inference; for the arguments he brings to support his principle will lead us to no other. At the same time it must be observed he has laid down the proposition so loosely, and ambiguously, that, when considered alone, it may either mean, “that the power of speaking strange languages was only infused occasionally, like the power of working miracles;” or else, “that the knowledge of the language,

* P. 87.

† P. 89.

when infused, was not lasting, but momentary, like the cloven tongues; the inspired linguist presently falling back into his natural state of idiotism."

In the first sense, the assertion seems to be well founded: and from its sobriety, and more especially from the extravagance of the other meaning, which leaves but little distinction between the power of speaking strange tongues at the day of Pentecost, and the extatic ravings of modern fanatics, one would wish to find was the sense we could fairly ascribe to it.

But then all the arguments employed by the learned person, for the support of his proposition, confine us, as we shall now see, to the other meaning.

1. His first argument is the *authority* of some modern critics *. But I may be excused, if I suffer these to have no more weight with me when they contradict a received interpretation, than they usually have with him when they confirm it.

2. His second argument is an inference from scripture itself. "It appears (he thinks) from the stories of Cornelius's family, and the disciples at Ephesus (both of whom spoke with tongues on the Holy Ghost's descending on them, while Peter preached to one, and Paul baptised the other), that the gift was not lasting, but instantaneous; and given only for a sign of their real admission into the church of Christ:" for, as he truly observes, "here was no room to suppose another use, the several assemblies being all of the same speech and language †."

But here the learned person from particular cases draws a general inference: because, in this case, he *sees no other use* than for a *sign*, he concludes the gift to be momentary in all other. By a better way of reasoning therefore, he will suffer us to conclude, that where we do *see another use*, as in the gift at Pentecost, that there it was as lasting as the use to which it served: and an equitable judge

* P. 89.

† P. 85, 86.

will conclude for us both, that the same endowment which in one instance was transitory, might, in another, last for life.

The converts of the family of Cornelius, and the disciples at Ephesus, were in a private station in the church: so that an instantaneous exercise of the power fully answered its end: it was a *sign* that these converts were indeed become members of Christ's mystical body, the church, as well by the baptism of the Spirit as of Water. But the case was different with respect to the apostles: they were the appointed preachers of the gospel to remote and barbarous nations: an office not to be discharged without a competent knowledge of the various languages of the earth. We find them, on the day of Pentecost, miraculously endowed with this knowledge. What are we to think, but that the PRINCIPAL end of the gift was to qualify them for their mission?

3. The learned writer's third argument in support of his opinion, is taken from the style of scripture, and is to this purpose: "that were the gift of tongues lasting, it would have been employed in the composition of their *gospels* and *epistles*: but that it was not there employed, appears from the barbarity of the style; since whatever comes from God must be perfect in its kind; so that, in this case, we should be sure to find the purity of Plato, and the eloquence of Cicero." But the consideration of this argument coming more properly under another head of this discourse, for that we shall reserve it; and might here take leave of this subject, *the duration of the gift of tongues*; as the common opinion remains unimpaired by his attack, and is still in possession of all the circumstances of credit in which he found it.

C H A P. III.

YET since this new interpretation (which makes the gift so transitory, and the power conferred by it so momentary) may be applied by licentious men to purposes the learned person might never intend, it cannot be too carefully considered.

Who hath not heard of the wondrous powers of the imagination, when raised and inflamed by fanaticism? and though we be ignorant of its utmost force, yet we know enough of it to convince us, that this faculty of the mind, the nurse and parent of enthusiasm, is able to put on every form of preternatural semblance. There are many well-attested cases in modern history (although we should agree that they have lost nothing of the marvellous in the telling), where enthusiasts, in their extasies, have talked very fluently in the learned languages, of which they had a very imperfect knowledge in their sober intervals. “When I saw
 “ (says the noble author of the *Characteristics*) the gentleman, who
 “ has writ lately in defence of revived prophecy (and has since
 “ fallen himself into the prophetic extasies) lately under an *agitation*
 “ (as they call it) uttering prophecy in a pompous Latin style,
 “ of which out of his extasy, it seems, he is wholly incapable, it
 “ brought into my mind the Latin poet’s description of the Sibyl,
 “ &c *.” And it is remarkable, that instances of this kind have occurred so frequently, that Thyræus, a famous Popish exorcist, as blinded as he was by the superstitious impiety of demoniacal possessions, has, in his *Directory*, expressly declared it to be the common opinion of his brotherhood, that the *speaking strange languages* is no certain sign of a *possession*, and warns the exorcist against this illusion †.

* Letter concerning Enthusiasm, § 6.

† De Dæmoniis, c. xxii.

Now were it generally believed that the *speaking with strange tongues* in the first ages of Christianity, was a mere fleeting, transitory power, the bold licence of our times would be ready to conclude that it was much of the same kind with these feats of modern fanatics. For let us consider how the matter would be thought to stand, on the representation of this learned writer: a sudden flash of lightning, under the fancied figure of *cloven-tongues*, kindles the fiery imaginations of a number of enthusiastic men, met together in a tumultuary assembly, and inflaming one another's fanaticism by mutual collision; and in this temper, *they began to speak with tongues as the spirit gave them utterance.*

I shall therefore endeavour to shew, in the last place, that this new interpretation contradicts what SCRIPTURE itself expressly delivers of the use and, by necessary inference, of the *duration* of this *gift of tongues* on the day of Pentecost.

The learned writer affirms, "that this knowledge was transitory, serving only for an occasional sign, and not intended for the use of the apostolic mission." Now Jesus himself tells us, that it was intended for this use: who, on his leaving the world, comforts his disciples with this promise:—*But ye shall receive POWER, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be WITNESSES unto me, unto the uttermost part of the earth* *, recorded by the evangelic writer, as an introduction to his narrative of the miraculous gift of tongues; which he considers as the completion of this promise; and that the *power to be received*, was the *power* then given: the use of which, as we see, was to enable the disciples to become *witnesses unto him, unto the uttermost part of the earth.* We find St. Paul had this *power*, not only in the fullest measure, but in a proportionable duration; for, endeavouring to moderate the excessive value which the Corinthians set upon *spiritual gifts*, he observes, that, with regard to the most splendid of them, the *gift of tongues*, he himself had the advantage of them all—

* Acts i. 8.

I thank my God (says he) *that I speak with tongues more than you all* *. The occasion shews that he considered this his acquirement as a *spiritual gift* : and his using the *present time*, shews that he boasted of it as then in his possession. But why did he speak with more tongues than all of them ? For a good reason ; he was the peculiar apostle of the Gentiles ; and was to preach the Gospel amongst remote and barbarous nations. Whom then shall we believe ? Shall we take his word who promised the gift ; shall we take his, on whom it was bestowed ; or shall we prefer to both, the conjectures of this learned and ingenious modern ?

Would reason or the truth of things suffer us to be so compliant, we might concede to unbelievers all which they fancy the learned writer hath procured for them, “ that the power of tongues was temporary, and, like the power of healing, possessed occasionally,” without being alarmed at any consequence they will be able to deduce from it. For let it but be granted (and they must grant it, or prevaricate) that the gift of tongues returned as often as they had occasion for it ; and it is no great matter where the power resided in the mean time.

But neither reason nor the truth of things will suffer us to be thus compliant. The power of healing or of working miracles (to which the learned writer compares the gift of tongues) is, during the whole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter and motion : it was therefore fitting that this power should be given occasionally. But the *speaking with tongues*, when once the gift was conferred, became, from thenceforth, a natural power ; just as the free and perfect use of the members of the body, after they have been restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. Indeed, to have *lost* the gift of tongues after this temporary use of it, would imply another miracle ; for it must have been by actual deprivation, unless we suppose the apostles mere irrational organs through which divine sounds

* C. xiv. ver. 18.—μᾶλλον γλῶσσαις λαλῶν.

were conveyed. In a word, it was as much in the course of nature for an apostle, whom the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost had enabled to speak a strange language, ever afterwards to have the use of that language, as it was for the cripple, whom Jesus had restored to the use of his limbs on the Sabbath-day, ever afterwards to walk, run, and perform all the functions of a man perfectly sound and whole. In one thing, indeed, the power of healing, and of speaking with strange tongues coincided; as the disciples could not heal at all times, so neither could they speak at all times in what unknown dialect they should choose to converse: Yet when once, by the Holy Spirit, they had been enabled to speak and understand a language, they could not but retain the use of it, with the same facility as if they had acquired it in the ordinary way of instruction. But the confusion in this affair, and the learned person's embarrass when he states the question, arise from not distinguishing, in these two cases, between the *active power* and the *passive gift*. In healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle; in speaking strange tongues, as the persons on whom a miracle is performed.

C H A P. IV.

THUS far with regard to this extraordinary descent of the Holy Ghost, as the GUIDE OF TRUTH. And this being as well the FIRST FRUITS as the TYPE and SEAL of all *inspired knowledge*, the sacred historian thought proper to give us a circumstantial relation of so important an adventure.

The other endowments from the *spirit of truth* he hath mentioned only occasionally. So that, had not the subject of one of St. Paul's epistles led the writer to enumerate those various gifts, as they were afterwards distributed amongst the faithful, we should have had a very imperfect knowledge of their whole extent. The church of Corinth was foolishly elated by spiritual pride; which

St.

St. Paul endeavoured to mortify and humble: and in applying his remedy, he begins with reckoning up those various graces, the credit of which they had abused, by their indulgence of this unhappy temper—*Concerning spiritual gifts* (says he) *I would not have you ignorant. Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit. To one is given by the spirit the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge by the same spirit; to another, the gifts of healing by the same spirit; to another, working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, discerning of spirits* *. And when he comes to apply his premisses, and to shew the inferiority of all these gifts to *charity*, he recapitulates the most distinguished of them in the following manner:—*though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains, and have no charity, I am nothing* †.

In explaining the nature of these gifts, the two passages will afford light to one another.

The first he mentions, is the word of wisdom ‡. By which, I think, we must understand, *all the great principles of natural religion* §. The ancients used the term in this sense: and we can hardly give it another, in the place before us, where we see it distinguished from the word of knowledge ||, which follows, and evidently means *all the great principles of the revealed*; the term *γνώσις* being as peculiarly applied by Christian writers to *revealed Religion* **, as *σοφία* is by the Pagan, to *natural*: and it is no less a generic term than the other, being mentioned in the next chapter,

* 1 Cor. xii. 1, & seq.

† c. xiii. 2.

‡ Λόγος σοφίας.

§ In this sense St. Paul uses the word, Col. iv. 5. Ἐν σοφίᾳ περιπατεῖτε πρὸς τὸς ἰερεῖς.

|| Λόγος γνώσεως.

** St. Paul uses it in this sense, 2 Cor. xi. 6. Εἰ τίς ἐξ ἐμάς ἐν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ τῇ ΓΝΩΣΕΙ. And St. Peter, 1st Ep. iii. 7. Οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὁμοίως, συνουσίᾳ καὶ ΓΝΩΣΕΙΝ. From this term, those early Heretics, who so much deformed the simplicity and purity of the Christian faith by visionary pretences to a superior knowledge of Revelation, took their name.

with one of its species,—all MYSTERY and ail knowlege: for *mystery* is that part of *knowledge* which regards the interpretation of such Jewish prophecies as concern the *new dispensation*. In a word, our apostle speaking, in another place, of Christ, who perfected *Revelation*, built (from its first delivery and rudiments) on *natural Religion*, uses the two terms in these assigned significations.—*In whom* (says he) *are hid all the treasures of WISDOM and KNOW-LEGE* *.

In the recapitulation, FAITH, we see, is reckoned amongst the gifts of the Spirit: and in the following chapter, where these graces are again mentioned, he explains its nature to us, in calling it a *Faith which could remove mountains*, or such a *Faith* as was attended with the power of controlling nature; alluding to that want, with which Jesus upbraids his disciples, where he says,—*had ye Faith as a grain of mustard-seed, ye should say unto this mountain, Remove hence into yonder place, and it shall remove* †.

The two next gifts, of HEALING and WORKING MIRACLES, are two specieses of the foregoing genus. By *healing* is meant that salutary assistance administered to the sick, in a solemn office of the church, as directed by St. James ‡: and by *working miracles*, a more private and extemporaneous exercise of the same power, though less confined in its objects §.

PRO-

* Ἐν ᾧ κρυπταὶ πάντα οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς ΣΟΦΙΑΣ καὶ τῆς ΓΝΩΣΕΩΣ ἀπύκρυφτοι, Coloss. ii. 3. He uses the word ἀπύκρυφτοι, as having in the foregoing verse called this *wisdom and knowledge* τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ. That the word σοφία is used in the sense here contended for, is plain from his immediately subjoining a warning against vain philosophy, βλάπην μὲν τοι ἔμαθες ἔργῳ δὲ συναλωγνῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, &c. As much as to say, I present you with the treasures of *true wisdom*—οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας—take care that nobody deceive you with the *false*.

† Matt. xvii. 20.

‡ *Is any sick among you? let him call for the Elders of the Church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of Faith* [i. e. the faith mentioned just before] *shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up.* Gen. Epist. chap. v. 14.

§ The χαρίσματα ἐκκλησίας properly expresses gifts belonging to the Church as such, and ἐκκλησιαστικὰ δυνάμεις implies virtue residing in the individual or particular Agent. Besides

PROPHECY, which follows, plainly signifies, foretelling the future fortunes of the church, to the comfort and edification (as St. Paul expresses it) of the assembly. *He that PROPHESIETH speaketh unto men, to edification, and exhortation, and comfort* *. And these effects, generally attending the act of *Prophecy*, in a little time assumed its name †. But the proper sense of *Prophecy*, and that in which it is to be understood in this place, is the *foretelling things to come*; which Jesus himself declares to be one essential part of the office of the Holy Spirit. *Howbeit, when the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth—and he will SHEW YOU THINGS TO COME* ‡.

The last of these gifts, in the order of things, as well as in the apostle's enumeration of them, is the DISCERNING OF SPIRITS. The reputation attending the exercise of these extraordinary endowments would be a strong temptation to impostors to mimic and belie their powers; as we see it was in the case of Simon the Magician. It graciously pleased the Holy Spirit, therefore, amidst the bounty of these gifts, to bestow one, whose property it was to bring all the others to the test §, by the virtue which the possessor of it had, of distinguishing between true and false inspiration, where accidental ambiguity or designed imposture had made the matter doubtful or suspected.

These gifts, St. Paul tells us, were severally distributed amongst the Faithful. But the apostles themselves, as Scripture leads us to conclude, had them all in conjunction; exercised them in fuller

we may observe, *χαρίσματα ἰσχύων* was a less degree of miraculous power than the *ἐνέργημα δυνάμεως*, and is expressly intimated so to be, *ver.* 28.—*ἕκαστα δυνάμεις, ἢ τα χαρίσματα ἰσχύων*.

* 1 Cor. xiv. 3. † As Rom. xii. 6. 1 Cor. xiii. 9. xiv. v. 24.

‡ John xvi. 13.—*καὶ τὰ ἐρχόμενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑμῖν*.

§ *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων—δυνάμεις* is used in other places in this signification—*καὶ οἱ διακρίσεις λόγων ὑμῶν*, Rom. xiv. 1.—*πνεῦς δυνάμει καὶ τῇ καὶ καὶ*, Heb. v. 14.—*πνεύματα*, of spirits or divine affluents. And so the Author uses it, a little after, *πνεύματα φρονησάντων*, c. xiv. 32.

measure; supported them by additional revelations*; and (as hath been proved of one of them at least) possessed them by a more lasting title.

But, for a fuller account of their *nature* and their *use*, we must have recourse to SCRIPTURE itself, which contains the history of their various fruits. And as the richest of these fruits is the INSPIRATION OF SCRIPTURE itself, I shall select this for the subject of what I have further to say of the primitive operations of the Holy Spirit; especially as this hath, in these *latter times*, been called in question.

C H A P. V.

WE may observe, that the Ministry of the Apostles consisted of these two parts: (1.) The temporary and occasional instructions of those Christians whom they had brought to the knowledge of, and faith in, Jesus, the Messiah: (2.) and the care of composing a WRITTEN RULE for the direction of the Church throughout all ages. Now it being granted, because, by the history of *the Acts of the Apostles*, it may be proved, that they were divinely inspired in the discharge of the temporary part; it must be very strong evidence indeed which can induce an unprejudiced man to suspect, that they were left to themselves in the execution of the other. Their preaching could only profit their contemporaries: For instructions conveyed to future ages by tradition are soon lost and forgotten; or, what is worse, polluted and corrupted with fables. It is reasonable therefore to think, that the church was provided with a WRITTEN RULE. The good providence of God hath indeed made this provision. And the Scriptures of the New Testament have been received

* Now, Brethren, if I come unto you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you, except I shall speak unto you either by REVELATION, or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine, 1 Cor. xiv. 6. And this additional gift of Revelation, which conveyed the further knowledge of God's will in the Gospel, seems properly to have been appropriated to the Apostles, with design to dignify their office.

by all the Faithful, as divine Oracles, as the inspired dictates of the Holy Spirit ; till superstition extending the notion of inspiration to an extravagant length, over-cautious Believers joined with Libertines, who had taken advantage of the others' folly, to deny or bring in question all inspiration whatever. For extremes beget each other ; and when thus begotten, they are suffered, in order to preserve the balance of the *moral system*, as frequently to support as to destroy one another ; that, while they subsist, each may defeat the mischiefs which the other threatens ; and when they fall, both of them may fall together.

I shall therefore take upon me to expose the extravagance of either folly ; and then endeavour to settle the TRUE NOTION OF SCRIPTURE INSPIRATION.

1. We have seen how fully gifted the apostles were for the business of their mission. They worked miracles, they spake with tongues, they explained mysteries, they interpreted prophecies, they discerned the true from the false pretences to the Spirit : And all this, for the temporary and occasional discharge of their ministry. Is it possible then, to suppose them to be deserted by their divine Inlightener when they sat down to the other part of their work ; to frame a rule for the lasting service of the church ? Can we believe that that Spirit, which so bountifully assisted them in their assemblies, had withdrawn himself when they retired to their private oratories : or that when their *speech* was *with all power*, their *writings* should convey no more than the weak and fallible dictates of human knowledge ? To suppose the endowments of the Spirit to be so capriciously bestowed, would make it look more like a mockery than a gift. And, to believe all this would be a harder task than what (the Deist tells us) religious credulity imposes on us. No candid man therefore will be backward to conclude, that what powers the apostles had for the temporary use of their Ministry, they had, at least in as large a measure, for the perpetual service of the church.

2. St.

2. St. Paul, where he recommends the study of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, to Timothy, expressly declares them to be **INSPIRED**, in that general proposition, *All Scripture is given by inspiration of God* *. Now if in the Mosaic dispensation, the written rule was *given by inspiration of God*, where the church was conducted in every step, at first by oracular responses, and afterwards by a long series and continued succession of Prophets; and all this under an *extraordinary* administration of Providence, such as might well seem to supersede the necessity of a scriptural inspiration; how confidently may we conclude, that the same divine Goodness would give the **INFALLIBLE GUIDE** of an inspired Scripture to the Christian Church, where the miraculous influence of the Holy Spirit is supposed to have ceased with the apostolic ages, and where the administration of Providence is only *ordinary*? Nor can it be said, that what St. Paul predicates of *Scripture* must be confined to the **LAW** (whose very name indeed implies inspiration), and what is prefatory to it: since the largeness of his terms, *all Scripture*, extends to the whole canon of the Old Testament, as then received by the two churches. And this general expression was the more expedient, as the *historic* writings did not either by their nature, like the *Prophetic*, or by their name, like the *Legal*, necessarily imply their coming immediately from God. The Canonical books of the **OLD** Testament, therefore, being inspired, Reason directs us to expect the same quality in the **NEW**. And, as in the *Old*, amongst several occasional writings, there was the fundamental record, or the **GREAT CHARTER** of the Pentateuch; and in the Volumes of the Prophets, the Oracular predictions of the future fortunes of the Church to the **FIRST** coming of the Messiah; so, in the *New*, there is, besides the occasional Epistles, the authentic Record or **GREAT CHARTER** of the Gospel-Covenant; and in the Revelations of St. John, the same divine predictions continued to the **SECOND** coming of the Saviour of the world.

* 2 Tim. iii. 16.

3. The reason of the thing likewise supports us in concluding for this inspiration. An universal Rule of human conduct implies as unlimited an obedience : the nature of such a Rule requiring it to be received entire ; and to be observed in every article. But when once it is supposed to come to us, though from heaven, yet not immediately, but through the canal of an uninspired instrument, liable to error both in the receiving and in the dispensing of it, men would be perpetually tempted to own just as much as, and no more than, they liked to believe, or were disposed to practise ; and to reject the rest as a mere human imposition. Nay the very reasons which the writers against this inspiration give us, why it is not afforded, seem to shew the necessity why it should : such as the imperfect knowledge that the Apostles had of the genius of Christianity ; their disputes and differences with one another ; their mistakes in matters of easy prevention, though of little consequence, &c. for if the composers of a *Rule of Faith* for the universal Church were thus naturally defective in historic and religious knowledge, What security could we have for their not misleading us in things of moment, unless prevented by the guard and guidance of the Holy Spirit, while they engaged themselves in this important task ?

I am enough sensible of the weakness and folly of that kind of reasoning which concludes from *right* to *fact* ; and assumes, that because a thing is imagined to be expedient, useful, or necessary in God's moral Government, that therefore he hath indeed made provision for it. Thus the Papal Doctors, in their arguments for the *standing power of Miracles* and the appointment of an *infallible guide*, having endeavoured to shew that the first is necessary for those *without*, and the second for those *within*, would draw us to conclude with them, that the *true church* hath, in fact, the exercise and use of MIRACLES and INFALLIBILITY.

But the cases are widely different. It is by no means agreed, that the Church, after the apostolic ages, was in the possession of so large a portion of the Holy Spirit as to enable either this pretended HEAD, or its MEMBERS, to exert the powers in question : Whereas

it

it is confessed by all, that at the time these Scriptures were written, the composers of them were divinely inspired for the occasional work of the ministry: and the only question in dispute is, whether that Spirit which aided them in defending the gospel before the tribunals of Kings and Magistrates *—in working miracles before the multitude of Unbelievers—and in prophesying and explaining mysteries to the assemblies of the faithful whether this Spirit, I say, did accompany, or desert them, when they retired within themselves, to compose a **RULE OF FAITH** for the perpetual service of the Church?

4. But, lastly, we have the clear testimony of Scripture for this inspiration. And though the *bearing witness to itself* † might be reasonably objected in an argument addressed to Unbelievers, yet being here enforced against such of the faithful who doubt or hesitate concerning the inspiration of the New Testament, it hath all the propriety we can desire.

I venture therefore to say, that St. Paul, in the general proposition quoted above, which affirms that *all Scripture is given by inspiration of God* ‡, necessarily includes the scriptures in question; what it predicates of *all Scripture* taking in the *new* as well as *old*; as well that which was to be written, as that which was already collected into a canon. For the term, *Scripture*, as the context leads us to understand it, is general, and means a religious rule, perfect in its direction, for the conduct of human life, in belief and practice: it being under this idea that he recommends the *Scriptures* to Timothy. The assertion therefore is universal, and amounts to this, “That *divine inspiration* is an essential quality of every *Scripture*, which constitutes the **LAW** or **RULE** of a religion coming from God.”

* *And when they bring you unto the Synagogues, and unto Magistrates and Powers, take ye no thought how or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say: for the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say.* Luke xii. 11, 12.

† *If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true.* John v. 31.

‡ Πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος, &c.

On the whole then, we conclude, that *all the Scriptures of the New Testament were given by inspiration of God*. And thus the prophetic promise of our blessed Master, that the *Comforter should abide with us for ever*, was eminently fulfilled. For though, according to the promise, his ordinary influence occasionally assists the faithful of all ages, yet his constant abode and supreme illumination is in the sacred Scriptures of the New Testament *.

* The late Mr. William Law, who obscured a good understanding by the fumes of the rankest enthusiasm, and depraved a sound judgment, still further, by the prejudices he took up against all sobriety in religion, seized the above paragraph, as he found it detached from the discourse in a quotation made of it, by an ingenious writer; and thus descants upon it: “Dr. Warburton’s doctrine is this, that the inspired books of the New Testament is the Comforter or *spirit of truth and illuminator*, which is meant by Christ’s being always with the Church. Let us therefore put the Doctor’s doctrine into the letter of the text, which will best show how true or false it is. Christ saith, *If any man love me, my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him*. That is, according to the Doctor’s theology, certain books of Scripture will come to him, and make their abode with him; for he expressly confineth the *constant abode and supreme illumination* of God to the holy Scriptures. Therefore (horrible to say) God’s inward presence, his OPERATING POWER OF LIFE and light in our souls, his dwelling in us, and we in him, is something of a lower nature, that only may occasionally happen, and has less of God in it than the dead letter of Scripture, which alone is the *constant abode and supreme illumination*. Miserable fruits of a paradoxical genius!”——*A humble, earnest, and affectionate address to the Clergy*, p. 69, 70.

This poor man, whether misled by his fanaticism or his spleen, has here fallen into a trap which his folly laid for his malice. In the discourse, from whence the paragraph so severely handled is taken, I treated distinctly of these two branches of the Holy Spirit; 1. As he *illuminates the understanding* under the title of the *Spirit of truth*. 2. As he *rectifies the will* under the title of the *Comforter*: by the first of which, he *establishes our faith*; and by the second, he *perfects our obedience*.

Now it is under the first branch in which this obnoxious paragraph is found. So that common sense and common honesty require, that when I say, the *constant abode and supreme illumination of the Holy Spirit is in the Sacred Scriptures of the New Testament*, I should be understood to mean, that he is there only as the *illuminator of the understanding*, the *establisher of our faith*. But Mr. Law applies my words to the other branch of his office, as the *rectifier of the Will*, the *perfecter of obedience*; and so makes my observation nonsense in order to arraign it of impiety.

C H A P. VI.

IT remains only to be considered, in what sense we are to understand this *inspiration*?

A spurious opinion, begotten in the Jewish church by superstition, and nursed up by mistaken piety in the Christian, hath almost passed into an article of faith, "That the language of Scripture was dictated by the holy Spirit in such sort that the writers were but the passive organs through which every word and letter were conveyed." And as superstition seldom knows where to stop, the Mahometans improved upon this fancy, and represented their Scriptures as sent them down from Heaven ready written. Having got into so fair a train, the next theological question in honour of the Alcoran was, whether it was *created* or *uncreated*; and the orthodox determination, we may be sure, was in favour of the latter. But it was a rabbinical hyperbole, concerning the unvariable reading of the copies of the law, which seems to have given the Mahometan doctors a hint for this last conceit, concerning the physical nature of the Alcoran*.

But there are many objections to that idea of organic inspiration, which mistaken piety hath adopted.

1. It would be putting the holy Spirit on an unnecessary employment; for much of these sacred volumes being historical, and of facts and discourses which had fallen under the observation of the writers, they did not need his immediate assistance to do this part of their business for them.

* Orobio, speaking the language of the Rabbins, says,—*Liber Moïsi est ita perfectus et purus, atque ab erroribus alienus, ab ejus conditore per tot secula variis in nationibus servatus, ut cætera naturalia quæ Deus non corruptioni exposita creavit; ut Cæli, Sol et Astra, quæ a sua formatione non majore Providentia incorrupta, servantur et subsistunt, quam divini legis libri, qui nunquam aliquam mutationem experti fuerunt.* Apud Limb. p. 147.

2. Had

2. Had the Scriptures been written under this organic inspiration, there must have been the most perfect agreement amongst the four Evangelists, in every circumstance of the smallest fact. But we see there is not this perfect agreement. In some minute particulars, which regard neither faith nor manners, neither the truth nor certainty of the History in general, the several writers vary from one another. A variation, which, though it discredits the notion of an organic inspiration, yet (which is of much more importance) supports the fidelity of the historians; as it shews that they did not write in concert, or copy from one another; but that each described the proper impressions which the same facts had made upon himself.

3. Were this the true idea of Scripture-inspiration, that each writer was but the mere organ of the Spirit, the phraseology or turn of expression had been one and the same throughout all the sacred books written in the same language: whereas we find it to be very different and various; always corresponding to the conditions, tempers, and capacities of the writers.

4. Lastly, the very words of Scripture must, in this case, have been preserved, throughout all ages, perfectly pure and free from the corruptions and mistakes of transcribers. For if it were expedient, useful and sorting with the views of divine wisdom, that every word and letter should be inspired, it was equally expedient that every word and letter should be preserved uncorrupt; otherwise the holy Spirit would appear to have laboured in vain. Now general experience assures us, that this is not the case; frequent transcribing hath occasioned numerous variations in words and phrases throughout all the Scriptures of the New Testament. But though this opposes the notion of organic inspiration, yet the harmless nature of the variations, which never disturb the sense, nor obscure a single proposition of Faith, or precept of good manners, affords us a noble instance of the gracious providence of God, in bringing down to us those Scriptures, destined for an *infallible rule*, incorrupt and entire, in all essential and even material

points; though after escaping the impure hands of so many outrageous bigots, schismatic visionaries, and heretical seducers, they had a long journey still to run, through the dark cloisters of dreaming superstition, and of ignorance but half awake.

From all this we conclude, that the notion of organic inspiration must needs be false: and yet we have proved it to be an undoubted truth, that the Scriptures of the New Testament were *given by the inspiration of God*.

C H A P. VII.

LET us consider then, in what sense this inspiration is to be understood.—From the premises we can deduce no other notion of it but this, “That the Holy Spirit so directed the pens of these writers that no considerable error should fall from them:—by enlightening them with his immediate influence in all such matters as were necessary for the instruction of the Church, and which, either through ignorance or prejudice, they would otherwise have represented imperfectly, partially, or falsely; and by preserving them by the more ordinary means of providence, from any mistakes of consequence, concerning those things whereof they had acquired a competent knowledge by the common way of information. In a word, by watching over them incessantly; but with so suspended a hand, as permitted the use, and left them to the guidance, of their own faculties, while they kept clear of error; and then only interposing when, without this divine assistance, they would have been in danger of falling.”

This seems to be the true idea of the inspiration in question. This only doth agree with all appearances; and will fully answer the purpose of an inspired writing, which is to afford an **INFALLIBLE RULE** for the direction of the Catholic Church.

But

But it is not only the nature and genius, the state and condition of Holy Scripture, which support this idea of inspiration: the express words of its composers lead to the same conclusion. St. Peter, speaking of the Epistles of his fellow-labourer St. Paul, uses this temperate expression concerning their inspiration; he hath written to you, says he, *according to the wisdom given unto him* *: now, as on the one hand, by the character of this *wisdom*, which is said to be GIVEN, we must conclude it to be *that wisdom coming immediately from above*; so, from this account of the Apostle's free use of it, who employed it as the regulator of his thoughts and conceptions, we must conclude on the other, that there was no inspiration ruling irresistibly, further than to secure the writer from error and mistake. And the diffidence with which the Apostle himself speaks, on a certain occasion †, concerning his inspiration, shews that it could not be organic, for this species excludes all doubt and uncertainty concerning its presence.

But it may be said, that, on this moderated idea of inspiration, we shall never be able to distinguish which parts were written under the immediate influence of the Spirit, and which were the product of human knowledge only. What if we shall not? Where is the mischief or inconvenience? While all we want to know is, that every sentence of Scripture, which but remotely concerns either faith or practice, is infallibly true. It is of little consequence to us to be instructed how or in what manner that truth came to be secured: whether by direct inspiration: or by that virtual superintendence of the Spirit, which preserved the writers of it from error. Scripture is the rule of Christian conduct; and if the rule be known to be unerring, this is all that is wanting to effectuate its end.

• And yet I am persuaded, licentious men have been the forwarder to contend for this moderated inspiration, under the idea of a *par-*

* ΚΑΤΑ τὴν αὐτῷ ΔΟΘΕΙΣΑΝ σοφίαν——2 Pet. iii. 15.

† οὐκ ἔστι κριτὴς τοῦ σώματος οὗ ἔχω. 1 Cor. vii. 40.

tial one, on the pleasing fancy that it would support them in believing no more than suited with their principles or their practice. But, what hath been observed on this head sufficiently exposes the vanity of all such idle contrivances to let men loose from any part of their faith or duty. For, be it admitted that this or that particular doctrine or precept was not delivered under the immediate influence of the Holy Spirit, but was conveyed to posterity, in the common way of history, as the writer received it from his master, yet this takes nothing at all from that certainty of truth which attends directer inspiration; since the rational idea of a *partial* influence implies, that the Spirit so watched over the authors of the New Testament, and so guided their pens, as to admit no mixture of material error in those parts where they discharged no more than the function of ordinary historians.

In a word, it imports us little to be solicitous about the Scriptural DELIVERY of Gospel truths; whether they be conveyed to us by means merely human, or by the more powerful workings of the Holy Spirit, so long as we are assured that divine Providence guarded that delivery from all approach of error. But then let us observe that this is a very different thing from the ORIGIN of the truths themselves: for on this latter, the reality of our religion, indeed, depends; the very nature of it consisting in this, that the doctrines which it teacheth be not only truths SIMPLY, but truths REVEALED from Heaven. And indeed, even with regard to the *delivery*, when the writers propose any thing of *faith* or *practice*, explanatory of what their master taught, and not explicitly contained in his words, we must needs conclude, that so far forth they were under the immediate direction of the Holy Spirit, who was *to teach them all things*: and this influence the Apostle calls, *speaking by revelation* *.

Thus we see the advantages resulting from a PARTIAL INSPIRATION as here contended for and explained. It answers all the ends

* *ὅτι μὴ ὁμῶς λαλῶσα ἐν ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ.* 1 Cor. xiv. 6.

of a Scripture universally and organically inspired, by producing an **UNERRING RULE** of Faith and Manners; and, besides, *obviates* all those objections to *inspiration* which arise from the too high notion of it: such as trifling errors in circumstances of small importance; for the least error is inconsistent with organic inspiration, but may well stand with a virtual and cooperating influence: such again, as the various readings in the several transcripts; and the various styles amongst the several authors of Scripture: inconsistencies which would never have been permitted, and contrarities which could never have happened, under universal inspiration; but which are the natural and harmless consequences of the **PARTIAL**.

In a word, by admitting no more than this lower kind of inspiration, so warmly contended for (and in terms as vague and indeterminate as the Scepticism of the users) by men who were in hopes that the admission of it would end in no inspiration at all, we secure and establish the infallible word of Scripture; and free it from all those embarrassing circumstances which have been so artfully and disingenuously thrown out to its discredit.

C H A P. VIII.

BUT there is no idea of an inspired Scripture which libertines men have not perverted to serve their evil purposes. Thus, when their own idea of a *partial inspiration* hath failed in this service, they have tried what mischief that other, of our invention, an *organic inspiration*, was likely to produce. In order to this, they have laid it down as a proposition not likely to be contested, "that, on this idea, the work inspired could be no other than a perfect model of eloquence, *pure, clear, noble, and affecting beyond the force of common speech*." To this, it was thought enough to shew, that
 their

their principle was false ; that, in the composition of sacred Scripture, there was *no organic inspiration* : and this, I presume, I have sufficiently performed.

But, luckily for their purpose, there is another circumstance in the dispensation of Grace, which restores their objection, concerning a *perfect model of eloquence*, to its native force. This circumstance therefore is now to be considered ; the use made of it, fairly represented ; and the proper reasoning applied, to enervate its new recovered force.

The circumstance is this : Several books of the New Testament are written by persons who acquired the knowledge of the Greek tongue by miraculous infusion, as at the day of Pentecost. “ Now the Holy Ghost, say they, could not but inspire the purest Greek, and the most perfect eloquence in the use of it ; whatever they wrote therefore in any future time, in this language, must needs bear these marks of its celestial birth, whether they were assisted in the composition by the Holy Spirit, or whether they wrote upon the fund of their formerly acquired knowledge. But the language of all the books of the New Testament is utterly rude and barbarous, and favours nothing of so high an original.”

The learned person (whose reasoning against the duration of the inspired knowledge of language on the day of Pentecost, hath been considered above) lends the Libertine these arms, in his concluding argument, in support of that notion ; which argument I have reserved to be considered in this place.

“ If we allow (says he) the gift to be lasting, we must conclude “ that some at least of the books of Scripture were in this inspired “ Greek. But (says he) we should naturally expect to find an inspired language to be such as is worthy of God ; that is, pure, “ clear, noble, and affecting, even beyond the force of common “ speech ; since nothing can come from God but what is perfect in “ its kind. In short, the purity of Plato, and the eloquence of “ Cicero. Now (continues he) if we try the apostolic language “ by this rule, we shall be so far from ascribing it to God, that
“ we

“ we shall scarce think it worthy of Man, that is, of the liberal
 “ and polite ; it being utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding
 “ with every fault that can possibly deform a language. And
 “ though some writers, prompted by a false zeal, have attempted
 “ to defend the purity of the Scripture-Greek, their labour has been
 “ idly employed*.”

These triumphant observations are founded on two propositions, both of which he takes for granted, and yet neither of them is true.

1. The one, That an inspired language must needs be a language of perfect eloquence.

2. The other, That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech. I shall shew the falsehood of both.

With regard to the first proposition, I will be bold to affirm, that were the **STYLE** of the New Testament exactly such as his very exaggerated account of it would persuade us to believe, namely, that it is *utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding with every fault that can possibly deform a language*, this is so far from proving such language not divinely inspired, that it is one certain mark of this original.

I will not pretend to point out which books of the New Testament were or were not composed by those who had the Greek tongue thus miraculously infused into them ; but this I will venture to say, that the style of a writer so inspired, who had not (as these writers had not) afterwards cultivated his knowledge of the language on the principles of Grecian eloquence, would be precisely such as we find it in the books of the New Testament.

For, if this only be allowed, which no one, I think, will contest with me, that a strange language acquired by illiterate men, in the ordinary way, would be full of the idioms of their native tongue, just as the Scripture-Greek is observed to be full of *Syriasms* and *Hebraisms* ; how can it be pretended, by those who reflect upon

* Dr. Middleton's *Essay on the Gift of Tongues*, Works, vol. II. p. 91.

the nature of language, that a strange tongue divinely infused into illiterate men, like that at the day of Pentecost, could have any other properties or conditions?

Let us weigh these cases impartially. Every language consists of two distinct parts; the single terms, and the phrases and idioms. The first, as far as concerns appellatives especially, is of mere arbitrary imposition, though on artificial principles common to all men: The second arises insensibly, but constantly, from the manners, customs, and tempers of those to whom the language is vernacular; and so becomes, though much less arbitrary (as what the Grammarians call *congruity* is more concerned in this part than in the other), yet various and different as the several tribes and nations of mankind. The first therefore is unrelated to every thing but to the genius of language in general; the second hath an intimate connexion with the fashions, notions, and opinions of that people only, to whom the language is native.

Let us consider then the constant way which illiterate men take to acquire the knowledge of a foreign tongue, Do they not make it their principal, and, at first, their only study, to treasure up in their memory the signification of the terms? Hence, when they come to talk or write in the speech thus acquired, their language is found to be full of their own native idioms. And thus it will continue, till by long use of the strange tongue, and especially by long acquaintance with the owners of it, they have imbibed the particular genius of the language.

Suppose then this foreign tongue, instead of being thus gradually introduced into the minds of these illiterate men, was instantaneously infused into them; the operation (though not the very mode of operating) being the same, must not the effect be the same, let the cause be never so different? Without question. The divine impression must be made either by fixing the terms or single words only and their signification in the memory; as for instance, Greek terms corresponding to the Syriac or Hebrew; or else, together with that simple impression, another must be made, to enrich the
mind

mind with all the ideas which go towards the composing the phrases and idioms of the language so inspired : But this latter impression seems to require, or rather indeed implies, a previous one, of the tempers, fashions, and opinions of the people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of those to whom the language is thus imparted ; because the phrase and idiom arises from and is dependent on the manners arising from thence : and therefore the force of expression can be understood only in proportion to the knowledge of those manners : and understood they were to be : the Recipients of this spiritual gift being not organical Canals, but rational Dispensers. So that this would be a waste of miracles without a sufficient cause ; the Syriac or Hebrew idiom, to which the Disciples were enabled of themselves to adapt the words of the Greek or any other language, abundantly serving every useful purpose, all which centered in the communicating of **CLEAR INFORMATION**. We conclude, therefore, that what was thus inspired was the **TERMS**, together with that grammatic congruity in the use of them, which is dependant thereon. In a word, to suppose such kind of inspired knowledge of *strange tongues* as includes all the native peculiarities, which, if you will, you may call their *elegancies* (for the more a language is coloured by the character and manners of the native users, the more elegant it is esteemed) ; to suppose this, is, as I have said, an ignorant fancy, and repugnant to reason and experience.

Now, from what hath been observed, it follows, that if the style of the New Testament were indeed derived from a language divinely infused as on the day of Pentecost, it must be just such, with regard to its style, which, in fact, we find it to be ; that is to say, Greek terms very frequently delivered in Syriac and Hebrew idiom.

The conclusion from the whole is this, that a *nominal* or *local* barbarity of style (for that this attribute, when applied to style, is no more than nominal or local, will be clearly shewn under our

next head) is so far from being an objection to its miraculous acquisition, that it is one mark of such extraordinary original.

But the learned writer is so perfectly satisfied that this *barbarity* of style, which claims the title of inspired, is a sure mark of imposture, that he almost ventures to foretel, it will prove the destruction of those pretensions, as it did to the *Delphic Oracles*. The parallel, he thinks, is a *curiosity*; and so do I; therefore the reader shall have it just as he himself has dressed it up. “It is somewhat “*curious* to observe, that there was a controversy of the same kind “amongst the Ancient Heathens concerning the style and composition of the *Delphic Oracles*. For as those Oracles were delivered “in verse, and the verses generally rude and harsh, and offending “frequently both in the exactness of metre and propriety of language, so men of sense easily saw that *they could not be inspired “by the Deity*: others, on the contrary, blinded by their prejudices, “or urged by their zeal, to support the credit of the popular superstition, constantly maintained, that the verses were really “beautiful and noble, and worthy of God; and that the contrary “opinion flowed from a false delicacy and sickly taste, which relished no poetry, but what was soft and sweet; and breathing “nothing, as it were, but spices and perfumes. The dispute “however seems to have been compounded, and a distinction found, “in which all parties acquiesced, by allowing *some sort of inspiration, and divine authority to the matter of the Oracle*, but leaving “all the rest *to the proper talents and faculties of the Prophets*: who “being tired at last with the continual labour of versifying, began “to utter her Oracles in prose, till the whole imposture fell by degrees into an universal contempt, and so finally expired *.”

A sad story! But, happily, the essential differences between these *oracular* pretensions, and those of the Christian Evangelists (all of which the learned Writer has thought proper to overlook), will ease us of our fears; for any one of these differences is sufficient to

* *Essay on the Gift of Tongues*, vol. II. of Middleton's Works, p. 91, 92.

shew, that though the objection may hold good against the Heathen Oracles, yet it has not the least force against Scripture inspiration.

1. First then the *Delphic Oracles* were supposed to proceed from the fabled *God of verse*, who having, according to the popular opinion, inspired his *Poets* as well as *Prophets*, there was, in the writings of the most authentic of the *former*, a model of divine eloquence, on which the pretensions of the *latter* might be estimated. But Scripture inspiration came professedly from a Deity who had declared that: *his thoughts are not our thoughts, neither are our ways his ways. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, &c **.

2. The Delphic Oracles were delivered in *verse* or *measure*; for the composition of which, there were established rules, formed on the writings of the ancient Poets: when therefore this species of eloquence was employed by the Delphic Prophetess, if she conformed not to the established rules, but *offended against the metre*, which her own God originally inspired, she might be fairly adjudged an impostor. But the inspired Penman disclaimed all models of human eloquence, and *the enticing words of man's wisdom*.

3. The Delphic Prophetess was a *mere organ*, her Prophecies being delivered in a fit of extacy, when the *presence* of the God was supposed to obliterate all the impressions of human ideas; so that every iota was to be placed to the account of the inspiring God. But it was just otherwise with such as were actuated by the Holy Spirit: These, in the very moments of inspiration, still retained the free use of themselves, and continued masters of their rational and persuasive faculties; *the Spirits of the Prophets* (as St. Paul informs us, who spoke from his own experience,) *were subject to the Prophets* †! The Pagan Zealots therefore grossly prevaricated, when, to cover the imposture of the *Delphic Oracle*, they compromised the matter with their adversaries, *by allowing some sort of inspiration, and divine authority, but leaving all the rest to the proper talents and faculties of the Prophetess*. But the Defenders of our holy Religion,

* Isaiah, lv. 8, 9.

† 1 Cor. xiv. 32.

when they say the same thing in defence of sacred Scripture, do neither prevaricate nor compromise ; they advance, and they adhere to, a reasonable and consistent hypothesis ; which, in an examination of the present state of the books of the New Testament as transmitted down to us from the earliest antiquity, I have shewn to be actually supported by fact.

On the whole then, we need not be too much alarmed at the hint which the learned Writer hath here given us, in the fate of the *Delpbic Oracles*, though never so tragically related :—*The Prophetess, tired at last with the continual labour of versifying, began to utter her oracles in PROSE, till the whole imposture fell by degrees into an universal contempt, and so finally expired* ; I say we need not be much alarmed at this catastrophe, because our Oracles hold nothing in common with the *Delpbic* ; and because the disgrace brought upon these was derived neither from their *bad verse* nor *barbarous prose* ; but from very different causes ; which the learned Person either did not know, or at least did not care that his Reader should.

In a word, there is but one single mark of resemblance in all this ostentatious parallel ; and that does not lie between the Pagan and Christian Oracles, but between their Defenders ; who, with equal indiscretion, contended for purity, elegance, and beauty of style, where in one case it was not to be found, though pretended to ; and in the other, neither pretended to, nor found. The defenders of the *Delpbic Oracles*, the learned Person thus describes, *that, blinded by their prejudices, or urged by their zeal to support the credit of the popular superstition, they constantly maintained, that the verses were really beautiful and noble, and worthy of God ; and that the contrary opinion flowed from a false delicacy, and sickly taste, which relished no poetry, but what was soft and sweet, and breathing nothing but spices and perfumes*. The Defenders of Scripture eloquence he had before represented in the same light.—*And though some Writers, prompted by a false Zeal, have attempted to defend the purity of Scripture-Greek, their labours have been idly employed*.

Nothing,

Nothing, indeed, is more certain. Their labours have been very idly employed. One common delusion has misled the zealous defenders of all religions on this head, not only the *Pagan* and the *Christian*, but, as we have seen, the *Mahometan* likewise. And here let me observe, what is well worth our notice, that that common imbecillity of our nature, which leads the professors of all Religions into the same specific absurdities of the *marvellous*, though without imitating one another, has (when blundering on, in the obscure of Superstition, or the blind blaze of Fanaticism) generally been more successful in the support of false Religion than of the true. Of this I have occasionally given divers instances elsewhere. One of them, which I just now chanced to mention, will deserve to be explained. The Mahometan Doctors were (with their Master) under this common delusion, that an inspired writing must needs be a perfect model of eloquence. And they succeeded better than the Christian; for they had advantages which our zealots had not. For first, Mahomet himself delivered the Alcoran to his followers under this character; and defied the Masters of human eloquence to equal it; whereas the writers of holy Scripture disclaim all these fantastic advantages. Secondly, when Mahomet retailed his Alcoran, there was no acknowledged model of Arabic eloquence; but when the books of the New Testament were composed, there were many, and of the highest authority; so that those bold pretensions easily obtained, and soon smoothed the way for its actually becoming such a model. Lastly, Enthusiasm, which had just done much greater things, easily induced the Saracens to believe, that they saw what their Prophet so confidently objected to their admiration, an all-perfect model of eloquence in the Chapters of the Alcoran. And they believed so long till the book became in fact, what at first they had only fancied it, as real and substantial a pattern of eloquence as any whatsoever; a paradox, which, like many others that I have had the odd fortune to advance, will presently be seen to be only another name for Truth. But here in the North-west,

vest, our enthusiasm is neither so exalted, nor our habits so constant. We have neither the knack of persuading ourselves so readily, nor the humour of sticking to a fashion so obstinately.

However foolish then our *false Zealots have shewn themselves in attempting to defend the purity of the Scripture Greek*, it little became the learned Writer, of all men, to make them the subject of his derision; since the *same false principle*, which betrayed them into one extreme, hath misled him into another. The principle I mean (and it has misled many besides) is that which lays it down for truth, *That an inspired Scripture must be a model of perfect eloquence.*

C H A P. IX.

THIS brings us to the learned Writer's *second* proposition, which I promised to examine; and on which the principle, here delivered, is founded. It is this,

2. That eloquence is something congenial and essential to human speech; and inherent in the constitution of things.

This supposes, that there is some certain *ARCHETYPE* in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to be formed and modeled. And, indeed, admitting this to be the case, one should be apt enough to conclude, that when the Author of Nature condescended to inspire one of these plastic performances of human art, he would make it by the exactest pattern of the *Archetype*.

But the proposition is fanciful and false. Eloquence is not congenial or essential to human speech, nor is there any Archetype in nature to which that quality refers. It is accidental and arbitrary, and depends on custom and fashion: It is a mode of human communication which changes with the changing climates of the earth; and is as various and unstable as the genius, temper, and manners of its diversified inhabitants. For what is *PURITY* but the use of
such

such terms, with their multiplied combinations, as the interest, the complexion, or the caprice of a Writer or Speaker of Authority hath preferred to its equals? What is ELEGANCE but such a turn of idiom as a fashionable fancy hath brought into repute? And what is SUBLIMITY but the application of such images, as arbitrary or casual connexions, rather than their own native grandeur, have dignified and ennobled? Now ELOQUENCE is a compound of these three qualities of Speech, and consequently must be as nominal and unsubstantial as its constituent parts. So that that mode of composition, which is a model of *perfect eloquence* to one nation or people, must appear extravagant or mean to another. And thus in fact it was. Indian and Asiatic Eloquence were esteemed hyperbolic, unnatural, abrupt, and puerile, to the more phlegmatic inhabitants of Rome and Athens. And the Western Eloquence, in its turn, appeared nerveless and effeminate, frigid or insipid, to the hardy and inflamed imaginations of the East. Nay, what is more, each species, even of the most approved genus, changed its nature with the change of clime and language; and the same expression, which, in one place, had the utmost *simplicity*, had, in another, the utmost *sublime*.

Longinus reading these words in the Septuagint, *God said, Let there be light, and there was light*, and regulating his ideas on the genius of his own language, very acutely gave them as an example of the *sublime*. We may be sure the judgment of so accomplished a Critic would be eagerly laid hold on by our Doctor's *zealous Divines*, to exalt the credit of Moses's elocution. Indeed, the sublime introduction to the book of Genesis passed, for a long time, unquestioned. At length Huetius and Le Clerc, more carefully attending to the original text, discovered that the words were so far from being *sublime*, that they were of the utmost *simplicity*; and each of these Critics composed a long dissertation to support his opinion. So far was well; but not content with what they had done, they would needs prove that Longinus was mistaken in his criticism of the Greek. This provoked the Poet Boileau, who had

just translated that celebrated work, to support his Author's judgment; and (as he was in the same delusion with his adversaries) he did it by endeavouring to prove the sublime of the original expression. This furnished matter for answers and replies in abundance: Whereas, had the disputants but reflected, that the same expression, which in one language was highly *sublime*, might, in another, be extremely *simple*, the judgment of the Greek critic would have been confessed by Huetius and Le Clerc, and the biblical knowledge of these two learned Interpreters allowed of by Boileau. As the reason of all this serves to illustrate what is here advanced concerning *the nature of eloquence*, I shall endeavour to explain it. The ideas arising from the knowledge of the true God, and his attributes, were familiar to Moses; and whenever ideas are familiar they raise no emotion; consequently the expression of such ideas will naturally be cold and simple. There is the utmost simplicity in the words—*God said, Let there be light, and there was light*: and nothing but their simplicity would be seen or felt by a Jewish Reader, to whom the same religious ideas were equally familiar. But let a Greek, brought up and educated in the groveling and puerile notions which his national Theology produced and supported, let such a one, I say, raise himself with pain, by the strong effort of a superior genius,

“ To the first Good, first Perfect, and first Fair,”

the new ideas, with which his mind is warmed and enlarged by the knowledge of the true God and his Attributes, naturally produce admiration; and admiration in a Genius, is the parent of *sublime* expression. So that when the subject is Creation, his point will be to convey the highest idea of Omnipotence: but the effect of divine power, immediately following its volition, gives that highest idea: therefore, in the midst of his sublime conceptions, he will hardly think of any other words to convey them than—*God said, Let there be light, and there was light*. And every Greek Reader, to whom the ideas of true Theology were as novel and unfamiliar as they were

were to the Writer, would naturally esteem that expression, which so graphically describes the instantaneous production of Omnipotence, to be infinitely **SUBLIME**.

Apply all this to the Books of the **NEW TESTAMENT**, an authorised collection, professedly designed for the rule and direction of mankind. Now such a rule demanded that it should be inspired of God. But inspired writing, the Objectors say, implies the most *perfect eloquence*. What human model then was the Holy Ghost to follow? And a human model, of arbitrary construction, it must needs be, because there was no other: Or if there were another, it would never suit the purpose, which was to make an impression on the minds and affections; and this impression, such an eloquence only as that which had gained the popular ear could effect. Should therefore the *eastern* eloquence be employed? But this would be too inflated and gigantic for the *West*. Should it be the *western*? But this would be too cold and torpid for the *East*. Or suppose the *generic* eloquence of the more polished Nations was to be preferred, Which *species* of it was to be employed? The rich exuberance of the Asiatic Greeks, or the dry conciseness of the Spartans? The pure and poignant ease and flowing sweetness of the Attic modulation, or the strength and grave severity of the Roman tone? Or should all give way to that African torrent, which arose from the fermented mixture of the dregs of Greece and Italy, and soon after overflowed the Church with theological conceits in a sparkling luxuriancy of thought, and a sombrous rankness of expression? Thus various were the specieses! all as much decried by a different Genus, and each as much disliked by a different Species, as the eloquence of the remotest East and West, by one another.

But it will be said, Are there not some more substantial principles of eloquence, common to all?—Without doubt, there are.—Why then should not these have been employed, to do credit to the Apostolic inspiration? For good reasons: respecting both the Speaker and the Hearers. For what *is* eloquence but a persuasive turn given to the elocution to supply that inward, that conscious persuasion of

the Speaker, so necessary to gain a fair hearing? But the first Preachers of the Gospel did not need a succedaneum to that inward conscious persuasion! And what is the *end* of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to those more general principles, but to stifle reason, and inflame the passions? But the propagation of Christian Truths indispensably requires the aid of Reason, and requires no other human aid. And Reason can never be fairly and vigorously exerted but in that favourable interval which precedes the appeal to the passions. These were the causes which forced the Masters of Eloquence to confess, that the utmost perfection of their art consists in keeping it concealed; for that the ostentation of it seemed to indicate the absence of Truth—*Ubique ars ostendatur*, says the most candid and able of them all, *veritas absesse videatur* *. Hence so many various precepts to make their most artificial periods appear artless. Now surely that was a very suspicious instrument for Heaven-directed Men, which, to preserve its credit, must pretend absence, and labour to keep out of sight.

What, therefore, do our ideas of fit and right tell us is required in the *style* of an universal Law? Certainly no more than this—To employ those aids which are common to *all* Language as such; and to reject what is peculiar to *each*, as they are casually circumstanced. And what are these aids but **CLEARNESS** and **PRECISION**? By these, the mind and sentiments of the Composer are intelligibly conveyed to the Reader. These qualities are essential to language, as it is distinguished from jargon: they are eternally the same, and independent on custom or fashion. To give a language *clearness*, was the office of Philosophy; to give it *precision*, was the office of Grammar. Definition performs the first service by a resolution of the ideas which make up the terms; Syntaxis performs the second by a combination of the several parts of speech into a systematic congruity: these are the very things in language which are least positive, as being conducted on the principles of Metaphysics and Logic.

* Quint. l. ix. c. 3.

Whereas,

Whereas, all besides, from the very power of the elements, and signification of the terms, to the tropes and figures of Composition, are arbitrary; and, what is more, as these are a deviation from those principles of Metaphysics and Logic, they are frequently vicious. This, the great Master, quoted above, freely confesseth, where speaking of that ornamented speech, which he calls σχήματα λέξεως, he makes the following confession and apology — “*esse enim omne Schema vitium, si non peteretur, sed accideret. Verum auctoritate, vetustate, consuetudine, plerumque defenditur, sæpe etiam RATIONE QUADAM. Ideoque cum sit a simplici rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, virtus est, si habet PROBABLE ALIQUID quod sequatur **.”

Now these qualities of *clearness* and *precision*, so necessary to the communication of our ideas, eminently distinguish the writers of the New Testament; insomuch that it might be easily shewn, that whatever difficulties occur in the sacred volumes, they do not arise from any imperfection in the mode of conveying their ideas, occasioned by this local or nominal *barbarity of style*; but either from the sublime or obscure nature of the things conveyed to the reader by words; or from the purposed conciseness of the writer; who, in the occasional mention of any matter unrelated, or not essential, to the dispensation, always affects a studied brevity.

But further; suppose that, in some cases, an authentic Scripture, designed for a religious rule, demanded this quality of local eloquence (for that, in general, it is not required, I have fully shewn above); let this, I say, be supposed, yet still it would not affect the case in hand, since it would be altogether unsuitable to the peculiar genius of the GOSPEL. It might easily be known to have been the purpose of Providence (though such purpose had not been expressly declared), that the Gospel should bear all the substantial marks of its divine Original; as well in the circumstances of its promulgation, as in the course of its progress. To this end, the

* Quint. l. ix. c. 3.

appointed Ministers of it's conveyance were persons, mean and illiterate, and chosen from amongst the lowest of the people; that when Sceptics and Unbelievers saw the world converted by the *foolishness of preaching*, as the learned Apostle, in great humility, thinks fit to call it, they might have no pretence to ascribe the success, to the parts, the station, or the authority of the Preachers. Now had the language, infused into these illiterate men, been the sublime of Plato, or the eloquence of Tully, Providence would have appeared to counteract it's own measures, and defeat the purpose best calculated to advance it's glory. But *God is wise, though man's a fool*. And the course of his Wisdom was here, as every where else, uniform and constant. It not only chose the weakest Ministers of his Will, but kept out of their hands that powerful weapon of *contorted* words, which their adversaries might so easily have wrested to the dishonour of the Gospel. So much was Dr. Middleton mistaken, when besides *clearness* (which he might be allowed to expect), he supposes *purity*, *nobleness*, and pathetic *affection*, to be qualities inseparable from an inspired writing. St. Paul, who, amongst these simple instruments, was, for the same wise purposes, made an exception to the general choice, yet industriously prosecuted that sublime view, for the sake of which the choice was made; by rejecting all other weapons but those of the Spirit, to spread abroad the Conquests of the Son of God. *My speech* (says he) *and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and of Power*. As much as to say, "My success was not owing to the sophistical eloquence of Rhetoricians, but to the supernatural powers, with which I was endowed, of interpreting Prophecies and working Miracles." He subjoins the reason of his use of these means—that *their faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God*; i. e. Be converted not by force of Philosophy and Eloquence, but of the supernatural gifts of the Spirit: *Therefore* (saith he again) *God hath chosen the foolish things of the World to confound the wise; and the weak things of the World*

World to confound the mighty *. And lest it should be said, that this was an affectation of despising advantages which they themselves could not reach, it pleased Providence that this declaration should be made, not by one of the more sordid and idiotic of the number : but by Him, to whom both nature and discipline had given powers to equal even the heights of Greek and Roman elocution. For we see, by what now and then accidentally flames out in the fervor of his reasoning, that he had a strong and clear discernment, a quick and lively imagination, and an extensive and intimate acquaintance with those Masters in moral painting, the Greek Sophists and Philosophers : all which he proudly sacrificed to the glory of the *everlasting Gospel*. Nor does he appear to have been conscious of any inconsistency between an *inspired language* and it's *local barbarity of style* : for having had occasion, in this very Epistle, to remind the Corinthians of the abundance of spiritual grace bestowed upon him, he says, *I thank my God, I speak with tongues more than you all* † ; and yet he tells them that he is *rude in speech* ‡. Which apparent inconsistency the reader may accept, if he pleases, for a further proof of the truth of what has been above delivered, concerning the natural condition of an inspired language.

Thus we see, how unsuitable this quality of *local* eloquence would be to the peculiar genius of the Gospel. Yet as there is, in the Old Testament, much of this ornament of style, and more imagined, it may not be improper to explain the reason of this diversity, and shew how consistent the use of it is, in those places, with the principles already laid down.

1. First, then, we may observe that Judaism was not an *universal* religion, but instituted for the use of a single people ; so that none of the inconveniencies mentioned above of a *local eloquence* could arise from the use of it in that religion.

* 1 Cor. ii. 4.

† 1 Cor. xiv. 18.

‡ 2 Cor. xi. 6.

2. The Jewish religion had a *public part**; and consequently abounded in such Rites and Ceremonies, to which an ornamented style was well adapted.

3. The subjects of several of the Books of the Old Testament are in their nature *poetical*, *several rhetorical*, and so seem to have demanded a Style suitable to their genius.

C H A P. X.

AND now enough hath been said to make a just estimate of the value of those objections which two celebrated writers† have enforced, with all their art and address, against the inspiration of the New Testament, from it's local barbarity of style. Dr. Middleton's objection hath been considered already. I shall chuse to close this first part of my discourse with an examination of that still more ingenious objection of the noble Author of the *CHARACTERISTICS*; who hath employed all the powers of his wit and eloquence to expose the want of these qualities in the sacred Volumes.

— “ It is NO OTHERWISE (says his Lordship) in the grammatical art of Characters and *PAINTED SPEECH* than in the art of painting itself. I have seen, in certain Christian Churches, an ancient piece or two, affirmed, on the solemn faith of priestly tradition, to have been *angelically* and divinely wrought by a supernatural hand and sacred pencil. Had the piece happened to be of a hand like Raphael's, I could have found nothing certain to oppose to the tradition. But having observed the whole *STYLE* and manuer of the pretended heavenly workmanship, to be so different as to vary, in many particulars, from the *truth of art*,

* See Div. Leg. Book V.

† Dr. Middleton and Lord Shaftesbury.

“ I presumed, within myself, to beg pardon of the tradition, and
 “ assert, *confidently*, that *if the pencil had been heaven-guided it could*
 “ *never have been so lame in it's performance* : it being a mere con-
 “ tradition to all divine and moral truth, that a *celestial hand*, sub-
 “ mitting itself to the rudiments of a human art, should sin against
 “ the art itself, and express falsehood and error instead of justness
 “ and proportion *.”

This tale of *St. Luke's painting*, like the story of the DELPHIC ORACLES, needs no application. Every one sees that it is given to discredit the inspiration of holy Scripture. But as *confidently* as his Lordship says, he draws his conclusions from it, he gives them no other support than this mistaken conceit, which he erects into an axiom : *That it is no otherwise in the grammatical art of characters and painted speech than in the art of painting itself* : or, in other words, that the *painted speech of Characters* which represent ideas, and the *painted images of things*, are performances of the same kind. Now, in examining their natures by the principles of human speech, before laid down and explained, it appears that they are of very different kinds, having nothing in common but the office of giving information, *truly* and *clearly* ; one of them by representing the images of corporeal things ; the other by representing the incorporeal ideas of the speaker's or writer's mind. And what thing is there, in art or nature, which does not hold something in common with another ? But the difference between *these* is indeed no less than between things NATURAL and things POSITIVE, between constitutional and arbitrary ; *painting* being IMITATION, and WORDS only SYMBOLS. The subject of the *first*, constant, unvariable, necessary ; as having it's archetype in nature : the other unstable, shifting, and capricious, as depending for it's existence on the human will, under the direction of fancy and caprice. In PAINTING there is, properly speaking, but *one true style*, and that is an exact imi-

* Charact. viii. p. 230.

tion of nature. In *SPEECH* there are as many true styles as there are tempers and humours, customs and fashions, amongst men. Eloquence, *or truth of style*, in speaking or writing, being nothing else but the adapting the terms of human speech to the various conceptions, fancies, and affections of the hearers; so that, as in *painting* there is but one true style, and that *REAL*, because an imitation of nature; in *speech* there are many true styles, but all *FANTASTIC*, because all are the creatures of arbitrary fashion.

The noble Author himself seemed to suspect that these two things had but a slender connexion in *nature*, and therefore endeavoured to strengthen the tie by *art*. Hence his figurative expressions of *PAINTED SPEECH*, for *writing*, in order to clap up a forced alliance between writing and painting; and, on the contrary, *STYLE*, for manner of painting; to bring painting and writing related. A favourable Critic may possibly say, that the noble Writer had no other purpose, in the use of these elegant figures, than to ornament his language. Perhaps not. It is then only a remarkable example of the truth of an observation made above: "that the principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to mislead reason, and to cajole the fancy and affections."

On the whole then, all the conclusion we can reasonably draw from this noble Author's remarks on *HEAVENLY WORKMANSHIP* in *painting* and in *speech*, is only this, that if an inspired Painter were to give us a Picture, it would indeed equal or excel the pencil of Raphael; because here was a *real Archetype* to work by, that is to say, *NATURE*: but, if we may credit Reason, whose dictates, I am sorry to say, are not always those of his Lordship, an inspired Writer would receive no more assistance from Heaven in his expression, than what was necessary to give his speech the essential qualities of all language, namely, *CLEARNESS* and *PRECISION*; because here was no *real archetype* to follow; the various modes of eloquence being mostly fantastic, as existing only in capricious custom; and therefore unworthy the notice of a divine Inspirer.

I have

I have now gone through the first part of my Discourse; which proposed to consider the Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit as THE GUIDE OF TRUTH, who clears and enlightens the Understanding. In this part, I have endeavoured to vindicate his first Descent and his inspiration of holy Scripture; I have distinguished the mode of that inspiration; I have explained the character of an inspired language; I have inquired into the nature of human eloquence, and have carefully examined the force of our free Reasoners, on every one of these distinct heads.

A
D I S C O U R S E
O N T H E
O F F I C E A N D O P E R A T I O N S
O F T H E
H O L Y S P I R I T.

B O O K I I.

C H A P. I.

I NOW proceed to the second branch of my Discourse, which is, to consider the Holy Spirit under the idea of THE COMFORTER, who purifies and supports the Will.

And here, his divine power manifested itself in the same miraculous Operations. Sacred Antiquity is very large and full in its accounts of the sudden and entire change made by the Holy Spirit, in the dispositions and manners of those whom it had enlightened; instantaneously effacing all their evil habits, and familiarizing their practice to the performance of every virtuous and pious action.

To

To this illustrious and triumphant conviction of the truth of Christianity, the very enemies and persecutors of our holy Faith have been forced to bear witness : not only in the serious accounts which some * of them have given of the innocence and virtue of **PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY** ; but even in the mockery and ridicule of others †, on the subject of the boasted virtue of water-baptism ; which was then commonly accompanied with, and sometimes preceded by, these extraordinary effusions of grace from the *Comforter*. “ Come here (say these unhappy Libertines) and see the amazing efficacy of Christian-baptism ! whoever is immersed in this water, though before, he were an adulterer, a practised thief or murderer, rises cleansed and purified from all his crimes ; and commences, on the instant, a life of temperance, of justice, and of charity.” Thus did these impious scorners endeavour to disguise their chagrin at the triumphs of the Spirit, over Vice and Paganism, by a sarcastic parody of the grateful exultations of the Christian Pastors. In truth, it was all they had to say ; for, after this, they were reduced to seek a forced consolation in the possibility that some **NATURAL CAUSE** had produced so extraordinary a phenomenon.

It may be worth while, therefore, to enquire whether any such cause can be reasonably assigned.

The enemies of our Faith hope to find it in **FANATICISM** and **SUPERSTITION**, the two Passions which the strong impression of a *new* Religion begets, by it's **HOPES** and **FEARS**, on the mind of man.

Let us see, whether either, or both of these, will account for so *sudden* and *lasting* a conversion, from vice and corruption, to a life of sanctity and virtue.

SUPERSTITION, which only depraves the Reason without making any impression on those faculties of the mind that most incline the Will to a new bias, never effects any considerable change in the

* Pliny the younger, Suetonius, Tacitus, &c.

† Celsus, Julian, &c.

MANNERS. It's utmost force is but just enough to persuade us, that an exact attention to the officious ceremonies of Religion will be of force to secure us from the evils denounced against vice and immorality ; or, at least, that some transient acts of penitence, as the approaches of Death alarm us, will be sufficient to entitle us to the reward of a pure and well-spent Life.

FANATICISM, indeed, shakes and agitates the mind with greater violence : and by instigating those faculties which most influence the Will, frequently forces the Manners from their bent ; and sometimes effaces, or obscures, the strongest impressions of custom and nature. But this extraordinary fervour, though always violent, is rarely lasting : never so long as to turn the new System into a habit. So that when its rage subsides, as it very soon does, but where it drives the unhappy victim into downright madness, the late impressed bias on the Will keeps abating, till all the former habitudes recover their relaxed tone.

This is confirmed, not only by the general History of past Fanaticism, but likewise of the present, where we commonly see the final issue of a sudden conversion to be, either a return to an open profligacy of manners, or a deep hypocritical dissimulation of them.

But now if we look into the history of those early Converts, we shall find that their Virtue, from the very first impression of it, had all the ease, sobriety, and moderation of a settled habit ; in this they persevered ; and adding *grace to grace*, they went on, through life, in one constant tenor, from the first baptismal profession of their Faith by water, to the last awful confirmation of it in their blood. A dreadful period ! when Nature, by the very shock, and in the struggle, it then suffers, becomes enabled to dissipate all the fumes of *mental*, as it is frequently observed to do, of *corporeal* intoxication. This it did, in the famous case of the virtuous SAVANAROLA of Florence ; whose story is so finely told by Guicciardini in the second and third books of his History. This Man, a genuine Fanatic, if ever there were any, had assumed the personage
of

of a Prophet and inspired Preacher. A Character which he had long and successfully sustained; taken up amidst the distresses and distractions of his Country, and, without doubt, occasioned by them. But losing his credit in the new Revolutions of Italy, and being brought by his enemies to the stake, he died, after having disavowed his pretensions, on the rack, he died, I say, fullen and silent, without any remaining symptom of his former Enthusiasm.

Nor could this sudden conversion of the first Christians be the effect of MERE rational conviction. We know it to be morally impossible for Reason, however refined and strengthened by true Philosophy, to root out, on the instant, the inveterate habits of Vice. All that this magisterial Faculty can do is, by constantly repeating her dictates, and enforcing her conclusions, gradually to win over the Will; till, by little and little, the mind accustoms itself to another set of ideas, productive of other practices and other habits. A work of time and labour! as those good men have sufficiently experienced, who, on a mere rational conviction, have attempted and perfected a change in their lives and manners. When therefore we see the deepest impressions of evil custom, and the darkest stains of corrupted nature, thus suddenly wiped out and effaced, to what must we ascribe so total a reform but to the all-powerful operation of Grace?

But it may be objected, "That there are instances where Enthusiasm alone hath kept men steady in the practice of that virtue which a certain fanatic turn of mind first recommended." Doubtless there have been many good people, who, either through the weakness of their reason, or the force of their more refined passions, have been hurried into fanatic fervours, which have supported and confirmed them in their previous innocence of manners. But even here we have sufficient marks to distinguish these better sorts of Enthusiasts, from such of the first Christian Confessors, who were in the happy circumstance of being *found* innocent, when they were led into the practice of all virtue by the Holy Spirit: whose office, as we have said, consisted in this gracious combination, to enlighten the understanding,

derstanding, and to rectify the will. Now, that genial splendour which conducted the first Christians into the knowledge of *all truth*, sufficiently disclosed the divine Inspirer of *all righteousness*. But we see none of that *shining light* ordained and employed to gild the *good works* of Grace, in the morals of innocent Enthusiasts. On the contrary, we often find a more than ordinary ignorance ; and sometimes, even an incapacity of making rational conclusions.

Thus was the first part of the promise to *send the COMFORTER*, fulfilled.

C H A P. II.

THE other part, that HE SHOULD ABIDE WITH US FOR EVER, comes next to be considered. We have observed how this likewise hath been verified by the sure deposite of the *Spirit of Truth* in sacred Scripture. Yet this is not the whole of the completion. His present influence, together with the fruits of the past, make the entire subject of the promise. Hence we conclude that he abides with *the Church for ever*, as well PERSONALLY in his office of *Comforter*, in supporting the Will, as VIRTUALLY in his office of *Enlightener*, in directing the Understanding.

The only question will be, whether, from the primitive ages down to these latter times, he hath continued to exercise either part of his office in the same extraordinary manner in which he entered upon it, when his descent on the Apostles was accompanied with all the sensible marks of the Divinity.

And this, as it tends to the decision of more than one important question (not only the superstitious claim of CHURCH-MIRACLES, but the fanatic pretences to DIVINE INFLUENCES) should be considered more at large.

But here, I shall venture to invert the method of those Divines, who, in their inquiries concerning God's Dispensations, endeavour to

to prove those supposed facts, which they have preconceived, from the *fitness* which they pretend to have discovered; that is, having determined of what is *fit* for God to do; they, on the credit of this, maintain that he hath done it. On the contrary, I deem it more rational, as well as modest, first to enquire of Scripture what God hath done: and, when that is known, it will be then time enough to explain the *fitness* of his doings.

Let us see now, what holy Scripture hath delivered concerning the DURATION of the extraordinary endowments of the Holy Spirit: Which, whether they rested in the Recipient, and manifested themselves in *Grace and Knowledge* transcending the powers of humanity; or whether they extended outwards, in the *gifts of healing*, to the relief of others' infirmities, may, with equal propriety, be called and be accounted MIRACULOUS. In the one case, the *gifted* person was passive; in the other, active.

Now the Holy Spirit, by the mouth of Paul, has, I presume, determined this question for us, where, in the passage quoted before, on another occasion, he recapitulates the various prerogatives of the Apostolic age. This decisive passage is in these words—*Charity never faileth: but whether there be PROPHECIES, they shall fail; whether there be TONGUES, they shall cease; whether there be KNOWLEDGE, it shall vanish away* *.

It was the Apostle's purpose, in this place, to exalt CHARITY above all other Christian Graces; and therefore, having, in the preceding words, shewn its superiority to the rest, from its QUALITIES and attributes; he proceeds to urge the advantage still further, from the consideration of its DURABILITY—*Charity never faileth, &c.*

The question is, Whether the superior *duration*, here ascribed to *Charity* over *Prophecies, Tongues, and Knowledge*, respects only the progress of the Gospel HERE; or whether it extends to the completion of it in its triumphant state, HEREAFTER? The common

* 1 Cor. xiii. 8.

opinion is, that it respects another life; supported, as should seem, by the Apostle's enforcing his argument on this observation, that *now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face: now we know in part; but then shall we know even as we are known* *; where the different condition of the *two states* are plainly set in opposition to one another.

But the other sense appears to me to be the true; and gives us the Apostle's meaning to this effect: "The virtue of *Charity* is to accompany the Christian Church throughout all its stages here on earth; whereas the gifts of *prophecy*, of *strange tongues*, of *supernatural knowledge*, are only transitory graces, bestowed upon the Church during its infirm and infant state, to manifest its divine birth, and to support it against the delusions and the Powers of darkness."

As the words, considered in this sense, convey a most important Doctrine, viz. *the cessation of the miraculous operations of the Holy Spirit after the establishment of the Christian faith*, and as this perhaps is the only express declaration of it, recorded in sacred Scripture; I shall endeavour to support my interpretation by considerations drawn from its coherence, in this sense, and in this sense only, with what precedes and follows in the course of the Apostle's argument.

The Church of Corinth, though abundantly enriched with all divine Graces, would not yet suffer the Holy Ghost to do his *perfect work*, in the enlargement of the heart by universal benevolence: but, elated with SPIRITUAL PRIDE (whose property is not to bear with those who differ from us, and to despise those who are beneath us in sublime attainments), split and divided themselves into opposite Sects and Factions: And this unhappy situation not only rendering all their endowments vain and fruitless, but reflecting dishonour on the *Giver of all good things*, the Apostle addresses himself to expose their folly with the utmost of his force and vigour of reasoning.

* 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

He proves the superior excellence of *Charity* above all other spiritual graces whatsoever, both in its QUALITIES and its DURATION. The *first three verses* * of his argument declare that the other graces without Charity, are neither of use nor ornament in the Christian life: The *next four* † specify the superior qualities of Charity: and the *remaining six* ‡ (of which, the words in question make the *first* §), consider Charity under the single advantage of its continuance, when all those other graces, with which they were so foolishly elated, should be withdrawn. *Charity never faileth: but whether there be Prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be Tongues, they shall cease; whether there be Knowledge, it shall vanish away.* In the next two verses || he gives the reason, *For we know in part, and we prophecy in part, but when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.* As much as to say: When that CHRISTIAN LIFE, the lines of which are marked out by the Gospel, shall, by the vital powers of CHARITY on which it is erected, arrive to its full vigour and maturity, then those temporary aids of the Holy Spirit (such as *Tongues, Prophecy, and Knowledge*, bestowed with a purpose to subdue the prejudices and scepticism of those without, and to support the weakness and infirmities of those within; and given too, but imperfectly, in proportion to the defects of the human Recipients) shall, like the scaffolding of a Palace now compleated, be taken down and removed. And to shew, that the loss of these things will be no longer regretted, when the Church hath advanced from a state of Infancy to Manhood, in the steady exercise of the CHRISTIAN LIFE OF CHARITY, he illustrates this truth by an elegant similitude—*When I was a Child, I spake as a Child, I understood as a Child: but when I became a man, I put away Childish things* **. Yet no one will be so absurd to suppose that it was the Apostle's intention to disgrace these spiritual Gifts by so

* Ver. 1, 2, 3.

† Ver. 4, 5, 6, 7.

‡ Ver. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

§ Ver. 8.

|| Ver. 9, 10.

** Ver. 11.

low a comparison? It was the ABUSE of them only (to which these Corinthians were so prone) that was designed to be corrected by it.

But the Apostle, having represented these extraordinary gifts to be as defective in themselves as they are contemptible in their abuse, thought fit to add, that this defect did not proceed from any penurious influx of the Holy Spirit, but from the narrowness of the human recipient; the passages to the Soul being so clogged up with corporeal obstructions, as to be unable to convey to the Sensory any more than an oblique glimpse of the SOVEREIGN GOOD: But that, when we have shaken off this mortal incumbrance, and regained the regions of light and liberty, we shall then intuitively comprehend the whole œconomy both of NATURE and of GRACE. *For now (says he) we see through a glass darkly *, but then face to face: Now I know in part, even as also I am known.* And this observation, which evidently respects a *future state*, led men to understand the Apostle as taking in another life, on which to found that superior *duration* which he gives to *Charity*, the subject of his general argument. But they seem to have mistaken the drift of his remark concerning the defects in human knowledge, which was not

* *Βλέπομεν γὰρ ἀφ' ὧ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐν αἰνίγματι*—the *seeing through*, or *in a glass*, by an *Enigma*, seems, at first view, an odd and incongruous expression, since information by a speculum, of what kind soever, conveys the natural or real image of the reflected object, though that image be seen only faintly and obscurely. But an *Enigma* is not the natural image of the object conveyed, but an arbitrary mark which, under very foreign ideas, is mysteriously made to stand for the natural image. Yet, if we attend carefully to the subject, we shall find the expression to be very elegant. The Apostle is comparing the knowledge of spiritual things, gained *here*, with that knowledge which we shall gain *hereafter*. Now all our present knowledge being conveyed through the Organs of Sense, the Apostle, by his *ἐν αἰνίγματι*, would insinuate, that our most correct and sublime ideas of spiritual things are no more the real images of spiritual things, than Enigmas, or mysteriously contrived marks, are the natural or real images of those things to which they are put as Signs. A *glass*, or *speculum*, is therefore used by the Apostle, in this place, to signify the *corporeal organs*; and an *Enigma*, to signify the *representative knowledge*, which the corporeal organs are only capable of producing, when employed about spiritual things.

made

made (as they suppose) for a *direct* inforcement of the argument in the eighth verse, *Charity never faileth, &c.* but was an *occasional* answer to an objection, which naturally arose from his management of one of the topics in the eleventh, *when I was a child, &c.* For it might have been objected to the Apostle, “ By this similitude, you seem to represent the Gospel as first springing up in an infant-state, and needing time and culture to bring it to perfection.” “ No (replies the Apostle) ; this last Law of God, like the first created Man, came perfect from the hands of its Almighty Framer. But man, to whom it was given, by reason of the imperfections of his present state, arrived only by degrees to the more perfect knowledge and practice of it : and to this gradual advance, from obscure to intuitive science, does the similitude refer.” This, I say, seems to have been the source of the error : and yet the Apostle’s concluding observation was sufficient to have set these critics right, and to have shewn them, that the superior duration of Charity referred to the present life only.— *And now abideth FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY, these three ; but the greatest of these is Charity.* Which is in effect to say, “ You may now perhaps object, that this quality of *superior duration* is not peculiar or confined to *Charity*, but belongs equally to those two other Christian graces, *Faith* and *Hope*, which travel through with the Church of God, and continue to support and adorn it, in all its revolutions here on earth, when *Prophecy, Tongues, and Knowledge*, shall long have *failed and ceased, and vanished away* : So that, with regard to DURATION, *Faith* and *Hope* share with *Charity*, in this advantage, over the other transient endowments of the Spirit.” “ I agree, replies the Apostle, thus far to the Objection, that they are all three joint sharers in this prerogative ; but still, I say, THE GREATEST OF THESE IS CHARITY : And in the beginning of my argument (says he) I have given the reason, in the observation, that *Though I have all FAITH so that I could remove mountains, and though I give my body to be burned* [in sure and certain HOPE of a resurrection] *and have no Charity, it profiteth me nothing.* The reason is on account of the superior qualities

qualities of *Charity*: it hath those which *Faith* and *Hope* have not, *she seeketh not her own, &c.* as well as those which *Faith* and *Hope* have, and are most essential to them, for *she BELIEVETH all things, she HOPETH all things.*" It is thus the Apostle answers concealed objections; and at the same time instructs the unwary reader with what caution and application he should come to the study of that profound reasoning with which all his Epistles abound.

But now, suppose the *superior duration* of *Charity* to take in the consideration of another life, and the Apostle never could have said, that *Faith* and *Hope* had the prerogative of *remaining*, or of having an equal *abiding* with *Charity*, when both *faith* and *hope* will be swallowed up in fruition *.

From the whole, then, of this account of *Charity*, it evidently appears, that THE MIRACULOUS POWERS OF THE CHURCH WERE TO CEASE ON ITS PERFECT ESTABLISHMENT; as well those which relieved corporeal, as those which administered aid to spiritual, distresses: and consequently, that SUPERSTITION and FANATICISM equally laboured under the wound inflicted on them by the hand of the Apostle, when he made this virtual Declaration of the total withdrawing of those *Powers*.

* The late Bishop of London, Dr. Sherlock, in his first volume of Sermons, contends for the common interpretation of this passage; and, to remove the difficulty of *faith* and *hope's* being said to *abide* with *Charity* in a future state, argues thus — "*Charity* and universal benevolence is the very grace and ornament of Heaven. Nor can *faith* and *hope* ever be parted from TRUE RELIGION; for there is no Being so great as not to depend on *faith* in God, in his power and wisdom, or to be above *hoping* any thing from his goodness and benevolence," p. 377. Here St. Paul is speaking of one thing, and the Bishop, as usual, of another. The Apostle's *faith* and *hope* are CHRISTIAN GRACES; that is, Faith in the *Messiah the Redeemer*, and Hope in the *Resurrection of the dead*, both of which hereafter will be, as is said above, swallowed up in fruition. The Preacher, in order to support a point, puts the change upon us, and, for the Apostle's *faith* and *hope*, gives us his own: a *faith* and *hope* at large, and in the air: such as will *abide* indeed, while we have any being, but such as, on the same principles of interpretation, will give abidance to *Knowledge* likewise, although the sacred Writer expressly tells us, *it is to vanish away*.

Here

Here especially, all the *superstitious* and *fanatical* pretences of the Church of Rome, to supernatural powers, are detected and exposed; not only the gift of INFALLIBILITY, which comprehends *all Mysteries and all Knowledge*; and the work of TRANSUBSTANTIATION, which comprehends *all Faith*, not to remove, but to make, mountains; but likewise all the LEGENDARY MIRACLES of their Hierarchy in general, and of their canonized Saints in particular. In which pretences, to observe it by the way, the blunder seems to be as glaring as the imposture: St. Paul reckons the STATE OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION not to be the STATE OF MIRACLES, but that of CHARITY. *For we know in part* (says he) *and we prophecy in part: but when THAT WHICH IS PERFECT is come, then that which is in part shall be done away**. What is *that perfect* thing which was to come; and which the Corinthians of this time so much wanted? What but that which he had so highly extolled, the State of CHARITY? So that as this advanced, the imperfect state of MIRACLES was to recede, and *be done away*. Yet in the Church of Rome, the state of SAINTSHIP, which is *their state of perfection*, is supported by miracles; whilst *St. Paul's State of perfection*, that of CHARITY, was so little acknowledged or understood, that one of their greatest Saints, and most abounding in *miraculous* endowments, was St. Dominic, the founder of the INQUISITION. Indeed, if the Apostle's reasoning would bear this inference, that *Miracles* were not only to remain till *Charity* had done *its perfect work*, but till it had perfectly done its work, I know of no Church that has a better claim to the continued exercise of those Powers than the CHURCH OF ROME. But whatsoever need she may have, she fails so wretchedly in her most pompous exhibitions of them, that we may well regard ROMISH MIRACLES in the lowest rank of those *childish things*, which, the Apostle says, men and churches should be ashamed of, and *put away*, when they come to years of discretion.

* Ver. 9, 10.

C H A P. III.

HAVING now established the FACT, that *miraculous gifts* were to pass away with the first ages of the Church, we may safely and reasonably inquire into the FITNESS OF THE THING.

There appears to have been two causes of the *extraordinary* operations of the Holy Spirit : The manifestation of his Mission as it was predicted, and the comfort and instruction of a suffering Church, as it was promised.

To the first, we have observed, that in the early propagation of our holy Faith, it was fit the SANCTIFIER, as well as the REDEEMER, should support his presence by Miracles. But the same considerations which shew this *fitness* to be no more, in the one case, shew it likewise in the other. For the DIVINE ORIGINAL of our *Faith* being once established, it supports itself ever after on the same credibility of human testimony, which all other truths do, that are founded on facts.

1. As to his extraordinary operations for the comfort and instruction of the Church, we may observe that, on his first descent upon the Apostles, he found their minds rude and uninformed ; strangers to all celestial knowlege ; prejudiced in favour of a *carnal Law*, and utterly averse to the genius of the *everlasting Gospel*. The minds of these he illuminated ; and, by degrees, led into all the truths necessary for the Professors of the Faith to know, or for the Propagators of it to teach. For a *rule of Faith* not being yet composed, some extraordinary infusion of his Virtue was still necessary, both to regulate the Faith of him who received it, and to constitute the Authority of him who was to communicate, of what he had received, to others. But when now the *Rule of faith* was perfected in an authentic collection of the Apostolic Writings, part of this

this office was transferred upon the Sacred Canon*; and his enlightened grace was not to be expected in so abundant an effusion as would make the Recipients *infallible Guides* to others, but only in a measure adequate to the direction of themselves.

These reasons for the change of œconomy, in the dispensations of the Holy Spirit, are sufficient to discredit the false confidence of modern FANATICS, who pretend to as high a degree of divine communications as if no such *Rule of Faith* was in being; or at least, as if that Rule was so obscure as to need the further assistance of the Holy Spirit to explain his own meaning; or so imperfect as to need a new inspiration to supply its wants. — But these men read the History of the dispensations to the first Propagators of our holy Faith: they look with admiration on the privileges and powers conferred on those chosen Instruments: their imagination grows heated: they forget the difference between the *present* and the *past* œconomy of things: they seem to feel the impressions they hear of; and they assume the airs, and mimic the Authority of Prophets and Apostles.

2. Again, the nature and genius of the Gospel were so averse to all the religious Institutions of the World, that the whole strength of human prejudices was set in opposition to it. To overcome the obstinacy and violence of these prejudices, nothing less than the power of the *Holy One* was sufficient. He did the work of Man's Conversion; and reconciled an unbelieving world to God. At present, whatever there may be remaining of the bias of prejudice (as such will mix itself even with our best conclusions), it draws the other way. So much then of his task was finished; and the Faith, from thenceforth, had a favourable hearing. Indeed, were we to make our estimate of the present State of the religious World from the Journals of modern Fanatics, we should be tempted still to think ourselves in a land of Pagans, with all their prejudices full blown upon them. For the account they give us of their provin-

* See p. 565.

cial Missions always runs on in such strains as these — The *name of Jesus* is preached up in this City ; the *glad tidings of the Gospel* conveyed to that Hamlet ; a *new light springs up* in a land of darkness ; and *life and immortality* is now first offered to those who *sit in the shadow of death*.

3. A further reason for the abatement of the influences of the supporting spirit of Grace is the peace and security of the Church. There was a time when the Powers of this world were combined together for its destruction. At such a period, nothing but superior aid from Above could support humanity in sustaining so great a conflict as that which the holy Martyrs encountered with joy and rapture ; the horrors of death in torment. But now the profession of the Christian Faith is attended with ease and honour ; and the conviction, which the weight of human testimony, and the conclusions of human reason afford us, of its truth, is abundantly sufficient to support us in our religious perseverance.

But the obstinate and continued claims of FANATICS in all Ages, to this primitive abundance of the Spirit, may make it expedient to examine their pretensions yet more minutely and exactly. And to this inquiry, Scripture itself, which foresaw and foretold the evil, directs us to the remedy, where it exhorts us to TRY THE SPIRITS. *Beloved, believe not every spirit* (says St. John), *but try the Spirits whether they be of God ; because many false Prophets are gone out into the World**. At the time this precept was given there was a more than ordinary attention requisite to guard against the delusions of false Prophets : For, the abundant effusion of the Holy Spirit on the rising Religion gave encouragement to Impostors to counterfeit, and a handle to Enthusiasts to mimic, all that was equivocal in its operations.

Hence we find that, amongst the various endowments of the primitive Church, some of which were to correct Gainsayers, and others to edify Believers, there was one of the mixed kind, of spe-

* 1 John iv. 6.

cial use to support the dignity, and to vindicate the divine original of all the rest; by detecting Impostors, who crept in amongst the truly inspired: and this, we have seen, the Apostle called, the DISCERNING OF SPIRITS. With this Gift, Peter detected Simon the Magician; and with this, Paul confounded Elymas the Sorcerer.

But when *extraordinary inspiration* itself had ceased, the false pretence to it, for some wise ends of Providence, to us unknown, still continued to infect the Church with its impious Mummeries; and while that Virtue (*the discerning of Spirits*), whose office was to detect them, was withdrawn with the rest of the inspired graces, the Command to *try the Spirits whether they were of God* still remained in force. But to try without a faculty of *discerning* would be a dangerous, or at best, an impertinent employment.

Now from this unreasonable task we are delivered by the gracious providence of the Holy Spirit; who provided that those whom he had endowed with the gift of *discerning of Spirits* should leave behind them some Rules whereby the Faithful of all ages might be qualified to *try the Spirits*, and be thereby enabled to defend themselves from the seduction of error and imposture: because, says the advice, *many false Prophets are gone out into the World*.

If the *false Prophet* pretend to a *character foretold*, then we are bid to *search the Scriptures* *, to see if they *testify* of such a Character. Thus the *Bereans* are esteemed of more noble and generous sentiments than their Neighbours, for this very point of wisdom, *the searching the Scriptures daily to find whether those things were so* †.

But if the *false Prophet* pretend only to some extraordinary measure of the Spirit, then we are directed to *try that Spirit* by applying to it the following Characters of real inspiration.—THE WISDOM THAT IS FROM ABOVE IS FIRST PURE; THEN PEACEABLE,

* John v. 39. *Search the Scriptures, for they testify of me.*

† Acts xvii. 11.

GENTLE, AND EASY TO BE INTREATED, FULL OF MERCY AND GOOD FRUITS, WITHOUT PARTIALITY, AND WITHOUT HYPOCRISY *.

It is worthy our notice, that, in this rule or direction for the *trial of Spirits*, the marks of real inspiration are to be applied only **NEGATIVELY** : that is, we may safely pronounce, that the man in whom they are not found, hath not the Spirit of God, or *the wisdom which is from above* : while on the other hand, we are not to conclude, that he in whom any or all of them are found, is, from this circumstance alone, endowed with any *extraordinary* measure of the Holy Spirit ; since they may be no other than those ordinary graces which arise from the knowledge of, and obedience to, God's Will as contained in sacred Scripture. So that although such a one may be truly said to be possessed of *the wisdom which is from above*, it is not that which comes to him by way of inspiration, the thing here in question.

Thus we see, the Apostle's Rule carries, in its very nature, the evidence of its divine original : for the assistance wanted in the *trial of Spirits*, since these extraordinary powers were withdrawn, was only such a set of Marks as was rather fitted to detect Impostors, than to assure the truth of a Character not now to be expected.

This the Reader should have in mind, when we bring him to apply these marks to the features of modern Fanaticism ; especially as they are seen in the famed Leader of the **METHODISTS**, Mr. **JOHN WESLEY** ; and not *seen* neither, as Sancho Pancho *saw* his mistress, *by hearsay* (which indeed has been too much the custom, in the representations of this transcendant man), but as he appears in person in his own **JOURNALS** : for by those indelible marks alone, there traced out, and by his own pen, I propose to **TRY**, in him, chiefly, **THE SPIRITS** of all modern Pretenders to supernatural Powers.

* James iii. 17.

CHAP. IV.

AND that I may not be suspected of combating a Fantom, it will be proper first of all to shew that this extraordinary man hath, in fact, laid claim to almost every Apostolic gift and grace; and in as full and ample a measure as they were possessed of old.

But as a good Actor will first prepare his Scene, he hath carried us back, by the magic of his dramatic powers, into all the wonders of the primitive Times; where we meet the Devil unchained and let loose, to exert his last efforts against the *new* Religion: As, on the other hand, to oppose to his infernal rage, we see, with the same evidence, an abundant effusion of the Holy Spirit poured out upon this *rising* Church. And now, every thing being well prepared, Both these Powers stand ready to act their parts, by the time our Apostle thinks fit to appear upon the Stage.

His JOURNALS are full of the Alarms which he gave the Devil, and of the mortifications which the Devil gave him.—“The Devil (says he) knew his kingdom shook, and therefore stirred up his servants to ring bells, and make all the noise they could *.” — “The *Devil’s Children* fought valiantly for their Master, that his kingdom should not be destroyed: And many stones fell on my right hand and on my left †.” “Some or other of the *Children of Belial* had laboured to disturb us several nights before ‡.” Nay, so accustomed was he to these conflicts with the *Evil One*, that it was even matter of surprise to him, to find the Enemy, once upon a time, reserved and *still*; till he reflected, that it was because *his Goods were in peace*. “I preached—as yet I have found only one person amongst them, who knew the love of

* Journal from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 37.

† Ibid. p. 82.

‡ Ibid. p. 31.

“ God,

“ God, before my Brother came. No wonder the Devil was so still : for *his Goods were in peace**.” Another instance which he gives us, of this peaceable convention between his Congregation and the Devil, is in one of his northern excursions. “ Wed. 29, I preached at Durham to a QUIET, STUPID Congregation †.” But this never lasted long wherever he came ; for he had always the skill of curing the spiritual lethargy by a frenzy.

When the Devil had set the mob on work, he then, like other Politicians, retired to better company ; such as the two Mr. Wesleys and the Saints. But, as this sad and solemn meeting was not to his taste, he tried to *buffet* them into a better humour. “ I was a little surpris’d at some who were *buffetted* of Satan in an unusual manner by such a *spirit of laughter*—I knew the same thing ten or eleven years ago. Part of Sunday my Brother and I then used to spend in walking in the meadows and singing Psalms. But one day, just as we were beginning to sing, he burst out into a *loud laughter*. I began to be very angry, and presently after to laugh as loud as he.—We were ready to tear ourselves in pieces, but were forced to go home without singing another line ‡.” From the Head, these *buffettings* (which, not to overload the Devil, I will, for once, venture to call *hysterical*) descended, and were plentifully bestowed, upon the Members. And, “ one evening (says he) such a *Spirit of laughter* was amongst us, that many were much offended. But the attention of all was soon fixed upon poor L——a S—— ; one so violently and variously torn of the EVIL ONE did I never see before. Sometimes she *laughed*, then broke out into cursing and blaspheming, &c. §.” On this occasion, he relates a fact, which, though He seems not to have turned to a proper use, the sober and atten-

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 29.

† Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 16.

‡ Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 37.

§ Ibid. p. 38.

tive Reader may.—“ Our outward trials indeed were now removed, and peace was in all our borders. But so much the more did inward trials abound, *and if one member suffered, all the members suffered with it.* So strange a SYMPATHY did I never observe before : whether considerable temptation fell on any one, unaccountably spreading itself to the rest. So that exceeding few were able to escape it *.” In these various struggles, the Devil was at length tired out ; and Mr. Wesley forces him into close quarters ; to betake himself to the bodies of friend or foe indifferently, just as he could find opportunity or entertainment. And now comes on the shining part of our Apostle’s exploits, the driving him out, in the face of the whole Congregation, by EXORCISMS and spiritual Ejections.

But if Evil thus abounded, Grace did much more abound in this memorable Æra, when Mr. John Wesley first went out upon his Mission. The Spirit overcame all resistance, broke down all the strong-holds of Sin, and, what Mr. Wesley was much more set against, of INSENSIBILITY.—“ So many living Witnesses (says he) hath God given, that *his hand is STILL stretched out to heal, and that signs and wonders are even NOW wrought by his holy Child, Jesus †.*” For, *out of the mouths of babes and sucklings,* it once again, as of old, *perfected praise ; the young men saw visions, and the old men dreamed dreams.*

“ Amongst the poor Colliers at Placey, John Lane, then *nine or ten years old,* was one of the first who found peace with God. From that hour he continued to walk day and night in the light of his countenance. I saw him last year longing to be with Christ, &c. ‡.” — “ I enquired more particularly of Mrs. N. concerning her little Son. She said, He appeared to have a continual fear of God, and an awful sense of his presence ; that he

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 37.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739.

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 18.

“ frequently

“ frequently went to prayers by himself: that he had an exceeding
 “ great tenderness of Conscience, being sensible of the least sin.—
 — “ A few days since he broke out into prayers aloud, and then said,
 “ Mamma, I shall go to Heaven soon — and you will go there too,
 “ and my Pappa; but you will not go so soon.” On which Mr.
 Wesley very judiciously observes, “ When the Holy Ghost teaches,
 “ is there any delay in learning? This Child was then just *three*
 “ *years old*. A year or two after he died in peace *.”

—— “ I heard (says he) a surprising account of a young wo-
 “ man of Manchester, which I received from her own mouth. She
 “ said, I was sitting in the house while one read the passion hymn.
 “ I had always gone to Church, and had never heard any of the
 “ methodist preachers. On a sudden I saw our Saviour on the
 “ Cross, as plain as if it had been with my bodily eyes.—Then
 “ I saw as it were Heaven open, and God sitting upon his Throne.
 “ And I saw a large book, in which all my sins were written,
 “ &c. †” But this was nothing to the vision of S—— T——,
 (a girl of *ten years and three quarters old*), which takes up between
 three and four pages in the telling; so that partly for the length,
 but principally because I suspect Mr. J. Wesley intended it only
 for the solace of his *babes and sucklings*, for whose use this dis-
 course is not intended, I shall only point to the Journal where
 the wonderful adventure is related ‡. For the same reason I shall
 pass over many of the *Dreams and Visions*.

All these wonders were not worked for nothing. The Spirit
 of the Lord was gone out, and it did not stop till it had mani-
 fested itself, in the last efforts of its power, THE NEW BIRTH:
 But it went not out, as of old, in the *still, small voice*, but in
 storms and tempests, in cries and extacies, in tumults and confu-
 sion; and when Nature was exhausted, then Grace had done its

* Journ. from Oct. 27, 1734, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 133.

† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 94.

‡ Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 141, & seq.

work. But he tells us, his correspondents hearing of *this strange* affair, enquired of him *how can these things be ?* They cautioned him *not to regard visions or dreams, or to fancy people had remission of sins because of their cries or tears, &c.* To this, he tells us, he answered ; “ You deny that God does now work these effects : at least that he “ works them in this manner. I affirm both. I have seen “ very many persons changed in a moment from the spirit of “ fear, horror, despair, to the spirit of love, joy, and peace.—What “ I have to say touching *visions* or *dreams* is this : I know several “ persons in whom this great change was wrought in a dream, or “ during a strong representation to the eye of their mind, of Christ “ either on the Cross or in glory *.”

But here unhappily, as is usual in these matters, the symptoms of *Grace* and of *Perdition* were so interwoven and confounded with one another, that our Apostle himself is sometimes at a loss to distinguish the hand ; and to determine, with certainty, who had the largest share in the WORK, GOD or the DEVIL ; inasmuch that a Manichean might have greatly availed himself of this untoward circumstance. Mr. J. Wesley had been grieved, and the Spirit of God had been grieved likewise, at the scandal given by some of his own flock, who “ blasphemed the work, and imputed it “ either to Nature or the force of Imagination and Animal-spirits, “ or even to the delusion of the Devil †.” — “ Many (says he) were “ deeply convinced ; but none were delivered from that painful “ conviction. *The Children came to the BIRTH, but there was not “ strength to BRING FORTH.* I fear we have grieved the Spirit of “ the jealous God by questioning his work ‡.” Yet these pangs of the NEW BIRTH becoming, on certain occasions, more violent, and more general than ordinary, and even found to be taking and infectious,—the Apostle himself was staggered, and seemed ready to recant. “ These symptoms I can no more impute to any natural

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 48, 49.

† Ibid. p. 59.

‡ Ibid. p. 68.

“ cause than to the Spirit of God. I make no doubt it was SATAN
 “ tearing them as they were coming to Christ. And hence
 “ proceeded those grievous cries, whereby he might design both
 “ to discredit the work of God, and to affright fearful people from
 “ hearing that word whereby their Souls might be saved *.” But
 since these Symptoms were universal and inseparable from the *new*
birth, I rather think, and I will venture to say, as it is only rais-
 ing the Catachresis one step higher, that the Devil was here
 only in the office of *Man-Midwife* to the *new birth*. And Mr.
 Wesley himself, on second thoughts, seems not much averse to this
 conceit, as appears from the following relation.—“ I visited (says
 “ he) a poor old woman a mile or two from the Town. Her
 “ trials had been uncommon; inexpressible agonies of mind joined
 “ with all sorts of bodily pain, not (it seemed) from any natural
 “ cause, but the *direct operation of Satan*: Her joys were now as
 “ uncommon; she had little time to sleep, having for several
 “ months last past seen, as it were, the *unclouded face of God*, and
 “ praised him day and night †.”

C H A P. V.

SUCH was the EVANGELIC STATE of things when Mr. J.
 Wesley first entered on this Ministry: who, seeing himself
 surrounded with subjects so harmoniously disposed to obey the
 touch of a master, thus triumphantly exults:—“ Full as I was, I
 “ knew not where to begin, till my Testament opened on these
 “ words, *I came not to call the Righteous, but Sinners, to repentance*:
 “ In applying which, my soul was so enlarged, that methought I
 “ could have cried out (in another sense than poor, vain Archimedes)

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743.

† Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 60.

“Give me where to stand, and I will SHAKE THE EARTH *.” A bravado that would have suited Ignatius Loiola in his first slippery extacies in the mire, as the World has sufficiently experienced. How it became our adventurer, on his first setting out, the World may be brought to know in good time.

Here then was a Scene well prepared for a good Actor, and excellently fitted up for the part he was disposed to play, which, as we have said, was that of an APOSTLE. And, to do him justice, he hath exhibited it with such splendor, that, of all the Apostolic gifts and graces, there is but one with which we find him not adorned, viz. the *gift of tongues*; and as to this, the learned Mr. J. Wesley may reply with the learned Paul, *he already spoke with tongues more than they all*. For the rest, whether they were *prophecy—supernatural aids in his ministry—bealing the sick—casting out Devils—or inflicting divine vengeance on his opposers*, he had them all, as we understand by his *journals*, in abundant measure.

We will begin (as is fitting) where he himself began, with declaring his MISSION. “A multitude of people got together in the house, yard, and street, far more than my voice could reach. I cried aloud to as many of them as could hear, *All things are ready: come ye to the marriage*. I then DELIVERED MY MESSAGE. So before ten we took boat, &c. †.” Yet, like Moses, he was at first a little mutinous.—“From the directions I received from God this day, touching an affair of the greatest importance, I could not but observe the mistake of those who assert, ‘God will not answer your prayer unless your heart be wholly resigned to his will.’ *My heart was not entirely resigned to his will*. Yet I know and am assured, he heard my voice, and sent forth his light and his truth ‡.”

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739.

† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 29.

‡ Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 37.

PROPHECY or *Speaking by the Spirit*, the first and most essential quality of a divine Messenger, he had at will. “We had (says he) “a watch night at the Chapel: being weak in body, I was afraid I “could not go through it. But the longer I spoke, the more “strength I had. Inasmuch that at twelve a clock all my weariness and weakness was gone; and I was as one refreshed with “wine *.”—“Several of the Gentry desired to stay at the meeting “of the Society, to whom I explained the nature of inward Religion, *words flowing upon me faster than I could speak* †.”—“I intended to have given an exhortation to the Society. But as soon “as we met, the *Spirit of Supplication fell upon us*, so that I could “hardly do any thing but pray and give thanks, till it was time “for us to part ‡.” But the Spirit soon came down in a torrent that took away all utterance.—“In the evening the word of God “was indeed quick and powerful. Afterwards, I desired the men “as well as women to meet. But I could not speak to them. *The Spirit of prayer was so poured upon us all*, that we could only “speak to God §.”

The *exterior* assistances in his Ministry were no less signal than the *interior*.—“Many were seated on a large wall adjoining, which “being built of loose stones, in the middle of the Sermon all fell “down at once. *I never saw, heard, nor read, of such a thing “before*. The whole wall and the persons sitting upon it sunk “down together, none of them screaming out, and very few altering their posture. And not one was hurt at all; but they appeared sitting at the bottom, just as they sat at the top. Nor “was there any interruption either of my speaking, or of the attention of the hearers ||.” The next rises in due gradation. An unruly mob became of a sudden as harmless as the *stones*. Though,

* Journ. from. Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 32.

† Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 87.

‡ Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 84, 85.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 104.

|| Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 23,

had they met, and opposed the ministry, *together*, one does not know what might have happened.—“The mob had just broke open the door, when we came into the lower room; and exactly while they burst in at one door, we walked out at the other. *Nor did one man take any notice of us*, though we were within five yards of each other *.” Without doubt they were struck *blind*; though, in imitation of the modest silence of the Evangelist, who relates the like adventure of the blessed Jesus, he forbears the express mention of this stupendous miracle—The next and more powerful operation was on his female friends; and these, he as fairly struck *dumb*—“The whole multitude were silent, while I was speaking. Not a whisper was heard. But the moment I had done, the *Chain fell off their tongues*. I was really surprized. Surely never was such a cackling made on the banks of Cayster, or the Common of Sedgmoor †.” And to *chain up the tongues* of five hundred cackling gossips, he held, and with great reason, an exploit worth recording. Indeed he appears to have taken the most effectual method with them, that is, to *out-clamour* them: For thus he measures out his own Stentoronic voice.—“Observing that several sat on the side of the opposite hill, I afterwards desired one to measure the ground; and we found it was seven-score yards from the place where I had stood. Yet the people there heard perfectly well. I did not think any human voice could have reached so far ‡.” And as, on proper occasions, every courteous Knight-Errant has condescended to let his *horse* into a share of the adventure, so our Spiritual Martialist, unwilling to break so good a custom, has divided (as St. Martin did his cloak with the Beggar) the next exploit of price with his Beast. “My horse was exceeding lame—we could not discern what it was that was amiss, and yet he could scarce set his foot on the ground.—My head ached more than it had done for some months (what I here aver

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 57.

† Ibid. p. 96.

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1753, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 10.

“ is the naked fact ; let every man *acconut for it* as he sees good).
 “ I then thought, ‘ Cannot God heal either man or beast, by any
 “ means, or *without any!*’ Immediately my weariness and head-
 “ ache ceased, and my Horse’s lameness *in the same instant*. Nor
 “ did he halt any more either that day or the next. *A very odd*
 “ *accident this also* *.”

Come we next to his GIFT OF HEALING. One of his miracles of this kind, had, it seems, been brought in question ; on which occasion, he thus explains himself—“ Miracle or no Miracle, the
 “ fact is plain. W. Kirkman is, I apprehend, still alive and able
 “ to certify for himself, that he had that cough threescore years,
 “ and since that time [viz. the miraculous aid afforded him] it had
 “ not returned †.” In the pamphlet where this extraordinary case was first recorded, Mr. Wesley asks, Whether any one could suppose, that if he had performed it by his skill in physic, he should not have been ready to do honour to himself rather than transfer that honour to another ? If Mr. Wesley be serious in this question, he is the dupe of his spiritual ambition. The Character of a great Saint is infinitely more flattering to the Head of a Sect than that of a great Physician. — But to proceed. — “ I administered the Sacra-
 “ ment to R. A. Some years ago he found peace with God, and
 “ was freed at once without any human means from a distemper
 “ *naturally incurable* ‡.” But acute as well as chronical disorders fly his sacred presence.—“ I found (says he) Mr. Lunell in so violent
 “ a fever that there was little hope of his life. *He revived the mo-*
 “ *ment he saw me*, and fell into a breathing sweat. He began to
 “ recover from that time. *Perhaps for this also was I sent* §.” “ In
 “ the evening I called upon Anne Calcut. She had been speechless
 “ for some time. But almost as soon as we began to pray, God re-
 “ stored her speech. She then witnessed a good confession indeed.

* Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746.

† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 10, 1750, p. 123.

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 34.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 34.

“ I expected to see her no more. *But, FROM THAT HOUR, THE*
 “ *FEVER LEFT HER*, and in a few days she arose and walked, glo-
 “ rifying God *.”—I visited several of the Sick. Most of them
 “ were ill of the spotted Fever; which, they informed me, had
 “ been extremely mortal, few persons recovering from it. But
 “ God had said, *HITHERTO SHALT THOU COME. I believe there*
 “ *was NOT ONE with whom we were, but he recovered* †.”—“ They
 “ told me the Physician said, he did not expect Mr. Meyrick would
 “ live till the morning. I went to him, but his pulse was gone.
 “ He had been speechless and senseless for some time. A few of
 “ us immediately joined in prayer (*I relate the naked fact*). Before
 “ we had done, his sense and his speech returned. Now he that
 “ will account for this by *natural causes*, has my *free leave*. I chuse
 “ to say, *THIS IS THE POWER OF GOD* ‡.” However, gracious as
 this *free leave* is, I would not, Reader! be the man to advise you
 to trust to it. Saints are vindictive: He has fairly told you what he
chuses to call it. And after this, who can tell how far he may
 think the honour of God concerned in making so free with his
 Messenger as to take him at his word, having before solemnly as-
 sured you, of “ many living witnesses which God hath given, that
 “ *His hand is STILL stretched out to heal; and that signs and wonders*
 “ *are even now, wrought by his holy Child JESUS* §?”

From the cure of *natural* diseases, proceed we to the *supernatural*,
 or, saving your presence, to the CASTING OUT OF DEVILS. Having
 related, by way of prelude, the extravagances of a furious female
 Demoniac of nineteen or twenty years of age, whom he set to
 rights without much ceremony; he proceeds immediately to another
 of the same Sex; but her he exorcises in form, and according to
 the true Roman fashion.—“ I was sent for to one in Bristol—She
 “ lay on the ground furiously gnashing her teeth, and after a while

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 34.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 61.

‡ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 81.

§ Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 40.

“ roared

“ roared aloud. It was not easy for three or four persons to hold
 “ her, *especially when the name of Jesus was named*. We prayed;
 “ the violence of her symptoms ceased, *though, without a complete*
 “ *deliverance*. In the evening being sent for to her again, I was un-
 “ willing, indeed afraid to go; thinking it would not avail, unless
 “ some, who were *strong in faith*, were to wrestle with God for
 “ her. I opened my Testament on these words—*I was afraid, and*
 “ *went and hid my talent in the earth*. I stood reproved, and went
 “ immediately. She began screaming before I came into the room,
 “ then broke out into a horrid laughter mixt with blasphemy,
 “ grievous to hear. One who, from many circumstances, apprehended
 “ a preternatural Agent to be concerned in this, asking,
 “ How didst thou dare to enter into a Christian? was answered,
 “ *She is no Christian. She is mine*. Q. Dost thou not tremble at
 “ the name of Jesus? No words followed, but *she shrunk back and*
 “ *trembled exceedingly*. Q. Art thou not encreasing thy own dam-
 “ nation? It was faintly answered, *Ay, ay*: which was followed
 “ by fresh cursing and blaspheming. My Brother coming in, she
 “ cried out, *Preacher! Field-Preacher, I do not love field-preaching*.
 “ This was repeated two hours together, with spittings and all the
 “ expressions of strong aversion. And now it was that God shewed
 “ he heareth the Prayer—She was filled with peace, and knew that
 “ the *Son of Wickedness was departed from her*.—This is very well:
 The next is not inferior—“ I was sent for to Kingswood again”
 [namely to the young woman with whom he preludes these at-
 achievements.] “ A violent rain began just as I set out, so that I
 “ was thoroughly wet in a few minutes. Just at that time the
 “ woman (then three miles off) cried out, *Yonder comes Wesley gal-*
 “ *loping as fast as he can*. When I was come, I was quite cold
 “ and dead, and fitter for sleep than prayer. She burst out into a
 “ horrid laughter, and said, *No power, no power; no faith, no faith*:
 “ *She is mine. Her Soul is mine, I have her, and will not let go*.
 “ We begged of God to increase our faith.—One, who was clearly
 “ convinced

“convinced this was no natural disorder, said, *I think Satan is let loose*. I FEAR HE WILL NOT STOP HERE; and added, I command thee in the name of the Lord Jesus, to tell if thou hast commission to torment any other Soul. It was immediately answered, *I have; L——y C——r and S——b J——s*, two who lived at some distance, and were *then* in perfect health*.” In which, I dare say, they did not long continue, after the Exorcist had thus consigned them over to Satan, now *let loose* to do Mr. Wesley honour. But what is most material (if we may believe Him or his spiritual Coadjutor) is, that Mr. Wesley’s *new birth only* makes the *Christian*; and that the Devil hates *field-preaching*. To evince these great Truths seems to have been the end both of the Possessious and of the Exorcisms. POPEY and PURITANISM, it is to be observed, have, at times, for the like righteous ends, received equal credit from the same reverend Testimonies, the Devil and the Priest: as the curious may read with pleasure in the *Detection* of two famous impostures carried on in each of those Quarters, and recorded by the elegant pen of Dr. Samuel HARSNET †, bishop of Norwich, and afterwards Archbishop of York. By which we may gather, that the Inhabitants below are divided into Sects as well as those above; and that there are *Popish*, *Puritan*, and *Methodist*, DEVILS; who have all, in their turns, been forced to answer to Interrogatories; and to depose in honour of the Sect they persecuted, at the expence of that to which they belonged.

Such were the blessings which Mr. Wesley bestowed upon his Friends: for his Enemies he had other things in store; and those no small ones, the exterminating JUDGMENTS OF HEAVEN. Yet still the treatment was strictly Apostolical. “I preached (says he) at Darlaston, late a den of Lions: But most of the fiercest of them *God had called away by a TRAIN OF AMAZING STROKES*;

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 92, 93, & seq.

† *A declaration of egregious Popish impostures, &c.* Lond. 1603. Q. *Declaration of Puritan impostures, in the case of Darrel, &c.* Lond. 1599. Q.

“and those that remain are now as lambs*.” The corrections, we see, as those of Heaven should, had their proper effect.—“I preached at R——, once a place of furious riot and persecution; but quiet and calm, since the *bitter Rector is gone to give AN ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF TO GOD†.*”—“Hence we rode to T——, where the Minister was slowly recovering from a violent fit of the Palsy, with which he was struck *immediately* after he had been preaching a virulent Sermon against the *Methodists ‡.*”—“The Rev. Mr. ——— preached and inveighed very much against the novel sect, the upstart *Methodists*—Shortly after, he was to preach [the same sermon again]. He had named the text twice, when he was suddenly seized with a rattling in his throat, attended with a hideous groaning. He fell backward against the door of the pulpit; was carried away, as it seemed, dead into the vestry. In two or three days he recovered his senses, and the Sunday following, DIED §.”

“One of the chief of those who came to make the disturbance on the first instant, had HANGED HIMSELF. A second of them had been for some days in strong pain, and had many times sent to desire our prayers. A third came to me himself and confessed, he was hired that night and made drunk on purpose: But when he came to the door, *he knew not what was the matter*, he could not stir nor open his mouth ||.” Here, by ill luck, the miracle suffers; for drunkenness alone is but too apt to deprive a man of his faculties of speech and local motion. “I was quite surprized when I heard Mr. R—— preach. That soft, smooth, tuneful voice, which he so often employed to *blaspheme the Work of God*, was lost without hope of recovery. All means had been tried, but none took place. He now spoke in a manner SHOCKING TO

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 81.

† Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 11.

‡ Ibid. p. 23.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 103, 104.

|| Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741.

“HEAR, &c. *—“Mr. C. spoke so much in favour of the Rioters, “that they were all discharged—a few days after Mr. C. walking “over the same field *dropt down and spoke no more*. Surely the “MERCY of God would not suffer a well-meaning man to be any “longer a tool to *Persecutors* †.”—“Calling at Newgate [in Brif- “tol] I was informed that the poor wretches under sentence of “death were earnestly desiring to speak with me; but that it could “not be: Alderman Beecher having just then sent an express order, “that they should not. I CITE *Alderman Beecher to answer for these “Souls at the judgment seat of Christ* ‡.”

In reviewing these JUDGMENTS (though fulminated with the air of one who had the divine Vengeance at his disposal) I find some difference between his and those inflicted by the Apostles.

1. Their terrors fall upon Cheats and Impostors, such as *Ananias* and *Sapphira*; *Elymas* the Sorcerer, and *Simon* the Magician: Whereas the judgments of this new Apostle strike only the members of his own Church, for opposing the tumults of *field-preaching*, and the freaks of, what he calls, THE NEW BIRTH. 2. The Enemies of the infant Church were the Jewish Leaders; and they persecuted in good earnest; yet all these, the Apostles left untouched, and reserved them for a future reckoning. Mr. Wesley’s Enemies are his own fellow-members; and they persecute in jest; that is, they beat drums, they ring bells, and roar with the rabble; yet these, with unrelenting rage, he *cuts off for troubling him*: while the anger of the holy Apostle, on the like occasion, never rose higher than a passionate wish §. These differences, I leave Mr. Wesley to reconcile. There is another, which, I think, I may be able to account for myself. 3. When the Apostles punished publicly, they as publicly pronounced sentence. Thus to *Sapphira*, *Behold the feet of them which buried thy husband are at the Door and shall carry thee out*; to *Simon*, *Thy money perish WITH THEE*; and to *Elymas*,

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 79.

† Ibid. p. 108.

‡ Ibid. p. 31.

§ *I would they were even cut off which trouble you*, Gal. v. 12.

Now behold the hand of the Lord is upon thee, and thou shalt be blind—But, in this very important affair, Mr. Wesley appears to have followed a better model, the practice of the INQUISITION; where, though the *Execution* be with all the open pomp of bitter and uncharitable piety, the *Sentence*, it is well known, is ever pronounced *in secret*. In one instance indeed, he varies from his model; and, at Bristol, commences, as we have seen, a regular process against Mr. *Alderman Beecher*; whom he summoneth, to give an account for *lost Souls, at the judgment seat of Christ*: But whether the Alderman demurred; or whether he excepted to the jurisdiction; or indeed what became of him, after he had been so fairly *cited*, we no where learn.

These are some of the extraordinary Graces of which Mr. J. Wesley assumes the Privileges. But let not this faithful view of them, delivered in his own words, be mistaken for a confutation. My purpose, here, is only to shew that he lays claim to them, and so becomes a proper Subject of the APOSTOLIC TEST, by which we are enabled to discriminate all sublunary *Wisdom* from that which is *from above*. And if, on the application now to be made, he cannot bear the *touch*, it will be our fault not to see him for the future, in his genuine FORM of Deluder and Fanatic; which he has been long suspected to have covered with another, namely, the FORM OF GODLINESS.

C H A P. VI.

WE come now to the application of this Sovereign Test, the Scourge and Confusion of Imposture.

THIS WISDOM FROM ABOVE, of which the Apostle so highly predicates, is, we see, the same as *Wisdom revealed immediately from Heaven*; but, descending to Man, is adapted to the capacity of his Powers. So that *heavenly* and *earthly* wisdom have this in common,

common, to be COMMUNICABLE, that is, TO BE UNDERSTOOD. For to communicate nonsense, which is a nothing, is no communication. When therefore we find a pretender to inspiration, such as JACOB BEHMEN, delivering to us, under this Character, a heap of unmeaning, or, what amounts to the same thing, unintelligible words, we reasonably conclude, that if indeed, this *Wisdom* did come from above, it hath so degenerated in its way down, as to be ever unfit to return; but must be content, with the other lapsed Entities of celestial original, to seek employment amongst fools and knaves, here below. Nor will the Apology of his illuminated Disciple *, in his book called *The Way to divine Knowledge*, at all mend the matter. “When Jacob, (says he) like Elijah, in his FIREY CHARIOT, is caught up into such heights, and sees and relates “such things as I cannot yet comprehend, I love and reverence “him for being where I never was, and seeing such things as “he cannot make me see; just as I love and reverence St. Paul, “&c. †.” The comparison, we see, is honourable; though less apposite than one could wish: For here lies the difference between *Jacob* and *Paul*: the *Rosencrucian* talks largely of what he knew his reader could not understand; and the *Apostle*, as Master of himself, though not of his Subject, more sagely observes a religious

* Mr. William Law.

† *The way to DIVINE KNOWLEDGE*, &c. p. 88.—Mr. John Wesley indeed, though no enemy to these superb Vehicles, speaks very disrespectfully of Jacob’s *fiery Chariot*: “I can and must say thus much [of his *Myſterium magnum*] and that with as full “evidence, as I can say that two and two make four, it is most sublime nonsense, “inimitable bombast, fustian not to be paralleled.” Journal from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743. Another writer, who had the best means of being well informed, assures us, that this *fiery Chariot* was not of Jewish but of German construction. “Jac. “Böhmius Sutor Gericentis—Hic cum natura ipsa proclivis esset ad res abditas per- “vestigandas, et Rob. Fluddii ac Rosencrucianorum scita cognovisset, Theologiam, igne “duce, imaginatione comite invenit, ipsis Pythagoricis numeris et Heracliti notis o’- “scuriorem—ita enim Chymicis imaginationibus et tanta verborum confusione et cali- “gine omnia miscet, ut ipse sibi obſtrepere videatur.” J. L. Mosheimii Inst. Hist. Eccl. ant. & recent.

silence*. But so will not Mr. *William Law*, who is Master of neither. And who, without the *blessed Jacob's fiery Chariot*, can soar like him to the lunar region of lost intellects; from whence he brings us these curiosities, — *a hungry, wrathful, material fire—spiritual materiality* — a mirror of sound—*wrath turned into Sun and Stars—darkness into Earth* — and *mobility into Air*: And informs us of these secrets, that *life is desire*; that *rage is the cause of hardness in a flint*; *meekness, of fluidity in water*; that *earthly serpents are but transitory out-births of covetousness, envy, pride and wrath*; and lastly, that *body is only coagulated or curdled spirit*: with much more to the same purpose, that would disgrace even Bedlam at full moon.

C H A P. VII.

HAVING shewn this *Wisdom* to be, in its nature, COMMUNICABLE, and so, cut off all the bold pretensions of these MYSTICS, we come to what St. James makes its first and essential quality; *The wisdom from above*, says he, is FIRST, PURE; *πῶτον μὲν ἀγνή ἐστίν*—i. e. *pure*, both from *carnal* and *spiritual* pollution. Now as Mr. *Wm. Law* begot METHODISM †, and Count *Zinzendorf* rocked the Cradle, it may not be improper, first of all, to examine *their* pretensions to this essential quality of heavenly wisdom, *purity*.

As *purity* respects *practice*, those followers of the Count, the MORAVIANS, give us little trouble. For to pass by their open *Hymn-book*, a heap of blasphemous and beastly nonsense; if we may

* *ἡσυχία ῥήματα αὐτοῦ ἐξῆν ἀποστόλων λαλοῦσαι.* 1 Cor. xii. 4.

† “Meeting with Mr. *Law's Christian Perfection and serious Call*—the light shined in so mightily on my soul, that every thing appeared in a new View, &c. &c.” Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, *to his return from Germany*, p. 29.

give credit to the yet unconfuted relations both in Print and in MS. (composed by their own Members, the Participants of their most sacred mysteries), their practices in the consummation of marriage, or, as their Ritual calls it, the *Marriage Oeconomy*, are so horribly, so unspeakably flagitious *, that this People seems to have no more pretence to be put into the number of Christian Sects than the *TURLUPINS* of the thirteenth Century; a vagabond crew of miscreants, who rambled over Italy, France, and Germany, under the title of *Brothers and Sisters of the free Spirit*; who, in speculation, professed that species of Atheism, called *Pantheism*; and in practice, claimed an *exemption* from all the obligations of morality and religion.

The *BEHMENISTS*, indeed, have not extended the *FREEDOM* of their *Spirit* to this length; yet the Leader of the sect, amongst us, though manifesting an exemplary abhorrence of all *carnal impurity*, has fallen into the lowest dregs of the *Spiritual*; and hath written a large discourse to recommend *PANTHEISM*, a Doctrine so much ennobled by the *Turlupins*, of the thirteenth Century; so learnedly explained by the Cartesian Spinofists, and so politicly concealed by the Chinese Virtuosi: which teaches, that there is but one universal Substance existing, of which, the Creature and Creator (if, after this, they are to be distinguished) participate in common. The general principles of this unhappy Philosophy, the Reader may find in the note below †.

But

* Mr. J. Wesley, in a *melancholy account*, which, he says, he received of these Wretches at Bedford, inserts the following particular—"Mr. Rimius has said nothing to what might have been said concerning their *MARRIAGE OECONOMY*. I know [saith the informer] a hundred times more than he has written. But the particulars are too shocking to relate. I believe no such things were ever practised before, no not amongst the most barbarous Heathens." Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 74.

† "It is the same impossibility for a thing to be created *out of* nothing, as to be created *by* nothing. It is no more a part or prerogative of God's omnipotence to create a Being out of nothing, than to make a thing to be without any one quality of Being, in it—Every creature is nothing else than *NATURE* put into a
"certain

But next to this *impurity* of fanatic *Wisdom* which sets NATURE in the throne of God, is that other, which separates REASON from

"certain form of existence." *An Appeal to all that doubt or disbelieve the truths of the Gospel*, by W. Law, M. A. 1742, p. 8.

"That which thinks and wills in the soul, is that VERY SAME unbeginning breath which thought and willed in God, before it was breathed into the form of a human soul; and therefore it is, that Will and Thought cannot be bounded.—The essences of the soul were a breath in God before they became a living soul, they lived in God before they lived in the created soul; and therefore the soul is a partaker of the eternity of God, and can never cease to be." P. 10.

"The creation of a soul is the bringing the powers of thinking and willing out of their eternal state in the one God, into a beginning state of self-conscious life, distinct from God. And this is God's omnipotent creating ability, that he can make the powers of his own nature become creatural, living personal images of what he is in himself, in a state of DISTINCT PERSONALITY from him." P. 12.

"It is no more a property of the divine omnipotence to be able to annihilate a soul, than to be able to make an eternal truth become a fiction of yesterday. And to think it a lessening of the power of God, to say, that he cannot annihilate the soul, is as absurd as to say, that it is a lessening of the light of the Sun, if it cannot destroy or darken its own rays of light." P. 17.

"To suppose this or any other MATERIAL world to be made out of nothing, has all the same absurdities in it as the supposing angels and spirits to be created out of nothing. All the qualities of all beings are eternal.—All qualities, properties, or whatever can be affirmed of God, are self-existent and necessarily-existent. Self and necessary existence is not a particular attribute of God, but is the general nature of every thing that can be affirmed of God. All qualities and properties are self-existent in God.—It follows undeniably that EVERY CREATED THING MUST HAVE ITS WHOLE NATURE FROM, AND OUT OF, THE DIVINE NATURE." P. 23, 24.

"Properly and strictly speaking, nothing CAN BEGIN to be. The beginning of every thing is nothing more than its beginning to be in a *new state*.—No quality or power of nature then began to be; but such qualities and powers as had been from all eternity began then to be in a *new state*. Ask what fire, light, darkness, air, water, and earth are; they are and can be nothing else but some ETERNAL THINGS, BECOME gross, finite, measurable, divisible and transitory: For if there could be a temporal fire that did not spring out of eternal fire, then there might be time that did not come out of eternity." P. 114, 115.

"Will any one now call these things *whimsical speculations*? Can any thing be thought of, more WORTHY of God, more CONFORMABLE to Nature, or more CONSONANT to all revealed Religion?" P. 118.

GRACE.

GRACE. It is “a point we CHIEFLY INSIST UPON, (says Mr. J. Wesley, the pillar and ground of *Methodism*) that orthodoxy or “RIGHT OPINION is, at best, but a very slender part of Religion, “IF ANY PART OF IT AT ALL*.” Here we see REASON is, as it were, discarded from the service of RELIGION, and from its attendance on GRACE: though one part of the office of the Holy Spirit be *to lead us into all truth*. For when Reason is no longer employed to distinguish between *right* and *wrong* in *Opinions*, Religion hath no further connexion with it. And what occasion for its service when the distinction, we are told, is of so little consequence? And yet if we once agree to *separate* Reason from Religion, *Piety* will soon degenerate into Superstition or Fanaticism. But the Piety of the first ages had a different essence: it was then the glory of the Gospel to be a *reasonable Service*. By this quality it was distinguished from the various modes of Gentile Worship, which entirely consisted in the fanatic Raptures of their Prophets, and the Superstitious Rites of their Priests. Articles of belief, or a formula of Faith, they left to those Innovators who had now pretended to bring in *Reason* for the regulation of Religion; *orthodox or right Opinion* being (on the principles of these antient Masters of the Mob, the supporters of Paganism) *at best but a very slender part of Religion, if any part of it at all*. On the other hand, St. PAUL considered *right Opinion* as a full third part, at least, of Religion; where speaking of the three great supports which the Master-builder, the HOLY SPIRIT, had provided for the Christian-Church, he makes this, of *right opinion*, to be one. *The fruit of the Spirit* (says he) *is in all GOODNESS and RIGHTEOUSNESS and TRUTH* †. For by *Goodness* ‡ is meant the conduct of Particulars to the Whole; and consists in the exemplary habits of *social virtue*: and this refers to CHRISTIAN PRACTICE. By *righteousness* § is meant the conduct of the Whole to Particulars; and consists in that

* Mr. J. Wesley's *Plain account*, &c. p. 4.

† Eph. v. 9.

‡ Ἀγαθότης.

§ Δικαιοσύνη.

equal gentleness of Government, where Church-Authority is made to coincide with the private rights of Conscience ; and this refers to CHRISTIAN DISCIPLINE. And by *Truth** is meant the conduct of the Whole and of Particulars to one another, mutually ; and consists in *Orthodoxy* or *right Opinion* ; and this refers to CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. So different an Idea had St. Paul of RELIGION from what this over-zealous man hath been led to entertain of it. No less was the difference, which the first *Reformers* from the errors of Popery, entertained of it ; who, for the sake of *right opinion*, occasioned so many revolutions in *Civil* as well as in *Spiritual* Systems ; the perversity of men turning, as it had before done, the message of *peace* into a *sword*†. How much then had all these to answer for, if *right opinion* be at best but a slender part of Religion, if any part of it at all. Without doubt, Mr. Wesley has, by this declaration, provided well for the fortune of his own Sect, amongst all denominations of Christians. But what obligations the Church of England (of which he professes himself a member) has unto him for thus shortening the labours of the Popish Missionaries, he would do well to consider. Such escapes as these, I suppose, they were, which occasioned the reports of his preaching *Popery* to his Followers ; a calumny of which he bitterly complains : and not without reason : for, to do him justice, I believe he has as little regard to the interests of Popery as any of his hearers ; and as much to his Own : the truth seems to be this. He could not find a better mean of securing the honour of his own pretensions than by this extraordinary declaration. He saw the exact resemblance there is between his Saints and those of the Church of Rome, at the time of the NEW BIRTH. This might lead reflecting men to conclude, that the Original of both was the same. Yet as the Popish and Protestant opinions, or Articles of faith, are very opposite to one another, the God of Truth (while *Truth* was supposed to consti-

* Ἀλήθεια.

† Matt. x. 34. *Think not that I am come to send peace on earth, I came not to send peace, but a sword.*

tute a principal part of Religion) could never be believed to have any thing to do with the *new birth*, whether Popish or Protestant. Nothing then was left for those who had deserted *Nature*, but to ascribe both to *Enthusiasm* or *Demonianism*. To avoid this disgrace, Mr. Wesley rather chuses to let Popery share with him in the glory of divine communications, and expressly vouches for the Miracles wrought at the tomb of *Abbé Paris* *. Now this concession could be no otherwise supported than by inculcating the notion, that errors in Faith have so little to do with Religion, that they are no bar or impediment to the highest favours of the Holy Spirit. *It is the point* (says he) *we chiefly insist upon, that Orthodoxy or right opinion is at best but a very slender part of Religion, if any part of it at all.* Great reason likewise had he to INSIST ON THIS POINT, on another account, namely the Character he hath given of his own Saints. “The more (says he) I converse with this People, “the more I am amazed. That God had wrought a great work “is manifest. And yet the main of them — are not able to give a “*rational account of the plainest principles of Religion.*” Nor is this observation confined to the People. He had made a profelyte of Mr. D. vicar of B. And to shew he was no discredit to his Master, he delivers him to us under this Character — “He seemed to stagger at nothing; though as yet his *understanding is not opened* †.” He then attempts at the cause of this strange Phenomenon. “It is “plain, God begins his work at the *Heart*; then the inspiration “of the Highest giveth *understanding* ‡.” But this solution, though it be in Scripture language, is neither Scripture doctrine nor history. In the first propagation of Religion, God began with the *understanding*; and rational conviction won the *heart*. When the Holy Ghost fell on the Disciples at the day of Pentecost, *the devout men of every nation under heaven* heard them speak in their own tongues.

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 23.

† Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 11.

‡ Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 121.

But what ? Not the jargon of fanatic movements, but the *wonderful works of God*, i. e. they heard them give a rational account of the various parts of God's religious Dispensations to Mankind. It was just the same on all other occasions : when the Spirit first fell upon Believers, they *prophefied*; that is, they explained the Scriptures of the Prophets. But the diffension amongst the Corinthians fet this matter in the clearest light, and shews that the *first* effect of inspiration is to *give understanding*. Their understanding was so enlarged by all spiritual gifts, that the work not having been begun at the *heart*, they abused these advantages to the violation of Charity. But, for this discordancy, between *his* Mission and St. Paul's, he has a salvo : he observes occasionally, in several places of his journal, " that God *now* not only does a *new work*, but by "*new ways*." This solution of our spiritual Empiric, puts one in mind of the Quack in Moliere, who having placed the *liver* on the left side, and the *heart* on the right, and being told that the structure of the parts was certainly otherwise, replied, *Oui, cela étoit autre fois ainfi ; mais nous avons changé tout cela, & nous faisons maintenant la médecine d'une methode toute nouvelle.* — But though he talks of the *understanding* coming after, this is only to put off his *babes of grace*, to *latter lammas* : Which he has plainly enough insinuated in a parallel between the work carried on in England and in America. " I now (says he) looked over Mr. Prince's *Christian History*. What an amazing difference is there in the manner " wherein God has carried on his *work* in England and in America ! " *There*, above an hundred of the established Clergy, men of age " and experience, and of the greatest note for sense and learning " in those parts, are zealously engaged in the *work*. *Here*, almost " the whole Body of the aged, experienced and learned clergy, " are zealously engaged against it : a few, but a handful of raw " young men, engaged in it : without name, learning, or *EMINENT SENSE* ! And yet by that large number of honourable men " the *work* seldom flourished above six months at a time ; and " then

“ then followed a lamentable and general decay, before the next
 “ revival of it : Whereas that which God hath wrought by these
 “ despised instruments hath continually increased for fifteen years
 “ together *.” Now, what is this but to tell us, that the *under-*
standing hath nothing, and *will have* nothing, to do in the work ?

On the whole, therefore, we conclude, That that *Wisdom* which
 divests the Christian Faith of its *Truth*, and the test of this Truth,
Reason, and resolves all into internal feelings, into mystic spiritua-
 lism, and extatic raptures, instead of giving it the manly support of
 MORAL DEMONSTRATION, That this, I say, can never be *the wis-*
dom which is from above, whose characteristic attribute is *Purity*.
 Thus, on a fair trial, these illuminated Doctors have, at their very
 first entrance, excluded themselves from their high pretensions :
 Principles like these always coming from *Spiritual impurity* : and
 often leading, as we have seen, into the very sink of the *carnal*.

C H A P. VIII.

BUT now, had it been our good fortune to have found the mat-
 ter otherwise ; and that the *Wisdom* enquired after had rested
 upon that foundation on which *celestial Wisdom* must necessarily
 stand (and this it might well do, though it came not immediately
 from the Fountain-head of Purity ; as the *unbroken Cisterns* of Holy
 Writ were amply sufficient to supply these *living waters*) ; our next
 business would be to prosecute the inquiry, and to apply the other
 apostolic marks to these pretending Sectaries.

Of these marks, the first only (which has been so amply dis-
 cussed) namely *purity*, respects the NATURE of the *Wisdom* from
 above ; or, in other words, *the Doctrines* taught. All the rest,
 which follow, concern the MANNER of teaching, or the Conduct of

* Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 43.

the Teachers. We are not therefore to stop short in our enquiry, because we may have found that the mark of *purity* has answered to the touch; though Mr. J. Wesley (who assures us that he preaches nothing but the doctrine of the Church of England) thinks this sufficient to satisfy all reasonable men concerning his conduct. "I simply described (says he) the *plain old Religion of the Church of England*, which is now almost every where spoken against, under the name of METHODISM *." If *Methodism* be *spoken against*, those who censure it, could mean neither an *old* nor a *new* Religion, since the word signifies only the *manner of propagating* either one or the other. And, of all men, Mr. Wesley should best know the meaning of the term; since it was not a nick-name imposed on the Sect by its enemies, but an appellation of honour assumed by, and bestowed upon, themselves. If therefore they preach only *the plain old Religion of the Church of England*, they could mean nothing, by *Methodism*, but the *manner of preaching* it; for the thing itself needed no other name of distinction than that which it had already. Why then will Mr. J. Wesley so grossly misrepresent his Adversaries as to say, that when they *speak against Methodism*, they *speak against the plain old Doctrine of the Church of England*? since he himself has taught them to call *methodism* (and they might well have called it by a harder name) the *manner*, in which he and his followers attempt to propagate this *plain old Religion*.

However, strip him of his prevarication and his sophistry, and we find him plainly enough declaring, "That the *manner* of preaching, so it be *truth* which is preached, ought to give no offence." And, to this purpose, he relates the following conversation: "A serious Clergyman desired to know, In what point we differed from the Church of England? I answered, To the best of my knowledge, in none. The Doctrines we preach are the Doctrines of the Church of England. Indeed, the fundamental doctrines of the Church, clearly laid down both in her Prayers, Articles, and Homilies †."

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 90.

† Ibid. p. 81.

Be this never so true, yet it will still be as true that the most holy things may be depraved, in passing through impure hands; and that, **RIGHT OPINION**, which inspires wisdom and promotes peace, may then serve for nothing but to turn the heads and hearts of men to folly and dissention, otherwise naturally framed and disposed to profit by the truth. Indeed, a **FANATIC MANNER** of preaching, though it were the doctrine of an Apostle, may do more harm, to Society at least, than a modest revival of *old* speculative heresies, or, than the invention of *new*; since it tends to bewilder the Reason of some, to inflame the Passions of others; and, in that state of things, to spread disorder and disturbance throughout the whole Community. And in subjection to the civil Community was the Gospel first preached; and under the protection of it was it, at length, every where established. For, what does **FIELD-PREACHING** (for instance) imply, but a *famine of the Word*, occasioned by a total neglect in the spiritual Pastors appointed by Law? And what can it produce, but strong resentments in behalf of the Ministers of Religion, thus injuriously treated? What can be the issue of the **NEW BIRTH**, attended with those infernal throes and frightful agitations so graphically described in the Journals of Mr. J. Wesley, but high ferments in behalf of Religion itself, thus scandalously dishonoured and traduced?

The sacred Writer himself, who delivered this **TEST** for the trial of these Mens pretensions, was unquestionably in these sentiments, "that a *fanatic* Spirit did more mischief in the *mode* of teaching, than an *erroneous* one, in the *matter* taught;" since, of half a dozen marks recommended for this purpose, the first only is applicable to the *doctrine*; all the rest concern the *manners* of the Teacher.

Nay, what is more, we have Mr. J. Wesley himself, for once, on the side of the Apostle, where he says, that *it is a point he chiefly insists upon, that ORTHODOXY or RIGHT OPINION is, at best, but a very slender part of Religion, if any part of it at all.* The Operation of Religion on the heart therefore (which with him is the same as

on the fancy, and manifests itself in corporeal agitations) is the principal point. But *this*, altogether resolves itself into the *manner* of propagating the Faith.

Yet still it may be disputed, Who it is that becomes answerable for the disorders occasioned by this *new mode* or *method* of propagating Religion? Is it Mr. J. Wesley, or is it his Adversaries? He, I make no question, will exculpate himself by the direction of St. Paul to Timothy—to *preach the word, in season, and out of season*. Which implies, he thinks, that the *manner* can never be amiss, or made chargeable with blame.

But he would infer more from the Text than it will bear; and misapply it, into the bargain. This direction relates to *time* only, which is but one of the many circumstances attending the *manner of preaching*; and *that one*, in which the abuse is least material. The application (as we say) is no less faulty. The direction is confined to the state of things *then* existing; when the suffering Church had so few opportunities to preach the word, that all, whether *seasonable* or *unseasonable*, were with reason to be laid hold on. When the Church was once established, and *fixed* and *seasonable* times were appointed for holy offices, then (as every one may see) to fly to the *unseasonable* would be factious, and a breach of the discipline of that Church, of which the transgressor professed himself a member. To judge, therefore, of the integrity of Mr. J. Wesley's conduct, we must turn from the directions which St. Paul gives *for his own times*, to those which St. James gives *for all times*.

C H A P. IX.

AND this leads us on, in our Enquiry. The Wisdom from above (says this Apostle) *is first pure, then PEACEABLE.*—To be PEACEABLE is a leading quality in its general Character. A Choir of Angels ushered in the Advent of the Son of God, with *peace, good-will towards men* *. And He himself, on his departure from us, bequeathed it to us, as his dearest legacy: *Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you* †. Now that which the FATHER proclaimed, which the SON bestowed, must needs be of the office of the HOLY GHOST to maintain. Whatever *form of godliness*, therefore, hath not this Characteristic mark, can never reasonably be deemed of heavenly extraction.

That the propagation of *Methodism* hath occasioned many and great violations of *peace*, Mr. Wesley hath amply shewn in the journalary history of his Adventures.

But as in all contests between party and party, the blame is reciprocally thrown upon one another; before we come more directly to adjust the share which may be fairly cast upon *Methodism*, it may be useful previously to inquire into that *temper which makes for peace*; for we may be reasonably well assured, that the fault lieth not in that quarter where such a temper is found. Now our blessed Redeemer, who so earnestly recommends *his peace* to us, hath given us directions how to preserve it: *Be ye therefore wise [σοφίμοι, PRUDENT] as Serpents, and harmless as Doves* ‡.

And he, who gave his Followers no precept, regarding life and manners, which he did not eminently recommend by his own example, was the most perfect pattern of *innocence*, under the direc-

* Luke ii. 14.

† John xiv. 27.

‡ Matt. x. 16. So again, *Who is that faithful and wise [σοφίμος, prudent] Servant?* Matt. xxiv. 45.

tion of PRUDENCE ; as appears in his dextrous evasions to captious questions of the Jewish Leaders, who wanted matter to inflame the people against him ; in his avoiding the People when thus inflamed ; and, above all, in his declining an untimely promulgation of his *Messiah-Character* ; which would either have occasioned civil commotions, or have endangered his life before he had compleated his Ministry. The first instance of this consummate *prudence* is too important not to be more particularly explained. “ There came to him (says St. Mark) the Chief Priests and Scribes, and the Elders, and say unto him, By what authority dost thou these things ? and who gave thee this authority ? And Jesus answered and said unto them, I will also ask of you one question, and answer me, and I will tell you by what authority I do these things. The baptism of John, was it from Heaven, or of Men ? answer me. And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven ; he will say, Why then did ye not believe him ? But if we shall say, Of men ; they feared the People : For all men counted John that he was a Prophet indeed. And they answered and said unto Jesus, We cannot tell. And Jesus answering, saith unto them, Neither do I tell you, by what authority I do these things *.”

A direct answer to this question, apparently reasonable, and urged by those who had authority to demand it, must have immaturely revealed what the destined Ministry of Jesus made necessary to be kept secret. And yet, to evade the question, in such a manner as was sufficient to satisfy Authority, needed all that divine prudence with which the Author of our Salvation was endowed. He therefore replies, “ First, answer me this question concerning John.” The question was reasonable, considered in the view of an argument *ad hominem* ; it was reasonable, from the force it had in itself : For if it should appear, that that question had not been determined in the case of John, it was evident from their own conduct, that

* Chap. xi. 27, & seq.

the jurisdiction of the Sanhedrim was not violated by any man's declining to answer one of the same import. Further, the question was reasonable and proper in itself. John publicly professed himself the forerunner of Jesus : So that if it were necessary for the Sanhedrim to come at the true knowlege of the general Case, they should have begun with John. This, the natural order of a judicial proceeding required. Nor would the Chief Priests have been backward to answer it, in either view. But here lay the difficulty ; the People were of one opinion concerning John, and the Sanhedrim of another. This embarras silenced them. And in our Saviour's taking advantage of that circumstance consists the divine dexterity of his exemplary prudence. *Neither do I tell you (says he) by what authority I do these things.* As much as to say, " Both on my principles and on your own, a previous question is first to be resolved, namely, concerning *the baptism of John*. When you have answered this, then comes my time to answer yours : But till then, you have no right to insist upon an answer."—Such instances of Prudence, and so divinely managed, made St. Paul, where in his Epistle to the Ephesians he distinguishes (in the twofold Character of the blessed Jesus) between his office of *Redeemer* from Sin, and *Preacher* of Righteousness, express his latter office in these emphatic words, *He hath abounded towards us in all wisdom and PRUDENCE* *, σοφία ἡ φρονήσις. Which, as appears by what follows, the Apostle makes to consist in his Master's suiting and adapting the various Revelations of his Will to the peculiar seasons and occasions when the knowlege of it was become useful to the furtherance of the Faith. *Having (says St. Paul) made known unto us the Mystery of his will according to his good pleasure, which he hath purposed in himself ; that in the dispensation of the fulness of time he might gather together in one, all things in Christ, &c.* By which the Apostle seems principally to have in mind that obscure and backward intimation, which, for some time, kept hid from his Disciples this

* Chap. i. 8.

mystery of his will; the usual title given by the sacred Writers to the calling in of the Gentiles into the Church of Christ. The *prudence* of which conduct is obvious. The Gospel was to be first offered to the Jews. But their reception of it was so unkind, that, had the Apostles been then acquainted with this *Mystery*, they had been tempted to turn to the Gentiles, before the mission to the Jews had been fairly completed. When that was accomplished, the *mystery* was revealed, in all its splendor, to St. Peter.

On the whole, therefore, we see, that THE PEACEFUL CHARACTER IS THAT, WHERE INNOCENCE IS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF PRUDENCE. Emancipated from this direction, *Innocence* becomes a prey both to itself and to others; and is, either actively or passively, the perpetual source of Discord.

Let us see, now, the regard our new Missionaries *profess to pay* to this precept and example of their Master. HUMAN PRUDENCE has, some how or other, so highly offended Mr. J. Wesley, that he scruples not to call it, the MYSTERY OF INIQUITY and the OFF-SPRING OF HELL.—“I believe (says he) it pleased God to bless the “first Sermon most, because it gave most offence, being indeed an “open defiance of that *mystery of iniquity* which the World calls “PRUDENCE *.” As he here informs us, Who gave it that Name, one might be apt to suppose he meant, the *Prudence* of the *unjust Steward*, which is indeed the *mystery of Iniquity*, did not he himself forbid us to understand it in this sense, by fairly telling us that he meant, what the *World* calls CHRISTIAN *Prudence*. And as bad as the *World* is, I think it never qualified the *prudence* of the *unjust Steward* with that attribute.—“God, deliver me, and all that seek “him in sincerity, from what the World calls CHRISTIAN PRU- “DENCE †.” And again, to a friend who approved not of his *field-preaching*, “—I fear that *offspring of Hell*, worldly or mystic “PRUDENCE, hath drawn you away from the simplicity of the

* Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, to his return from Germany, p. 12.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 13.

“ Gospel *.” If his aversion to *Prudence* be thus great, his enmity to those, amongst whom it is usually found, can scarce be thought less, from the hard words he gives whenever he speaks of them.—
 “ Mrs. Baddiley (says he) desired me to go up to her Son, who had
 “ been out of order for some days. For a year or two he was a
 “ pattern to all the family, till he began to converse more with
 “ GOOD SORT OF MEN. He then grew cooler and cooler in the
 “ ways of God, and in a few months quitted the Society †.”—“ It
 “ is absolutely needful for such a one as me to follow the wise ad-
 “ vice of Mr. Herbert. And this, I bless God, I can, in some
 “ measure, do, while I avoid that BANE OF ALL RELIGION, the
 “ Company of GOOD SORT OF MEN, as they are called, Persons
 “ who have a liking to, but no SENSE of, Religion ;” [i. e. no ex-
 “ tatic feelings or the pains of the *new birth*, &c.] “ But these in-
 “ sensibly undermine all my resolution, and steal away what little
 “ ZEAL I have ‡ ;” i. e. persuade him to be *peaceable*.

And again, speaking of one of his Backsliders, he says—“ but indulging himself in HARMLESS COMPANY he first made shipwreck of his ZEAL, and then of his FAITH § ” In this I think he is right. The *Zeal* and the *Faith* of a FANATIC are such exact tallies to one another that I have no conception how either can exist alone. They came into the World together to disturb Society and dishonour Christianity ; and they must go out together before the One can regain its peace, or the other its dignity.

On the whole, we find that Mr. J. Wesley is, by his own confession, entirely destitute of that temper *which makes for peace* : If therefore his preaching be attended with tumults and disorders, we cannot but ascribe it to the want of that quality, which the Founders of our holy Religion made essential to the successful propagation of the *Gospel of Peace*, namely, PRUDENCE. It is true,

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 56, 57.

† Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 31.

‡ Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 31.

§ Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 41.

Mr. Wesley, as we have seen, throws the whole fault of these tumults on the DEVIL ; and this may be allowed him in the sense that every poultry Pilferer and Sabbath-breaker is used to do. But if we seek for the more immediate cause, we shall find it much nearer hand. The Roman Satirist pretended,

———— Nullum Numen abest, si sit PRUDENTIA.

Where PRUDENCE governs, no God is wanting to keep the world in order. We may say, with more sobriety and truth, that where IMPRUDENCE takes the lead, there needs no *Devil* to throw it into confusion. What, for instance, more strongly tends to tumult and disorder than for One who professes to propagate only the *plain old Religion of the Church of England*, to set at nought its established Discipline, by invading the province of the parochial Minister ; by assembling in undue places and at unfit times ; by *speaking evil of Dignities*, in scurrilous invectives against the Governors and Pastors of the national Church ? Insolences of this nature provoke warm and ill-instructed men to demand justice on the offenders : Which not being at hand (as the interests of Society will not, always, permit the Magistrate to enforce it, where the insults on his office are covered with the pretences of Religion), Particulars are but too apt to seek that in a tumultuary and criminal way, which all the providence of Government, and all the equity of Law, are but barely sufficient to adjust, with such discretion, as, that while the dignity of the State is vindicated, the rights of Religion are not infringed.

Nor will that fanatic Apology, which is ever at hand, be any excuse for them in the commission of their disorders ; namely, “ That the violation of *peace amongst men* serves to advance the *peace of God* ; our blessed Master having himself declared, that *he was not come to send Peace on earth, but a sword.*” Now the same Spirit which disposes them to apply to their own case all those declarations concerning the first extraordinary state of the Gospel, hinders them from seeing, that these words of Jesus respect only the
accidental

accidental and transient struggle of the then expiring Powers of darkness; but that the heavenly Proclamation of *peace towards men*, declares the genuine and constant fruits of *God's good-will to his Creatures*: that the *first* only predicted the early fortunes of a suffering Church; and that the *other* described the essential nature, the eternal genius, of an all-beneficent Religion. But Enthusiasts, hurried on by the fervours of an inflamed fancy, lose sight of a Christian land, and a believing Magistrate; and have nothing before their eyes but a Country of Pagans and Idolaters, with the Princes of this world risen up to suppress and persecute the *Word of life*. Under these delusions, it is no wonder that they despise order, insult Government, and set their Rulers at defiance.

BUT PEACE is the cure of FANATICISM, as *Fanaticism* is the bane of *Peace*. Sectaries must either kick or be kicked. They must either persecute, or they must provoke persecution. To be in this turbulent state, is living in their proper element.

As every *Libertine* aspires to be on the *laughing* side, so every *Zealot* would fain be on the *persecuting*. But Zealots, as well as other Adventurers, must take their chance in this world, whatsoever security they have made for the other. We see METHODISM, at present, under a well-established watchful Government, where it is obliged to wear a less audacious look. To know its true character, and native disposition, we should see it in all its fortunes. And this our own Country, productive of every strange thing, hath given us ample means to contemplate. For They, who now go under the name of METHODISTS, were, in the days of our Fore-fathers, called PRECISIANS; terms of their own devising, and (as the fruits of the same spirit) nearly synonymous, importing that the bearers of them had carefully squared out their Religion by line and level. The *elder Methodism*, on its first appearance, put on the same suffering exterior, which we see the younger Brother wear at present. During the firm administration of Elizabeth it disguised, and but barely disguised, its native ferocity, in a feigned submission; after having invited persecution with the air of a persecutor. Those times,

times, we may be sure, would not suffer it to wait long for what it wanted. And then, as a precious Metal, which had undergone its trial in the fire, and left all its dross behind, the Sect, with great propriety, changed its name, from PRECISIAN to PURITAN. But in the weak and distracted times of Charles the First, it ventured to throw off the mask; and, under the name of INDEPENDENT, became the chief Agent of all the dreadful disorders which terminated that unhappy reign. For INDEPENDENCY was a name as well suited to the weakness of that Government, which it defied and overturned, as METHODISM is to the strength of This, of which it stands in awe. Nor is this Pedigree, which makes *Methodism* of the younger House to *Independency*, invented, like heraldic fictions, to ennoble my subject. Whoever reads the large accounts of the *Spiritual state of the Regicides* while under condemnation (written and published, at that time, by their friends, to make them pass, with the People, for Saints and Martyrs), and compares them with the circumstantial Journals of the *Methodists*, will find so exact a conformity in the frenzy of sentiment, and even in the cant of expression, upon the subjects of Faith, Grace, Redemption, Regeneration, Justification, &c. as may fully satisfy him, that they are both of the same Stock; and ready, on a return of the like kindly season, to produce the same fruits. All the difference, which distance of times and variety of circumstances have effected, is only this: The *Methodist* is now, an *Apostolic Independent*; and the Independent was then, a *Mahometan Methodist*.

Indeed, it hath been Mr. J. Wesley's mishap, with every other requisite of a skilful Leader, to fall upon times very unpropitious to the fortunes of a new Sect.

He found himself in a Government whose equity abhorred Persecution for Religion; and whose firmness, on the other hand, would not suffer its principles of Toleration to be abused, to the disturbance of Society. Here was little room for the exertion of that quality by which a Sectary may be properly said to exist, namely, ZEAL active or passive. He wanted to be persecuted; but Persecution

secution would not come at his call. Yet, it must be owned, he used every extraordinary method to provoke it : The time was now past, when it could be said of this *Demon*, as of the less mischievous ones of old, “*Vocatus, aut non vocatus, audit.*” The advantages of *persecution* to a new Sect, Mr. J. Wesley is not at all shy in confessing.—“About one, I preached at Holton, where like-
“wise all is now calm, after a violent storm of several weeks,
“wherein many were beaten and wounded, and outraged various
“ways ; *but NONE MOVED from their stedfastness.* In the evening I
“preached at Armley, *to many who want a storm, being quite UN-*
“*NERVED by constant Sunshine* *.” It is the same conscious want which makes him complain of ill treatment ; and yet be dissatisfied with good—“We came to St. Ives before morning prayers, and
“walked to Church without so much as one huzza. How strangely
“has one year changed the scene in Cornwall ! This is now a
“peaceable, nay honourable station. They give us good words in
“almost every place. *What have we done, that the World should be*
“*so civil to us + ?*”

Is not this the language of a man whom nothing can please, when he is defeated in a secret purpose, which he is ashamed to own ? He languished, we see, for good WHOLESOME SEVERITIES. Many (as he well expresses it) *wanted a storm, being quite UNNERVED by constant Sunshine.* To supply this want, which the Magistrate so cruelly denied, he is forced to make the best of those mock persecutions, the *Drums* and *Huzzas* of the Rabble. And so bloody always are his ideas, by a constant meditation on this subject, that, speaking of the misnomers of the Grand Jury of Cork, in their presentment of his Brother, and half a score more itinerant Preachers, as vagrants and persons of ill fame, &c. he thus expresses himself—“The names (only most of them *miserably mangled and mur-*

* Journ. from. Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 88.

+ Ibid. p. 31.

dered) were designed for the names of eight Preachers, &c. *” The future Martyrologist whom favouring Destiny has appointed to collect together the Saints and Martyrs of this afflicted Church, will, if he be wise, never suffer himself to be misled into a belief that this *mangling and murdering* can refer to *names*; or indeed to any thing less than to an *Irish Massacre*, charitably disguised by our meek Apostle, under a figure, not to say a deformity of Speech. To give these *Persecutions* all the *relief* in his power, he expatiates on every adventure with such circumstance, that there is hardly a turnip-top thus sacrilegiously employed, which has not had the honour of being recorded. But this is for Posterity: Something more was to be done for the sake of the *unnerved* Brethren. This small pittance of *persecution*, poor as it is, must be turned to use while time served, lest, like a flame of straw, it should go out as soon as it was put into a blaze. He therefore contrives to keep *persecution* alive by *prosecuting his Persecutors*: And, to make his revenge the sweeter, he does it on the *toleration act*; the *Law* which does him so much mischief, in depriving him of a real Persecution. This he notably turns against itself, and makes an Instrument to support and keep up a shadowy Persecution, in the Shouts and Revels of the Mob.

Of this contrivance, and of the success of this contrivance, he has given us many curious examples in his Journals. Abundantly sufficient to evince, that though he who persecutes, breaks the Peace, yet as he is but the tool and Instrument of him who invites and provokes *persecution*, the crime at length comes home to him who set the Rioter on work.

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 4.

CHAP. X.

THE next mark of celestial Wisdom is, its being GENTLE AND EASY TO BE INTREATED. That is, neither a rigid reprover of the indifferent manners of others, nor obstinately tenacious of its own : but, as far as Truth and Honesty will permit, compliant and even obsequious to all men. The great Apostle of the Gentiles fully approves his pretensions to this *Wisdom*, in the account he gives of his conduct, *in becoming all things to all Men, that he might gain some* *. For the truth of which, he appeals to those who were best acquainted with his life and conversation. But amongst our modern Apostles the Scene is shifted. We find them severe condemners of those innocent manners of their fellow-citizens, which they themselves have abstained from, on pretence of their being less profitable and edifying, or, perhaps, obstructive of that perfection which they pretend to aim at. Nor are they less severe exactors of conformity to their own observances.

They tell us what we are to think of them, in the very appellation they assume. For METHODISM (as we have said) implies a set of manners, marked out by the rule and compass ; and, when made a name of distinction, it declares those manners are to be religiously and invariably observed, as the sacred badge of the Brotherhood. Hence Mr. J. Wesley in a letter *to the Church of God at Hernhuth in Upper Lusatia*, having reproved them for teaching, “ that it does imply *Liberty* to conform to the world, by talking “ on useless, if not trifling subjects, and by joining in worldly diversions, *in order to do good*,” they justify themselves by saying, “ We believe it much better to discourse out of the news-papers, “ than to chatter about holy things to no purpose.” To which he

* 1 Cor. ix. 22.

replies, " Perhaps so. But what is this to the point? I believe " both one and the other to be useless, and therefore AN ABOMINATION TO THE LORD *." Nay, he pushed this matter so far, as to come to a solemn resolution, NEVER TO LAUGH: and, to guard himself against the approaches of this paltry infirmity, *never to speak a tittle of worldly things*. And certainly, he who carries his dissociability to this extreme, is in no danger of being EASILY INTREATED. He was now fit company only for the Devil (with whom, as we have seen, he had a great deal to transact); indeed, not for him neither, till the more sociable Fiend had a little relaxed his muscles: for the first trick Satan played him, after they grew acquainted, was, as he himself tells us, to make him burst out into an *immoderate fit of Laughter* †. But he was ready *to tear himself to pieces* for his frailty.

Our Apostle's GENTLENESS may, by this time, be easily guessed at. But he saves us the trouble. We learn it fully in his *encaustic Paintings* of his Adversaries. He met with one of these in a violent storm at Sea. Yet the common danger of this dreadful hour could not abate the more violent tempest in his mind — " For who " should be there (says he) but the famous Mr. Gr—— of Carnarvonshire. A clumsy, overgrown, hardfaced man; whose " countenance I could only compare to that (which I saw in Drury-Lane, thirty years ago) of one of the *Ruffians in Macbeth* ‡—— " I walked over (says he) to Egham, where Mr. —— preached " one of the most miserable sermons I ever heard: Stuffed so full " of dull, senseless, improbable lies of those he complimented " with the title of false Prophets §."—" At St. Ives we were " saluted, as usual, with a Huzza, and a few stones *or* pieces " of dirt:" Yet, for want of a better, he has dignified even

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 103.

† See p. 610 of this Discourse.

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 31.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 88.

this with the name of a *Persecution*. “The *Persecution* here (says he) was owing in great measure to the indefatigable labours of “Mr. *Hoblin* and Mr. *Simmons*; Gentlemen worthy to be had in “everlasting remembrance for their unwearied endeavours to destroy Herefy.

“Fortunati ambo ! Siquid mea pagina possit,
“Nulla dies unquam memori vos eximet ævo *.”

Here he tells us, without disguise, that it is his holy purpose, to gibbet up the *Names* of these his two Persecutors, to everlasting Infamy: while, by the most unregenerate malice in the world, he dips his curses in the gall of irony; and, that they may strike the deeper, flecthes them with a prophane classical Parody.

Yet this is the man who says,—“God forbid that I should RAIL, “at a Turk, Infidel, or Heretic. I would point out their Errors, “and I trust, in the SPIRIT OF MEEKNESS †.” Yea, *this SPIRIT* was so strong in him, that he blesses God for his goodness, in directing all temptations to fall on this *side*; which, though it may be called his *blind side*, (as he always winks at his injuries; sometimes, indeed, to take the better aim) he assures us, is not his *weak side*——“I cannot but stand amazed at the goodness of God. “Others are most assaulted on the *weak side* of their Soul. But “with me it is quite otherwise. If I have any strength at all, “IT IS IN FORGIVING INJURIES. And on this very side am I “assaulted more frequently than any other ‡.” By which, with uncommon modesty, he would insinuate that though his *persecutions* abound, yet his *forgiveness*, in the *Spirit of meekness*, does much more abound.

St. Paul and St. James may be reconciled. But he is a bold man who will undertake to reconcile St. Paul and Mr. Wesley. The

* Journ. from Oct. 17, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 22.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1730, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 112.

‡ Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 39.

Reader,

Reader, perhaps, will be better employed in turning his attention upon *ancient* and *modern* SAINTSHIP, at large: where, in one general view, he will see *God's grace* in the First, and, in the Second, *Man's nature* severally asserting their Rights throughout the whole progress. The genial Spirit of God could breathe nothing but the balm of *gentleness and ease*. The pestilent heat of Fanaticism raises an inflammation and a tumour in the mind, whose Symptoms are an obdurate rigour, and impatience under the probe. The Heaven-struck Heart is affected like the purer metals, which easily soften, and run speedily at the touch of the ethereal Ray. But the Fanatic Spirit, self-heated by its own fiery nature, retains the property of its congenial earth, which grows harder and more intractable as it burns.

C H A P. XI.

TO proceed. St. James, in his account of celestial *Wisdom*, advances from grace to grace. It is *peaceable*: this is its lowest quality. It is *Gentle and easy to be intreated*: this is a further advance in its Character. The first only implies the not giving umbrage or offence to our Brother; but the second declares a readiness to consult his pleasure and convenience. The Apostle's next recommendation of this *Wisdom* rises still higher: it is, he says, **FULL OF MERCY AND GOOD FRUITS**. It would have been a poor account of the *Wisdom from above*, that it amounted only to an obsequious *ease* and *gentleness* of Manners: a disposition of heart little more than the shadow or out-line of Benevolence, that harmony of the affections, which the Christian Faith calls **CHARITY**; and which the Apostle, by a beautiful periphrasis, terms, the being *full of mercy and good fruits*.

Let

Let us enquire then into the MERCY and GOOD FRUITS of modern Saintship. The *mercy* of the Sufferer is *forgiveness*; the *mercy* of the Inflicter is *forbearance*.

Of Mr. Wesley's *forgiveness* under sufferings, we have seen many examples in the Language he bestows on his Opposers; who pass with him under no other title than that of the *Devil's Servants* and the *Devil's Children*: of his *forbearance*, when compleatly armed with the Vengeance of Heaven, we have seen many more, in his dispatching the Principal of these *Children of the Devil*, without mercy, to their *Father*. For one sure mark of the hypocondriac spirit under a Fanatic ferment, is the readiness to dispense, and the rashness to fling about, the exterminating Judgments of God: and when an Enthusiast *calls down fire from Heaven*, the least of his concern is, his being heard. So that every disaster, befallen his Opposers, is considered by him as God's *owning the Cause*, and he would esteem it ingratitude to his Master to give it any other name than that of a JUDGMENT; just as *Witches*, when a mischief happens to those whom they have often cursed, ascribe it to the Avenger of their quarrels, their trusty Coadjutor the Devil. For under the agitations of wrath and revenge, the *fruits of this Spirit* are much the same, whether Heaven or Hell be called to their assistance. Do I wrong these Men? See what has been said above of this matter*: and if that does not suffice, turn again to Mr. J. Wesley's *Journals*. "Wednesday 15. I went to Bedlam at the
" repeated request of Mr. S. who had been confined there above
" two years. This was the Person, who, while he was speaking
" against my Brother and me, to the Society at Kingswood, was in
" a moment struck raving mad. But, it seems, God is at length in-
" treated for him, and has restored him to a sound mind †." Again,
" One J——n H——n, a weaver——zealous for the Church and
" against Dissenters of every denomination——He laboured much

* P. 621—623.

† Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 33.

“ to convince his acquaintance that the *strange fits, into which people*
 “ *at the Societies fell*, was a delusion of the Devil. We were going
 “ home when one met us in the street, and informed us, That
 “ J——n H——n was fallen *raving mad*.——Between one and
 “ two, I came in and found him on the floor, the room being full
 “ of people, whom his wife would have kept out, but he cried
 “ aloud, No, let the world see the *just Judgment of God*. Two or
 “ three men were holding him as well as they could. He imme-
 “ diately fixed his eyes upon me, and stretching out his hands,
 “ cried, Oh! this is he who, I said, was a deceiver of the People.
 “ But *God has overtaken me* *.”—And again,—“ I was informed of
 “ an *awful providence*. A poor wretch who was here the last
 “ week, cursing, blaspheming, and labouring with all his might
 “ to hinder the *word of God*, had afterwards boasted to many,
 “ that he would come again on *Sunday*, and no man should stop
 “ his mouth then. But on Friday *God laid his hand* upon
 “ him, and on Sunday he was buried †.—I saw a poor man, (*once*
 “ *joined with us*) who wanted nothing in this world, but the peace
 “ the world cannot give. A day or two before, *he hanged himself*,
 “ but was cut down before he was dead. He has been crying out
 “ ever since, *God had left him, because he had left the Children of*
 “ *God* ‡. But he is inexorable to all who apostatize.—“ I buried
 “ the body of Lucy Godshall——after pressing toward the mark
 “ for more than two years——*She became weary and faint—I*
 “ *put her out of the band*,——God blessed this to her soul.”——
 But how?——“ She fell down on her knees, and delivered up her
 “ soul and body into the hands of God. In the instant the use of
 “ all her limbs was taken away, and she was in a burning fever.—
 “ She cried out on *Satan*——was in *darkness*——was in *light*——closed
 “ her eyes and died §.”——“ I was pressed to visit Nicholas Palmer,

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 44.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 59, 60.

‡ Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 91.

§ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 71.

“ one who had *seperated from us*, and behaved with a great *bit-terness*, till *God laid his hand* upon him. He had *seut for me* several times, saying he could not die in peace till he had seen me.—We wrestled with God in his behalf—his soul was comforted; and a few hours after quietly fell asleep*.”

Their GOOD FRUITS come next to be considered. Mr. J. Wesley’s idea of *true Religion* doth not promise much. He saith, “ It doth not consist in any or all these three things, *the living harmless—using the means of Grace – and doing much good*. A man, he says, “ may do all this, and yet have *no true Religion at all*†.”

Yet St. JAMES talks another language. *Pure Religion* (and, I suppose, *pure* and *true* differ only in sound) *and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the World*‡.

Now, what is *visiting the fatherless and widows*, but *the doing much good*? And what is *keeping one’s self unspotted from the world*, but *using the means of Grace*? In what a fearful taking then, must Mr. Wesley’s Zealots be, who, misled by the Bible, have so long mistaken *true Religion*? The least it will do is to drive them to *despair*. But this is the very state in which their Master delights to take them up. And his assurance, that *true Religion* consists in *God’s dwelling and reigning in the Soul*§, soon makes way for a happier madness: the Jaws of Hell begin to close, the Gates of Heaven to open.—But, what the over-laboured imagination suffered, during the course of this operation, requires the hand of a Master to describe. I shall give it therefore in Mr. J. Wesley’s own words: and as these his spiritual cures (which he reports with the exactness of an Hippocrates or a Sydenham) are all the GOOD FRUITS he pretends to, he will not be displeased to have a few of the choicest of them set in a fair light.

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 5.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 11, 12.

‡ St. James, c. i. ver. 27.

§ P. 11. ut sup.

The condition of his Audience, on his first operation upon them, is thus graphically described—"I preached in an open place, two or three miles from Newcastle. The wind was high and extremely sharp: but I saw none go away till I went. Yet I observed none seemed to be much convinced; only STUNN'D, AS IF CUT IN THE HEAD *." This was in order. They were first to be *stunned*; the Watchman, Reason, was to be laid asleep before he could set fire to their Imaginations. But he brings them to their senses with a vengeance, the vengeance of the Devil. "I felt the FIRE OF HELL already kindled in my breast (says one), and all my body was in as much pain as if I had been in a burning fiery furnace †."—"I was interrupted (says he) by the cries of one who was *pricked at the heart*." One of those, I suppose, who had before been *cut in the head*: and having now got possession both of the *head* and *heart*, the game begins.—"Another person dropped down—a little boy near him was seized in the same manner. A young man who stood behind fixed his eyes on him, and sunk down himself as one dead. But soon began to roar out and beat himself on the ground, so that six men could scarcely hold him.—Mean while many others began to cry out to the Saviour of all, that he would come and help them, insomuch that all the house, and indeed all the street for some space, was in an uproar.—I was called after supper to one who feeling in herself such a Conviction as she had never known before, had run out of the Society in all haste, *that she might not expose herself*. But the hand of God followed her still, &c. ‡." This fear of *exposing herself*, Mr. J. Wesley, we see, takes much amiss. He speaks with some resentment, but more contempt, of her delicacy. Yet it seems hard that he would not suffer the young Woman to understand the nature of *her own feelings*, and conse-

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 82.

† Ibid. p. 83.

‡ Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 50, 51.

quently

quently to be the best judge of the danger she was in, of *exposing herself*.—"Forty or Fifty of those who were seeking salvation, desired leave to spend the night together in the society room. Before ten, I left them, and laid down."—For our Engineer had so amply provided them with combustibles, and so fitly laid his train, that he knew they would take fire from their own collisions. He was not disappointed.—"Between two and three in the morning he was awaked, and desired to come down stairs. I immediately (says he) heard such a confused noise, as if a number of men were all putting to the sword. It increased, when I came into the room, and began to pray, &c. *."—"Thence I went to a poor woman who had been long in *despair*. I was glad to meet with Mrs. R. there; the person mentioned in Mr. Whitefield's Journal, who after *three years madness* (so called) was so deeply convinced of Sin, &c. †."—"Another of Dr. Monro's patients came to desire my advice; I found no reason to believe she had been otherwise *mad* than every one is, who is deeply convinced of Sin ‡."—"A middle-aged woman desired me to return thanks for her to God; who, as many witnesses then present testified, was, a day or two before, really *distracted*, and, as such, *tied down in her bed*. But upon prayer made for her, she was instantly relieved, and restored to a sound mind §."—"I could not but be under some concern with regard to one or two persons, who were tormented in an unaccountable manner, and seemed to be indeed *Lunatics*, as well as sore vexed ||." Here, for the first time, Humanity seems to have recovered a little of its rights, amidst these scenes of horror. Mr. J. WESLEY himself confesses, *he could not but be under some concern*. But invigorated by the *new Man*, he soon shakes off the *human pity* of the *old*, and makes a joke even of the very *Lunacy*, he had pretended to lament.

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 51, 52.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 8.

‡ Ibid. p. 83.

§ Ibid. p. 4.

|| Ibid. p. 88.

“ Two or three who were at the Devanden (a high hill two or three miles from Chepstow) *are gone quite distracted*, i. e. they mourn and refuse to be comforted till they have Redemption, &c. *”—“ I desired one who had seen affliction herself to go and visit Mrs. G—— in *Bedlam* (put there by her husband as a *mad woman*), where it pleased God greatly to knit their hearts together, and with his comforts to refresh their souls †.”—“ Amongst the hearers was one, who some time before had been deeply convinced of her ungodliness, insomuch that she cried out day and night, *Lord, save, or I perish!* All the neighbours agreeing that she was *stark mad*, her husband put her into a Physician's hands, who blooded her largely, and laid on several blisters. But all this proving without success, she was in a short time judged to be *incurable*. When Mrs. Johnson came, she soon saw the nature of the disease, having herself *gone through* the same. She ordered all the medicines to be thrown away, and exhorted the Patient to *look unto Jesus ‡.*”

And with this spiritual *madness* he is so enamoured, that he calls it, when at its height, A GLORIOUS TIME. “ I preached at Weavers Hall. IT WAS A GLORIOUS TIME. Several dropped to the ground, as if struck with lightning, &c. &c. §” And where this is wanting, though every other thing be to his wish, he is so dissatisfied, that it is as much as ever his submission to the divine Will can obtain of him, *to let God do as seemeth him good.*—“ I saw none of that *triumph of Faith*, which has been so COMMON in other places. But the Believers go on *calm and steady.*—LET GOD DO AS SEEMETH HIM GOOD ||.”

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 9c.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 54.

‡ Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 53.

§ Ibid. p. 27.

|| Ibid. p. 78.

But though Mr. J. Wesley does so ably, in this new Trade of *turning fools into mad-men*, yet his Craft's-master is certainly one Mr. Wh—y, of whom Mr. Wesley tells this extraordinary tale—“A poor woman gave an account of what I think ought never to be forgotten.” Truly, I think so too—“It was four years, sh— said, since her Son, Peter Shaw, then nineteen or twenty years old, by hearing a Sermon of Mr. Wh—y, fell into great uneasiness. She thought he was ill, and would have sent for a Physician. But he said, No, no, send for Mr. Wh—y. He was sent for, and came; and, after asking a few questions, told her, *The Boy is mad*, get a Coach and carry him to Dr. M—, use my name, I have sent several such to him *.”—Who this Mr. Wh—y is, or what he is, I know not. But, we see, he sends his People to Monro, with the same unconcern in search of lost brains, that one would enquire of Sir J. Fielding for a lost portmanteau.

Such are the exploits which Mr. J. Wesley calls, in the place last quoted, BLESSINGS FROM GOD: and which therefore we may well call the GOOD FRUITS of his Ministry; those by which St. James directs us to judge of his *Mission*. For what the Apostle calls *good fruits*, namely, *doing much good*, Mr. J. Wesley plainly tells us, belong not to *true Religion*: What belongs not to true Religion he rightly deems superfluous: And whatever is superfluous he makes solemn resolutions to avoid †.

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1759, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 56.

† Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, to his return from Germany, p. 13.

C H A P. XII.

HITHERTO the Marks delivered by St. James, to judge of a pretended Missionary from Heaven, consider him as urging his pretensions fairly and with good faith; though possibly in a fanatic or enthusiastic way: But what follows—**WITHOUT PARTIALITY AND WITHOUT HYPOCRISY**—represents the pretender to such a character as capable of acting in a mask, and using the mere worldly arts of fraud and deceit. And this supposition is made with admirable judgment and knowledge of human Nature.

ENTHUSIASM, so indispensable a requisite in the successful leading of a Sect, must always be accompanied with craft and knavery. There is a necessity for this odd combination; and the thing itself, as strange as it may seem, is very naturally to be accounted for.

A meer cool-headed Projector, without any tincture of innate enthusiasm, can never succeed in his Designs, because such a one can never exhibit those surprizing freaks, which a heated imagination, working on a *disordered*, though, for this purpose, *fitly framed* temper of body, so speciously produces. For the spirits of the People, who are to be taken in, can never be allured, but by raising their *admiration*, and keeping up their confidence in an inspired Leader. Besides, new doctrines and new ideas are never so readily received as when the Teacher of them is in earnest, and believes *Himself*: For then there is something so natural in his conduct as easily to conciliate belief; there is something so alluring that it acts even like an Incantation.

On the other hand, a *mere Enthusiast*, who, by virtue of this faculty, hath gone so far in his purpose as to raise the admiration, and to captivate the spirits, of the People, must here begin to fail, if he be without the other quality, *sectarian Craft*: For his *fanaticism* not being under the controul of his *judgment*, he will want
the

the proper dexterity to apply the different views, tempers, and pursuits of the People, now enflamed and ready to become his Instruments, to the advancement of his Projects.

But when these two talents of *Fraud* and *Fanaticism* unite to furnish out the Leader of a Sect, great will be the success of his undertakings. And when such a one feels the strength of this union, it is no wonder he should be ready to cry out with Mr. J. Wesley, *Give me whereon to stand, and I will shake the whole earth* *. For now the fallies of his Enthusiasm will be so corrected by his Cunning, as to strengthen and confirm his supernatural pretences; and the cold and slow advances of a too cautious policy will be warmed and pushed forward by the force of his *Fanaticism*. His *craft* will enable him to elude the enquiries and objections of the more Rational; and his Visions will irrecoverably subdue all the warmer Noddles. In a word, they will mutually support and strengthen each other's force, and cover and repair each other's defects. St. Jerom seems to have had a true idea of this extraordinary combination, when he said, "Nullus potest Hæresin struere, nisi qui ARDENTIS INGENII est, 'et habet DONA NATURÆ †." Which may be thus paraphrased — *No Heretic will ever be able to raise a Sect, but he, in whose constitution Nature has enabled Fraud and Fanaticism to act in concert.*

Several things concur to facilitate this happy conjunction. An Enthusiast considers himself as an Instrument employed by Providence to attain some great End, for the sake of which he was sent out. This makes him diligent in his work; impatient under any lett or obstruction; and attentive to every method for removing it. Persuaded of the necessity of the End, and of the divine Commission intrusted to the Instrument, he begins to fancy that such a one, for the obtaining so great a purpose, is dispensed with, in breaking, nay is authorized to break, the common Laws of Mora-

* See p. 615 of this Discourse.

† See The Divine Legation, Book III. Sect. 6.

lity ; which, in the cant of those times, when Fanaticism had its full play, was called the BEING ABOVE ORDINANCES. In the first application of these *means*, the People are the Dupes of their Leader : But the success being frequently far beyond even his own conception, he becomes, in his turn, the Dupe of himself ; and begins in good earnest to believe that the trick which he played them, was indeed not of his own contrivance, but the inspired instigation of Heaven *. This will explain an obscure passage of Tacitus, where speaking of this sort of Character, in his oracular way, he says, *FINGUNT SIMUL CREDUNTQUE*. Let me add, that this seems to have been much the case of OLIVER CROMWELL, from his first mounting into the Saddle and the Pulpit, to his last reveries on his death-bed †.

Again, *Enthusiasm* is a kind of ebullition or critical ferment of the mind, which a vigorous nature sometimes works through, and by slow degrees is able to surmount. Hence the most successful Impostors, who have set out in all the blaze of Fanaticism, have completed their Schemes amidst the cool depths and stillness of Politics. Though this, in some degree, be common to them all, yet I know of none who exemplifies the case so fully as the famous IGNATIUS LOIOLA. This wonderful Person began his *extases* in the mire, and finished his course in the direction and execution of Councils, which, even in his own life-time, were ready to give Law to Christendom. Mr. J. Wesley appears to have studied this great

* That great observer of Nature CERVANTES, having made Sancho (to save himself from the vexation of a sleeveless errand) palm upon his Master a supposititious Dulcinea ; When the Squire comes to relate this adventure to the Dutchess, she extols his ingenuity so highly, that he begins to suspect himself to be tricked into his own contrivance : and that the Enchanters had presented him with a *true* Dulcinea in masquerade, when he thought he was imposing a *false one* barefaced on his Master.

† Thurloe tells us, that the Protector, on his death-bed, foretold his recovery, as an inspiration from Heaven. Had it proved true, he had gained much by obtaining to himself the useful Character of Prophet : and he lost nothing by the conviction of its falsehood.

Master

Master well : though, by a common practice of those who set up for themselves, he kicks away the steps by which he mounted. “ I rode (says he) to Oxford—in riding I read over that surprising book, the life of **IGNATIUS LOIOLA**. Surely one of the greatest men that ever was engaged in the support of a *bad cause*. I wonder any man should judge him to be an *Enthusiast*. No : but he knew the people with whom he had to do. And setting out like Count Z. with a **FULL PERSUASION** *that he might USE GUILT TO PROMOTE THE GLORY OF GOD **.” Now I desire to know, how any, but an **ENTHUSIAST**, could have a *full persuasion*, i. e. be persuaded, bona fide, *that he might use guilt to promote the glory of God ?* Or how any, but a **KNAVE**, could succeed in this *persuasion* ?—Cicero observes that the *Eye*, which sees all other things, sees not itself ; This instance will shew it to be equally true, that the *Mind*, which plays such strange tricks, is often very inattentive to its own frame and operations.

Modern Saintship then being so subject to these odd traverses, it is well for **BOTH SOCIETIES**, that we have an unerring Rule whereon to estimate its Claim. For the Apostle having declared that *the wisdom from above is without PARTIALITY and without HYPOCRISY*; if such qualities be found in those who pretend to derive all, immediately, from *above*, we need no further evidence of the imposture. And, now, having hitherto used this famed Head of his Sect for an Example, it would be unkind to drop him here, and not suffer him to finish, as he began, his Apostolical career.

PARTIALITY consists in dispensing an *unequal measure*, in our transactions with Others :

And **HYPOCRISY** in attempting to cover that *unequal measure* by prevarication and false colours.

The Reader must have been very inattentive to what hath been produced from Mr. J. Wesley's **JOURNALS**, not to have observed the many convincing marks of the writer's *partiality* and *hypocrisy*.

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 67.

The passages have indeed been given to convict him of other *fanatic qualities*, equally inconsistent with the *wisdom which is from above*; but many of them will, at the same time, serve to shew how ably he availed himself of these two political Accomplishments.

We have seen in general, that his Followers are always the *Children of God*; and his Opposers, the *Children of the Devil*. But the first being directed by inward feelings and the impulse of an inflamed fancy, and the other by the outward testimony of Scripture, interpreted by human reason, it is no great wonder that Mr. J. Wesley, who saw them so much unlike, should marshal them under two different Leaders. But what shall we think, when we find him saying the worst of his Friends that his Enemies have said of him, as soon as ever he sees them presume to play over his own pranks in any other Name? If they follow not him, they are *Fanatics* and *Enthusiasts*, how like soever they be in all other things to their ghostly Pattern.—“I was with two persons (says Mr. J. Wesley) who, I doubt, are properly *Enthusiasts*. For first they “think to attain the end without the means, which is *enthusiasm*, “properly so called: again they think themselves inspired by God, “and are not. But false imaginary inspiration is *enthusiasm*. That “theirs is only imaginary inspiration appears hence, it contradicts “*the Law and the Testimony* *.” These are wise words: but what do they amount to? Only to this, That these two Persons would not take out their Patents of Inspiration from his Office; and, therefore, he has advertised them, for Counterfeits. However, thus much we gain by them, that all modern pretences to Inspiration are, by the acknowledgement of Mr. J. Wesley himself, to be tryed by the *Law and the Testimony*. He cannot, then, surely, refuse to have his own pretensions tried before that Judicature to which we have appealed him.

Miss Gr—, one of the holy, had told another Miss, that Mr. J. Wesley was a *Papist*, perhaps on account of the honour he does to

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 23.

auricular confession, one kind of which he recommends to his BANDS. Upon this Miss Gr— is anathematized. And we are told, that, in consequence, “she had lately been *raving mad*; that as such, she “was tied down in her bed*.” Yet all these circumstances of *madness* have, in the opinion of the ablest Physicians, befallen Mr. J. Wesley’s favourite Saints; whom he has vindicated from that Opprobrium; he has laughed at the ignorance of the faculty; and declared those equivocal marks to be the constant Symptoms of the NEW BIRTH.

He pronounces Sentence of *Enthusiasm* upon another: And tells us, Wherefore, without any disguise.—“Here (says he) I *took leave* of a poor, mad, *original Enthusiast*, who had been scattering “abroad LIES in every quarter†.” By which we find, that, even in Mr. J. Wesley’s own opinion, *Fanaticism* and *Knavery* are very near neighbours.

“I had much conversation with Mr. Simpson, an *original Enthusiast*.—I desired him in the evening to give an exhortation—He “did so, and spoke *many good things, in a manner peculiar to himself*. When he had done, I summed up what he had said, methodizing and explaining it. O what pity is it that this well-meaning man should ever speak without an Interpreter‡!”—and that Mr. J. Wesley should not be he!

In these two last passages, we are presented with two ORIGINAL ENTHUSIASTS. But how differently do we find them treated! The first is accused of doing the work of the Devil, of spreading *lies* of his Master; on which account his Master *takes his leave of him*: a gentle expression, to signify, the thrusting him out, head and shoulders, from the Society of Saints: The other likewise, whose *original enthusiasm* is made to consist only in want of *Method*, or, to speak more properly, want of *Methodism*, is only lamented, as having the ill luck to *speak without an Interpreter*. That is, without

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 73, 74.

† Journ. from Oct. 27, 1743, to Nov. 17, 1746, p. 71.

‡ Ibid. p. 91.

having his doctrine regulated on the dictates of his Master. But the First set his Master at defiance: the Second *spoke many good things*, that is, he professed a doctrine agreeable to Mr Wesley; indeed, *in a manner peculiar to himself*, that is, not on Mr. Wesley's Authority, but his own. Now, there were some hopes of Him; but none at all of the other. Therefore though they are pronounced ORIGINAL ENTHUSIASTS alike, yet we must distinguish, and rate their Titles very differently. The first *Original* was of his original the Devil, *a scatterer abroad of lies in every quarter*: The second was worth recovering. His *Original Enthusiasm* was a foundation, like *Original Sin*, to erect upon it a monument of Grace.

But the most *genuine instance of enthusiasm*, which, he tells us, he will give, and which, without doubt, he does give, with the utmost reluctance, is the following. He preached at *Tanfield-Leigh*. "But so dead, *senseless*, unaffected a congregation (says he) have I scarce seen, except at *Wickham*. Whether Gospel or Law, or English or Greek, seemed all one to them." Yet he *spoke*, he tells us, *strong rough words*. But why is *want of sense* put into this *rough* description of their unregenerate State? He owns, that numbers of the Godly were without any. And why would he elicit *sense* from these Gentiles, when, upon their conversion, they were finally to be deprived of it, in *extacies* and *new births*? However, as ungrateful as the Soil appeared, — "Yet the seed sown even there was not quite lost. For on Thursday morning, between four and five, *John Brown*, then of *Tanfield-Leigh*, was *waked out of sleep* by the voice that raiseth the dead; and ever since he has been full of love and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." But now see what comes of *waking these sleepers*. This same J— B—, who had received the Holy Ghost but at the latter end of November, became so *freakish* by the beginning of December, that he even forced Mr. J. Wesley (for the honour of Methodism itself) to pronounce *him* likewise a *genuine Enthusiast*, and to throw aside this precious Saint, as flawed by over-bakeing, amongst the useless rubbish of his Shop.

"I was

“ I was both surpris'd and grieved”—here, Reader, thou mayest safely believe him—“ at a *genuine* instance of *Entbusiasm*. J—B— of Tanfield-Leigh, who had received a *SENSE* of the love of God “ a few days before, came riding through the town, *howling* and “ *shouting*” [the inseparable symptoms of the *new birth*] “and driving “ all the People before him, telling them, *God had told him he “ should be a KING, and should tread all his enemies under his “ feet *.*”

Now this being the only *FRUIT* of the *seed sown* in this place, had it not been better to have let these honest people alone? who appear amiable, even through the sarcastic abuse he so liberally pours over them.—“ At Wickham, I spoke strong rough words: but I “ did not perceive that any regarded what was spoken. The Peo- “ ple indeed were exceeding quiet, and *the cold kept them from fall- “ ing asleep*; till, before two, I left them very *well satisfied with “ the Preacher and with themselves †.*” And why should they not? Why is this poor satisfaction, in themselves, which they had so liberally expressed towards him, begrudged them? A reasonable Man desires no more, than that his friends be satisfied with him; he does not expect, nay, he would be sorry, to find them dissatisfied with themselves. But such an equality of mind and measure, as in the good people of Wickham, is destructive of all the schemes of a Fanatic Leader: Who must find, or *make*, a People desperate, and ready to hang themselves, before they can be prepared and rightly tempered for the sacred Mold of Methodism.

We shall end, where every Fanatic Leader ends—with his *HYPOCRISY*. And if *evasion* and *prevarication*, in the most essential points of his Ministry, may be called by that name, I cannot see how Mr. J. Wesley will escape from having this concluding mark of imposture fixed upon him.

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 79.

† Ibid. p. 78.

I. We have wearied ourselves and Readers, in recounting the numberless MIRACLES by which He and his affairs have been supported, amidst a *cloud of Witnesses* well disposed to magnify the scene. Yet, after all this, with a **WORLDLY PRUDENCE** which one would not expect in a man who calls it *the mystery of Iniquity*, he thinks fit to secure himself a retreat, in case all these wonders should become problematical. For after having heaped them upon one another, Olympus-high, throughout nine copious Journals, he sneaks away under the cover of a puny Wonder, and leaves the defence of all his Giant-miracles in the lurch! "About five (says he) "I began, near the Keelman's Hospital, many thousands standing "round, or sitting on the Grass. The wind was high just before; "but scarce a breath was felt, all the time we assembled before "God. I praise God for this also. Is it **ENTHUSIASM** TO SEE "GOD IN EVERY BENEFIT *which we receive* *?" Certainly it is not. The *Enthusiasm* consists in believing those *benefits* to be *miraculously* conferred by a change in the established order of Nature. This is the *Enthusiasm* with which he is charged; and this Charge almost every page of his Journals will support. But here, by the neatest address, he covertly insinuates (as a Word to the Wise) that he meant no more by his *Miracles* than the *seeing of God in every benefit we receive*. A certain Philosopher † of great name fancied he had explained the nature of vision well, on the principle of *seeing all things in God*. And if the World be content to be paid in such coin, our Divine will not be long in its debt. He can explain *Miracles*, as well as the other explained *Nature*, by the knack he has of *seeing God in all things*. This then goes a great way towards ridding his hands of Miracles when the Inquisitive become troublesome. But as he well knew it might be said of him, "If you part with your Miracles, you strip yourself of the credentials of your Mission," he has a fetch for this also; a Friend to help him at a dead lift; whose opinion, "he wishes all calm and impartial men "would consider—Not to establish the power of *working Miracles*

* Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 18.

† Malebranche.

“ as the great Criterion of a divine Mission ; when Scripture teaches “ us that the agreement of doctrines with truth as taught in those “ Scriptures, is the only infallible Rule *.” Suppose now any sense could be drawn out of these gallimatias of *Scripture’s teaching that the agreement of doctrines with truth as taught in those Scriptures, is the only infallible rule*: And that it might mean, “ that Scripture teaches us, that the conformity of its doctrines with the truths discoverable by natural light, is the only Criterion.” I then ask, Where SCRIPTURE teacheth this ? I ask it, I say, Because REASON teacheth another thing : for, from the Premises, of the conformity of *Scripture doctrines with truth*, Her Conclusion is only this, That Scripture doctrines are true ; not that they were immediately derived from Heaven. I am afraid therefore, that *Scripture* is here much scandalized, by making it talk a language so dissonant to *Reason*. And I am the more confirmed in this opinion, since Scripture, from the mouth of Jesus himself, expressly says, that the *power of working miracles*, and not *the conformity of Scripture doctrines to truth*, is the great criterion of a divine Mission. The words of Jesus are these : “ If I had not done amongst them the “ works which no other man did, they had not had Sin : But now “ have they both seen and hated me and my Father †.” But why, in case *no miracles had been worked* amongst them them, *had they not had Sin* ? For this reason, and only for this, that, without *Miracles*, there was *no sufficient criterion* of a DIVINE MISSION. And *Sin* could not be imputed to them for rejecting a Character which did not bring its full credentials with it. From what I can see then, Mr. J. Wesley must either stick to his *Miracles*, or give up his *Mission*.

II. But he shifts and doubles no less with regard to the *Extacies*, and the *New-birth* of his Saints. Sometimes they are undoubtedly of *God* ; sometimes again as certainly of the *Devil* : but he is

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 72.

† John, chap. xv. ver. 24.

constant in this, that *Natural causes* have no hand in them. The reason is plain : He could make both GOD and the DEVIL conducive to his purposes ; but NATURE is the sure destruction of every fanatic frolic.—The Saints met in Fetter-lane to humble themselves before God for *grieving the Holy Spirit*.—To the several offences assigned, Mr. J. Wesley adds—“ But above all, by *BLASPHEMING HIS WORKS* amongst us, imputing it either to NATURE, “ to the force of imagination and animal Spirits, or even the *delusion of the DEVIL*.—At that hour we found God with us as at “ the first. *Some fell prostrate upon the ground. Others burst out, “ as with one consent, into a loud praise and thanksgiving. And “ many openly testified, there had been no such day as this, since “ January the first, preceding *.*” — “ On Friday many were deeply “ convinced ; but none were delivered from that painful conviction. The Children came to the *birth* ; but there was not strength “ to bring forth. *I fear we have grieved the Spirit of the jealous “ God by questioning his work †.*”

—“ Innumerable cautions were given me, not to regard *Visions* “ or *Dreams*, or to fancy people had remission of Sins, because “ of their *Cries*, or tears, or outward professions. — The Sum of “ my answer was as follows : You deny that God does now “ work these effects : at least that he works them in this manner. “ I AFFIRM BOTH : because I have heard these things with my “ own ears, and seen them with my own eyes. I have seen very “ many persons changed in a moment from the Spirit of fear, “ horror, despair, to the Spirit of love, joy, and peace. — What I “ have to say touching *Visions* or *Dreams* is this : I know several “ persons in whom this great change was wrought in a *dream*, or “ during a *strong representation to the eye of the mind*, of Christ, “ either on the *Cross* or in *Glory*. This is the fact †.” — Nay, he is so convinced of its being the *work* of God, that the horrid

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 59.

† Ibid. p. 16.

‡ Ibid. p. 49.

blasphemies which ensued, he ascribes to the abundance of joy, which God had given to a poor mad woman of his flock. “I met with
 “one, who having been lifted up with the abundance of joy which
 “God had given her, had fallen into blasphemies and vain ima-
 “ginations *as are not common to men*. In the afternoon I found
 “another instance, nearly, I fear, of the same kind—She had
 “her *private revelations* so called, &c.*” But now, on a sud-
 den, he gives us the reverse of the Medal, and directly revokes
 all he had advanced.—“I told them they were not to judge of
 “the Spirit whereby any one spoke, either by *appearances* or by
 “*common report*, or by their own *inward feelings*. No, nor by
 “any *Dreams, Visions, or Revelations* supposed to be made to their
 “soul, any more than by their tears, or any *involuntary effects*
 “*wrought upon their bodies*. I warned them, all these were in them-
 “selves of a DOUBTFUL DISPUTABLE NATURE. They *might* be
 “from God, or they *might* not †.” The Reader cannot but be
 much surprized to find so formal a recantation of what he had said ‡
 just above concerning *inward feelings, dreams, visions, and ecstasies*;
 and of his own *confidence* in affirming these to be the work of God,
 from his *having both heard these things with his own ears, and from*
his having seen them with his own eyes; for here he denies *common*
report, (and are not other people’s ears and eyes as good as his?) or
appearances, or even *feelings*, to be a sufficient ground of assurance:
 of this, I can give no better account, and perhaps the Reader will
 desire no better, than this, that when our Apostle thought fit thus
 to unsay what he had so confidently affirmed before, it was in a
 desponding hour, when he *was in much doubt whether God would*
not lay him aside and send other Labourers into his harvest §. Under
 these fears he seemed resolved, at least, that these new *Labourers*
 should not reap what he had sown: and therefore, at all adventures,
 thought proper to cut the ground from under their feet.

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 54.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 60, 61.

‡ See p. 668.

§ Journ. *ibid.* p. 60.

At length, finding his Cause sufficiently disgraced by the unruliness of these *divine Agitations*; and knowing (as we shall see presently) how to make a better use of them; he fairly gives them all to the DEVIL. “I enquired (says he) into the case of those who had, almost every night the last week, *cried out aloud*, during the preaching. I found that all of them were persons in perfect health, and had not been subject to Fits of any kind till they were thus affected: that this had come upon every one of them in a moment, without any previous notice, while they were either hearing the word of God, or thinking on what they had heard: that in that moment they dropt down, lost all their strength, and were seized with violent pain. This they expressed in different manners. Some said, they felt just as if a sword was running through them: others, that they thought a great weight lay upon them, as if it would squeeze them into the Earth. Some said they were quite choaked, so that they could not breathe; others, that their hearts swelled ready to burst: and others, that it was as if their Heart, as if all their Inside, as if their whole Body was tearing all to pieces. These *Symptoms* I can no more impute to any NATURAL CAUSE than to the SPIRIT OF GOD. I can make no doubt but it was SATAN TEARING THEM as they were coming to Christ. And hence proceeded those *grievous cries* whereby he might design both to DISCREDIT the Work of God, and to affright fearful People from hearing that Word, whereby their souls might be saved*.”

Now, the Reader ought to take notice, that these were the very *Symptoms* which Mr. J. Wesley had before ascribed to the *spirit of God*.—But by this time he was sensible, and so he confesses in this very place, that they had DISCREDITED the *Work*. They were therefore to be sent to the DEVIL, from whence they came; yet still upon Mr. J. Wesley’s Errand. For there is nothing, except NATURE, as we observed above, which he cannot put to

* Journ. from Sept. 3, 1741, to Oct. 27, 1743, p. 91.

some good use or other. And this new Donation of the *extacies of the Saints* was a noble foundation for what he was now projecting, the Farce of DIABOLISMS and EXORCISMS. Well, therefore, might he exult over this Old Mischief-maker, *as not having wit enough to discern* that he was over-matched; and that Mr. John Wesley was too hard for him. *I wonder* (says he) *the Devil has not wisdom enough to discern that he is destroying his own Kingdom* *. Indeed, he has fairly turned the tables upon SATAN: and shewn us, that he can make full as good an use of a POSSESSION from below †, as of an INSPIRATION from above.

III. The Reader remembers how contemptuously Mr. Wesley has spoken of *Orthodoxy*, or *true belief*; even to the questioning whether it makes *any part of Religion at all*; certain is he, that, at best, it makes *but a very slender part*. “It is a point, says he, “we chiefly insist upon, that *Orthodoxy*, or right Opinion, is at “best but a very slender part of Religion, if any part of it at all ‡.” This was done to *take in* as many as he could, from amongst the *Secularies*; but when he wants to *take off* as many as he can, from amongst the *Churchmen*, then *Orthodoxy*, or true belief, is like *Methodism*, the *Unum Necessarium*: or, to speak more properly, *Orthodoxy* and *Methodism* are but two words for the same thing. “About a thousand people stood patiently while I simply described the *plain old Religion of the Church of England*, which “is now almost every where spoken against, under the new name “of *Methodism* §.”

IV. We have seen him (in the true Spirit of a Sectary) inviting and even provoking *Persecution*, as the only means of making the *good seed take root*: for, after having sown it in the mud and

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 56.

† See p. 6.9—621.

‡ Mr. Wesley's plain Account, &c. p. 4.

§ Journ. from Aug. 12 1738 to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 90.

slime of *field preaching*, he then, by a kind of Ægyptian Husbandry *, draws together whole droves of obscene Animals, who rush furiously in, and trample it about ; but this, as that Mother-seat of ARTS may have informed him, only made it spring up the better.—“ The Mob, says he, gathered in great numbers “ about my door, and quite closed me in. *I rejoiced and blessed “ God, knowing this was the time I had long been looking for †.*” But, mistake him not. A *Persecution* he certainly wished, and as diligently sought. But it was for his beloved Saints, who, as he says, wanted it ‡, who hungered after it ; nor for himself, who had no stomach to it, especially when it grew serious, as once upon a time it did.

In his ramble to *Georgia*, he got acquainted with one Mrs. Williamson (so he himself tells his story), to whom he refused the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. She had done some *wrong*, it seems, *to her neighbour*. What it was, he does not tell us. The Uncle (he says) desired he would declare in the Court-house, why he expelled Mrs. Williamson from the holy Communion. “ But he declined it, as apprehending *many ill consequences* might arise from so doing. What He would not declare, the Uncle did ; and said, that it was *in revenge for rejecting his, Mr. Wesley’s, proposals of marriage, and marrying Mr. Williamson*. The Husband prosecuted him for *defamation* : and the Wife, says Mr. Wesley, “ swore and “ signed an affidavit, *insinuating much more than it asserted*, but asserting, that he, Mr. Wesley, had many times proposed marriage “ to her, all which proposals she had rejected.”

In consequence of this, “ He is presented by the *Grand Jury*, “ upon oath, as having broken the Laws of the Realm by speaking “ and writing to Mrs. Williamson against her husband’s consent ; “ by repelling her from the holy Communion, &c.” The matter

* ———in suum quisque rus jacto semine, Sues immittit, et fatis conculcato a Sui-
bus semine, messem deinde expectat. Herod. l. ii. c. 14.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 56.

‡ See p. 645.

was now growing serious; the Georgians, he found, did not understand raillery, in the affair of spiritual Gallantry. It was time for him to look about him. In this distress, he began to have recourse, as usual, to his *revelations*—"I consulted my friends, *whether God did not call me* to return to England. The reason for which I left it had now no force, there being no possibility, as yet, of instructing the Indians: neither had I, as yet, found or heard of any Indians on the continent of America, who had the least desire of being instructed.—After deeply considering these things; *they were unanimous that I ought to go; but not yet.*" However, the Magistrate quickened his pace. He was declared *an Enemy to, and Hinderer of, the public peace.*—"I again (says he) consulted my friends, who agreed with me, *that the time we looked for was now come.*" The Reader, who has seen him so long *languish for persecution*, will conclude, he was now preparing to meet it with the constancy of a Martyr. No such matter. He was preparing for his flight. But to hide his poltrovery in a bravado, he gave public notice of his Apostolical intention. On which the Magistrates ordered that he should first find security to appear, when summoned, to answer the Charge brought against him. But he refusing, they published a Placart, "requiring all the Officers and Centinels to prevent his going out of the Province; and forbidding any persons to assist him in so doing." Things were now come to a Crisis: and Mr. J. Wesley, on the whole, thought it best to retreat without beat of drum; and to steal a march upon the Enemy.—"I saw clearly (says he) the hour was come for leaving this place. And as soon as *Evening Prayer* was over, [for Prayer must always make a part in his Stratagems], about *eight o'clock*, the tide then serving, *I shooed off the dust of my feet* *." A very pleasant way, truly, of acting the *Apostle*. But if he made the path easy for himself, he took care to render it doubly perplexed for his Followers. He left, we see, his

* Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 46—56.

little Flock in the lurch, to answer, as they could, for the crimes objected to their runaway Pastor.

But had his *longings for persecution* been *without Hypocrisy*, he had here the fairest occasion of honestly indulging himself to the full. He had gone as far as *Georgia* for it. The truth of his Mission was brought in question by the Magistrate, and decried by the People; not so much for his false doctrines, as his *false morals*. The honour of the Gospel was wounded through the Sides of its pretended Missionary. There was but one way to support its credit, the way the first Christian Preachers always took, the offering up themselves for the Truth they preached, and for the Integrity they professed. Instead of this, our paltry Mimic thinks he had discharged an Apostolic office, when he applied to himself an Apostolic phrase,—*I shook off the dust of my feet*, says he; much easier done than shaking off his infamy. Jesus, indeed, orders his Followers to *shake off the dust of their feet*, where the inhabitants would not receive their Doctrine, that they might not throw away their time in vain: but he never directed it as a Trial-ordeal of innocence when they were accused of immoralities, and the honour of the Mission concerned. When Paul and Silas had been imprisoned, and otherwise evil intreated at Philippi, neither the *Miracle* nor the *Magistrate* (when each, in their turn, had set open the Prison doors) could persuade them to stir a step till they had procured all honourable satisfaction to their injured Characters *. But what do I speak of the cases, in which the *prudence*, recommended by our great Master, directs his Disciples to *avoid*, or the *courage*, with which he inspires and enables them to *dare*, the rage of PERSECUTION? We are now on the detection of a HYPOCRITE, who expressed his longings for *persecution*; who invited it, who provoked it, in a Country where the Magistrate restrained and forbid it; and yet ran away from it when his own honour, as well as that of his *little flock*, should have induced him to oppose himself to it; and where the Magistrate, by

* Acts xvi.

his own account, was forward enough and ready to oblige him. But he ran away, like a Coward, on the wings of *Prayer* and the *Tide*: henceforth, the hatred of this unhospitable Shore, and the horror of the entertainment there prepared for him, made such an impression on his temper and his fancy, that he lets slip no occasion of revenge. For when the good man was got back to Europe, and even forced to beat it on the hoof as far as Hernhuth, in Germany, before he could get into a *Land of Christians**, he overtook, as he tells us, in a little village on the road, “ a large number of *Switzers*, Men, Women, and Children, singing, dancing, and making merry, being all going to make their fortunes in *GEORGIA*. “ *Looking upon them* (says he) *AS BEING DELIVERED INTO MY HANDS BY GOD*, I plainly told them, what manner of place it was. If they now leap into the Fire with open eyes, their *blood is on their own head*†.” It would be hard to guess how he came to *look upon these Switzers as delivered into his hands by God*, unless he believed, God was bound to revenge all his squabbles with the young Wenches of his *Bands*, (which, by his Journals, we find were not a few) and that therefore *God prepared* these Switzers for the Instruments of his Vengeance. He made a proper use of them; he *opened their eyes*; and so, in all likelihood, deprived a British Colony of many useful hands.

V. We have seen above, how he set *wordly prudence*, *Christian prudence*, and, in a word, every thing which bears the name of *PRUDENCE*, at defiance; denouncing it to be the *Bane of Religion*, and the *Instrument of the Devil*. This was but necessary to inflame the *madness* of his Followers. But a very different language is required when the *ambition* of his *RIVALS* is to be restrained. Then

* “ At Weymar, we came before I know not what great man (I believe the “ Duke) who, after many questions, asked, what we were going so far as *Herrnstadt* “ for? I answered, to *SEE THE PLACE WHERE THE CHRISTIANS LIVE*. He looked “ hard, and let us go.” Journ. from Feb. 1, 1737-8, to his return from Germany, P. 45.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 6.

PRUDENCE is the very balm of Gilead. the assuager of hurt Minds, and the great restorative of sickening Peace.

But we should take the affair from its beginning. So early as in the year thirty-nine, he began to suspect, that he should have RIVALS in his Apostolic office.—“ I came into my old Room at Oxford, from “ which I went to Georgia. Here, musing on the things that “ were past, *and remembering how many that came after me were “ preferred before me*, I opened my Testament, &c *.” For you must know, Reader, that, of all the *Superstitions* (and they were not a few) which struggled for Dominion with *sanaticism* in the Microcosm of this holy Man, the SORTES SANCTORUM were the Chief; a species of Divination to which, St. Austin tells us, the good Christians of his time had recourse, rather than consult the Devil, like their Pagan Neighbours. To this favorite folly, our Missionary refers all his doubts. It is his Urim and Thummim; and he applies it as freely and irreverently to his occasions, as a Village Conjuror does his *Sieve and Sheers*. At this time, indeed, it afforded him but small relief. He sunk so far in his despondency, *as to doubt whether God would not lay him aside, and send other labourers into his harvest*†. We soon see what it was that gave him these cruel twitches: a *Rival*, and he no small One, the famed Mr. WHITEFIELD; who now began to set up for himself; and, indeed, as much the madder of the two, to ingross the favour of the Rabble. While the Rivalship continued on a tolerable footing, Mr. J. Wesley contented himself with, now and then, giving his *beloved in Christ* a sly wipe of contempt, as occasion presented; and under the faintly symbol of *praising God for him*.—“ I read “ prayers, and Mr. *Whitefield* preached. How wise is God in giving “ *different talents* to different Preachers! even the *little imprieties both of his language and manner*, were a means of profiting “ many who would not have been touched by a *more correct dis-*

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 14, 15.

† Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 60.

“*course*, or a more *calm and regular* manner of speaking*.” This, we see, was full in his teeth; and by a side wind came up to that *Myfter-Preacher*, who is insinuated to be more correct, and calm, and graceful, in his Pulpit-Manners. Notwithstanding this, Mr. *Whitefield* went on triumphantly; and being ambitious to advance himself on the necks of his Fellows, taught FAITH ALONE; and offered FREE GRACE to a People little disposed to purchase it. Mr. J. Wesley was an Advocate for WORKS: but he must do them himself, if he expected any good from them, in this Contention. For an equivalent, therefore, to Mr. Whitefield’s *spiritual Graces*, He, like another Moïes, dispensed his *temporal Blessings*. Particularly, in the ART of Healing; for he would trust no longer to the GIFT, full as his Journals are of his *miraculous Cures*. It was now, he found, high time to set up a *regular Practice*. Accordingly, he told his People how deeply read he was in Medicine, which he had studied at Oxford. And to prove himself no Quack, he published a whole book of Receipts or Remedies for all the common Distempers of life. At the same time, he let the better Sort understand, he was well skilled in the *medicina Mentis*. He had given innumerable flirts of contempt, in his Journals, against HUMAN LEARNING: and, indeed, of what use could Learning be in a Religion like that which he propagated? In which, as he assures us, *Orthodoxy or right belief made a very slender part, if any part at all*. Yet when now he had to struggle with a Rival *pro aris & focis*, no means were to be left untried to secure his Dominion. He therefore plainly enough informs them, that he was ready to teach, in a better and more expeditious way than was hitherto known, even to the UNIVERSITIES, two eminent parts of this decried Learning, namely, *Rhetoric* and *Ethics*. “This week (says he) “I read over with some young men a Compendium of *Rhetoric*, “and a System of *Ethics*. I see not why a man of tolerable understanding may not learn, in six months time, more of *solid*

* Journ. from July 20, 1749, to Oct. 30, 1751, p. 24.

" *Philosophy* than is learned at Oxford in four (perhaps seven) " years *." Did ever JESUIT play his part better? Yet even this would not do. FREE GRACE bore down all before it; and Mr. Wesley was at last forced, as in a desperate case, to have recourse to that paltry quack remedy, which he had so much scorned and execrated, I mean PRUDENCE.—" I believed (says he) both " love and justice required that I should speak my sentiments freely " to Mr. Wh—— concerning the Letter he had published, said " to be *in answer to my sermon on free Grace*. The sum of what " I observed to him was this: 1. That it was quite IMPRUDENT " to publish it at all, as being only *the putting of weapons into " their hands, who love neither the one nor the other*. 2. That if he " was constrained to bear his testimony, AS HE TERMED IT, against " the error I was in, he might have done it by publishing a treatise " on this head without ever calling my name in question."—Here our Journalist can treat with scorn that very cant in which himself so much abounds, the applying Scripture phrases to the impertinence of modern occurrences.—" However (adds Mr. Wesley) " he had said enough—to make an open (and probably irreparable) breach between him and me: seeing, *for a treacherous " Wound and for the BEWRAYING OF SECRETS every friend will " depart †.*"

Without doubt, the Reader will be curious to know what these *Secrets* were, which had been so ill kept between these two *Free Masons*. But the purpose of this Discourse is not to prejudice the Readers against this extraordinary Man, from anecdotes or tradition, or from *secrets bewrayed*; but to enable them to form a judgment of his pretences, from what he himself has openly recorded of himself, and frequently repeated to the World. What I would have them observe on the last quoted passage, is only this, that Mr. J. Wesley, after so total an estrangement from WORLDLY PRUDENCE,

* Journ. from Nov. 25, 1746, to July 20, 1750, p. 14.

† Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 78.

has, at length, in his distresses, been forced to take shelter with her. And for his first visit, it must be owned, he acquits himself very well after so long an absence.—The Letter Mr. Whitefield had written should not have been published, as “*it was putting Weapons into the hands of the common Enemy.*”—It should not have been published, as it tended to a *Schism* in the Society.—If he must needs publish it, “*he should not have called Mr. Wesley's name in que ion,*” as this tended to a breach between these two fast friends. — And if he (Mr. Wesley) should never consent to have this breach closed, he was justified in PRUDENCE, since the *Wife man* says, *from a treacherous wound and bewraying secrets every friend will depart*; which he understands to signify, *every friend ought to depart*. Indeed, the Reader may object, that there was one expedient of PRUDENCE left untried, which was, the *meeting his quondam friend half way*. Mr. Wesley was no enemy to this use of PRUDENCE, as we shall see presently. But Mr. Whitefield was too formidable a Rival with whom to compromise, or even to yield an inch. A less considerable Opposer might be managed this way, without danger; and then his PRUDENCE directs him to pursue it.—“*I laboured (says he) to convince Mr. G—— that he had not done well in confuting (as he termed it) the Sermon I had preached the Sunday before. But he was absolutely above conviction.**”—Would not *prudence* now have justified him in leaving a man *above conviction*, to the error of his own ways? Surely a less consummate *prudence* than Mr. J. Wesley's would have done so. But he will not leave Mr. G—— so unkindly. “*I then asked (says he) Will you meet me half way? I will never preach publicly against you. Will not you against me? But he disclaimed any such agreement.*”—When PRUDENCE would have advised him not to *preach publicly* against the Body of that Clergy to which, he says, he belongs, then is PRUDENCE the *bane of Religion*, the *mystery of Iniquity*, and the *Whore of Babylon* her-

* Journ. from July 20, 1750, to Oct. 28, 1754, p. 81.

self. But when she prompts him to tempt a Brother of the same trade to *meet half way*, and not to *preach publickly* against him, then is PRUDENCE of heavenly birth, and sent for the assistance of the Saints: at present, indeed, honestly employed in the charitable errand of inviting Mr. G—— to play the *Hypocrite* with him: for he declares Mr. G—— to be *absolutely above conviction*; that is, in conscience unable to stir a step; which, too, was his own case: yet, in the same breath, he proposes to *meet him half way*. But Mr. G—— approved himself the honestest man. From all this we have reason to conclude, that Mr. J. Wesley, amidst his warmest exclamations against *Worldly PRUDENCE*, against *Christian PRUDENCE*, and against PRUDENCE of every denomination, had it still in petto to employ a succedaneum, on a pressing occasion: which he, indeed, calls PRUDENCE; but which, to save the credit of his consistency, he had better have let go under its true name of CRAFT.

Thus have I endeavoured to tear off the Mask from the furious and deformed visage of Fanaticism and Seduction. The power of Religion hath enabled me: and the interests of Religion have excited me to this attempt; nothing so much discrediting the *Doctrine of GRACE* as these counterfeit impressions of the Spirit of God. For, since the descent of the Holy Ghost was no longer in *the rushing mighty wind*, but in *the still small voice*, licentious men have been but too apt to conclude, either that GRACE was an imaginary Power; or at most, that it was no other than that assistance which the divine attribute of *Goodness*, as discoverable by natural light, was always ready to impart to distressed and helpless Mortals; just as they would persuade themselves that REDEMPTION is nothing else than that restoration to God's favour, which his mercy, discoverable too by the same light, prepares and lays open to repentant Sinners.

The Reader, in conclusion, will take notice, that the order I have here followed, is that which is best adapted to shorten the controversy, and to cut off all chicane and evasion.

1. I have

1. I have singled out the Founder and Leader of the Sect, that no one may have pretence to say, that what, He is here shewn to teach and practise, is not true and genuine METHODISM.

2. I have confined my remarks to his own adventures, recorded by his own pen, and here fairly quoted in his own words; that no one may have pretence to say, I have foolishly confided in false or uncertain reports: or unjustly made the Sect answerable for the indiscretions and absurdities of every obscure FIELD-PREACHER.

3. I have taken the Methodists at their word, when they call themselves members of the Church of England, that I might not run the hazard of confounding both the Reader and myself with long and blind scholastic disputations on *original Sin, irresistible Grace, and justifying Faith*; on *Regeneration, Election, Reprobation, and the immerit of good Works*. To their MODE of teaching, and not to the *things* taught, I confine my discourse. Of *that*, every reader can judge; and of *that*, he has a sure rule to judge by, the MARKS delivered by the holy Apostle St. James of the *Wisdom which is from above*: MARKS, which (for weighty reasons already explained) refer mostly to, the *mode* of teaching; and which, if not found in this new *mode* of methodist-teaching, are sufficient to convict it of imposture.

A
D I S C O U R S E
O N T H E
O F F I C E A N D O P E R A T I O N S
O F T H E
H O L Y S P I R I T.

B O O K I I I.

C H A P. I.

I NOW turn, for what remains of this Discourse, to those sober Ministers of the Established Church, who hold themselves bound to obey its DISCIPLINE as well as to profess its DOCTRINES.

If any good use can be made of what has been already said, it will be chiefly promoted by these Reverend Men, who, in honour of the Church which they serve, and in gratitude to the State by which they are protected, will make it their first care to support that most just of all Public Laws, the Law of TOLERATION : which, how long soever obstructed in its passage to us, and how late

late foever arrived amongst us, is certainly of DIVINE ORIGINAL: Nor will such Men ever venture to *refine* upon it (which will always be to *weaken* it) by idle distinctions between the *letter* and the *spirit* of the Law. For between these, in well-composed Laws, there is no difference; the *letter* being no other than the language and expression of the *spirit*. Indeed, one would wonder, they should ever have been opposed, did we not know how ready *Superstition* has always been to support the interests of bad Policy, in vitiating both the intellects and the morals of Mankind. God once gave a *preparatory Religion* to a select People, under the name of LAW, by which the future dispensation was half-revealed and half-hidden. In such a *Law* the *letter* and the *spirit* were necessarily different. A difference, which the Ministers to whom the propagation of this future Religion has been intrusted have been much accustomed to inculcate. Hence Superstition, in this, as in many other cases of the Jewish Law ill understood, very absurdly applied that distinction, to Civil Laws and compacts; where the full meaning was instant, and should be obvious; and where, as far as there was any real difference, so far were these Laws of defective Composition.

The Friend of *Toleration* therefore will not, I say, make any distinction, or contend for any difference, between the *letter* and the *spirit* of this Sovereign Law of Nature. This mischievous employment will be the task of him who regards it but as a temporary expedient, forced upon us, to prevent greater evils. And as, amongst the friends of *Toleration*, the English Clergy, seduced by a common error, were not amongst the first to give it a cordial reception, it seems incumbent on their Successors (who were however amongst the first to detect that *common error*), to obliterate the memory of the old prejudices of their Order, by the warmest patronage and support of what their more reasonable principles now so much approve.

Their friendly attachment to this Law will be best seen by their regarding it, first, as doing honour, in a *spiritual view*, to a

CHRISTIAN

CHRISTIAN CHURCH; implying confidence in the truth of its constitution, and that it will receive no detriment by a comparison with any other, how near or close soever they may be set together.

And secondly, as bestowing benefit, in an *ecclesiastical view*, on the NATIONAL CHURCH; it being a certain Maxim that an *Established Religion*, under a *Toleration* and a *T.ist*, will always go on enlarging its bounds; since the restraint which this latter Law imposes, is so light, that it is considered rather as a small inconvenience than an injury; a burthen so easy as not to exasperate, but barely to excite in men a disposition to remove it.

In a word, the CHURCH in which religious liberty is cordially entertained and zealously supported, may be truly called CHRISTIAN: for if *the mark of the beast* * be PERSECUTION, as the sacred volumes decypher it; well may we put TOLERATION as the *seal of the living God* †. This then is our present boast.

True philosophy, so lately cultivated, and now happily made subservient to the Truths of Religion, hath rectified many of those Doctrines which the still-misapplied aid of the *false* had deformed. Nor should the HIERARCHY (much honoured of late in the happy recovery of its ancient Ornaments, the Prelates of high birth and noble lineage) be denied the praise, so justly due, for its share in this reform. To men of Family, we are taught, by experience, to ascribe an innate generosity of mind, which inclines them to whatever is polite and decent in *private* life; and, in *public*, disposes them to support the rights of humanity and society. They are reckoned to be the low-born and Cell-bred *number*, in whose minds Bigotry and bitter Zeal are apt to get root and overspread. So that the Church may promise to itself great advantages from the genial lustre which this fair Accession to the sacred College is now deriving to it. DECUS ET TUTAMEN, is the motto inscribed on every Prelate's mitre; most certain to be read in every Prelate's breast. The

* Revel. xvi. 2.

† Revel. vii. 2.

first shines naturally out in the birth and manners of every noble Dignitary ; the *latter*, his solemn engagements will make him studious to discharge.

But this great Work will not be done by Talents at large, but by that sort of Talents only, which is suited to its sacred nature. Every Order and Station in Society hath its appropriated and proper *tone* ; where a consent in one common key makes that harmony which gives perfection to the Whole. It should be the care therefore of every Member of that Whole, to fit his manners and accomplishments to the natural *tone* of the Body which he honours, or by which he may think himself honoured. This is so true, that manners and accomplishments, foreign to the Profession, nay, though in general estimation of a superior kind, yet, when thus preposterously introduced, destroy all that concord which maintains its *dignity* and *use*.

On this occasion, hear an old Grecian Tale. A musician at Athens became famous for a sacred Lyre, descending to him, through a long race of Ancestors, from the first Heroes and Demy-gods of Attica. Its Tone was so ravishing, and the skill of the Master, in calling it out, so delicate and profound, that the Artist and his Lyre were always called upon to bear a principal part in the high Solemnities of that religious City. It happened, that in the midst of one of these Celebrations, a chord of the Lyre broke. It was strung in the ordinary manner with nerves, or what our musical neighbours call, *corde de boyau*. But the enamoured Owner, to do all honour to so rare a wonder, unadvisedly supplied the broken string with one of SILVER. The consequence proved fatal. The Lyre lost all its harmony and sweetness : it grew harsh and discordant. The People abhorred what before they had dwelt upon with raptures ; and the unhappy Lyre, now the public execration, was hung up, a neglected thing, a silent monument of the folly of the too-fond Possessor.

Nor should the great Body of the *Clergy* be forgotten on this occasion, They who have approved themselves no way *inferior* in an

honest zeal for the support of Christian Liberty. If any stale particles of the *old leaven* still remain, they lie perfectly inactive. A new Start-up Sect, indeed, will be apt to put them into a momentary ferment : and, on such an occasion, they will be eager to expose their evil nature.

Thus, the first appearance of METHODISM began to heat and irritate the mistaken Zeal of some ill-instructed men, against a new species of Fanaticism, which pretended to be of the Church, and yet insolently affronted its *discipline* ; disdaining to shelter itself under the peaceable shade of a legal Toleration : For these men, in their hearts, were enemies to this Law, as fanatic Sects generally are ; who contend for religious Liberty, not because they would obey conscience, but because they, an' please you, are the Advocates of Truth ; *Liberty*, as well as *Dominion*, being, in their opinion, founded in GRACE. This, indeed, was a trying occasion. But had those good men considered that the *Methodists* provoked the Public patience merely to procure to themselves a *mock persecution* ; for to more (as they very well knew) it could never amount in a State where the *honour* of the national Religion was secured by a *Toleration*, and the *safety* of it, by a *Test* ; had they considered this, I say, they would have left these factious men to their own inventions.

Besides, a fairer opportunity never offered itself, to do the Clergy credit. Had we appeared easy only with those who had qualified themselves to claim a legal Toleration, our acquiescence might have been imputed to our impotency in contending with it. But by bearing patiently with *Methodism*, the Clergy might have shewn the World, that the *Toleration-Act* had their hearts, as well as their outward obedience ; for this Sect professed to be of the Church, and yet, at the same time, dared to insult its Discipline, and set its Governors at defiance ; practices which no equitable indulgence would screen from punishment. This was the time for the Clergy to vindicate their character from the calumnies of their enemies ; and in general they wisely laid hold on it : So that now they can be no longer

longer suspected of malevolence to the *Law of Toleration*, when in a case where they were free from its influence, they yet bore with temper, and though provoked by insolent defiance, connived at the behaviour of a Sect of Fanatics, over whom all Laws, divine and human, had given them jurisdiction.

But then, if we shew ourselves thus rightly disposed in favour of this divine principle of Toleration, where the Law hath left offenders against Church Government to the justice of its Rulers; much more disposed shall we be to suffer the honest Sectary, who hath legally qualified himself for the enjoyment of his religious liberty, to possess it without trouble or controul.

When the *Law of Toleration* had once recognized this universal Right, it soon became apparent, that that other Law of prior date, the *TEST* (for the formation of *civil* Systems does not always, like the *natural*. begin at the right end) was now, by securing the Rights of the national Church, become more necessary than ever for the peace of the State. For, by this Law, Sectaries were restrained from the exercise of certain *civil Offices*, which some men have been pleased to call *natural Rights*: and we will not dispute with them about a word, for to no more does it amount, since it is confessed that Society could never have been formed without men's giving up some of their *natural rights*, in order to secure the peaceable enjoyment of the rest.

But it may so happen, by the Custom or Constitution of *Corporate Bodies*, that the conditional restraint which the *Test* imposeth, shall, by accident, become a benefit or advantage; as when a Sectarian member of a Corporation is appointed by his Body to discharge a very important though very onerous Office; and yet not permitted by the State to enter on it, but on conditions which his religious principles will not suffer him to comply with. For it having been, a long time, the custom for the Member, when nominated to this Office, to purchase, of the Body, an exemption, at a large price, called a *Fine*: when this came to be demanded of a dissenting Member, he naturally replied, that it could not equitably

regard any but Such who *willingly* declined a permitted Office; certainly, not Those whom the *Law* had forbidden, by severe penalties, to discharge it. But to this so plausible a plea, it was thought a sufficient answer, "That the Law, of whose restraint the dissenting Member would thus avail himself, was never intended for his advantage or emolument."

The question therefore to be decided was this, "Whether he "who *cannot* serve is equally obnoxious to the Fine, with him who "will not?" and, to this day, it remains undetermined*.

Now I humbly conceive, this question can never be rightly resolved, till the *true nature* of the TEST LAW be previously settled; and when that is done, it will, I suppose, be no longer disputable.

Were this Law enacted to draw, or to drive, Dissenters into the National Church, the prohibition, of serving Civil Offices, was certainly intended for a PUNISHMENT. If the Law were enacted only to keep Dissenters out of those Stations, in which, by hurting the Church, they would violate the peace of the State, it was as certainly intended for a RESTRAINT, only; and becomes a *punishment* but by accident.

Now were it intended for a PUNISHMENT, the *Fine* is most just and equitable: And then the reasoning of the Body against the Member, "That the Legislature, by this Law, never intended "the Dissenter should receive Civil benefit and advantage," will not be without its force; For a *benefit* defeats the end of the Law.

But if the Test impose a RESTRAINT only, and it become a *punishment* but by *accident*, it may, without the least evil influence on the Law, become a *benefit* likewise by *accident*. Nay, to hinder this fair Chance would be highly unjust. For if, from the inevitable condition of human things, Particulars receive *damage* by a Law which respects the General, and which never had such damage in its intention, it is but fit they should have the same chance of a *benefit*, though equally without the intention of the Legislature.

* In the Spring of 1762.

Indeed,

Indeed, where the unprovided-for, or unthought-of, Consequence tends naturally to defeat the purpose of the Law, there the Interpreters of it will interpose, and declare the advantage taken to be against the Law ; or, which amounts to the same thing, to be unsupported by it. But an accidental *benefit*, which arises from the *restraint* imposed, seems better calculated to effect the end of the *Test law* (which is to keep the enemies of the Church from office in the State) than a *damage*, which might tempt them to violate their conscience: The *benefit* is, indeed, liable to abuse (and what is there in civil matters which is not so ?) but this abuse does not affect the purpose of the Law, which is to keep Sectaries out of Office. But let me not be misunderstood, as if any thing here said, in favour of the sectarian Member, was meant to include the *Occasional Conformist*. For if such a one think that he may, with his conscience unhurt, *conform*, for the sake of *lucrative* employments, he can never be permitted, on pretence of Conscience, to plead the restrictive law, in order to evade those which are *onerous*. And here let me further observe, that the Dissenters will not seem to be in the properest circumstances to claim the advantage of the distinction here laid down in their favour, till they have a little reformed their ideas of a *Test-law*. For they have, I think, in order to throw the greater odium upon it, generally represented the prohibition, which it imposes, as inflicted for a *Punishment*. Now we have shewn, that if our Law-givers intended a *Punishment*, it defeats their purpose, to connive at its becoming an *accidental benefit*. I only remark this for the sake of a general observation, That when Bodies of men, whether civil or ecclesiastical, suffer themselves to be misled by their passions and prejudices, their interests or resentments, the errors, they fall into, will always, sooner or later, turn upon themselves.

Now it appears, both from Reason and Fact, that the TEST is a *restrictive*, and not a *penal* Law, in the proper meaning of these terms.

1. If .

1. If a Law may be understood in two senses, one of which supports its equity, while the other betrays its injustice Reason directs us to adopt the first. To *punish* Sectaries, in order to bring them over to the national Religion, is plainly wrong: But to *restrain* Sectaries from hurting the national Religion is as plainly right. Therefore, though the intention of the Legislature had in this particular instance been doubtful, yet a general Law of a free People would admit of no other interpretation.

2. But the intention of the Legislature was not doubtful: and the reason of the thing is supported by fact. When this Law was made, the *national Church* was deemed, in the public Opinion, to be in much danger both from Protestant and Popish Sectaries. In the early days of its establishment indeed, the Government had endeavoured to bring Both into it; and many *penal Laws* were enacted for that purpose: But, at the time the *Test* became a Law, that visionary and unjust project had been long dropt; and Government was content to confine its care to the *protection*, rather than *extension* of the national Church. Had this latter point been their aim, it was to be effected only by the vigorous execution of the old *penal Laws* then in being. The *Test* added no force to those; but, on the contrary, greatly relaxed their vigour, by disposing Government to repose their chief confidence, and seek their only remedy for disorders, in this new-made Law.

And now may be seen the strength of that Objection made to the *Test*, as it is legally enforced to affect the interests of Protestant Dissenters, viz. "that its original and direct intention (a fact no one will deny) was to oppose to the machinations of Popery; and that therefore, those being included only by accident, may very reasonably be overlooked." But if the idea here given of the *Test-law* be the true, it is apparent, that the general, though not immediate purpose of the Legislature, in this Law, was to provide for the safety of the national Church, and that for the sake of the State, from what quarter soever the danger might arise. At one season it might spring from *Popery*; at another from *Puritanism*; but

but the various civil mischiefs, consequent on religious quarrels, were to be repelled, as they sprung up, with equal vigilance and vigour. But let no one by this imagine, that a comparison is here insinuated between Popery and Puritanism. As Religions, they can no more be compared together, than a body irrecoverably corrupted, with one but slightly tainted. Yet, with regard to the civil mischiefs which religious differences occasion, we have experienced, that the lightest matters often produce as great, as the most important: And the surplice and cross in baptism have alienated fellow Citizens against one another as fiercely as the tyrannic claim of a Supremacy, or the superstitious worship of dead men deified.

However, the nature and genius of the two Sects is sufficiently discriminated by *tolerating* the one, and only (under suspended penal laws) *conniving* at the other: But still on the same *civil principles*; these laws not being directed against the religious errors of the Church, but the political perversities of the Court, of ROME; which will not suffer its Subjects to give any reasonable security for their allegiance to the supreme Magistrate: For with religious errors as such, the State hath nothing to do, nor any right to attempt to repel or suppress them. They are the *civil mischiefs* with which civil Society is concerned, the mischiefs arising from religious quarrels when the two Parties are near equal in Power (as I suppose they would soon be under a Toleration without a Test-law), and are set upon repressing one another's errors.

And now, since so much hath been urged in behalf of the Dissenters, their Civil and Religious Rights, they will bear to be reminded of one thing, in their turn; neither to abuse the *Toleration* themselves, nor to screen others in abusing it. And the case I am about to give of One, who, it is pretended, was thus screened, v^l, I hope, excuse this freedom. It is indeed the case of One who, without doing much injury to our dissenting Brethren, can never be reckoned in their number. This miserable Buffoon, of whom I would be understood to speak, was suffered for near thirty years

years together to turn all RELIGION and MORALITY into ridicule ; once, and, for some time, twice a week, in a licensed place of Devotion in the Capital of the Kingdom. A matter so much to the disgrace of Society, that They, on whom the scandal fell, thought proper to give out, that a vigorous prosecution of this Offender was ordered to be commenced ; but that when it was known, the Dissenters took the alarm, as if the *Law of Toleration* was in danger, since this Impostor acted under the common protection of a Licence from *Hicks's Hall*.

Yet, whoever hindered the prosecution, could not but confess, that this was a very vile *abuse* of a most sacred Law : They could not but apprehend that for an abused Law to screen the Abuser from punishment, was making Law to EXECUTE itself, in a very different sense from what crafty Politicians have sometimes projected.

But from all that has been here said in behalf of the *Law of Toleration*, let me not be understood as if I could suppose, or would insinuate, that this Law has altered the nature of the crime going under the name of SCHISM, which is an unnecessary separation from the national Church ; or, because it hath taken all civil punishment from the offender, that therefore *Schism* is become harmless, and an empty name : and that the Law in favour of *Schismatics*, like the Law in favour of WITCHES, had dissipated only a frightful Fantom. It is true, that, in both Cases, the Legislature acted for the same end, the restraint of injustice ; but it was on very different principles : In the first case, they took off civil punishment from a *real crime*, not cognizable by a human Judicatory : and, in the latter, they removed an opprobrium from the Statute Book, which expressed a sanguinary resentment against an *imaginary one*.

Schism, or a causeless separation from the national Church, is a crime, which, on all the principles of Law and Reason, deserves condign punishment. But, of this separation, whether with or without cause, there is no adequate Judge, but that Power who can distinguish between a well and an ill informed Conscience. Very
justly

justly therefore did this Free Government remit the question to a wiser Tribunal. But in so doing it did not mitigate, but, by its indulgence, rather aggravate the Guilt, wherever it shall be found, hereafter, to exist. And how wisely so doubtful a point was remitted thither, we may, in part, see from the answer of the *foreign Divines*, to whose judgment, at the beginning of our Reformation (when the quarrel between the Puritans and the Churchmen about Ceremonies and Discipline ran high), both Parties agreed to submit. Those prudent and honest men, when thus appealed unto, gave it as their opinion, that “the Puritans ought to conform, rather than make a schism; and that the Churchmen ought to indulge the others’ scruple, rather than hazard one.” A wise decision, and reaching much further, in religious matters, than to the single case to which it was applied.

Schism therefore is no less a crime now, that the Law consigns over its punishment to a proper Judicature, than it was when civil Authority, blindly and ineffectually, interfered to vindicate the honour of Religion from this unhappy scandal.

Thus have we seen what *reputation* accrues to the Church of England, from the establishment of this inestimable Law; and what *benefits* may further accrue to it by the prudent conduct of our Clergy, in its support.

CHAP. II.

WHAT remains of my Subject, will be more particularly addressed to the Ministers of Religion: who are surrounded with Enemies from various quarters; and insulted both by the attacks of INFIDELITY and FANATICISM.

Their defence, therefore, is indeed of necessity to be as much diversified; but it should still be under the safe conduct, and with the simple Armour of TRUTH only. For it is not the honour of a fan-

tastic *Set* of *Philosophy* which We are intrusted to support ; better committed to the care of those who exercise the talents of its old Patrons, the SOPHISTS ; neither is it the credit of a *Traditional Orthodoxy*, which, some of those who are called FATHERS of the Church have, of old, defended with the like arts and arms : But it is the simple GOSPEL of JESUS, equally abhorrent of *refinement* and *deceit*.

I cannot, nor indeed have I any just reason to suspect, that the English Clergy will dishonour so noble a Cause by any premeditated fraud. Yet the most Upright, in the heat of controversy (provoked, and perhaps alarmed at the extravagant powers which Libertines and Fanatics reciprocally ascribe to REASON and to GRACE), have been but too apt to run into destructive extremes, depreciating, and even annihilating, sometimes the One, and sometimes the Other, as best served the purpose they were then pursuing. Of which egregious folly, their Adversaries have never failed to take advantage, by turning their own ill-fashioned and worse-fabricated Arms against them. And this was easily done ; since *Revealed Religion* derives its whole support from the joint operation of these two Principles, *Reason* and *Grace*, acting on the human mind with equal and unremitted vigour.

But to understand more sensibly the mischiefs arising from such ill-judged defences of Religion, I shall set before the Reader a capital Example of each of these EXTREMES, of which we are now speaking. From whence we may learn the use and necessity of keeping within that equal MEAN, which most effectually serves to detect and to expose the errors of either Adversary.

It hath ever been amongst the principal arts of Infidelity to make the most extravagant encomiums on HUMAN REASON ; and, consequently, to profess the utmost regard and reverence for, what Unbelievers are pleased to call, NATURAL RELIGION. Under this cover, by the poorest sophistry and hypocrisy imaginable, they have accustomed themselves to undermine REVELATION. But now, What expedient, think you, did some warm defenders of Revelation

tion employ to uphold its credit? You will naturally say, they took care to moderate the extravagant representations of these false friends of *Reason* and *natural Religion*; by marking out the just bounds of the human Faculties, and shewing, how far Reason extends her jurisdiction, and in what she herself prescribes submission: by explaining how necessary a foundation *natural Religion* is to the *Revealed*; how it coincides with it, is compleated by it, and so inseparably annexed to it (as the foundation to its superstructure) that nothing can hurt the One which does not injuriously affect the Other; there being no objection, which the Logic of misapplied *Reason* can bring against *Revealed Religion*, which does not hold at least equally strong against the *Natural*.

This they did, you say, because This they ought to have done. Alas! they took a very different course. They declaimed against *human Reason*; they depressed it as extravagantly as their Adversaries had advanced it.—“Should you be so foolish, they told you, as to take it for your Guide, it would lead you to nothing but to sin and misery: that the Gospel disclaimed it, and went entirely on the surer ground of FAITH: that its confessed impotency in defence of *truths revealed*, may shew the absurdity of relying on it to discover *truths unrevealed*.” Hence, they assured you, “that the Deists boasted System of *natural Religion* was a Chimera; and that what (under this name) they recommended to the adoration of their followers, was an Impostor, made up of just so much of the *revealed* as was of use to them in combating the rest:” Finally, they said, “that all religious knowledge of the Deity, and of man’s relation to him, was *revealed*; and had descended traditionally down (though broken and disjointed in so long a passage) from the *first Man*; who received it as he came out fresh from the forming hands of his Creator.”

When our Enemies had gotten these indiscreet friends of Revelation at this advantage, they changed the attack, (for all Arms are indifferent to *them*, but in proportion to their present power of

doing mischief) and now tried, how *Revelation* was to be further shaken, on these new and extravagant principles of its Defenders.

I. Accordingly a certain masked Buffoon undertook to turn *one part* of this Paradox against them, in a Discourse to prove that REVELATION WAS NOT FOUNDED ON ARGUMENT; and tempered his irony with so grave and solemn a tone, that many good men mistook this arch-enemy of all godliness to be, at worst, but an overwarm promoter of it. He had two ends in this worthy attempt; the one, to discredit Religion; the other, to excite and encourage Fanatics to discredit it still more.

A fairer Writer against Religion, because a more open, took up the *other part* of the Paradox, with the same righteous design. And as the Buffoon had undertaken to shew that *Revealed Religion was not founded in argument*, so the Declaimer * sets himself to prove that *natural Religion was not founded in common Sense*: for, its existence depending on the moral attributes of the Deity, his *justice* and *goodness*, this broacher of the last runnings of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY labours to shew that *justice* and *goodness* belong not to him, whose entire essence consists in the *natural attributes* of *wisdom* and *power* only. Hence, under the name of *natural Religion*, he flurs in upon us an *irreligious NATURALISM*. And now *Revelation*, deprived of its foundation, *natural Religion*, and of its best defence and ornament, *human Reason*, lies a scorn to Unbelievers, and a prey to Fanatics and Enthusiasts.

But all this hath not yet taught these wayward Divines, wisdom. We have lately seen them, even at the Fountain of Science, the University †, attempting to support in good earnest the wretched paradox which Mr. — had so mischievously advanced in jest. And yet one should be utterly at a loss to guess in what the wit or wisdom of it lay, whether advanced in earnest or in jest. But a mischievous Heart will at any time risque the reputation of its head-piece to give the alarm to sober piety; and a warm Head discloses, without fear or wit, the rancour of its bosom, to vilify and bespatter

* Lord Bolingbroke.

† Oxford.

superior Reason. Otherwise, to ask, *Whether Christianity was founded in Reason or in Faith*, would be deemed just as wise a question as *Whether St. Paul's Clock was founded in Mechanism or in Motion?* Since, if it be found to have *motion*, we necessarily conclude that *motion* to be regulated by *mechanism*: So, if the vital principle of Christianity be *Faith*, we necessarily conclude it to be such a *Faith*, as was formed, and may be supported, on the rules and principles of *human Reason*. A wild Indian, perhaps, might imagine that the *Clock* was animated by a Spirit; and an Enthusiast, still wilder than he, may, for aught I know, conclude that *Christianity* rises only out of internal impulse. But surely none but a Buffoon or a Fanatic would, for his credit in jest, or for his interest in good earnest, discard the use of Reason in consulting for his *future* happiness, when he has already found it so useful in procuring his *present*. Both the future and the present are acquired by the right adaption, of means to ends; and this adaption, I suppose, will be confessed by all to be in the sole province of REASON. Nor has this heaven-appointed Guide ever given any just cause of complaint or jealousy. When men see themselves bewildered, they ought to suspect themselves: and, I believe, on enquiry, they will always find, that they had been directing *Reason* when they should have been directed by her. But the Passions and Affections, which have occasioned *her* discredit, go on, in their illusions, to excite *our* distrust.

II. Again, these indiscreet friends of Religion, while they were thus pushing the common Adversary, with these imaginary advantages gained by the depression of human reason, did not advert to the mischiefs they were letting in, at the opposite quarters of *Superstition* and *Fanaticism*. *POPERY* can only stand and flourish on the foundation of *implicit faith*; and the fervours of *ENTHUSIASM* soon rise into madness, when unchecked by Reason. The *PRIEST* expects of you to renounce your Understanding before he will undertake to reconcile you to the Church of Rome; but, indeed, when that is over, he permits you to take up as much of it again, as will serve you to justify your Apostasy. The quarrel, which the *FANATIC* has

has to it, is more serious. He is ever feeling its ill effects; and therefore his aversion to it is immortal. When *Ignatius Loyola* was in the Meridian of his Fervours, some of the writings of *Erasmus* chanced to fall into his hands. He was at first seduced, by the charms of the composition, to look into them; but finding they had, before he was aware, insensibly damped the inflammation of his Zeal; he cast them from him with abhorrence and execration. The very same disaster, Mr. *J. Wesley* informs us once befell himself, in his converse with the sober followers of *Erasmus*; inso-much that he was soon forced, he tells us, to avoid them, as the *bane of all Religion*. “I avoid that BANE OF ALL RELIGION, the company of good sort of men, as they are called. These insensibly undermine all my resolution, and steal away what little ZEAL I have*.” If this be true, though they steal but *Trash*, yet they leave him poor indeed; as his quondam Master has lately observed. “Your strictures upon Messieurs of the Foundery, and the Tabernacle, &c. (says he to a friend) are very just. These gentlemen seem to have “no other bottom to stand upon but that of ZEAL †.” Indeed, against so dangerous an Enemy as SOBER SENSE, the *Fanatic* cannot be too carefully guarded. And therefore, he never thinks himself secure from the mischiefs of *Reason*, till he has, with the same hoarse clamours that the metamorphosed Clowns in the Fable pursued Latona and her godlike Issue; driven away from the neighbourhood of the Saints, both *Reason*, and her fair and celestial Offspring, NATURAL RELIGION and HUMAN LEARNING.

Mr. J. WESLEY, who is ready to exhibit to us every feature of Fanaticism in its turn, has, I fear, been kept so long upon the Scene, as to tire out his Audience; he shall therefore be only once again exhibited, to testify, in a word or two, his civilities to *natural Reason* and *natural Religion*; and then dismissed for good. As to the first, he frankly tells us, the Father of *lies* was the Father

* Journ. from Aug. 12, 1738, to Nov. 1, 1739, p. 31.

† Mr. W. Law's Collection of Letters, &c. p. 189.

of *reasonings* also: “ I observed, (says he) every day more and more, the advantage *Satan* had gained over us. Many were “ thrown into idle *reasonings*.”—And again—“ Many of our Sifters are shaken. Betty and Esther H. are *grievously torn* by *reasonings* *.”—His civilities to NATURAL RELIGION, and to that eminent Writer who has so well explained the nature of this first great gift of God to Man, follow next: “ Meeting with a French “ man of New Orleans (says Mr. Wesley), he gave us a full and “ particular account of the *Chicasaws*:—And hence we could not “ but remark, what is THE RELIGION OF NATURE, *properly so* “ *called, or that Religion which flows from natural Reason, unassisted* “ *by Revelation.*” He then speaks of their manners in War.—Their way of living in Peace follows in these words; “ They do nothing “ but eat and drink and smook from Morning till Night, and in “ a manner from Night till Morning. For they rise at any hour of “ the night when they wake, and, after eating and drinking as much “ as they can, go to sleep again. See THE RELIGION OF NATURE “ *truly DELINEATED* †.” What is chiefly curious in this account is, that Mr. Wesley professes to shew us what that Religion is which is *properly called natural, or that which flows from NATURAL REASON unassisted by REVELATION*, and yet he gives us, in its stead, only man’s *natural manners*, which flow not from his *reason*, but from his *passions and appetites* only; in an example, where *Reason* may be rather said to have a capacity of existence than actually to exist, as being alike inert and void of power whether the *Chicasaw* be waking or asleep.

As to HUMAN LEARNING, if the zealous Mr. W. Law does not assault this more rudely than his forward Pupil has insulted NATURAL RELIGION, yet he returns much oftener to the Charge. The last Legacies, which this bountiful Gentleman hath bestowed upon the Public, are *A Collection of Letters*, &c. and *An Address*

* Journ. from Nov. 1, 1739, to Sept. 3, 1741, p. 8, and 17.

† Journ. from his embarking for Georgia, to his return to London, p. 44, 45.

to the Clergy, &c. In these two Works the hapless Author of the *Divine Legation* is pointed at on every occasion of *abuse*, and held up as the grand Apostate from *Grace* to *Human Reason*; and this chiefly, for denying (what indeed, I neither deny nor affirm, for I take it to be nonsense) That “*Divine Inspiration is ESSENTIAL to Man’s first created state, and vainly thinking to find out a middle way, between this and no inspiration at all, namely, that the Spirit’s ordinary influence occasionally assists the faithful*”.* For this, and for some few things besides, such as a charge of Spinozism on his beloved Behmenism, I have the honour to be plentifully, though *spiritually* railed at, whenever he fancies he sees me in the Retinue of HUMAN LEARNING.

He lays it down as a Postulatum, “That whatever comes not IMMEDIATELY from GOD can have nothing *godly* in it. Therefore what comes IMMEDIATELY from SELF, such as NATURAL REASON, however outwardly coloured, can have no better a nature within than the very Works of the DEVIL †.”

Now the fruit of *natural reason* being HUMAN LEARNING (indeed, according to this account, more properly than men were aware of, called *prophane Learning*); he thus descants upon it.

First of all, he assures us, it has nothing to do with Religion. “Where can God’s *Kingdom be come*, but where every other power, but his, is at an end, and driven out?—What now have Parts and Literature and the natural Abilities of man to do here? just as much as they can do at the Resurrection of the dead; for all that is to be done here is nothing else but *Resurrection* and *Life*.—Yet vain man would be thought to do *something* in this *kingdom of Grace*—because he has happened to be made a Scholar, has run through all the Languages and Histories, has been long exercised in conjectures and criticisms, and has his head full of all notions, theological, poetical, and philosophical, as a Dictionary

* See p. 12 and 25 of the Address to the Clergy.

† Address, p. 57.

“ is full of all sorts of words. Now let this simple question decide
 “ the whole matter here: Has this great Scholar any more power
 “ of saying to this mountain, *Be thou removed hence and cast into*
 “ *the Sea*, than the illiterate Christian hath * ?” To this reasoning
 against *human Learning*, in its use to Religion, little can be op-
 posed. For it is very certain *human Learning* can neither *raise the*
Dead, nor *remove Mountains*.

But it is not only useless in *Religion*, but is of infinite mischief.

For 1. It nourisheth PRIDE. “ The piercing Critic may, and
 “ naturally will, grow in *pride*, as fast as his skill in words disco-
 “ vers itself. And *every kind of knowlege* that shews the Orator,
 “ the Disputer, the Commentator, the Historian, his own powers
 “ and abilities, are the same temptation to him that Eve had from
 “ the serpent,” &c. †.

2. It nourisheth *Contention*.—“ *Grammar, Logic and Criticism*,
 “ each knoweth nothing of Scripture but its words; bringeth
 “ forth nothing but its *own wisdom* of words, and a Religion of
 “ wrangle, hatred, and contention about the meaning of them ‡.”

3. It turneth Religion to a *trade*.—“ Where *self*, or the *natural*
 “ *man* is become great in *religious Learning*, there, the greater
 “ the Scholar, the more firmly will he be fixed in their Religion,
 “ *whose God is their belly* §.”

4. It is *the abomination of desolation*.—“ *Genius and Learning* en-
 “ tered into the pale of the Church——Behold, if ever, *the*
 “ *abomination of desolation* standing in the holy place.——Christ
 “ has no where spoken one single word, or given the least power
 “ to *Logic, Learning*, or the *natural powers of man* IN HIS KING-
 “ DOM ||.” By this, we find, that CHRIST’S KINGDOM may be
 usurped as well by *classic Learning* as by CHURCH DISCIPLINE. It
 is certain, our modern ideas of *religious Liberty* can consist with

* Address, p. 96, 97.

† Letters, p. 187.

‡ Address, p. 122.

§ Ibid. p. 59.

|| Ibid. p. 114.

neither of them, for this *Liberty* claims an exemption both from **REASON** and **OBEDIENCE**.

5. It chuseth *darkness rather than light*.—"But now, Who "can more reject this divine light" [i. e. the *light of the world*, re-illuminated by the *blessed Jacob*, as he calls him] "or more "plainly choose darkness instead of it, than he who seeks to have "his mind enriched, the faculties of his fallen soul cultivated, by "the literature of Poets, Orators, Philosophers, Sophists, Sceptics, "and Critics, born and bred up in the worship and praises of Idol-Gods and Goddeses?"

6. Finally, it is a total *Apostacy* from God and Goodness.—"The practice of all Churches for many ages, has had recourse to "Learning, Art, and Science, to qualify Ministers for the preaching "of the Gospel—To this more than to any other cause, is the "great *Apostacy* of all Christendom to be attributed.—The death "of all that is good in the Soul, have now and always had their "chief nourishment and support from the sense of the merit and "sufficiency of literal accomplishments—And the very *life of Jesus* "in the Soul is by few people less earnestly desired, or more hard "to be practised, than by great Wits, Classical Critics, Linguists, "Historians, and Orators in holy orders *."—And again—"This "empty *letter-learned knowledge*, which the natural man can as "easily have of the Sacred Scripture and human matters, as of "any other books or human affairs, this being taken for *divine knowledge* has spread such darkness and delusion all over Christendom, as may be reckoned no less than a GENERAL APOSTASY "from the Gospel state of *divine illumination* †." We see by this, that the grand mistake of Scholars has hitherto been, in supposing, that the true sense of Scripture is to be discovered by the application of those Principles which enable us to find out the meaning contained in other ancient Books.

* Letters, p. 371.

† Address, p. 94.

And now the good man having worked up his *enthusiasm* into a poetical ferment (for, as it has been said, that a Poet is an Enthusiast in jest, so, he shews us, that an Enthusiast may be a Poet in good earnest) he adorns these powerful reasonings with a string of as beauteous Similes, in discredit of *human Learning*.

1. It is compared to the *fall of man*.—"Look (says he) at the present state of Christendom, glorying in the light of *Greek and Roman Learning*, and you will see the *fall* of the present Church from its *first Gospel-state*, to have much likeness to the *fall of the first divine man*, from the glory of paradisiacal innocence, and heavenly purity, into an earthly state and bestial life of worldly craft and serpentine subtilty *."

2. It is directly compared to the *old Serpent*.—"What a poverty of sense in such, to set themselves down at the feet of a *Master Tully*, and a *Master Aristotle*! who only differ from the meanest of all other corrupt men, as the *teaching Serpent* differed from his fellow-animals, by being *more subtle than all the beasts of the field* †."

3. It is compared to the *Tower of Babel*.—"A *Tower of Babel* may, to its builders eyes, seem to hide its head in the clouds; but as to its *reaching of Heaven*, it is no nearer to that than the earth on which it stands. It is thus with all the buildings of Man's wisdom—He may take the *logic* of Aristotle, add to that the *rhetoric* of Tully, and then ascend as high as he can on the ladder of *Poetic* imagination, yet no more is done to the reviving the lost life of God in his Soul, than by a Tower of Brick and Mortar, to reach Heaven ‡."

4. Again, it is compared to *Idolatry*.—"What is it that most of all hinders the *death of the old man*?—It is the fancied riches of *Parts*, the glitter of *genius*, the flights of *imagination*, the glory of *Learning*, and the self-conceited strength of *natural*

* Address, p. 98.

† Ibid, p. 139, 140.

‡ Ibid. p. 104.

“ *Reason*: these are the *strong holds* of fallen Nature, the Master-builders of *Pride’s Temple*, and which, as so many *Priests*, keep up the *daily worship* of IDOL SELF *.”

But, now his poetical Enthusiasm has blazed itself out; and he comes again to himself.—We know how the lucid intervals of a Fanatic are wont to be employed; generally in covering the madness of the *Hot* fit with the most deliberate and unblushing falsehoods of the *Cold*.

From what hath past, rash Divines might be apt to charge this holy man, so meek of Spirit, with *Enthusiasm*,—with a brutal spite to *Reason*,—and with more than Vandalic rage against *human Learning*. But they wrong him greatly, 1. As to *Enthusiasm*, he says,—“What an argument would this be; *Enthusiasts* have made a bad use of the doctrine of being *led by the spirit of God*; ergo, He is *Enthusiastical* who preaches up the doctrine of being *led by the spirit of God*. Now absurd as this is, was any of my Accusers, as high in *Genius*, as bulky in *Learning*, as *Colossus* was in *Stature*, he would be at a loss to bring a stronger argument than this to prove me an *Enthusiast*, or an abetter of them †.” This is plainly unanswerable, unless you read, as his Accuser wrote it, for—*who preaches up the doctrine*—*who ABUSIVELY preaches up the doctrine*.

2. “Another Charge (says he) upon me, equally false, and, I may say, more senseless, is, that I am a declared Enemy to the *use of Reason in Religion*. And, why? Because in all my writings I teach that *Reason is to be denied*. I own it, and this, because Christ has said, *Whoever will come after me, let him deny himself*. For how can a man *deny himself* without denying *his reason*, unless *reason* be no part of *himself* ‡?” Now I am at a loss to know, How any one can become an enemy to another more declared, than by *denying* or *renouncing* that other. Were I to *deny* my Sovereign, I should be

* Address, p. 110.

† Ibid. p. 51.

‡ Ibid. p. 52.

soon taught to know, that he considered me as his enemy, and would probably treat me accordingly. But Sovereign-Reason has no *Attorney-General*, unless perhaps, it be that *Colossus* he speaks of, and so loudly defies—However, if human *Reason* can argue no better than Mr. Law, I am ready to *deny* her too.—For, a Man's *self*, I have been taught, has a two-fold acceptance; his *Reason* may be called, *himself*, and so may his *Passions*. If therefore he be commanded to *deny himself*, I should conclude, it was not his *better self*, his *Reason*, but the *worse*, his *Passions*, to which the divine Command refers.

3. Then as to *human Learning*, the Charge, he tells us, is as *false and senseless* as the rest.—“Shew me a Scholar as full of *learning* as the Vatican is of Books, and he will be just as likely to give all that he hath for the *Gospel-Pearl*, as he would be, if he was as rich as Cræsus. LET NO ONE HERE IMAGINE I AM WRITING AGAINST ALL HUMAN LITERATURE, *arts, and sciences*, or that I wish the World to be without them. *I am no more an Enemy to them*, than to the common useful labours of life. *It is literal Learning, verbal contention, and critical strife* about the things of God that I charge with folly, and mischief to Religion. And, in this, I have all learned Christendom, both Popish and Protestant, on my side; for they both agree in charging each other, with a bad and false Gospel-state, because of that, which their Learning, Logic, and Criticism do for them*.” There are no such proficients in *sophistry* as the declared enemies of *Reason*; nor any so dextrous in legerdemain as the meekest bunglers in Mechanics.—He is not an Enemy, he tells us, to *human literature*, but to *literal learning* only: That is, he approves of Learning contained in Letters, but not of Letters contained in Learning. The truth is, he would willingly in this distress take shelter, did he know how, even in the *graceless* company of *Men of Taste*; who, like him, to hide their ignorance, are always scoffing at the Pedantry of *literal learning and verbal criticism*, with the

* Address, p. 152.

same good sense that an Artificer abuses those Tools of his trade which he knows not how to work with.—Again, do *Popish* and *Protestant* Disputers ever say to one another—*You support a bad and false Gospel by Learning, Logic, and Criticism?* Do not their reciprocal accusations of one another's errors turn upon the *WANT of Learning, Logic, and Criticism?* Or was Mr. Law, indeed, so ignorant as he pretends, when he supposes there are now *two* Kinds of Learning, Logic, and Criticism, a *Popish* and a *Protestant*; instead of *one*, founded and perfected on Principles, held by both Parties in common?—All that they charge on one another is the *abuse* of these Principles.

But to draw towards an end with this furious Behmenist—In all this ribaldry, the only chance he has of misleading illiterate and weak Mortals, is by the repeated insinuations, that all religious dissensions are owing to these mischief-makers, *Reason* and *Human Learning*; and that, in their absence, there is a perfect accord in Religion. But this is the fancy of none but Bards or Enthusiasts; who never saw, but in poetic, or extatic Visions, that time when

“Christians and Jews one heavy Sabbath kept;

“And all the Western World believ'd and slept.”

Before *mortals either writ or read*, the quarrels of Dunces were as fierce as those of Wits. In Religion, the dissensions amongst the *irrational Sects* have ever been as implacable as those amongst the *Rational*. And if, in those miserable conflicts, the wounds of the latter went deeper, it was because their force was greater and their weapons better.

To conclude, When I reflect on the wonderful infatuation of this ingenious man, who has spent a long life in hunting after, and, with an incredible appetite, devouring, the trash dropt from every species of *Myticism*, it puts me in mind of what Travellers * tell us of a horrid Fanaticism in the East, where the Devotee makes a

* Tavernier.

solemn vow never to taste of other food than what has passed through the entrails of some impure or Savage Animal. Hence their whole lives are passed (like Mr. Law's amongst his Ascetics) in Woods and Forests, far removed from the converse of mankind.

And now, to turn back to our FREETHINKER. As professed an Adorer as he would be thought of his Sovereign Mistress, REASON, we shall see, that the modern Infidel, like the Pagans of old, when their Gods proved unkind, can himself, on occasion, treat his favourite IDOL with the utmost ignominy and contempt; for as one of the most ingenuous of this holy Brotherhood has freely confessed, *When Reason is against a Man, a Man will always be against Reason* *.

They had so long boasted of the Power of this their favorite Idol, They had so loudly trumpeted the virtue of her Orient beam for driving away those Fantoms conjured up by *Revelation*, in the dark Regions of *Superstition*, that the able and sober Divine thought it high time to check their impertinent triumphs; and shew the World, On which side REASON had declared herself. In order to this, they enforced and illustrated (defecated from the dross of the SCHOOLS) the invincible arguments of their Predecessors in support of Revelation; to which they added large and noble accessions of their own. What was now to be done? The Deist could not directly degrade that *Reason* which he had already enthroned. Yet finding Her in this service, he thought he had a right to insinuate that she was no better than she should be; and had, like other common Prostitutes, changed her name, and affected to be called POLEMIC DIVINITY.

It must be confessed, that the unguarded manner in carrying on Theologic controversy had subjected it to much deserved censure. This, joined to the sort of Learning employed in divers of the more early defences of Religion, where, both the fashion and standard smelt strongly of the barbarous form and base alloy of the

* Hobbes.

SCHOOLS, gave them a large handle to run down all the defences that followed. Some parts of POLEMIC DIVINITY, appeared, on their Principles, to be trifling; other parts bore hard upon their Conclusions; so they took advantage of what was faulty in itself, and sought advantage of what appeared impertinent to them, to ridicule the whole. Hence *Polemic Divinity* became the whetstone of their wit, and the constant Butt of their malice. As the credit of Deism advanced, this cant grew familiar, and spread itself into the fashionable World. Nor could the divine Genius of those Masters of Reason, a GROTIUS, or an EPISCOPIUS, a HOOKER, or a CHILLINGWORTH, when once nick-named *Polemic Divines*, hinder them from being enrolled amongst *Scotists* and *Thomists*, and the veriest rabble of the Schoolmen, by some of the more ignorant or indiscreet of all Parties. But the thing most to be lamented is, to see any well-meaning Clergyman of affected taste and real ignorance, go out of his depth, as well as out of his Profession, to exert his small talents of ridicule on the same subject, merely for the sake of being in the fashion; and, free from all malice as well as wit, treat *Polemical Divinity* (which, for all the hard name, is indeed nothing but a critical examination of the doctrines of our Faith) as cavalierly as ever did Collins or Tindal, Lords Shaftsbury or Bolingbroke. Yet, had these small-dealers in second-hand Ridicule but the least adverted on their doings, they must have seen the absurdity as well as mischief of so unweighed and wanton a conduct.

Their ADVERSARIES had *sufficient provocation*, and were not without a *plausible pretence* for their quarrel with POLEMIC DIVINITY, whether it were employed in supporting Revelation in general against the common Enemy, or in defending the Gospel-truths against the errors of Sectaries.

The PROVOCATION they had received was not small. The Friends of *Revelation* having a Religion to defend which was founded on the Authority of a Divine Messenger, who appealed to *Miracles* performed, and to *Prophecies* fulfilled, They supposed the most
simple

simple and natural method was to prove the truth of this Religion, as all other human transactions are proved, by FACTS. This was at length so invincibly performed, that their Enemies were forced to have recourse to their favourite Deity, REASON, to undo the knot, and free them from their Embarras. Her power, they had long objected to believers, as the only barrier against *Superstition*; and now was the time to press it home. “ You urge us with *facts*, say they, and the *testimony of Antiquity*; Supports too slender to bear the unnatural load of *Revelation*. A thing impossible in itself, as it contradicts the established order of Providence: a thing impossible under the Bible-representation of it, as several passages in that Book directly oppose our common notions of God’s Attributes. Would you have us give credit to your fond notions of Revelation, let us see you support it on our common principles of Philosophy, natural, dialectic, and metaphysical. When you have done this, we shall be satisfied, for on these principles only will REASON allow us to submit.” This was what they pretended to expect; and Divines took them at their word; and immediately entered upon, and soon compleated a defence of Revelation, on this new prescribed method of proof. How effectually, the prevarication of their Adversaries, of which I am going to speak, amply evinces. For no sooner was that done which they had so vainly represented as impossible, than they changed their tone, and now attempted to ridicule it as a very impertinent atchievement. “ It is astonishing (says “ the Goliath of their party) how Divines could take so much silly “ pains to establish mystery on metaphysics, revelation on philosophy, and matters of fact on abstract Reasoning. Religion, such “ as the Christian, which appeals to facts, must be proved as all “ other facts that pass for authentic are proved. If they are thus “ proved, the Religion will prevail without the assistance of so “ much profound Reasoning*.” This was what the learned Divine got for his pains! not only to have his Compliance laughed at,

* Lord Bolingbroke’s *Letters concerning the Study and Use of History*.

but, what is the common attendant on Ridicule, to have it falsified. *Divines*, we see, are represented as *applying their metaphysics, philosophy, and profound reasoning, to Prophecies, and Miracles*. How gross the misrepresentation ! They had more wit, they had more honesty, than to take that *filly pains*. They employed their Philosophy as became such Masters of Reason, not to matters of *fact*, but of *right*. It was pretended that God could not give a *Revelation* ; that he could not select a *Chosen People* ; that he could not accept a *vicarious Atonement* : And against these bold assertions, the Christian Divine directed all the force and evidence of TRUE PHILOSOPHY. With what success, a better posterity shall tell with gratitude. This is the *spite*, I meant, which Unbelievers bear to that part of *Polemic Divinity*, which concerns the Being and Nature of Revelation.

The PLAUSIBLE PRETENCE they had to ridicule and condemn the rest, which is employed in settling and adjusting the various *MODES* of Religion, comes next to be considered. These men holding *Religion* itself to be visionary and fantastic, laughed, and naturally enough, to see such a bustle made about its *modes* ; which, on their ideas, was a dispute, about a Nothing once removed.

But now, to see the *Friends* of Revelation disposed to laugh with them, and to ridicule either one or other of these parts of *Polemic Divinity*, is not amongst the least of those absurd perversities, in which common life, at present, so much abounds. For is that which makes *our Hope not ashamed*, and supports the *Faith which is counted for righteousness*, is that, I say, the natural, the reasonable object of a *Christian man's* contempt ? But as this latter part is more generally known by the name of *Polemic Divinity*, and is the more usual topic of fashionable ridicule, it may be proper to add a word or two on the extreme folly of imitating the airs of our Adversaries, on this occasion. We have observed that the Freethinker was not without some excuse in laughing at this part of *religious Controversy*, since, on his ideas, it was disputing about the *modes* of a *non-entity*. But the Christian Divine takes his FAITH for a Reality ;
and

and therefore can never deem the *modes* of it to be indifferent; but must hold, that, of the various opinions arising from thence, some, with their truths, may be useful, and some, with their errors, hurtful to Society: So that when, about these *modes*, Churches differ, they become as reasonably the subject of serious enquiry, as any other real entities whatsoever; and have their importance in proportion to their good or bad influence on Truth and Virtue. In a word, POLEMIC DIVINITY is, in the fancy of a Libertine, a squabble for preference between two Falsehoods; in which, there is room enough for ridicule: But on the Principles of a Believer, it is a contest between Truth and Falsehood; in which, there is nothing to be laughed at, though much to be lamented.

C H A P. III.

BUT there was never yet *extravagance*, either of UNBELIEVER or FANATIC, which the over-zealous Advocate of Religion and sober Piety hath not unhappily opposed by a contrary, and frequently by as *mischievous* an *extreme*.

We have seen how unwarily some of them have been drawn in to depreciate and to degrade HUMAN REASON, when their Adversaries had too extravagantly advanced it. They have, at other times, advanced it as extravagantly, when their Adversaries were in an humour to vilify and disgrace it.

To understand what I mean, we must go a little back in the History of *Fanaticism*: And They, whom this matter most concerns, will need no other proof of the folly of such a conduct than what arises from the historical detection of it.

The REDEMPTION OF MANKIND by the death of Christ, and the SACRIFICE of himself upon the Cross, together with its consequent Doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE, were the

great Gospel-principles on which PROTESTANTISM was founded, on the first general Separation from the *Church of Rome*: by some, perhaps, carried too far, in their zeal for setting it at a mortal distance from the *Papish* Doctrine of *Merits*; the Puritanic schism amongst us being made on a pretence that the Church of England had not receded far enough from *Rome*. However, being Gospel-Principles, they were held to be the badge of true Protestantism by all: When the Puritans (first driven by Persecution from religious into civil Faction, and by these Factions heated, on both sides, into Enthusiasm) carried the doctrine of *Justification by Faith alone* into a dangerous and impure *Antinomianism*: For it is of the very nature of Enthusiasm to run all its notions to extremes. The speculation was soon after reduced to practice, by means of that knavery which always mixes itself with Enthusiasm, when once the *Fanatic* becomes engaged in Politics. The confusions which ensued are well known: And no small share of them has been ascribed to this impious abuse of the doctrine of *Justification by Faith alone*; first, by depreciating MORALITY, and then by *dispensing* with it.

When the CONSTITUTION was restored, and had brought into credit those few learned Divines whom the madness of the preceding times had driven into obscurity, the Church of England, still smarting with the wounds it had received from the *abuse* of the great Gospel-principles of FAITH, very wisely laboured to restore MORALITY, the other essential part of the Christian System, to its Rights, in the joint direction of the Faithful. Hence, the encouragement the Church gave to those noble Discourses, which did such credit to Religion, in the licentious times of Charles the Second, composed by these learned and pious men, whom Zealots abused by the nick-name of LATITUDINARIAN Divines. But the reputation they acquired by so effectually suppressing these rank Seeds of Fanaticism, made their Successors ambitious of sharing with them in the same honours: a laudable ambition! but men have ever a vain passion for improving upon those who went before. The Church was now triumphant; the Sectaries were humbled; sometimes

sometimes oppressed; always regarded with an eye of jealousy and aversion; till at length this Gospel-principle of FAITH came to be esteemed by many, as *Fanatical*: And they, who understood its true Original, found so much difficulty in adjusting the distinct Rights of GRACE and MORALITY, that, by the time this Century commenced, things were come to such a pass (MORALITY was advanced so high, and FAITH so frittered into nonsense), that a new definition of our Religion, in opposition to its Founder's, and unknown to its early Followers, was grown to be the fashionable tenet of the times: and *Christianity*, which till now had been understood as but coeval with REDEMPTION, was henceforth to be esteemed *as old as the CREATION*: an eminent Divine having, in a public Discourse, asserted, without circumstance or restriction, that *Christianity was a republication of the Religion of Nature*. Thus, between the two opposite Parties of Divines, we were, at the same time, left without either *natural* or *revealed* Religion. The one, we see, denied the very being of the *natural*; and the other assured us that the *revealed* was nothing else than that exploded non-entity.

This REPUBLICATION had, in effect, been talked of before, by many others of equal reputation: but being now explained, and ready to be received as the established System, our Adversaries began to think it time to check so ridiculous a triumph; and to *discredit Religion* (which they have always done with much success) *on the Principles of its Defenders*. For with the wanton Libertine,

——“It is the sport, to see

“The Engineer hoist with his own Petar.”

And one of the Party, an Enemy, equally determined, to *Grace* and *Morality*, composed that famous Book, intituled, *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, to decry all *Revelation* whatsoever, on this very principle of a REPUBLICATION; so unhappily conceived by modern Orthodoxy, as the surest way of evincing the *reasonableness* of the GOSPEL.

The

The like Advantage (to put things of a sort together, for the better illustration of the Subject) had, about the same time, been taken of our indiscretions by another of these men; and as the reasoning of TINDAL was directed to depreciate the Work of REDEMPTION, so the argument of COLLINS was enforced to insult the Character of the REDEEMER. The general body of the PROPHECIES which relate to JESUS, were, for certain great ends of Providence, so contrived, as to have a *primary* accomplishment in the events of the Mosaic Dispensation, and a *secondary* and final completion in the birth and ministry and sufferings of *Jesus the Messiah*. But the admirable contrivance of divine Wisdom, in giving to those Predictions a *primary* and a *secondary* accomplishment, being either soon forgotten, or generally overlooked, it produced large swarms of fanciful and fanatic Allegorists, who filled the Church with extravagant whimsies equally dishonourable to *Reason* and *Religion*. Amidst so thick a cloud of nonsense, the *logical propriety* as well as *moral fitness* of a *secondary sense* in the Prophecies relating to Jesus, being swallowed up and lost, some bold and hasty men, ever least qualified to distinguish between the use and the abuse of a positive institution, ventured to condemn *all secondary senses*, as irrational and fanatical; and finding but few Prophecies which relate to the MESSIAH, in the *primary*, they were forced upon the desperate expedient of holding, that the Jews, or other Enemies of Christianity, had adulterated and corrupted the whole body of these Prophecies, as they stand at present in our Bibles. But no sooner had Mr. Collins got these rash Men at this advantage, than he insulted them with his Discourse on the *Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*: In which he attempts to overthrow the Gospel on these two principles. 1st, That (by the confession of his Adversaries) a *secondary sense* of Prophecies is irrational and fanatical. And 2dly, That (by the confession of all sober men) the Jews had not corrupted or adulterated their Bible. His conclusion is, that the *Christian Religion* stands on no solid grounds or reasons; Jesus not having, as he pretended, been foretold under the Character of the

MESSIAH

MESSIAH of the Jews.—And here, let it be observed, that these works of *Tindal* and *Collins*, both rising on the advantage taken of our follies, are the two most artful and desperate attacks on Revelation, that were ever made since the times of *Celsus* and *Porphyry*.

I have attempted to give a good Account of Mr. Collins's *Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* elsewhere *, by confuting his first Proposition, on which the whole attack rises, and shewing the *logical propriety* and *moral fitness* of SECONDARY senses of Prophecy. I shall hereafter have occasion to do equal justice to Mr. Tindal's *Christianity as Old as the Creation*. For the only effectual way of answering these, as indeed all others of the like kind, is to renounce all fanciful Systems, and to preserve inviolate the great Principles of the *Mosaic Law* and the *Gospel of Jesus*; Principles which discover themselves, and indeed obtrude themselves upon us, on a careful study of those two connected Dispensations. When these Principles are once forsaken, there is no hurtful indiscretion to which the ablest Divines are not subject; and of which Unbelievers have not taken advantage. I shall, from amongst many, select an instance or two, least likely to give offence. The Advocates of the Church of *Rome*, to evade the charge of Idolatry, with which they are urged by the *Reformed*, pretend that this crime consists in giving the worship, due to the supreme God, to inferior Beings. The excellent Bishop Stillingfleet, in opposing this subterfuge, attempted to prove, that the most civilized Pagans, who are confessed to be Idolaters, did not give the honours due to the *first Cause* to their inferior Gods; the *first Cause*, as he pretends, being worshipped by them, as such: An assertion, which, if true, would confute all that the Prophets and Apostles say concerning the state and condition of the Pagan World. Again, the very learned Dr. Prideaux, to do honour to his exiled Jews, adopts, from Hyde and a rabble of lying Orientalists, the idle fable of a Philosophic Zoroas-

* Divine Legation, B. VI. § 5, 6.

ter, the subverter of Idolatry in Persia : Little attentive the while, to the more plausible conclusion of Unbelievers, from the same fact ; who pretend, that these Jews, so prone to Idolatry before their *Captivity*, were instructed during its continuance, by this Zoroaster, in a better Theology, which gave them juster notions of the Divine Nature, and consequently, of a Crime that, ever afterwards, they held in abhorrence. A conclusion pushed with great advantage by *Collins* and *Morgan*, on the ground thus prepared by Hyde, and further smoothed for them by Dr. Prideaux.

But to go on with our subject, Tindal's *Christianity as old as the Creation*.

This terrible advantage taken of a Principle become fashionably orthodox, greatly alarmed all serious men ; and the feeble Answers given to it, on that Principle, were so little satisfactory, that a commendable effort was made, by some whose Stations supported them in the attempt, to bring back the slighted Doctrine of REDEMPTION, and to reinstate it in its ancient Credit. And a worthy Bishop of London was amongst the first to repair the mischief, which the mistaken labours of his no less worthy Successor had unwittingly occasioned. So that, in a little time, we had regained much of the ground that had been lost, and were ready to replace the national *Faith* once again on its old Gospel-foundation ; in spite of the silly pains of a very equivocal Divine, who published a Book, in opposition to the returning Current, intituled, *The Scripture Doctrine of Redemption*, which was to prove that in reality there was no such thing : When the old puritan Fanaticism revived under the new name of *Methodism* ; and, as it spread, carried once more (as far as the difference of times would allow) those Gospel-principles to their old abusive extremes.

This soon put a stop to the recovery of that middle way, in which *Grace* and *Morality* are preserved in their respective rights : an unhappy disposition now appearing in several Opposers of this late revived fanaticism, to return back to the old *latitudinarian* excesses.

And

And now comes in (I hope, not improperly) the Caution, for the sake of which I have given this long detail of our former mis-carriages, to warn men against a repetition of them.

For these opposed doctrines of a REDEMPTION and a REPUBLICATION are not matters of so slight moment that either of them may be taken up, or laid down at pleasure, just as we are pressed, on the one hand, by *Infidelity*, or, on the other, by *Fanaticism*.

The DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION, is the *primum mobile* of the Gospel-System. To this the Church must steadily adhere, let the storm, against it, beat from what quarter it may. It is the first duty of the Ministers of Religion, to secure this great Foundation: They may then, with safety, and not with the less success, push the Enemies of the Church, the Enemies of their Order, nay, even the Enemies of their own peculiar opinions, with all the force they are able; but ever, as we say, in subserviency to the EVERLASTING GOSPEL, whose main Pillar is this *Doctrine of Redemption*.—How essential a part it is of the Gospel-Oeconomy (interpreted by God's general Dispensation, revealed to mankind, of which the Gospel-Oeconomy is the completion), and how agreeable it is to what the best and most received Philosophy teacheth us, concerning the relations between the creature and the Creator, shall be considered at large in its proper place*.

I. What better suits the melancholy subject we are now upon, namely, the advantages given to the common Enemy by those who, to get rid of some urgent difficulty, are apt to forsake their Foundations, will be to shew the various and unthought-of mischiefs which arise from the folly of attempting to change the nature of the Gospel-Oeconomy from a *Redemption of Mankind* to a *Republication of the Religion of Nature*. A folly, by which the great Author of our Salvation becomes dishonoured, and the Christian Faith exposed to the perpetual Insults of Libertines and Unbelievers.

* Divine Legation, Book IX.

1. For he who considers Jesus only in the light of a *Republisber* of the Law of Nature, can hardly entertain a higher opinion of the SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD than some have done of SOCRATES, whom Erasmus esteemed an object of devotion, and many a better Protestant hath thought to be divinely inspired. For was not Socrates, by his preaching up *moral virtue*, and by his dying to bear witness to the *unity* of the Godhead, *made*, to the Grecian People, and (by means of their extended commerce of politeness) to the rest of mankind, *Wisdom and Righteousness*? And what more was Jesus, though the Apostle adds to those two attributes, these two other, of *Sanctification* and *Redemption*? for, according to the principles of this paganized Christianity, his titles of MESSIAH and REDEEMER are reduced to mere figurative and *accommodated* terms.

2. As this Theology degrades Jesus to the low condition of a Grecian Sophist; so it renders his Religion obnoxious to the insults of every daring Impostor.

He was sent, say these new Doctors of the Church, to teach mankind the worship of the true God, and the practice of moral righteousness*.

“ This will be readily allowed, replies an understanding MAHOMETAN: And on this very principle, we hold, that when Jesus had done his office; and mankind had again relapsed, into *anti-christian* Idolatry and Polytheism, as before into *Pagan*, God sent OUR PROPHET, who worked the like sudden and sensible reformation in the NORTH-EAST, that your Prophet did in the NORTH-WEST.”

* A celebrated Frenchman, who writes on all subjects, and, on all, with equal judgment and capacity, knew better, perhaps, what he was about than these Divines, when he went further, and affirmed, That Christianity is not only no more than the Religion of Nature perfected, but that *it could not possibly be any more.*— “ *Nôtre Religion révélée n'est même, et ne pouvoit être, que cette Loi naturelle perfectionnée.*” *Discours sur le Théisme*, par M. de Voltaire.

And

And this reply, he makes on the very principles of his ALCORAN; which (with professions of the highest veneration for the character of JESUS) denies his proper Divinity, and at the same time, his death on the cross. But why, it may be asked, was this aversion to the PASSION of One whom the Alcoran makes a Mortal? For this plain reason: *Mabomet*, who wanted the refinement of our modern *Accommodators*, plainly saw that the doctrine of REDEMPTION followed the *passion*; compleated the *Scheme of Revelation*; and shut out all his bold pretences.

Mr. Otter, an intelligent Frenchman of the Academy Royal of Inscriptions, &c. tells us of a conference he had with a learned Persian. The Mussulman said, They revered all our sacred Writings except those of St. PAUL——*qu'ils respectent tous, excepté Saint Paul* *. Why this *exception*? I answer, On the Mahometan Principle, that *Christianity is only a republication of the Religion of Nature*: for St. PAUL is full of the doctrine of REDEMPTION; explains the Christian System by it, and makes the whole Faith depend upon it.

What now has our rational *Republisber* to oppose to this modest Apology for Ismaelism?

All he has to say is this, “That Jesus and his Apostles have every where intimated, that the *Gospel* is the last of God’s Dispensations; on the terms of which our final doom is to be decided: so that all future Pretenders to the like Office and Character must needs be deemed Impostors.”

But here a DEIST would come in, to take advantage of our distress; for (as we have said more than once) it may be observed alike of all these shifting defences, on fanciful, and unscriptural Systems, that they only supply new arms to the various Adversaries of our Faith; a *Deist*, I say, would be ready to reply, “That it is indeed true that Jesus hath declared his own Mission to be the LAST: but

* *Voyage en Turquie et en Perse*, vol. i. p. 22.

that this is a fly contrivance, put in use by every pretended Messenger from Heaven, in order to perpetuate his own Scheme, and to obviate the danger of an antiquated authority. The Impostor, MAHOMET himself, hath done it. He, who here obtrudes his *armed* pretensions upon us, hath secured the duration of his sensual Religion by the very same expedient: a thing, in his ideas, so much of course, that he did not even object to JESUS's use of it, who employed it before Him; and for no other purpose than to cut off all following pretensions to the like Character. On the contrary, He avowed and maintained the general truth of the Nazarite's Commission. Now (pursues the Deist) a method employed by a confessed Impostor is taken up with an ill grace by the defender of true Religion. But I draw a further consequence (says he) against the GOSPEL, from this representation of Christianity. For if the preaching of moral truth and righteousness were the whole of JESUS's Character and Office, then his Mission did not answer its end, the lasting reformation of mankind, in the *knowledge of God*, and in the *practice of Virtue*: since the world soon fell back again into the state from which JESUS had delivered it; as appears from the history of the times in which MAHOMET appeared, and the advantages he made of that degeneracy."

II. Thus subjected to the insults and injuries of all sorts of Impostors, who set themselves to delude the credulous, either by inventing NEW Revelations or by decrying the OLD, do these *Republicans* expose the holy faith of JESUS: that *Faith*, which, we are told, was *founded on a rock*, impregnable to Men and Demons; to the sophisms of Infidelity, and the prestiges of Imposture! And so, indeed, it is, if we will take it as we find it; if we will receive it as it came from above; if we will preserve it pure and entire as it was delivered to the Saints, under the idea of THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD, BY THE SON OF GOD, IN THE VOLUNTARY SACRIFICE OF HIMSELF UPON THE CROSS.

This

This secures the Character of JESUS from the insults of false Pretenders ; and his GOSPEL from the injuries of false Reasoners.

1. For, first of all, if JESUS did, indeed, *redeem* Mankind, and restore them to their lost Inheritance ; the scheme and progress of Revelation is completed : which beginning at the LAPSE, naturally and necessarily ends in the restoration and recovery of LIFE AND IMMORTALITY by the death and passion of our Lord. CHRISTIANITY considered in this view (and in this view only, does SCRIPTURE give it us to consider) soon detects all the artful pretences of Imposture ; and secures its own honour by virtue of its very *Essence* : the great scene of Providence being now closed, in a full completion of its One, regular, entire, and eternal purpose.

2. Secondly, if JESUS did indeed *redeem* mankind, then did he neither preach nor die in vain : it not being in man's power, with all his malice and perverseness, to defeat or make void the great purpose of his Coming. For though one part of his Mission (according to Paul) was to instruct the world in *Wisdom* * and *Righteousness*, which it was in man's power to forget and neglect ; yet, what (Paul tells us) is chiefly essential in his Character, and peculiar to his Office, the *Sanctification* and *Redemption* of the World, Man could not frustrate nor render ineffectual : For it is not in man's power to make that to be undone which is once done and perfected.

The fastidious Caviller † therefore hath employed his pains to little purpose in attempting to discredit Revelation from this topic, *The moral state of the world, before and since the coming of Christ*. For, besides what one might venture to affirm, that, when the comparison is fully and impartially scrutinized, the advantage will be found to lie on the side of our Religion : yet, supposing the Truths preached by JESUS, and the Assistance given by the Holy SPIRIT, have not much improved the general morals of mankind ; How

* 1 Cor. i. 30.

† Lord Bolingbroke.

does this tend to the discredit of the Gospel? unless it can be shewn that the Gospel hath no natural tendency to make men better. But this is so desperate an undertaking, that, I believe, Infidelity will hardly be persuaded to engage in it. Indeed the contrary is so true, that, (as I have shewn elsewhere) when you lay together the state of PAGAN and CHRISTIAN Morals, one manifest and essential difference is found between them; which is this, That in the Gentile world, men often acted wrong UPON PRINCIPLE; in the Christian always AGAINST PRINCIPLE*. Now, not to insist upon the necessary restraint this must needs be upon Vice; it plainly demonstrates that the NATURAL TENDENCY of the *Gospel* is to make men virtuous: And, to draw them by a *stronger* attraction, did not suit the genius of a rational Religion, whose objects were free Agents.

But the proper answer to this idle cavil arises from the explanation given above. To Instruct the world in *Wisdom* and *Righteousness* was but the *secondary* end of Christ's Mission. The FIRST and primary, was to become its SANCTIFICATION and REDEMPTION; *That* must needs be common to every Revelation coming from God; *This* is peculiar to the Christian: and *this*, as we have shewn, cannot possibly be frustrated, or rendered ineffectual.

To conclude from what hath been said: As we should not affect to pry into the nature of those things which God hath been pleased to withhold from our search, and to cover with the sacred veil of Mystery; so neither should we reject a Truth, expressly delivered, because we may not fully comprehend the whole reason on which it stands. In a word, as we should not venture to go on where the silence of Scripture directs us to stop; so neither should we presume to stop where, with so loud a voice, it commandeth us to go on.

The sum of all then is this: REASON biddeth us to keep a MEAN: The great Philosopher informeth us that NATURE is not able to

* Div. Leg. Book iv. § 2.

keep a MEAN *. What remains but that we fly to GRACE, which, the greater Apostle assures us, is able: for, *the Spirit helpeth our infirmities* †. Nor will there be any danger (when, in such a disposition, we apply to this *Guide of truth*) of abusing its credit by fanatical extremes; for, to *establish the heart with Grace*, the same Apostle informs us, is the only way to prevent our being *carried about with the divers and strange Doctrines* of Deceivers ‡.

* *Natura modum tenere nescia est.* BAC.

† Rom. viii. 26.

‡ Heb. xiii. 9.

ERRORS OF THE PRESS IN VOL. IV.

- P. 86. l. 9. nor to do, r. not to do.
 175. n. l. 1. for fare aver, r. faire avec.
 177. l. 20. for and, r. and.
 179. n. l. 4. for civis, r. civilis.
 184. l. 5. from the bottom, *For every politic society*, r. *For of every*, &c.
 230. l. 9. deduced *by* the, r. deduced the.
 275. l. 2. from the bottom, for confiture, r. confiture.
 317. l. 8. from the bottom, for prædationem, r. prædationem.
 336. l. 15, 16. for decison, r. decisions.
 365. l. 18. And part again by the admirable contrivance of divine wisdom. Both opposed
 &c. r. And part again, by the admirable contrivance of divine wisdom, both
 opposed &c.
 517. n. l. 5. oraculis, feruntur r. oraculis feruntur, &c.
 611. l. 5. for whether, r. whatever.

University of California
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Return this material to the library
from which it was borrowed.

ED
URL

REC'D CD-URL

APR 03 1990

JUL 28 1990

Wankentin, R
10-21-90

Hayduck, R
2/16/92

REC'D LD-URL

NOV 21 1994

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
7438 01023 0010

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
D 000 001 368 0



